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Disclaimer
This book contains a collection of articles written by friends and colleagues of
Paolo Zamboni Garavelli. These are personal contributions to a collective work
aimed to honour his memory. Although the authors are or have been members
of the Legal Committee of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and
the contributions depict several legal aspects of the ESCB, the views contained
in those chapters are personal to their respective authors and cannot be
considered to represent the collective views of the Legal Committee. The content
of the book does neither describe the opinion of the respective institution for
which the authors work, nor the position of the European Central Bank as editor
of the book.  
Paolo Zamboni Garavelli
INTRODUCTION
Antonio Fazio
It was just over a year ago that Paolo Zamboni died.
He had a long and distinguished career in the Bank of Italy that began in 1970
when he joined the Legal Department. His cursus honorum led him f irst to the
position of Head of the Law and Economics Off ice and then to that of Head of
the Legal Department.
The area of the Bank that deals with legal research and advice has acquired
substantially broader duties and powers in recent decades. In addition to
preparing opinions and assisting in pleadings, increasingly it has worked closely
with the Bank’s Directorate in the f ields of banking supervision and central
banking. Paolo made an important contribution to the acknowledged prestige
of this role.
Paolo spread his professional expertise with great versatility in many directions:
from the reorganisation of public banks to the groundwork for the Consolidated
Law on Banking; from antitrust measures in the banking sector to the study of
law from the viewpoint of economics, to the international aspects of the Bank’s
activities. He followed the progress of the Monetary Union from its conception
to its creation.
His example to us is one of conscientious professionalism, particularly for the
profundity of his thought and his ability to tackle every new situation with
enthusiasm, inspiring the involvement of his colleagues, especially the younger
generations. He has also left us with the memory of his exemplary conduct, the
equable, courteous and sympathetic manner that never left him, not even in the
diff icult period of his illness.
He was one of the small circle of legal experts assisting the Committee of
Governors to draw up the Statute of the European System of Central Banks.
His skill as a jurist and legal practitioner earned him an assignment of great
responsibility and complexity when it became necessary to draft the national
measures that would adapt Italian law to European legislation on monetary policy
and the European System of Central Banks and thus govern the Bank of Italy’s
entry into the System.
It is therefore a highly commendable idea to honour the memory of Paolo Zamboni
with a collection of writings on the subjects that were closest to his heart.
These issues have gained enormous importance in recent years with the creation
of the European System of Central Banks and its subsequent entry into operation –
steps which have called for great effort and commitment, particularly in the legal
f ield.
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The establishment of uniform rules, allowing the new system to operate
eff iciently in a framework founded on a plurality of jurisdictions and
acknowledged rights, was an arduous challenge.
It was won by achieving a balanced solution between a common monetary law
and different national rules, whose diversity is an inexhaustible source of wealth
for European legal culture.
From the outset, the decision-making bodies of the European Monetary Institute
and then of the European Central Bank continuously received meticulous and
valuable advice and assistance from the groups of legal experts of which Paolo
was a member (initially the Working Group of Legal Experts and subsequently
the Legal Committee).
Fundamental issues for the establishment and working of the System, such as
the convergence of national laws and regulations and the concept of central bank
independence, were analysed in those groups. The independence criteria were
developed considering the tradition of autonomy of central banks, deeply rooted
in their history and national legal framework.
Analysing and solving the many legal questions brought to light by the operation
of the system was a crucial part of ensuring that it would function with increasing
eff iciency. The groups of legal experts made an invaluable contribution to the
drafting of the rules that govern monetary policy operations and the various tasks
entrusted to the System by the Treaty and the Statute.
Paolo Zamboni maintained an attitude of open and incisive collaboration at all
times, including in various international fora, where he stands as an example
to all of those who work and participate there.
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PAOLO ZAMBONI GARAVELLI
A PORTRAIT
Marino Perassi
ABSTRACT
La professionalità di Paolo Zamboni Garavelli e la sua ineffabile personalità
nell’ambiente professionale ed in ogni contesto nel quale si sia trovato a svolgere
i propri incarichi era fortemente e direttamente influenzata dalle sue qualità
umane. La ragguardevole predisposizione amichevole di Paolo e la sua
gentilezza d’animo nella vita privata e nelle relazioni familiari gli avevano
guadagnato il sincero attaccamento di tutte le persone che lo hanno conosciuto.
Viveva i suoi rapporti personali con un gusto per la discrezione e il buon senso
che non gli vennero meno neppure nei momenti più cupi della sua infermità.
Con una miscela unica di gentilezza, capacità professionali e preparazione
giuridica, conquistò l’apprezzamento e la stima di tutti i partecipanti al Gruppo
degli Esperti Legali costituito dal Comitato dei Governatori per la preparazione
della bozza dello Statuto del SEBC e della BCE, del Gruppo di lavoro di Esperti
Legali e infine del Comitato Legale, in cui egli fu un maestro per più d’una
generazione di legali della Banca d'Italia coinvolti in questioni internazionali.
Nonostante il segno profondo lasciato nella sua carriera dalla lunga esperienza
internazionale, il ricco novero di incarichi professionali assegnati a lui
all’interno della Banca d'Italia dimostra l’intensità del suo coinvolgimento
nell’attività della banca centrale.
Affrontò esperienze impegnative come la privatizzazione del sistema bancario
italiano e la predisposizione della bozza del nuovo Testo Unico Bancario,
offrendo un significativo contributo grazie alla sua ampia preparazione giuridica
di base.
Compito rimarchevole e difficile fu l’avvio dell’Ufficio Diritto dell’Economia,
che, nei primi tempi dalla sua istituzione, egli venne anche chiamato a dirigere.
Dopo la nomina a Capo del Servizio Consulenza Legale, si era riproposto con
la consueta positività nella tradizionale attività giuridica. 
Egli ha segnato il cammino per l’attività della Consulenza Legale negli anni
a venire, in cui l’interazione tra la dimensione internazionale e quella nazionale
delle questioni giuridiche è destinata a crescere.
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A PORTRAIT
Reviewing the many occasions on which Paolo and I worked together, I found
it diff icult to choose one that could capture, like a flashback, the kind of person
he really was and how he approached his work.
These two aspects were closely connected, for in all his work Paolo brought to
bear his truly unique personal qualities: courtesy and moderation, and the ability
to listen and to empathise. He was also always capable of being enthusiastic,
and in a contagious way, about a new undertaking. His manner, urbane and
politely authoritative, owed much to his upbringing in a family with a strong
naval tradition, which counted many admirals among his ancestors.
And I still remember clearly the day when Paolo telephoned me to ask me, with
his usual tact and courtesy, to take part in drawing up the rules for Monetary
Union and the single European currency project; both were in their early stages
at that time and would later evolve into the Treaty of Maastricht. To give you
some idea of the context, at the beginning of the 1990s, when economic and
political conditions in Italy were not good and there was little prospect of the
country’s becoming involved in the project, such efforts seemed aimed at a very
distant future and unlikely to prove successful. As I hesitated, Paolo observed
that “when the lawyers are called in it means things are taking a serious turn”,
adding that the decision of the Committee of Governors to pass the project on
to the legal experts was a sign of confidence in its success. The upshot was that
I agreed, and I did so with feelings of youthful enthusiasm, looking forward to
working with someone so reliable and so remarkably talented.
After graduating in law from the University of Bologna Paolo completed his
military service and then worked for a short time in the legal department of a
multinational corporation in Milan before joining the Banca d’Italia’s staff of
lawyers. 
During the early part of his career he spent some years in one of the banking
supervision departments, working side by side with colleagues engaged in the
daily reality of monitoring the commercial banks. There he built up a fund of
knowledge and experience of the banking sector and the broad spectrum of its
operations which was later to play a crucial role in his professional life.
In the same period, he was often involved in the Bank’s international activity owing
to his good command of English and the knowledge he had acquired during his
university studies. It was a time when this type of work often seemed pioneering,
given the closed nature of Italy’s banking and f inancial markets in the 1970s.
After transferring back to the Bank’s Legal Department, Paolo worked in the
usual areas of the legal profession, qualifying for the rolls of attorneys authorised
to appear before the higher courts. His professional development and career
advancement continued, and toward the end of the 1980s he became one of the
Bank’s leading senior counsels.  
I have another very clear recollection, that of Rome in the hot summer of 1989
when a scandal broke involving the US branch of a well-known Italian bank that
had granted excessively large and risky loans to a Middle Eastern country. The
senior management of the Bank felt it was only natural that Paolo should be the
one to set off at a moment’s notice, with a member of the banking supervision
department, to handle the matter. 
Paolo had just arrived at the seaside resort between Rome and Naples where he
usually spent his holidays, and had not even had time to unpack, when he was
urgently recalled to Rome to take the f irst possible flight to the US. Without
turning a hair, Paolo came back to Rome to prepare for the journey. As he took
his leave of us he remarked, with the ironic air he often adopted, that it was no
great problem having to depart in such a hurry as at least he did not have to pack. 
On that occasion we glimpsed an important aspect of Paolo’s character: his
ability to cope with situations others would f ind irksome and disagreeable with
a great sense of responsibility and professional commitment, but also with just
the degree of detachment that allowed him to adopt a thorough but well-balanced
approach to his work, without allowing it to overrun his life.
That summer was not the only diff icult one for Italy’s f inancial sector and for
the Banca d’Italia. The 1990s marked the beginning of an era of extraordinary
change for Italy’s banking and f inancial system. At home, the publicly-owned
banks were progressively being privatised as a series of major laws were passed.
The restructuring of public banking was an extremely ambitious project that went
hand in hand with the introduction of the group structure for companies in the
banking sector. Paolo contributed signif icantly on these issues, writing one of
the most important papers on the subject.1
Abroad, the project for the single currency was forging ahead, and by February
1992 the regulatory structure of the Treaty of Maastricht was already in place.
Paolo was able to participate in both events, taking it upon himself to monitor
developments in the f ield of national legislation and of the implementing
regulations issued by the Supervision Department. He drafted in several lawyers
from the Legal Department and organised their work.
These were extraordinary years, years when Paolo was given important
assignments that were to have a crucial influence on his later career. Thus, he
was appointed, almost contemporaneously, a member of the Treasury Committee
set up to draft the new banking law, which was passed in September 1993 as the
Consolidated Law on Credit and Finance, as well as the Banca d’Italia’s
representative in the Working Group of legal experts assisting the Committee
of Governors to draw up the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) and the European Central Bank (ECB).
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1 “Il gruppo creditizio: prof ili di vigilanza”, in Banca d’Italia (1992), La ristrutturazione della banca pubblica
e la disciplina del gruppo creditizio, Quaderni di ricerca giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia,
26 (Rome: Banca d’Italia).
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Those fortunate enough to work with Paolo on these projects realised what a
crucial role his personal qualities once again played. His positive and
constructive attitude, together with his acceptance of new ideas, naturally led
him to be of great assistance to the Supervision Department’s experts in drawing
up the rules of the new Consolidated Law. His liberal ideas were fundamental
in understanding that for banks to evolve from public law credit institutions to
public limited companies, operating with all the structures and instruments
permitted by private law, the old ways would have to be left f irmly behind and
the laws of the market adopted in their place.
One should always consider the effects that regulation can have on market forces
and the behaviour and decisions of market players. This is one of the greatest
lessons Paolo passed on during those years to the people working with him on
the reform of the banking sector, especially the f irst implementation of the
antitrust law passed in the autumn of 1990, which also regulated competition
in the banking sector. Paolo’s ability to assess the economic repercussions and
concrete consequences of regulatory options was to become a deciding factor
in his further advancement.
The area in which Paolo made the greatest contribution, however, was surely
that of monetary union. As a member of the small elite that helped to draw up
the Statute, working alongside the Directorate of the Bank, its senior
management and the staff of the Economic Research Department, Paolo never
wavered in his optimistic belief that it would become a reality.
During another unsettled summer for Italy’s f inancial sector in 1992, when the
storm triggered by the unfavourable outcome of the Danish referendum on the
Treaty of Maastricht struck many European currencies, including the Italian
currency (lira), the project for a single currency, or the ECU (European Currency
Unit) as it was known then, seemed a very distant goal. In the autumn of that
year, with a heavily devalued lira and little prospect of monetary unif ication,
plans for work at the European level floundered.
This scepticism did not lift immediately, but instead persisted for quite a long
time, that is until, with the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI)
and the commencement of convergence by the countries involved, progress
towards the introduction of the single currency resumed, at an even faster rate.
In 1995 the EMI set up the Working Group of Legal Experts (WGLE). Paolo
was involved from the outset, contributing all the experience he had acquired
during the preparatory work carried out on behalf of the Committee of
Governors. The years leading up to the adoption of the single currency were
unforgettable. At the EMI in Frankfurt and at the Commission in Brussels, the
lawyers played a crucial role in designing the regulatory and legislative
framework needed for the introduction of the single currency.
Paolo took part himself in the work of the WGLE and coordinated all the efforts
of the Banca d’Italia’s lawyers engaged in drawing up the legal framework for
the adoption of the euro, during what was certainly one of the most signif icant
phases of his career.
The rules governing the introduction of the euro in Italy and the amendments
to the legislation concerning the Banca d’Italia during the delicate stage of
implementing the principle of legal convergence represent the high point of his
work. It is understandable that the legislative decree adapting Italian law to the
principles of the Treaty of Maastricht is regarded in the Banca d’Italia as the
fruit of his personal efforts.2
He instantly became a conspicuous participant in the WGLE, contributing well-
balanced and constructive proposals. His affable and helpful manner once again
proved highly valuable, and contributed greatly to the working of such a large
committee, which brought together widely differing cultures and attitudes.
The greatest challenge at the time was to reconcile the different positions based
on different legal systems rooted in very diverse traditions. It was not just a
question of the old conflict between common law and continental law, but
something more. A point of encounter had to be found between the various legal
systems regarding money, and this meant using the instruments of private and
public law contemporaneously. It was in this f ield that the experience Paolo had
built up over the years, working on typical issues not only of commercial law
but also of banking supervision and hence public and administrative law, proved
to be particularly useful.
With the creation of the ECB and the introduction of the single currency, the
WGLE was replaced by the Legal Committee (LEGCO). Once the Eurosystem
was established, the Committee’s task became less demanding in one respect but
possibly more arduous in another, since the role of assisting and advising the
ECB’s Governing Council in its decision-making required even greater mediating
skills. It was in this area that Paolo’s easygoing personality and openness to other
people’s ideas proved invaluable. As a consequence his contribution was always
greatly appreciated and he became a clear point of reference within the
Committee. It was a real privilege for me to take part in the work of the LEGCO
alongside Paolo.
In 1999, however, a new task awaited him. In that year the Law and Economics
Off ice was set up at the Banca d’Italia, with the mandate to carry out research
in the f ields of economics and f inance, based on a multidisciplinary approach
that combined law and economics. As a result of the high regard and esteem in
which the Directorate of the Bank held Paolo, he was appointed head of the
Off ice.
Launching a new project is always an onerous task, and being at the helm of such
a unit, in a unique sector, dealing with extremely new topics, was in many ways
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2 Legislative Decree No 43 of 10 March 1998. Together with Carlo Santini, Paolo edited an important work on
this subject, “La Banca d’Italia nel Sistema Europeo di Banche Centrali”, in Banca d’Italia (1999), Scritti in
memoria di Pietro De Vecchis (Rome: Banca d’Italia).
a great challenge. Paolo took it on with equanimity and succeeded. Today, the
Office is very busy carrying out research on the sectors of the economy that are
of greatest interest to the Bank. Paolo’s frequent and close experience of the
concrete requirements of banks and f inancial intermediaries certainly played a
fundamental role in his new f ield of work.
Despite his new commitments Paolo retained a deep interest in Community
matters, participating as constructively as ever in the work of the LEGCO,
although on a less frequent basis. He continued to do so even in 2002, when he
left the Law and Economics Off ice to rejoin the Legal Department as Head of
Department.
Although this period was one of the high points of Paolo’s career, he was
simultaneously contemplating retirement. The ability to maintain a degree of
detachment from work – which had always been part of his personality – seemed
to be taking over, as he began to want to spend more time with his family. It was
almost a presentiment that the time left would not be very long. It goes without
saying that when his closest colleagues heard of his intention to take early
retirement, they found a thousand reasons why he should not do so.
This evokes another important memory. In May 2003, at the meeting of the
LEGCO hosted in Dublin by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority
of Ireland (CBFSAI), we found a further reason to persuade him to stay on: the
next meeting of the LEGCO had to be organised in Rome, at the Banca d’Italia.
It was the last project on which Paolo worked. Even during his illness, at the
time when a recovery did not seem impossible, he continued to follow the
organisational aspects and drew up a programme for the event, although he did
not come into the off ice. As fate would have it, he was unable to take part.
There is no denying that we all miss Paolo greatly. At the same time, he leaves
behind some important lessons for all those who knew and worked with him. 
Paolo was very good at delegating, and allowed those who worked with him
plenty of scope, although he was always available to discuss problems and offer
advice. The door of his off ice was permanently open to anyone eager to engage
in discussion.
More than one generation of lawyers now following the subject dearest to him,
the goal of the single currency, have learnt considerably from his guidance, his
style, his method of tackling matters. Such a precious gift will help them cope
in the coming years as more and more areas become aver more closely regulated
by Community law, making it increasingly necessary to consider European issues.
The people who knew and respected Paolo from meetings in European fora were
greatly affected by his death, and his family received many expressions of
sympathy. One of the most moving tributes was contained in a letter to his family
from friends and colleagues at the CBFSAI: in Gaelic it reads “Ar dheis láimh
Dé go raibh a anam dílis” (May his soul sit at the right hand of God).
24
THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
OF CENTRAL BANKS

MONETARY POLICY AND CENTRAL BANKING IN THE
CONSTITUTION
Jean-Victor Louis
ABSTRACT
La costituzione non introduce cambiamenti rivoluzionari per quanto riguarda
la politica monetaria e la BCE. Come la BCE ha osservato con l'opinione resa
il 19 settembre 2003 dopo la conclusione dei lavori della Convenzione,
“funzioni, compiti, status e regime legale della BCE e del SEBC rimangono
sostanzialmente inalterati”. Nondimeno, la Costituzione introduce alcune
interessanti novità, le cui implicazioni non sono agevoli da predire. La
Costituzione indica la politica monetaria tra le competenze esclusive dell'Unione
Europea. La rilevanza di siffatta qualificazione dipenderà dall'interpretazione
delle disposizioni contenute nel capitolo relativo alla politica monetaria,
contenuto nella Parte III della Costituzione. La BCE diviene un'istituzione sui
generis dell'Unione, un cambiamento in linea con la decisione della Corte di
Giustizia sul caso OLAF, che conferma l'appartenenza della BCE al sistema
giuridico della Comunità Europea. La Costituzione, che inserisce fra le sue
disposizioni la nozione di “Eurosistema”, non offre indicazioni nuove sui ruoli
del SEBC, dell'Eurosistema e della BCE. Come in passato, l'individuazione caso
per caso delle funzioni rispettivamente delle Banche Centrali Nazionali e della
BCE resterà affidata all'applicazione e all'interpretazione delle disposizioni
dello Statuto, rimasto inalterato. Neppure è agevole precisare quale impatto avrà
la nuova classificazione e gerarchia delle fonti sugli strumenti legali adottati
dalla BCE. I Regolamenti della BCE diventano regolamenti europei. La legge
europea avrà pertanto automaticamente prevalenza sui regolamenti della BCE?
O si potrebbe essere autorizzati ad invocare il principio di specialità? Queste
sono alcune delle questioni sollevate dalla Costituzione con riferimento alla
politica monetaria e alle banche centrali. Lo studio vuole soltanto richiamare
l'attenzione su esse e su altri aspetti di un certo interesse.
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1 THE EURO AND MONETARY POLICY
1.1 THE EURO
Article I-8 states that “the currency of the Union shall be the euro”. This makes
the euro one of the key symbols of the Union, along with the flag, the anthem,
the motto and Europe day. It is interesting to observe that the clear-cut formula
relative to the currency is not to be found in the text of the Regulation that
constitutes the pillar of the legal framework of the euro.1 There, the euro is
presented as the currency of participating Member States and as the unit of
account of the ECB and the national central banks.2 The word “euro” has also
been substituted for the word “ecu” in all the provisions of the Constitution
containing the name of the currency. So the primary law of the Union will at
last be made to conform with secondary law and practice.
This mention among the f irst of the articles of Part I of the Constitution is in
contrast to the lack of any reference to EMU among the objectives of the Union
in Article I-3 and the formulation of Article I-15, which have lead one author
to write that “the Constitution [at least in its f irst part – author’s observation]
[…] avoids regarding the achievement of the EMU as the normal situation to
which the provisions of the Chapter on economic and monetary policy should
be addressed and the non-achievement thereof as an exceptional situation for
which a specif ic regime should be needed.”3
The Convention introduced a provision on the symbols in the text of the
Constitution during the last stage of its work with the purpose of promoting a
single European identity. The euro can indeed be a “vector of identity”.4
However, the appropriation of the euro by the citizens of the euro area depends
on a number of factors. There is a kind of dialectic relationship between identity
shaping and the achievements of the euro. European identity is inseparable from
the success of the single currency, and this success itself appears to be a
consequence of the emergence of a European identity.5
The adoption of the euro is irreversible. Protocol 10 annexed to the EC Treaty
by the Maastricht Treaty expressed this feature of Economic and Monetary
Union. The Constitution does not include a similar provision or protocol,
although this does not mean that the principle does not remain. What the
Constitution does do is provide for the right of withdrawal from the Union by
any Member State in Article I-60. René Smits has pointed to the element of
insecurity for the euro involved in this possibility.6 So-called disaster clauses,
taking on board changes in the membership of the euro area, will flourish. On
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1 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1).
2 Ibid., Articles 2 and 4. 
3 See P. J. G. Kapteyn, “EMU and Central Bank: Chances Missed”, European Constitutional Law Review 1 (2005),
pp. 123-30 (124).
4 See G. Koenig (ed.), L’euro, vecteur d’identité européenne (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg,
2002).
5 See P.-G. Méon, ibid., p. 321.
6 R. Smits, The European Central Bank in the European Constitutional Order (Utrecht: Eleven International
Publishing, 2003), p. 44.
the other hand, the agreement arrived at by the Union and the Member State
wanting to withdraw7 can include maintaining the euro as the country’s legal
tender. Without this agreement, the outgoing Member State cannot keep the
single currency. It is also important to remark that Article I-60 may contribute
towards making the dissolution of the euro area an unrealistic hypothesis. Among
other eventualities, it ensures that the withdrawal of a Member State does not
affect the continuation of the integration process among the others. 
1.2 MONETARY POLICY
The Constitution maintains the present asymmetry between the two pillars of
EMU. It provides for a transfer of powers in the monetary f ield and the
competence of the Member States as far as economic policy is concerned. 
Article I-13, paragraph 1 (c) of the Constitution def ines monetary policy as an
exclusive competence of the Union for the Member States whose currency is
the euro. Article I-12, paragraph 1, states that “When the Constitution confers
on the Union exclusive competence in a specif ic area, only the Union may
legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of
Union acts”. 
1.2.1 THE CONCEPT OF MONETARY POLICY
The main question raised by the qualif ication of monetary policy as an exclusive
competence resides in how the concept of monetary policy is interpreted. Is it
monetary policy in the narrow sense of the expression, i.e. internal monetary
policy, including the determination of interest rates, the supply of liquidity to
the economy and the recourse to such instruments as the imposition of
compulsory reserves, or should we adopt a broader concept and consider that
under monetary policy one should include the competences provided in Section 2
on “Monetary policy” of Chapter II “Economic and Monetary Policy” in Title III
“Internal Policies and Action” of Part III of the Constitution? René Smits lists
four additional areas to monetary policy in its strictest sense that should be held
as exclusive competences: exchange rate policy, the task of the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB) in holding transferred reserves and conducting
exchange rate operations, the oversight of payment systems, and the issuance
of banknotes.8 The ECB took a position in its opinion of 19 September 2003
against a narrow and technical interpretation of monetary policy. It understood
“monetary policy” as reflecting the title of Section 2 and “therefore consider[ed]
that it encompasses all exclusive competences related to the euro ‘as described
in the relevant provisions of the […] Constitution’, in particular Articles III-[185]
and [186].”9 As the wording of the draft of the Convention was not modif ied on
this point by the IGC, it can be presumed that the ECB’s interpretation has been
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7 Under Article I-60, the Member State desiring to withdraw can also do so if the negotiation with the Union
fails. However, it has to wait two years from the notif ication of its intention to withdraw. 
8 R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, pp. 39-41.
9 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 September 2003 at the request of the Council of the European
Union on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 229, 25.9.2003, 7, point 9. Italics are
ours.
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validated by the IGC. In order to determine the allocation of competences
between the EU and the Member States in a specif ic f ield, the meaning of the
particular provision in Part III has to be interpreted. Indeed, under Article I-12,
paragraph 6, the “scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union’s
competences shall be determined by the provisions relating to each area in Part
III”. This rule reflects the principle of conferred competences, included in the
def inition of the Union (Article I-1, paragraph 1), and reaff irmed by Article I-
11, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. For example, Article III-186 provides for
the possibility of both the ECB and the national central banks to issue banknotes.
However, to make use of this possibility, the national central banks have to have
authorisation from the ECB. Member States may issue coins10, but the ECB states
the volume of the issue, while the Council harmonises the face values of these
coins and adopts technical specif ications for them. These provisions clarify the
extent of the respective competences of the Union and the Member States. These
are of course straightforward examples; a less obvious one is the delimitation
of competences in the f ield of payment systems under Article III-185, paragraph
2, d). Moreover, it is not easy to def ine the precise role of the ECB and of the
national authorities in the f ield of prudential supervision after reading Article
III-185, paragraphs 5 and 6. From this last paragraph, to which we will return,
this appears to be in effect a moving target.
1.2.2 EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Some authors have questioned the exclusive character of the external monetary
competences of the Union. Doubts have been expressed in the f ield of external
relations, in particular based on the wording of Article 111, paragraph 5 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty, reproduced in Article
III-326, paragraph 4 of the Constitution, which states: “Without prejudice to
Union competence and Union agreements as regards economic and monetary
union, Member States may negotiate in international bodies and conclude
agreements.”11 Chiara Zilioli and Martin Selmayr list a series of f ields in which
the Member States have a residual competence to conclude agreements with third
countries (agreements on foreign exchange working balances, on banking
supervision, on coins and old agreements under Article 307 of the EC Treaty,
and agreements with countries and territories with a special status).12 We believe
that most of the examples quoted are not pertinent. Either the Union (the Council
or the ECB) has been given the competence to orientate, limit or effectively
suppress by their action the so-called residual competence of the Member States
whose currency is the euro, or it has enabled the states concerned to conclude
an agreement, as was the case for the agreements on the introduction of the euro
in European micro-states. Article 307 does not allow in principle new agreements
to be concluded. The true exception is prudential supervision, as long as the
10 When Article I-30, paragraph 3 provides that the ECB “alone may authorise the issue of the euro”, it should
more accurately have limited this sentence to the issue of banknotes. The Constitution, in Part III, directly
authorises Member States to issue coins. 
11 See F. Tuytschaever, Differentiation in European Union Law (Oxford: Hart, 1999), p. 171; C. Zilioli and 
M. Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Oxford: Hart, 2001), p. 213: “The insertion of such a
paragraph in the last provision of the chapter on monetary policy can be interpreted only in the sense that there
is still a certain competence of the Member States left in the f ield of monetary policy.” 
12 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, op. cit. in footnote 18, pp. 213-28.
Union and the Bank have not used their competences in this f ield, and these
competences have become exclusive under the doctrine of pre-emption that the
Constitution conf irms (Article I-13, paragraph 2).
Does the Constitution suff iciently take into account the exclusive character of
monetary policy in the provisions on external relations specific to the euro area?
Article III-196 provides for the adoption of common positions and unif ied
representation in international f inancial institutions and conferences. However,
although the wording implies that there is an obligation to adopt common
positions, it is somewhat looser as far as “unif ied representation” is concerned,
which is no more than an enabling clause. Of course, the provision refers to the
whole of Economic and Monetary Union, and the competences of the institutions
and conferences referred to are mixed from the viewpoint of Union law. These
provisions are without prejudice to the exclusive nature of the monetary policy
competence of the Union, but it would be diff icult to quote one of any of these
institutions and conferences that bears exclusively on monetary affairs stricto
or lato sensu. Moreover, Member States are not very keen to admit their
substitution by the Union, although they should be in favour of the euro area
speaking with one voice and achieving a single representation for the whole field
of EMU, as the question of the allocation of competencies between the Union
and Member States is an internal question for the euro area.13
1.2.3 PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
Article 105, paragraph 6 of the EC Treaty provides for the attribution to the ECB
of specif ic tasks concerning policies relating to prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other f inancial institutions, with the exception of insurance
undertakings. The decision should be taken by the Council, which must
unanimously decide on a proposal of the Commission and obtain the assent of the
European Parliament. The Convention introduced the legislative procedure in this
f ield and thus substituted qualif ied majority voting for unanimity within the
Council in Article III-185, paragraph 6. Unexpectedly, the Italian presidency of
the IGC proposed to amend the procedure by requiring once more unanimity within
the Council and a simple opinion of the European Parliament.14 This proposal was
accepted by the IGC. Neither the Convention nor the IGC changed the content of
the provision and, in particular, the rather odd exclusion of insurance companies
from the f ield of application of the tasks to be conferred to the ECB.15 
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13 See European League for Economic Cooperation, “European Economic Governance Revisited”, Cahier Comte
Boël, No 11 (2004), p. 43.
14 CIG 52/1/03 REV 1 (en), Annex 8 to Addendum 1, 25 November 2003.
15 See R. Smits, The European Central Bank. Institutional Aspects (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997),
p. 361. 
2 THE ECB IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE EU
2.1 THE ECB, THE ESCB AND THE EUROSYSTEM
It is not purely by chance that the ECB and the ESCB are mentioned in an article
(Article 8 EC, ex 4A) that is separate from the one (Article 7 EC, ex 4) on the
(classic) institutions. Neither the ECB nor the ESCB are comparable to the main
organs of the Community, which are endowed with decision-making power in
all aspects of Community law. On the other hand, the choice of a specif ic article
demonstrates the desire of the authors of the Treaty to underline the
independence of the monetary authorities of the Community. Nevertheless, they
are part of the Community’s overall legal order. EMU should not be considered
as a specif ic pillar like the ones on a Common Foreign and Security Policy or
Justice in Home Affairs. The provisions on EMU are inserted into the EC Treaty.
The institutions play their role in both pillars of EMU, notwithstanding some
peculiarities owing to the specif icity of the subject. The Court of Justice is
competent for reviewing the acts of the ECB, under the provisions on the appeals
to the Court and Article 35 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB.
The precise nature of the ECB has prompted much controversy in the literature.
Zilioli and Selmayr have advanced the view, f irst in a series of articles, and then
in a book16, that the ECB is “an independent specialised organisation of
Community law”17, a “new Community” within the central Community pillar of
the EU, on an equal footing with the other Communities.18 They argue that there
is no hierarchy between secondary Community law and ECB law, and that the
two legislations subsist at the same normative level.19 General Community
legislation thus does not apply to the ECB, or in f ields that do not lie within
the spectrum of the ECB’s competences. This doctrine has unsurprisingly been
strongly contested.20
Although the Bank has not adopted Zilioli and Selmayr’s thesis as such, the
position of the ECB was at the centre of a litigation case that placed the ECB
in opposition to the Commission on the application to the Bank of Regulation
(EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May
1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office.21
The ECB had adopted a Decision 1999/726/EC of 7 October 1999 on fraud
prevention.22 This Decision established an anti-fraud committee within the Bank
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16 See C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, op. cit. in footnote 18.
17 Ibid., p. 31.
18 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
19 Ibid., p. 43.
20 See R. Torrent, “Whom Is the European Central Bank the Central Bank of? Reaction to Zilioli and Selmayr”,
CML Rev. (1999), pp. 1229-41; F. Amtenbrink and J. De Haan, “The European Central Bank: An Independent
Specialised Organisation of Community Law – A Comment”, CML Rev. (2002), pp. 65-76; R. Smits, op. cit.
in footnote 13; A. Malatesta, La Banca Centrale Europea. Gli aspetti istituzionali della banca centrale della
Comunità europea (Milan: Giuffré, 2003), pp. 75-76.
21 OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1.
22 OJ L 291, 13.11.1999, p. 36. This Decision has been replaced by the Decision of the ECB of 3 June 2004
concerning the terms and conditions for the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations of the ECB, in relation
to the prevention of fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities detrimental to the European Communities’
f inancial interests and amending the Conditions of Employment for Staff of the ECB (ECB/2004/11),
OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 56, adopted in answer to the Court’s judgment. 
in charge of relations with the surveillance committee of OLAF, which excluded
any power of investigation of this body within the Bank. The Commission,
considering this Decision contrary to Regulation No 1073/1999, appealed to the
Court of Justice to annul the Decision. For its part, the Bank invoked, among
other arguments, its independence as well as the independence of national central
banks and the fact that it had its own f inances that were separate from the
Community’s budget. 
Following the conclusions of Advocate General Jacobs, the Court declared the
Decision null and void in its sentence of 10 July 2003.23
The Court states that “the ECB, pursuant to the EC Treaty, falls squarely within
the Community framework” (point 92). It specifies the independence recognised
to the ECB by observing: “As is clear from the wording of Article 108 EC, the
outside influences from which that provision seeks to shield the ECB and its
decision-making bodies are those likely to interfere with the performance of the
tasks which the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute assign to the ECB. As the
Advocate General has pointed out at paragraphs 150 and 155 of his Opinion,
Article 108 EC seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all political pressure
in order to enable it effectively to pursue the objectives attributed to its tasks,
through the independent exercise of the specif ic powers conferred on it for that
purpose by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute” (point 134). It adds that:
“recognition that the ECB has such independence does not have the consequence
of separating it entirely from the European Community and exempting it from
every rule of Community law. First, it is evident from Article 105(1) EC that
the ECB is to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the European
Community, whilst Article 8 EC states that the ECB is to act within the limits
of the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute. Second,
as the Commission has observed, the ECB is, on the conditions laid down by
the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute, subject to various kinds of Community
controls, notably review by the Court of Justice and control by the Court of
Auditors. Finally, it is evident that it was not the intention of the Treaty draftsmen
to shield the ECB from any kind of legislative action taken by the Community
legislature, as is clear from, inter alia, Article 105(6) EC, Article 107(5) and
(6) EC and Article 110(1), f irst indent, and (3) EC […]” (point 135). 
The Court does not qualify the ECB as an “institution” in the relatively technical
sense of Article 7 EC; this is impossible under the EC Treaty. The Constitution
takes the step of making a sui generis institution out of the ECB. Under Article
I-30, paragraph 3, the ECB is def ined as an institution with legal personality.
This Article appears with the Court of Auditors24 in Chapter II on “The other
Union institutions and advisory bodies”. This can be contrasted to Chapter I on
the institutional framework, which includes the traditional institutions, plus the
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23 Case C-11/00, Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank [2003] ECR I-7147. For
more details on this judgement, see F. Elderson and H. Weenink, “The European Central Bank Redef ined? A
Landmark Judgment of the European Court of Justice”, Euredia (2003), pp. 273-99.
24 The Court of Auditors became an institution and was included in Article 7 (ex 4) EC by the Maastricht Treaty.
The Constitution re-establishes some coherence in making a distinction between institutions with general
competences and specialised institutions. 
European Council. This distinction between the two chapters underlines the
special features of the two “other institutions”.25
Article I-30 also mentions the ESCB and the Eurosystem. On the ESCB, the
Constitution maintains the same ambiguous situation as in the present wording
of the Treaty. The ESCB is mentioned in the f irst and second paragraphs of the
Article, while the four last paragraphs only refer to the ECB. Paragraph 1, which
also alludes to the Eurosystem26, states that the ESCB includes the ECB and (all)
the national central banks. Paragraph 2 indicates that the ESCB shall be governed
by the organs of the ECB, a provision that is already contained in the present
treaty. It recalls the objectives of the ESCB (price stability and, without prejudice
to this objective, to support the general objectives of the Community) and states
that the ESCB “shall conduct other Central Bank tasks in accordance with 
Part III and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank”. 
Two remarks need to be made regarding these provisions. On the one hand,
paragraph 1 attributes to the Eurosystem, i.e. the ECB and the national central
banks whose currency is the euro, the task to “conduct the monetary policy of
the Union”. On the other hand, paragraph 4 seems to confer the same powers
to the ECB, although some of the Articles of Part III that it refers to mention
that the ESCB is the bearer of these competences. These provisions accurately
reflect the general perplexity about the nature of the ESCB. In this regard, we
would like to quote René Smits, who wrote in 2003 that “the ECB is truly ‘the
central bank of the European Community’. This is my preferred view of the ECB:
as an organ of the Community […] an independent agency for the performance
of monetary policy attributed to the Community level of government and for the
execution of several other tasks within the overall price-stability objective.”27
He continues: “This view of the ECB extends to the larger ESCB […] it is not
itself endowed with legal personality. Yet, because of the combination of legal
entities entrusted with Community policy and Community tasks, the ESCB can
also be seen as a Community organ.” In a similar vein he concludes: “Thus, the
ECB and the NCBs – in their ESCB functions – are organs of the Community.”
This does not however prevent the author from observing that “the ESCB
structure, although diff icult to explain, does not require urgent adaptation in the
context of the European Convention for reasons of transparency.”
Perhaps the above suggestion is correct: obviously the nature and the respective
roles of the ESCB (Eurosystem) and the ECB are moving targets, depending on
the tension between centralisation and decentralisation within the system.
However, we would at this point like to make four additional observations. First,
the phrase “conduct the monetary policy” used in Article I-30, paragraph 1, in
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25 It should be noted that in its Opinion to the IGC as quoted already in this paper, the ECB expressly requested
to be included in the “institutional framework”, but without being listed among the first category of institutions.
See OJ C 229, 25.9.2003, p. 8, point 11. 
26 It is also pursuant to a request of the ECB expressed in its Opinion quoted in the note supra that the IGC inserted
the concept of the “Eurosystem” in the Constitution. This expression was used by the ECB in its legal and
other texts in order to make a distinction between the ESCB, in which all national central banks participate,
and the kind of collaboration uniting the national central banks whose currency is the euro, and the ECB. 
27 R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, pp. 24-25.
relation to the Eurosystem does not correspond to the legal situation if we give
the verb “conduct” its ordinary meaning. It is the ECB, and not the (Euro)system
or the national central banks and the ECB, which is in the driving seat with
regard to deciding monetary policy. Second, the national central banks have a
role in the implementation of monetary policy, but they are submitted in a clear
hierarchy to the authority of the ECB. Third, all the legal acts adopted on the
basis of Treaty (Constitution) provisions are acts of the ECB and not of the
system. Fourth, the insertion of the concept of the “Eurosystem” in a single
provision of the Treaty cannot clarify the legal situation. It is to be regretted
that the opportunity was not taken to review systematically the provisions of the
Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, in order to replace, where convenient, the
expression “ESCB” with “Eurosystem”. Obvious examples here are Article 14,
paragraph 3 on guidelines and instructions that cannot be addressed to central
banks other than the ones whose currency is the euro; or Article 15, paragraph
2, which imposes the establishment of a weekly consolidated financial statement
of the ESCB, something that has never been done. In practice, the statements
reflect only the situation of the Eurosystem, and rightly so. However, the
“cleaning” exercise was perhaps politically diff icult because of the different
views held on what belongs to the competence of the System and what to the
competence of the ECB, as became clear during the negotiation of the Maastricht
Treaty.
2.2 THE APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW TO THE ECB28
The Court has ruled in its judgment of 10 July 2003, already quoted, “that there
are no grounds which prima facie preclude the Community legislature from
adopting, by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty and under
the conditions laid down therein, legislative measures capable of applying to the
ECB” (point 136). Elderson and Weenink observe that “the quotation is
important as it recognises that the legislator can only adopt legislation of
relevance to the ECB in so far as the Treaty allows for this.”29 There is a case
where the Treaty (Article 285) and the Constitution (Article III-429) expressly
reserve the right of the ECB to adopt rules on its own for the establishment of
statistics for which Article 5 of the ESCB Statute confers a competence to the
ECB. But this explicit “non-prejudice clause” is the exception. In other
hypotheses, it is a question of how to interpret the (general) provisions of the
Treaty and the (specif ic) provisions on the ECB and monetary policy. 
The question has been raised about the application of general Community law
to the ECB, for example in the f ield of public procurement, competition, other
rules of the internal market, civil servants, accounting and auditing. We cannot
enter into an in-depth discussion on this subject, which is a complex one;
nevertheless, some aspects appear clear. For example, EU institutions are not
directly bound by the directives that apply to public procurement and which bind
the Member States. However, they “have adopted their own set of procurement
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28 On this topic, see the sometimes contrasting views expressed by R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, pp. 25-33,
and F. Elderson and H. Weenink, op. cit., pp. 287-91. 
29 Op. cit., p. 287. The italics are the authors’.
rules in line with the principles of the Directive.”30 If we examine Competition
law, there is an agreement that the ECB and the national central banks are not
“undertakings” in the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 EC.31 However, René Smits
seems to be posing the right questions when he asks: “are the ESCB activities
undertaken within its public authority or ancillary to its tasks? Or, does the
Eurosystem also undertake activities which are normally engaged in by private
companies for gain?”32 On the other hand, it is well-known how delicate and
controversial the subject of the “anticompetitive State action in Community
law”33 is as treated by the case law of the Court of Justice, which may be
transposed to the action of public authority in general. One has to take into
account the fact that both the Treaty (the Constitution) and the ESCB Statute
refer to “the principle of an open market economy with free competition”
(Article 105, paragraph 1 EC and Article III-185, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution; Article 2 of the Statute). 
2.3 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ECB AND ESCB (EUROSYSTEM)
Nothing has changed as far as the objectives of the ESCB/ECB are concerned
(Articles III-185 and Statute, Article 2). The suggestion made by some
participants in the Working Group on Economic Governance to add a reference
to growth and employment was not accepted by the Group. So the primary
objective remains price stability and, without prejudice to that objective, the
support of economic policies in the Union that support the general objectives
as laid down in Article I-3 and which include among other aims, a social market
economy and sustainable development. This topic is covered by the contribution
of Servais and Ruggeri in this volume. We will observe that the application of
the objectives of monetary policy to the Member States whose currency is not
the euro is not treated the same way in the Constitution as it is in the Statutes,
which are an integral part of it. Under Article III-197, a transitory provision,
which lists in paragraph 2 the provisions of the Constitution which do not apply
to non-participating Member States, paragraph 1 of Article III-185, on the
objectives, is declared to be inapplicable. In the ESCB Statute, under Article
43, paragraph 1, Article 2 on the objectives is not quoted in the list of
inapplicable provisions. Which of these provisions should then prevail? It has
to be observed that the situation is no different now, as the same inconsistency
exists. Is the question only a theoretical one? Partly yes, because “stable prices”
36
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or public debt management policy by “a Member State, by the ESCB, by a national central bank or by any
other officially designated body, or by any person acting on their behalf ” in Article 7 of the Directive 2000/6/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation
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concerned, see point 3.7 of the Code of Conduct of the ECB adopted in accordance with Article 11.3 of the
Rules of Procedure of the ECB, OJ C 76, 8.3.2001, p. 12.
31 R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, p. 27; F. Elderson and H. Weenink, op. cit., p. 288.
32 R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, p. 27. The production of banknotes appears to be a case in point. The ECB
has decided that a common Eurosystem competitive approach with tendering will be fully implemented by
2012 at the latest. The national central banks with in-house/public printing works will be allowed to opt out
of this common approach, see ECB Annual Report 2003, p. 95. In 2004 the Euro Private Banknote Printers
Association (EUPBA), created in 2002, submitted a complaint to the Commission against alleged anti-
competitive behaviour by national central banks and other public printers, apparently on third markets, see
Het Financieele Dagblad, 23 April 2004. 
33 See the in-depth analysis by J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic
Constitutional Law of the Community (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 127-61. 
is a requirement for all Member States under Article III-177, sub-paragraph 3
(ex Article 4, paragraph 3 EC). On the other hand, under Article I-30, “Member
States whose currency is not the euro, and their central banks, shall retain their
powers in monetary matters”. They are able in the transition period to state their
own priorities compatible with the Treaty in order to promote their economic
recovery and to decide the path (or at least the rhythm) that they will follow in
order to adopt the euro. “Price stability” as such has been promoted by the
Constitution, but as one objective among others. There are reasons to admit some
flexibility for the “Outs”. At any rate, there is no other sanction provided for
them apart from critical convergence reports and delayed entry into Economic
and Monetary Union.
2.4 INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
2.4.1 INDEPENDENCE OF THE ECB AND OF THE NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS
Article I-30 conf irms the independence of the ECB in the following terms: “it
shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its
f inances.” This provision is developed by Article III-188, which takes over the
content of Article 108 EC. In a letter of 5 June 2003 and in its Opinion to the
IGC of 19 September 2003, the ECB requested recognition of the independence
of the national central banks in Article I-30. It wanted this provision to be in
line with Article III-188. Obviously, the ECB feared the possible modif ication
of Article III-188 under the simplif ied procedure. Nevertheless, the wording of
Article I-30, paragraph 3, remains unchanged. It does not appear to be a threat
to the independence of the national central banks, because, as observed in 1991
by Governor de la Rosière, one cannot conceive of an institution in charge of
a single monetary policy which would include delegations with instructions that
are possibly contradictory.34
2.4.2 FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
The specific mention of financial independence is new and a welcome innovation
because, although the budgetary independence of the ECB was recognised in
practice, and by the Court in its already quoted judgment of 10 July 200335, it
did not have special recognition either in the Treaty or in the Statute.36 Article
26 of the Statute relates only to accounting and reporting. The word “budget”
does not appear in the Statute. Budgetary independence was, and still is, held
to be inherent in the nature of an independent central bank. 
2.4.3 DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
No progress has been made with regard to the degree of accountability of the
ECB, a natural complement of its independence.37 The Constitution, by including
37
34 Quoted by J.-V. Louis, “Union économique et monétaire”, Commentaire J. Mégret, Vol. 6, 2nd ed. (Brussels:
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1995), p. 63.
35 Point 132.
36 One of the principles applicable to the (general) budget of the EC is the principle of unity, from which there
are a certain number of exceptions, see “Les Finances de l’Union européenne”, Commentaire J. Mégret, 
Vol. 11, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1999), p. 265, No 497. 
37 On this question, see C. Zilioli, “Accountability and Independence: Irreconcilable Values or Complementary
Instruments for Democracy? The Specif ic Case of the European Central Bank”, Mélanges J.-V. Louis, Vol. 2
(Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2003), pp. 395-422.
Article III-383, paragraph 3 (cf. Article 113 EC), creates the conditions for the
continuation of what has been called the “monetary dialogue” between the ECB
and the European Parliament.38
The Italian presidency of the IGC has proposed to enlarge the scope of provisions
covered by the existing enabling clause (the so-called simplif ied revision under
Article 107, paragraph 5, which is under the present treaty limited to technical
or f inancial provisions) for amending the ECSB/ECB statute.39 The Articles
which would have been added to the list were Articles 10 to 12, concerning the
Governing Council and the Executive Board, as well as Article 43, which states
the provisions of the Statute to be applied and those that do not apply to central
banks of countries whose currency is not the euro. The ECB vigorously protested
against this suggestion in a letter by its President of 26 November 2003. It argued
that the simplif ied procedure would encompass any change to the basic
provisions governing the decision-making bodies of the ECB. It would also do
away with the need for each Member State to ratify, as currently foreseen in
Article 10.6 of the Statute regarding the voting power within the Board of
Governors. “This would imply a far-reaching change to the current constitution
of the ESCB, which the Governing Council cannot support.” The IGC did not
adopt the Italian suggestion. This means that most of the statutory rules
governing the ESCB/ECB will remain at the level of primary (constitutional)
law, which guarantees that the status quo will be preserved, but also represents
a situation that is in stark contrast to the powers of the Legislature over the
central bank in any state in the world.40 This may be explained by the fact that
the ECB is still a young institution that needs to strengthen its position. 
2.5 OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
2.5.1 THE APPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND
VOTING IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL
Article III-382 substitutes a Decision of the European Council by qualif ied
majority vote to the common agreement of the governments of the Member
States at the level of Heads of State or Government, regarding appointing
members of the Executive Board. This change will contribute to avoiding the
appearance of “horse trading”. On the other hand, it will make it easier for larger
states to form coalitions designed to assure the continuity of their
“representation” on the Executive Board. 
It should also be recalled that, on the basis of an enabling clause inserted in the
Statute by the Treaty of Nice, the Council, at the level of Heads of State and
Government, has adopted a Decision modifying Article 10.2 of the Statute from
the perspective of enlargement.41 This Decision has been submitted to the
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38 See F. Martucci, “Le rôle du Parlement européen dans la quête de légitimité démocratique de la Banque centrale
européenne”, Cahiers de droit européen (2003), pp. 549-95. 
39 See CIG 52/1/03 REV 1, Annex 9 to Addendum 1. 
40 See also the observations of R. Smits, op. cit. in footnote 13, p. 38.
41 Decision of the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government of 21 March 2003
on an amendment of Article 10.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 66
(2003/223/EC). This Decision entered into force on 1 June 2004 and will be applicable as soon as the number
of national central bank governors exceeds 15. 
ratif ication of the Member States under their constitutional provisions. It
establishes a system of asymmetric rotation within the Governing Council in
which governors of national central banks exercise successively and at a distinct
frequency their voting rights.42
2.5.2 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
The f irst part of the Constitution provides a new classif ication and hierarchy
of legal instruments. Article I-33 lists the legal acts of the Union: European law,
European framework law, European regulations, European decisions,
recommendations and opinions. So the regulations and decisions of the ECB
become respectively European regulations and European decisions in Article 
III-190 of the Constitution and in Article 34 of the Statute. 
Like the present Treaty, the Constitution does not mention the guidelines and
instructions that are addressed to the national central banks, and which are the
main instruments used by the ECB within the System. They still are provided
in Articles 12 and 14 of the Statute, as annexed to the Constitution, and there
is no reason to believe that they will lose their prominent role among the
instruments used by the ECB.
As far as recommendations are concerned, the Constitution innovates. Article
I-35, paragraph 3, provides that the ECB adopts recommendations “in the
specif ic cases provided for in the Constitution”. Such a condition has not been
introduced in Article 34 of the Statute, but it seems obvious that the new wording
of the Constitution will prevail. An example of a provision enabling the ECB
to adopt a recommendation is Article III-187, paragraphs 3 and 4, which confers
on the ECB the right of initiative for the adoption of legislative acts.
Another question is raised by the new classif ication and hierarchy of the legal
acts, especially between a European law and an (autonomous) regulation, be it
of the ECB or of the Council.43 It is certain, as observed in the literature, that
there are other principles than purely hierarchy to resolve a possible
contradiction between two norms44, such as the principle of lex specialis, the
restrictive interpretation of an exception to a general rule, lex posterior, etc.
Indeed, under the Constitution, laws and regulations have their respective
domains. However, as the same author observes, although the Constitution does
not explicitly establish the primacy of the law on regulations, it is most probable
that the Court will be inclined to establish such a ranking between two legal acts,
considering in particular that the conditions of appeal of private persons against
regulations under Article III-365, paragraph 4, have been made easier than
appeals against laws.45 Of course, there is no problem when the Constitution itself
includes a “no prejudice clause” that preserves the legal acts adopted by the ECB,
but there is but one example (which we have already mentioned) of such a
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42 F. Allemand, “L’audace raisonnée de la réforme de la Banque centrale européenne”, Revue du Marché commun
et de l’Union européenne (2003), pp. 391-98.
43 See S. Van Raepenbusch, “Les instruments juridiques de l’Union européenne”, in Commentaire de la
Constitution de l’Union européenne (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005) p. 217, point 23. 
44 Ibid., p. 210, point 9. 
45 Ibid.
favourable situation, namely the regulation of the establishment of statistics
(Article III-429). 
2.5.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
As an institution of the Union, the ECB is bound by the principle of subsidiarity
in the f ields that are not within the exclusive competence of the Union (Article
I-11, paragraph 3). It should not be considered as an innovation if one takes note
that the ECB is already part of the Community, which under Article 5 EC is
bound by this principle. What is new under Article 3 of the Protocol on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is the obligation
of the ECB to comply with the procedure of transmitting to the national
parliaments its recommendations aiming at the adoption of a “European
legislative act”, insofar as the proposed act does not fall within the exclusive
competence of the Union. The ECB is indeed competent under Article III-187,
paragraphs 3 and 4, for initiating, via recommendations, the legislative procedure
for a simplified revision of the Statute and for adopting so-called complementary
legislation on statistics, compulsory reserves, sanctions, etc. 
The recommendation is transmitted through the Council (Protocol, Article 4).
As with the legislative initiatives of the other EU institutions, groups of Member
States or the European Investment Bank (EIB), the purpose of transmission is
to enable national parliaments to issue, within six weeks, a reasoned opinion
on whether the draft complies with the principle of subsidiarity (“Early warning
procedure”).46 The opinion will be transmitted to the ECB by the president of
the Council (Article 6). If at least one-third of all the votes allocated to the
national parliaments (two votes for each national parliaments, shared among the
assemblies in case of bicameralism) consider that the draft does not comply with
the principle of subsidiarity, then it must be revised (Article 7). The ECB may
decide “to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. Reasons must be given for
this decision”. So, in principle, the ECB remains legally free to choose whether
to follow the opinions of the national parliaments. To borrow a metaphor from
football, these opinions function like yellow cards, rather than red ones.
However, if there is widespread agreement in the national parliaments, then the
pressure on the drafter of the text will be considerable. 
2.5.4 OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY
Article I-50 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of openness and the right
of access of citizens and residents of the Union to documents of institutions,
bodies and agencies of the Union, whatever their medium. The right of access
to documents is also provided in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 
II-102). The principle of openness is recognised by Article 1, sub-paragraph 2,
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the principle of access to
documents is taken from Article 255 of the EC Treaty, where it applies only to
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and enlarged to all
the institutions, bodies and agencies. The conditions of application of the
40
46 The justif ication of the draft legislation must also encompass the principle of proportionality. See Protocol,
Article 5.
principle of access to documents are included in Article III-399. This article
limits the obligation of access to documents of the Court of Justice, the ECB
and the EIB to their exercise of administrative functions. The ECB has recently
adopted a Decision on public access to the documents of the ECB.47
2.5.5 THE IMPLICATION OF THE ECB IN REVISION PROCEDURES
We have already mentioned the role of initiative of the ECB in the simplif ied
revision of its Statute. The Convention has introduced the legislative procedure
in this f ield and modif ies the rule of the existing treaty, which provides for
unanimity in the Council if the act is based on a proposal from the Commission,
and qualif ied majority if it is based on a recommendation of the ECB. In his
letter of 16 April 2004, the President of the ECB requested equality of rights
for the Commission and the ECB in the procedure. Article I-25, paragraphs 1
and 2, indeed makes it easier to reach a qualif ied majority in the Council when
the act to be adopted is based on a proposal by the Commission than if it is not.
This traditional rule expresses the philosophy of the initiative competence of
the Commission under the treaties. However, the IGC did not agree to the request
of the ECB. 
In its letter of 16 April 2004 the ECB also asked the IGC to ensure that the ECB
is consulted in the simplif ied procedure if the provisions of Title III of Part III
of the Constitution on the internal policies and actions of the Union are amended,
should an institutional change concerning the ECB be proposed. The ECB must
indeed be consulted on such changes as part of the ordinary procedure (see
Article IV-443 and Article 48 TEU). In its earlier opinion of 19 September 2003,
the ECB also asked to be consulted in the negotiation of agreements with a
Member State that has notif ied its decision to withdraw from the Union, if these
arrangements include provisions that affect the institutional status of the ECB.
The IGC accepted the f irst but not the second of these requests. It should be
noted that the Constitution does not foresee the consultation of the ECB in the
case of any change from unanimity to qualif ied majority voting or for the
introduction of ordinary legislative procedure under the so-called passerelle (or
cross-over) procedure, a simplif ied revision procedure under Article IV-444,
notwithstanding the fact that the recourse to this procedure may affect the
institutional balance in monetary policy. 
CONCLUSION
The Constitution does not include any revolutionary changes as far as monetary
policy and the ECB are concerned. As observed by the ECB in its opinion of
19 September 2003, delivered after the work of the Convention had been
completed, “the tasks, mandate, status and legal regime of the ECB and of the
ESCB remain substantially unchanged.” At the end of the IGC, Otmar Issing
observed in an interview that “Die EU-Verfassung ist eine Bestätigung der
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47 Decision ECB/2004/3, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 42. This Decision replaced an earlier one (ECB/1998/12 of
3.11.1998, OJ L 110, 28.4.1999, p. 30). 
entscheidenden Elemente der Europäischen Währungsverfassung: der
Unabhängigkeit und des Mandats der EZB”.48 Nevertheless, as we have observed,
it is not yet possible to foresee all the consequences for the ECB that will derive
from recognition of its new institutional status, or the implications for its
activities of the classif ication and hierarchy of norms introduced by the
Constitution. 
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ABSTRACT
Il contributo analizza l’impatto della Costituzione europea sul funzionamento
dell’Unione economica e monetaria e sul governo dell’economia.
Conformemente alla dichiarazione di Laeken, la Costituzione sancisce la
separazione delle competenze tra l’Unione e gli Stati membri. Tuttavia lo studio
sostiene che, a motivo della sua specificità, il coordinamento delle politiche di
bilancio ed economiche è una competenza UE sui generis. La Costituzione non
apporta modifiche fondamentali all’attuale governance economica della UE.
Il ruolo della Commissione è in qualche modo rafforzato nel settore delle
politiche di Multilateral Surveillance Procedure e Excessive Deficit Procedure;
nel Consiglio sono introdotte nuove regole di votazione ma il loro impatto è
limitato ed il ruolo del Parlamento rimane, nell’insieme, invariato. La situazione
è piuttosto diversa per quanto concerne la governance dell’area dell’euro, la
cui autonomia è notevolmente accresciuta. La Costituzione dà facoltà agli Stati
membri dell’area di adottare misure specifiche per le politiche di bilancio ed
economiche della stessa area. Viene anche notevolmente incrementato il numero
dei casi in cui nel Consiglio votano esclusivamente gli Stati membri dell’area
dell’euro, mentre il ruolo dell’Eurogruppo è ufficialmente riconosciuto nella
Costituzione. Tuttavia, ciò non implica la creazione di uno specifico Consiglio
Ecofin per l’area dell’euro. Infine, ulteriori modifiche vengono apportate nei
campi della rappresentanza esterna della UEM, delle misure che governano
l’utilizzo dell’euro e l’entrata nella UEM, delle procedure semplificate di
revisione, ecc. La Costituzione non corregge l’esistente squilibrio tra i due
pilastri della UEM, quello economico e quello monetario, ma apre la porta a
una migliorata governance economica all’interno dell’area dell’euro. I Ministri
finanziari dell’area dell’euro raccoglieranno la sfida?
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INTRODUCTION
Enhancing economic policy coordination was one of the items put on the agenda
of the Convention by the European Council of 14-15 December 2001.1 Many
economic and political observers have indeed criticised the asymmetry between
the economic and the monetary parts of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
National governments remain responsible for the conduct of economic and
budgetary policies, while monetary policy has been transferred to the European
level. Loose and mostly non-binding coordinating mechanisms are in place in the
economic field, while a centralised decision-making process has been established
within the Eurosystem in charge of the monetary policy of the euro area.
A Working Group on Economic Governance, chaired by Klaus Hänsch, was
established within the Convention to discuss this issue. Members of the
Convention proved to be deeply divided, resulting in only limited progress on
this issue, although some doors were nevertheless opened. The f inal result
reached by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is very similar to the
conclusions of the Convention’s proposals.
The Constitution not only reorganises the provisions of the European Union (EU)
Treaty: it also brings some changes. In this paper, we analyse these from different
points of view: the Union’s objectives and symbols (Chapter 1); the respective
competencies of the Member States and the Union in the economic f ield, and
more particularly the specific position of the competence to coordinate economic
policies among the competencies of the Union (Chapter 2); economic governance
within the Union (Chapter 3); and economic governance within the euro area
(Chapter 4). Finally, we will examine some other relevant changes in the f ield
of external representation, measures governing the use of the euro, entry into
EMU, withdrawal from the Union, and the revision procedures (Chapter 5).
This contribution does not cover amendments to the institutional position of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank
(ECB), which are addressed in Professor Jean-Victor Louis’ contribution to this
volume.
1 THE OBJECTIVES AND SYMBOLS OF THE UNION
The objectives of the Union were reviewed f irst by the Convention and then by
the IGC, resulting in the introduction of a specif ic title in the Treaty regarding
the Union’s symbols.
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1.1 THE UNION’S OBJECTIVES
The Maastricht Treaty referred to “the establishment of economic and monetary
union, ultimately including a single currency”, as a means of realising the
Union’s objective “to promote economic and social progress and a high level
of employment and to achieve balance and sustainable development”.2 Since
EMU is now a tangible reality, references to its establishment have disappeared
from the Union’s objectives. However, Part I of the Constitution mentions some
of EMU’s core elements. One of these is price stability, which should be regarded
as a cornerstone of EMU.
Besides the existing reference to balanced economic growth, the Constitution
mentions price stability as among the objectives of the EU. Price stability was
introduced into the Constitution at a late stage in the IGC negotiations, following
lengthy discussions and constant and repeated advocacy by the Eurosystem.3 The
Eurosystem’s arguments in favour of such an explicit reference can be
summarised in three main points.4 First, non-inflationary growth is mentioned
as one of the Community’s objectives5 in the Treaty establishing the European
Community (“the Treaty”). Second, “Price stability is not only the European
System of Central Banks’ primary objective but also forms part of the heart of
monetary union for all European citizens; in this sense ‘stable prices’ clearly
benefit society [...]”. Third, the introduction of a simplif ied procedure to amend
Part III of the Constitution, which includes the EMU provisions (see section 5.7),
rendered this reference necessary in order to strengthen the commitment towards
price stability.
Hence, Article I-3 (3), f irst indent, of the Constitution reads: “The Union shall
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming
at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientif ic and
technological advance.” However, this wording is not entirely free of ambiguity.
Is price stability referred to as a goal, or as a means to achieve the sustainable
development of Europe alongside balanced economic growth, a competitive
social market economy, etc.? This is a hard question to answer and may be the
subject of considerable debate.
To maintain price stability is the primary objective of the Eurosystem. In this
regard, it should be noted that mentioning price stability among the Union’s
objectives does not change, widen or restrict the primary objective of the
Eurosystem’s monetary policy. In fact, the question had been put forward by
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2 Article 2 of the EU Treaty.
3 “The European Constitution and the ECB”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, August 2004, pp. 51-64 (57-59).
4 The Eurosystem’s point of view was notably expressed in a letter sent by ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet
to the President of the Council of the European Union, dated 16 April 2004. The letter is available on the ECB’s
website.
5 Article 2 of the Treaty refers to “sustainable and non-inflationary growth”. Stable prices, together with sound
public f inances and monetary conditions as well as a sustainable balance of payments, are also considered in
Article 4 (3) of the Treaty to be guiding principles for the Community and the Member States. These guiding
principles are no longer to be found in the Constitution.
some Convention members. However, it was considered that “maintaining price
stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make with regard to the
achievement of other economic goals”.6
As an objective of the Union, price stability should also constitute a guiding
principle for all EU institutions when they act in the economic f ield and play
a key role in the def inition of Member States’ economic policies and their
coordination through the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and through
budgetary discipline.
1.2 THE SYMBOLS OF THE UNION
The euro, as the currency of the Union7, is one of the key symbols of the EU,
together with the flag, the anthem, the motto (“united in diversity”) and Europe
Day. With this provision, the Constitution corrects a peculiarity of the Treaty:
the Maastricht Treaty wording referring to the ECU (European Currency Unit)
as the single currency was never changed, and the legal status of the euro was
instead derived from a Council regulation.8
The Constitution presents the euro as the currency of the Union. However, in
other instances, the Constitution refers to “the Member States whose currency
is the euro”.9 So, whose currency is the euro? Is it the currency of the Union,
or the currency of its Member States? It could be the former, given that 
Article I-7 of the Constitution gives legal personality to the Union. However,
as not all Member States have joined the euro area yet and given the place where
the euro is referred to as the currency of the Union, we regard this reference to
the euro as the “currency of the Union” as being primarily symbolic. Legally,
the euro remains the currency of those Member States which have adopted the
euro, as stated in the substantive provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, this
“new and explicit” status as the currency of the Union should not change the
nature of the euro, nor have any impact on the functioning of EMU.
In the long run, however, it might have some influence on the current neutrality
policy of the EU institutions with regard to the international role of the euro.
Indeed, as a symbol of the Union or a token of its identity, the euro might also
acquire a political dimension, as indeed was the case with the old legacy
currencies (e.g. the Deutsche Mark), which were symbols of national identity
to which citizens were bound and that they aimed to protect or to promote.
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invited to consult the contribution of Professor Jean-Victor Louis in this volume.
7 Article I-8, 4th indent, of the Constitution.
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98, 3 May 1998, on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, 
p. 1). The name “euro” was decided by the European Council of 15 and 16 December 1995 in Madrid.
9 Articles I-13 (1) (c), I-15 (1), I-30 (1), III-194, III-195, III-196 (3), III-197 (2) and (4) and III-198 (2) and
(3) of the Constitution.
2 THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES: A SPECIAL CASE IN THE
CATEGORIES OF THE UNION’S COMPETENCE
One of the main objectives of the Convention on the Future of Europe – as
described in Declaration 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice – was to establish “a
more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the
Member States”.10 The subsequent Declaration of Laeken repeated the need to
“clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and
the Member States in the light of the new challenges facing the Union”.11
Given this clear mandate, the Convention and the IGC have undertaken to clarify
the allocation of powers between the Union and its Member States on the basis
of the principle of conferral as well as on the def inition of categories of the
Union’s competence. The principle of conferral belongs to the fundamental
principles on which the entire European integration process rests. In accordance
with this principle, the Union must act within the limits of the competences
conferred upon it by the Constitution in order to achieve the objectives set out
in the Constitution.12 Conversely, competences that are not conferred upon the
Union by the Constitution thus remain with the individual Member States.13
On this basis, Article I-12 of the Constitution enumerates three main categories
of competences which are entrusted to the Union and further detailed in 
Part III of the Constitution: exclusive competence14, which includes the monetary
policy15 of the Member States whose currency is the euro; shared competence16;
and f inally, the “competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or
supplement the actions of the Member States”.17 In addition to these three
categories, Article I-12 (3) states that “the Member States shall coordinate their
economic and employment policies within arrangements as determined by Part
III, which the Union shall have competence to provide”.
What is the nature of this competence of the “coordination of economic and
employment policies”? To which category of competence does it belong? This
issue is a complex one, and is examined below.
47
10 Declaration on the future of the Union, No 23, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, signed on 26 February 2001
(OJ C 080, 10.3.2001), signed on 26 February 2001, p. 85.
11 European Council of Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, Declaration annexed to the conclusions of the summit.
12 Article I-11 (1) of the Constitution.
13 Article I-11 (2) of the Constitution.
14 Article I-12 (1). For an exhaustive list of the exclusive competences, see Article I-13 (1) of the Constitution.
15 As Jean-Victor Louis mentions in his paper in this volume, some authors suggest a broad interpretation of
this concept. The wording of the ECB Opinion of 19 September 2003 addressed to the IGC, which has been
invoked in this debate in favour of a broad interpretation, was especially carefully chosen to avoid entering
into this debate on the scope of the exclusive competencies. The ECB Opinion clearly refers to the wording
of the provisions of Part III related to monetary policy. This results in our view that the Eurosystem’s exclusive
competence covers the conduct of monetary policy and of foreign exchange operations as well as the holding
and management of the off icial foreign reserves of the Member States. Competences are, on the other hand,
in our view shared in the f ield of payment systems, where the Eurosystem’s task is “to promote the smooth
operation of payment systems”, as well as in the f ield of f inancial stability, where the Eurosystem’s task is
“to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the f inancial system”. See also the view expressed by
the ECB in H. K. Scheller, The ECB, History, Role and Functions (Frankfurt: ECB, 2004), p. 142.
16 Article I-12 (2) of the Constitution.
17 Article I-12 (5) of the Constitution.
The provisions of Article I-12 (3) must be read in conjunction with Article I-15
(1), which further describes the type of competence that the EU can exercise in
the field of economic policy. Article I-15 (1), f irst indent, reads as follows: “The
Member States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union. To this
end, the Council of Ministers shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines
for these policies”. The wording closely reflects Article 99 (1) of the Treaty. It
can be argued that it follows from the wording of Article I-15 (1) that the
coordination of economic policy does not belong to “exclusive” or “shared”
competences18, but solely consists of a coordinating role on the part of the EU.
Moreover, Article I-15 (1) leaves no doubt as to the economic competence of the
Member States. Hence, the coordination of economic policies should pertain to
the third main competence of supporting, coordinating or complementary action.
However, Article I-14 (1) of the Constitution seems to invalidate this hypothesis
by clearly stating that “the Union shall share competence with the Member States
where the Constitution confers on it a competence which does not relate to the
areas referred to in Articles I-13 and I-17”, i.e. exclusive competence and areas
of supporting, coordinating or complementary action respectively. In addition,
it can be derived from the wording of the second paragraph of Article I-14 that
the list of “principal areas” of shared competence it contains is not exhaustive.
Since the coordination of economic policies is not mentioned as an exclusive
competence or among the areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary
action, one could conclude that it belongs to the category of shared competence.19
During the work of the Convention, some members of the Working Group on
Economic Governance considered that “in order to ensure economic growth, full
employment and social cohesion, this should extend to bringing macro-economic
policy within the shared competence of the Union and the Member States”.
However, in its f inal Report to the Convention plenary, the Working Group
recommended that “the current structure whereby exclusive competence for
monetary policy within the Eurozone lies with the Community, exercised by the
ECB under powers conferred upon it by the existing Treaty, and competence for
economic policy with the Member States, should be maintained”.20
We argue that the coordination of economic policies, given its specif icity, forms
a distinct category of the Union’s competence. This interpretation is supported
by f ive key arguments.
First, a specif ic provision deals with the coordination of economic policies, not
only in Article I-12, which lists the different categories of competence, but also
in the following Articles that describe each of them. Indeed, Articles I-13 to 
I-17 repeat the same logical order as Article I-12: Article I-13 f irst deals with
exclusive competence; Article I-14 then describes the areas of shared
competence; next come the provisions of Article I-15 on the coordination of
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19 See K. Lenaerts, “The Structure of the Union According to the Draft Constitution for Europe”, in J. W. de Zwaan
et al. (eds), The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration, Liber Amicorum A. E. Kellermann (The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute, 2004), pp. 3-22 (20).
20 Final Report of the Working Group on Economic Governance, CONV 357/02, 21 October 2002, p. 2.
economic policies; and f inally Article I-17 deals with areas of supporting,
coordinating or complementary action. Sources argue that this represents a
deliberate choice by the Convention to underline the specif ic nature of the
Union’s competence in the coordination of economic policies.21
Second, when the Union shares a competence with the Member States, it may
legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area.22 In the coordination of
economic policies, on the other hand, the Council adopts Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines are adopted under the form
of a Recommendation, which is not legally binding, unlike other instruments
such as European laws or framework laws. Furthermore, Article I-12 (2)
specif ies that “the Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent
that the Union has not exercised, or has ceased to exercise, its competence”.
Since the Union cannot adopt legally binding acts and the individual Member
States retain their basic competence in economic policy, this cannot be a shared
competence.23
Third, Article I-15 does not merely entrust the EU with a competence, but
notably provides that “the Member States shall coordinate their economic
policies within the Union”. Different wordings were used in the various drafts
produced by the Convention. Initially, the emphasis was exclusively put on the
Union’s competence; a reference was then progressively reintroduced regarding
the Member States’ competence (compare Article I-11 (3) with Article I-14 (1),
2nd sentence of the “Draft Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe”,
submitted to the European Council on 20 June 2003). The IGC completed the
shift of emphasis in favour of the Member States’ competence.24 As pointed out
by P. J. G. Kapteyn, “care is taken to avoid anything that could be explained as
conferring on the Union itself a competence to co-ordinate the economic and
employment policies of the Member States. Obviously Member States were
prepared to go to great length to protect themselves against encroachment of
their powers in these f ields”.25 The Union resembles a forum where coordination
takes place but without the ability to play its own role. In this sense, the concept
of coordination seems to be limited to the strict application of the rules foreseen
in Articles III-179 and III-184.
Fourth, the power of the Council to adopt sanctions against individual Member
States in the framework of the Excessive Def icit Procedure makes the
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21 In his commentary on the Convention’s work, “Vers une Constitution européenne”, Etienne de Poncins clearly
aff irms that the competence remains within the realm of the Member States, which thus leaves absolutely no
room for a shared competence between the Union and its Member States. He adds that the Union only
coordinates the policies of the Member States, and that it is because of the importance of this coordination
that the Convention deemed it necessary to mention it in a separate Article (see E. de Poncins, Vers une
Constitution européenne. Texte commenté du projet de traité constitutionnel établi par la Convention européenne
(Paris: Editions 10/18, 2003), p. 108).
22 Article 1-12 of the Constitution.
23 Peter Norman writes that the coordination of economic policies was given its own article because of its political
importance and because it did not involve legislation (see P. Norman, The Accidental Constitution: The Story
of the European Convention (Brussels: EuroComment, 2003), p. 197).
24 See D. N. Triantafyllou, La Constitution de l’Union européenne selon le Traité de Rome de 2004. Les choix
clés de la Convention et de la Conférence intergouvernementale (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005), p. 47.
25 P. J. G. Kapteyn, “EMU and Central Bank: Chances Missed”, European Constitutional Law Review, I-2005,
p. 125.
coordination of economic policies a specif ic competence. Not even in the areas
of exclusive competence may the Council exercise such power. The only other
instance where the Council has similar power is the suspension of voting rights
in the case of a breach by a Member State of the values of the Union.
Fifth, the coordination of economic policies does not belong to the third category
of competence either. In the areas of supporting, coordinating or
complementary action, the Union may adopt legally binding acts when it chooses
to act, although its actions do not supersede the competence of the Member
States. By contrast, in the coordination of economic policies the Union does not
have the power to adopt legally binding acts, nor the choice to exercise its
competence.
Therefore, we consider that the coordination of economic policies neither
belongs to the area of shared competence nor to the areas of supporting,
coordinating or complementary action, but is instead a specif ic competence.26
By conf irming that the competence for economic policy remains national and
by conferring to the Union only a very limited competence regarding the
coordination of economic policies, the Constitution does clarify the allocation
of power between the Union and its Member States.27 However, it does not touch
upon the existing imbalance between the two pillars of EMU, i.e. economic union
and monetary union.28 Except for some changes and improvements (see 
Chapters 3 and 4), one may argue that the structural weakness of EMU in terms
of economic and budgetary policy remains fundamentally unchanged. This lack
of political will towards further integration explains the diff iculties encountered
for instance in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) or
in the external representation of EMU. As we have seen, such structural
weaknesses also have an impact on the instruments used (i.e. non-legally binding
acts). This also considerably limits the possibility for the euro area to move
towards an economic government even if Article I-15 (1), second indent, provides
that “specif ic provisions shall apply to those Member States whose currency is
the euro” (see section 4.1).
3 THE ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EU
One basic feature of the Maastricht Treaty (and thereafter the EU Treaty) is that
the provisions which relate to the coordination of economic policies apply to
the whole Union. Except in very limited cases, the same rules apply to both euro
area and non-euro area Member States. While maintaining this basic feature,
the Convention and later the IGC discussed some changes with the aim of
improving the economic governance of the EU.
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27 The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder published a scathing open letter in this respect: “The pact will work
better if intervention by European institutions in the budgetary sovereignty of national parliaments is only
permitted under very limited conditions. […] In addition, more respect should be given to EU members’ primary
competence over economic and f iscal policy […]”, Financial Times, 17 January 2005.
28 Kapteyn, op. cit.: “The asymmetry of the ways economic and monetary policy objectives are pursued under
the EC Treaty has been retained in the Constitution” (p. 124).
3.1 THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission’s role is somewhat strengthened both in the multilateral
surveillance procedure of Article III-179 and in the Excessive Deficit Procedure
of Article III-184.
First, in both procedures, the Commission’s role as “guardian of the Treaty” or
as “independent referee”29 will be strengthened, as it will be able to address an
early warning directly to the Member State concerned. For the moment, this
possibility is reserved to the Council and limited to the preventive arm of the
SGP.30 Under Article III-179, the Commission will have the possibility to issue
an early warning to a Member State when it has established that its economic
policies are either not consistent with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines,
or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union.
This will cover the case of a signif icant budgetary deviation, thereby avoiding
the repetition of the January 2002 episode, when the Council decided not to issue
an early warning to Germany and Portugal, contrary to the Commission’s
recommendation. When issuing its warning, the Commission will alert a Member
State at an early stage, thereby allowing that Member State to take the necessary
measures with the view to avoiding an excessive def icit situation. Under 
Article III-184, when the Commission considers that an excessive def icit in a
Member State exists or may occur, it will now have “to address an opinion” to
the Member State concerned. This opinion could also be considered as a warning,
providing a Member State with the opportunity to take supplementary measures
and show goodwill, which would thus weigh favourably on the Council’s decision
as to whether an excessive deficit actually exists. However, because this opinion
will be issued just before the Council decision, it can also be regarded mainly
as being merely informative (no notif ication procedure currently exists when the
Commission considers a Member State to be in an excessive def icit situation).
Second, in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Council decisions on the existence
of an excessive def icit in a Member State will be based on a Commission
proposal instead of a recommendation. Again, the right of initiative of the
Commission will be reinforced, since the Council needs unanimity to deviate
from a Commission proposal as opposed to qualif ied majority in the case of a
recommendation. However, this represents the only case where the Constitution
extends the use of Commission proposals as opposed to recommendations. The
Commission had advocated for a more general use of proposals in the EMU
chapter, particularly regarding the adoption of the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines and associated surveillance measures.
3.2 THE NEW VOTING RULES IN THE COUNCIL
To cope with an enlarged Union, the decision-making process within the Council
had to be revised. Besides the new double majority rule, two other amendments
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29 European Commission, “EU Economic Review 2004”, p. 261.
30 In the event that the Council identif ies that the budgetary position of a Member State has significantly diverged
from its medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it (see Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97,
Articles 6.2 and 10.2).
were introduced which are specif ic to EMU. The f irst and most important of
these amendments consists in increasing the number of cases where only the euro
area Member States take decisions (given its importance, this issue will be dealt
with in a separate chapter). The second amendment consists in extending the
list of cases where the Council can act without the vote of the Member State in
question.
3.2.1 THE EXCLUSION OF THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION FROM THE VOTE
In the exercise of multilateral surveillance, the Council may address the
necessary recommendation to a Member State when it has established that the
economic policies of this Member State are not consistent with the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning
of EMU. It shall act without taking into account the vote of the Member State
concerned31, whereas “under the present rules, this Member State is judge and
defendant at the same time”.32 It can be argued that “the change of practice
introduced by the Constitution will help to strengthen the impartiality of
multilateral surveillance. In doing so the Constitution moreover removes the
existing bias in favour of large Member States, since under the current
arrangements the latter can constitute a blocking minority more easily than the
smaller countries because of their larger voting weight”.33
In the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the same exclusion of the vote applies when
the Council decides whether an excessive deficit exists.34 Strangely enough, such
a vote exclusion has not yet been applied to that decision, although it has already
been applied to the other measures taken by the Council in the context of the
Excessive Def icit Procedure.35 The Constitution f ills this gap.
As a result, the Constitution ensures that each time the economic or budgetary
policy of a Member State is discussed, this Member State cannot take part in
the vote. This constitutes an important achievement. As we shall see below, the
exclusion mechanism also facilitates the decision-making process, “since the
voting threshold will be lowered and will thus be easier to reach”.36
The exclusion of a Member State from the vote is not specif ic to decisions
related to economic policies. It also applies when suspending certain rights of
the Member States that seriously breach or risk breaching the values of the
Union, or if the Member State voluntarily withdraws from the Union.37 However,
this exclusion mechanism is not always exercised in EMU-related decisions
concerning a particular Member State. For instance, a Member State with a
derogation can take part in votes concerning decisions granting mutual assistance
or authorising protective measures in case of difficulties or a crisis in its balance
of payments.38 To provide another example, a Member State with a derogation
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32 European Commission, “EU Economy Review 2004”, p. 261.
33 Ibid., pp. 261-62.
34 See Article III-184 (6) of the Constitution.
35 See Article 104 (13) of the EC Treaty.
36 European Commission, “EU Economy Review 2004”, p. 262.
37 Articles I-59 and I-60 of the Constitution respectively.
38 See Articles III-201 and III-202 of the Constitution.
can participate in the decision to lift its derogation, as well as in the decision
that irrevocably f ixes the rate at which the euro is to be substituted for its
currency.39
3.2.2 THE NEW DOUBLE MAJORITY RULE
The voting modalities in the Council certainly constitute one of the longest
debated institutional issues during the Convention and the IGC. The horse-
trading concerning weighted voting in the negotiations of the Nice Treaty led
to substantial criticism. Pressure was thus high on the members of the
Convention and the IGC to come up with a more democratic and simple system.
As a result, they proposed a system of double majority voting.
A. The final regime (after 1 November 2009)
Article I-25 (1) of the Constitution introduces the double majority voting system.
A qualif ied majority shall require a minimum of 55% of the Member States, or
a minimum of 15 of them, whichever is the greater, and together they must
represent at least 65% of the EU population. A blocking minority requires more
than 35% of the EU population and at least four Member States. However,
according to Article I-25 (2), when the Council does not act on the basis of a
Commission proposal, a qualif ied majority requires 72% of Member States,
representing at least 65% of the EU’s population.
Does this higher threshold of 72% of the Member States and 65% of the
population apply within the context of economic policy?
The answer is yes in the following instances:
– The adoption of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Article III-179 (2));
– The adoption by the Council, acting on the basis of an ECB recommendation,
of complementary legislation def ining the limits and conditions of certain
powers of the ECB40 (Articles III-187 (4) and III-190 (3));
– Mutual assistance and protective measures in case of diff iculties or a crisis
in the balance of payments in a Member State with a derogation (Articles 201
and 202 (3));
– Appointment of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB by the
European Council on a recommendation from the Council (Article III-382(2)).
Conversely, the higher threshold does not apply when the Constitution establishes
specif ic voting rules, either because the Member State concerned cannot take
part in the vote, or because only euro area Member States may participate in the
vote. This concerns:
– The multilateral surveillance procedure (Article III-179 (4));
– The Excessive Def icit Procedure (Article III-184 (6 and 7));
– Measures specific to the euro area (Articles III-194 (2) and III-197 (2 and 4));
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39 See Article III-198 (2 and 3) of the Constitution.
40 However, the lower voting threshold will apply when the Council is acting on a proposal from the Commission.
This therefore creates an uneven level playing-field between Commission proposals (which are easier to adopt)
and ECB recommendations (which need a higher majority in the Council). This situation could have been
corrected by applying the special voting rules in both cases.
– The external representation of the euro area (Article III-196 (3));
– The recommendation of the euro area Member States for the abrogation of
a derogation (Article III-198 (2)).
In the latter cases, a qualif ied majority shall require 55% of the Member States
representing at least 65% of the population of the Member States participating
in the vote. A blocking minority shall include more than 35% of the population
of the Member States participating in the vote, plus one other Member State.
By not applying the higher threshold in these cases, as normally required when
the Council does not act on the basis of a Commission proposal, it can be argued
that the Constitution mitigates to a certain extent the consequences of the limited
role of the Commission in these areas.
B. The transitional period (until 1 November 2009)
The new voting rules, including the specif ic ones, will enter into force on 
1 November 2009. Until then, Protocol No 34 on the transitional provisions
relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union determines, among other
aspects, the applicable voting rules within the Council. In actual fact, the
Protocol merely upholds the current weighted voting rules. According to Article
2 (2) of the said Protocol, Acts of the European Council and of the Council
requiring a qualif ied majority shall be adopted if there are at least 232 votes
in favour out of a total of 321, and if they represent a majority of the Member
States, when decisions are taken on the basis of a Commission’s proposal.
Otherwise, 232 votes and two-thirds of the Member States will be needed.41
C. Comparison between the weighted voting and double majority regimes
This section seeks to assess the impact of the two regimes on the decision-
making process by comparing their main characteristics.
– The weighted voting rules are applicable until 31 October 2009:
In the EU25, a qualif ied majority requires 232 votes out of a total of 321 
(i.e. 72%). Thus, 90 votes are required to constitute a blocking minority 
(i.e. the combined votes of at least three large Member States (29 votes each),
plus one other Member State). In other words, four Member States are
suff icient to block any decision.42
– The double majority regime is applicable as from 1 November 200943:
In the EU25, a qualif ied majority shall require at least 55% or 72% of the
Member States, representing at least 65% of the population of the Union. A
blocking minority thus requires more than 35% of the population and at least
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41 A member of the Council may request a check to ensure that the Member States comprising the qualif ied
majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that proves not to be the case, the act
shall not be adopted (Article 2 (2), last indent, of the Protocol).
42 In some circumstances, three Member States are sufficient to block a decision. For instance, if either the United
Kingdom or Poland (both with 29 votes) is excluded from a vote in one of the cases described above, the total
number of votes will be reduced from 321 to 292. Therefore, only 210 votes are needed to attain a qualif ied
majority. A blocking minority then requires at least 83 votes, i.e. the cumulated voting rights of three “big”
Member States, which would comprise 87 votes combined.
43 If at least three-quarters of the blocking minority (in terms of population or number of Member States) indicate
their opposition to the Council adopting an act by a qualif ied majority, the Council shall discuss the issue and
do everything in its power to reach a satisfactory solution to address the concerns raised by the minority.
four Member States (or more than 35% of the population of the Member States
participating in the vote, plus one Member State in those cases where a
Member State has been excluded from the vote, as explained above).
To conclude, the overall balance remains more or less the same under the double
majority rule as under the present weighted voting regime as far as the EU25
is concerned. The impact of this reform on future decision-making processes
in the euro area is commented on below (see section 4.3).
3.3 THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The Constitution brings only limited changes to the role of the European
Parliament.
In the context of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the Constitution holds
that detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure may be laid down
in a European law (i.e. via the co-decision procedure), whereas they are to be
adopted through the so-called cooperation procedure in the current Treaty.44 The
role of the European Parliament is hereby strengthened or, more precisely, will
be strengthened if and when new rules are adopted for the multilateral
surveillance procedure.45
With regard to f iscal discipline, the Council may, in accordance with the
cooperation procedure, adopt legal acts specifying the def initions for the
application of the prohibitions relating to overdraft facilities with central banks
(monetary financing prohibition), privileged access to f inancial institutions, and
the so-called no-bailout rule.46 On this basis, the Council has adopted two
regulations.47 However, these are not considered of a legislative nature, but rather
of an implementing nature. Therefore, in accordance with the new hierarchy of
norms introduced in the Constitution, Article III-183 (2) has opted for
regulations or decisions (i.e. non-legislative and implementing acts) for the
adoption of which the European Parliament does not play any role. By way of
compensation, Article III-183 (2) states that the European Parliament will
however be consulted. If this seems to constitute a downgrading of the European
Parliament’s role, it should be noted that the existing regulations are not expected
to be amended in the foreseeable future.
Finally, there are two other amendments that increase the powers of the European
Parliament. In Article III-187 (3), which lays down a specif ic amendment
procedure for some provisions of the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and the European Central Bank (“the Statute”), the Constitution moves
from a Council decision to a European law. Moreover, in Article III-191, which
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44 Article 252 of the Treaty.
45 The agreement reached by the European Council on 22-23 March 2005 on the reform of the SGP will entail
an adaptation of the rules for multilateral surveillance.
46 These prohibitions are laid down in Articles 101, 102 and 103 of the Treaty.
47 Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying def initions for the application of the
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty, (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1); Council
Regulation (EC) 3604/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying def initions for the application of the prohibition
of privileged access referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 4).
allows the enactment of necessary measures for the use of the euro, the
Constitution also opts for legislative acts instead of mere measures adopted by
the Council.48
3.4 THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
The exclusion from the vote of the Member State concerned, together with the
exclusion of the votes of those Member States with a derogation in case the
budgetary position of a euro area Member State is discussed (see section 4.2),
represent the only changes brought to the Excessive Def icit Procedure. On the
substance, the Constitution leaves the current rules – the so-called corrective
arm of the SGP – unchanged.
However, a “Declaration on Article III-184” is attached to the Constitution. This
Declaration simultaneously:
– reaff irms the commitment to the provisions concerning the SGP as the
framework for the coordination of budgetary policies in the Member States;
underlines the importance of sound budgetary policy throughout the economic
cycle; and conf irms that a rule-based system is the best guarantee for
commitments to be enforced and for all Member States to be treated equally;
– considers that the orientations of budgetary decisions should reflect the right
priorities towards economic reforms, innovation, competitiveness and
strengthening of private investment and consumption in periods of weak
economic growth;
– states that the Member States will take all necessary measures to raise the
growth potential of their economies.
It concludes however that “this Declaration does not prejudge the future debate
on the Stability and Growth Pact”, a rather cautious conclusion. Thereafter, the
European Council reached an agreement to reform the SGP on 22-23 March 2005
and invited the Commission to bring forward rapidly proposals to amend the
Council Regulations.
4 THE ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA
As we have seen, the provisions relating to the coordination of economic policies
apply, as a rule, to the whole Union. However, when the authors of the Maastricht
Treaty drafted the provisions of EMU, they anticipated that not all EU Member
States would adopt the single currency at the same time. Hence, they laid down
transitional provisions according to which the Member States with a derogation
would not be able to participate in votes to adopt certain measures or decisions
to be taken by the Council in the f ield of EMU. Later, with the adoption of the
euro, the ministers of economy and f inance of the euro area Member States
decided to gather informally to exchange views on their respective economic
situations. This resulted in the creation of the so-called Euro Group.
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In view of EU enlargement, it has become increasingly evident that the
transitional period could be prolonged for many years and that the euro area
Member States could not and would not indef initely delay any further
coordination of their economic policies. The ministers of the euro area have
persistently requested more autonomy both in the Convention and later during
the IGC.49 The authors of the Constitution had to f ind a way to enable enhanced
economic coordination among the euro area Member States without overly
widening the gap between them and the Member States with a derogation.
The Constitution contains a number of provisions designed to achieve this
delicate balance. Formally, it includes a new heading on “provisions specif ic
to Member States whose currency is the euro”50, and recognises the existence
of the Euro Group through the inclusion of a special protocol. On the substance,
it extends the number of cases where only the euro area Member States vote in
the Council, and introduces a new provision which enables the euro area Member
States to adopt specif ic measures in order to enhance their economic
coordination.
4.1 MEASURES SPECIFIC TO THE EURO AREA MEMBER STATES
As mentioned above, Article III-194 of the Constitution introduces a new
provision which enables the euro area Member States to adopt measures specific
to them with regard to budgetary discipline and the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines.
4.1.1 IMPACT ON BUDGETARY PROVISIONS
Concerning budgetary discipline, Article III-194 (1) enables the euro area
Member States to adopt measures “to strengthen the coordination and
surveillance of their budgetary discipline”. Article III-194 (1) also stipulates
that these measures are to be enacted “in accordance with the relevant procedure
from among those referred to in Article III-179 and III-184, with the exception
of the procedure set out in Article III-184(13)”. What then is the exact scope
of this provision?
Article III-184 sets out the so-called Excessive Def icit Procedure, and refers
in paragraph 13 to the Protocol on the Excessive Def icit Procedure, which
contains further provisions relating to the implementation of this procedure. In
addition, it states that a European law shall lay down the appropriate measures
to replace the Protocol, and that the Council may also adopt European regulations
or decisions laying down detailed rules and def initions for the application of
the Protocol.
If, in accordance with Article III-194 (1), we except the procedures laid down
in Article III-184 (13), the euro area may not:
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49 See de Poncins, op. cit., pp. 300 and 310.
50 This new heading comprises three Articles: Article III-194 on the measures specif ic to the euro area, 
Article III-195 on the Euro Group and, lastly, Article III-196 on the external representation of the euro area.
All are commented on below.
– Adopt a European law replacing the Protocol and laying down further
provisions applicable to the euro area Member States to implement the
Excessive Def icit Procedure;
– Enact for the euro area Member States any European regulations or decisions
laying down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the Protocol
or of the above-mentioned European law.
In our view, because of the exclusion of Article III-184 (13), Article III-194 does
not allow the euro area Member States to adopt any measures specific to the euro
area that implement the Excessive Def icit Procedure or complement the
European laws, regulations or decisions applicable to the whole Union in this
f ield. This means that the content of the so-called corrective arm of the SGP
should remain the same for both the euro area and the non-euro area Member
States. Some euro area Member States were perhaps afraid by the possible
consequences of a new (stricter) Excessive Deficit Procedure for the euro area.
Another explanation could be that because of the serious consequences that the
Excessive Def icit Procedure entails, non-euro area Member States should also
agree to changes that would be applicable to them when they f inally join the
euro area.51
Instead, through Article III-194, the Constitution now offers a clear legal basis
for a possible preventive arm of the SGP that is specif ic to the euro area.52 A
European law based on Article III-179 (6) and III-194 could for instance def ine
additional rules relating to the medium-term budgetary objective, the adjustment
path to achieve it, and the content of the stability programmes applicable to the
euro area Member States. The euro area could also develop new instruments,
e.g. new statistics, qualitative data and other indicators.
4.1.2 THE BROAD ECONOMIC POLICY GUIDELINES
With regard to the economic policy guidelines, Article III-194 (1) allows the
euro area Member States “to set out economic policy guidelines for them”. Two
questions immediately arise: How can this provision be combined with the
adoption of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for the whole EU? And does
the new provision also allow the euro area to adopt individual Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines for its Member States?
As far as the f irst question is concerned, Article III-194 (1) states that the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines specif ic to the euro area Member States ought to
be “compatible with those adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under
surveillance”. Consistency is thus ensured. Furthermore, we expect that from
58
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10-11 March 2005). This means however that the wording of Article III-194 should be read as follows: “with
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52 The procedure referred to should be the procedure laid down in Article III-179 (6), which enables the Council
to adopt detailed rules for multilateral surveillance.
a political point of view, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the euro area
and its individual Member States will continue to form an integral part of the
whole EU Broad Economic Policy Guidelines exercise.
With regard to the second question, it is worth recalling that, under Article 99
(2) of the present Treaty, the Council (i.e. the 25 Member States) adopts general
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for both the EU and the euro area, as well
as individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for each Member State. In other
words, the same legal basis is used for the adoption of the different parts of the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. In the Constitution, the legal basis for the
adoption of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines is laid down in Article 
III-179 (2). However, the Constitution also provides in Article III-197 (2) (a)
that the Member States with a derogation do not vote on the “adoption of the
parts of the broad economic policy guidelines which concerns the euro area
generally”. In other words, only the euro area Member States take part in the
vote for the adoption of the general Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for the
euro area. However, Article III-197 (2) (a) cannot serve as a legal basis for the
adoption of the individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for the euro area
Member States.53 Therefore, it would seem logical to consider the provision of
Article III-194 as the legal basis which allows the euro area Member States to
adopt individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for each of them, without
the Member States with a derogation participating in the vote.
As a result, where the adoption of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
currently rests on a single legal basis (Article 99 (2) of the Treaty), the
Constitution introduces a complex construction whereby the different parts of
the Guidelines rest on three distinct legal bases:
– The general EU Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the individual Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines of the Member States with a derogation will be
adopted by the Council with the vote of all Member States, on the basis of
Article III-179 (2);
– The general euro area Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will be adopted by
the Council without the vote of the Member States with a derogation, in
accordance with Article III-197 (2) (a);
– The individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the euro area Member
States will be adopted by the Council with the vote of just the euro area
Member States, on the basis of Article III-194.
The increase in the number of legal bases certainly creates complexity but can
also be regarded as a necessary step to enhance the autonomy of the euro area.
By doing so, the Constitution gives the euro area the possibility to set out its
general and individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. However, these
Guidelines will retain the status of a recommendation. As a consequence, their
structural weakness (i.e. their non-binding nature) will remain not only for the
EU but also for the euro area.
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4.2 CASES WHERE ONLY THE EURO AREA MEMBER STATES VOTE IN THE COUNCIL
As indicated above, the current Treaty contains some transitional provisions
according to which a list of Articles do not apply to the Member States with a
derogation. Article 122 (3) of the Treaty includes in this list the following
provisions:
– Coercive means of remedying excessive def icits;
– Objectives and tasks of the ESCB;
– Issuance of the euro;
– Acts of the ECB;
– Monetary agreements and measures related to exchange rate policy as well
as the external representation of the euro;
– Appointment of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB.
In addition, Article 122 (5) of the Treaty suspends the voting rights of the
Member States with a derogation for the Council decisions referred to in these
instances.
The Constitution extends the list of provisions which do not apply to Member
States with a derogation and for which their vote is suspended. Article III-197
(2) and (4) adds new instances where only euro area Member States can decide,
namely:
– Adoption of the parts of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines concerning
the euro area as a whole;
– Recommendations made to the euro area Member States in the framework of
the multilateral surveillance procedure, including on stability programmes
and early warnings;
– All measures relating to excessive deficits concerning euro area Member States.
For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that in both Article 123
of the Treaty and Article III-191 of the Constitution, the measures governing
the use of the euro are adopted by the Council with just the votes of euro area
Member States.54 Furthermore, the same rule applies when the Council adopts
the measures set out in the new heading on “provisions specific to Member States
whose currency is the euro”.
By comparison with the current situation, the autonomy of the euro area is
increased, since it will be able to take all decisions concerning its members,
without the Member States with a derogation participating in the vote, in the
framework of:
– The coordination of their economic policies, through the adoption of the euro
area general and individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines55;
– The multilateral surveillance procedure of their national measures
implementing the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and of their individual
stability programme;
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55 With regard to the adoption of the individual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the euro area Member States,
please refer to the above considerations on Article III-194.
– The Excessive Def icit Procedure (i.e. when the Council decides that an
excessive def icit exists, addresses recommendations to the Member State
concerned, gives notice to that Member State and when it adopts coercive
means of remedying such an excessive def icit).
4.3 VOTING MODALITIES WHEN ONLY THE EURO AREA MEMBER STATES VOTE 
IN THE COUNCIL – TOWARDS A NEW EURO AREA ECOFIN COUNCIL
CONFIGURATION?
In a Communication to the Convention56, the Commission proposed to set up a
formal decision-making body for the euro area. This body would be composed
of euro area Member States only, and would act as the euro area ECOFIN
Council. In other words, the proposal added a new Council conf iguration,
restricted to euro area Member States, alongside the existing EU Council of
Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance (ECOFIN) Council. The new euro
area ECOFIN Council configuration would take all decisions related to the euro
area and its Member States. However, in its f inal report to the Convention
plenary, the Working Group on Economic Governance was split over whether
“decisions related exclusively to the Eurozone should be taken by the ECOFIN
Council, bringing together the participating Member States only”.57
The Convention and the IGC were confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand,
they recognised the need for enhanced coordination within the euro area and
therefore the need to increase the autonomy of the euro area. This has even
become all the more necessary now that the euro area currently constitutes a
minority of EU Member States (12 out of 25), whereas before the 2004
enlargement it constituted the majority (12 out of 15). On the other hand, bearing
in mind that all EU Member States will in principle adopt the single currency,
the authors of the Constitution did not want the euro area to become a sort of
closed club. Therefore, they chose not to create a euro area ECOFIN Council.
Instead, they decided that decisions will be taken by the ECOFIN Council in its
full composition, but the voting rights of the non-euro area Member States shall
be suspended when the Council adopts measures specif ic to the euro area or to
its individual Member States.58
As we have seen above, the voting modalities in the Council when only the euro
area Member States take part in the vote can therefore be summarised as follows.
The voting modalities in the Council will differ before and as from 1 November
2009. For our calculations below, we will work on the basis of a euro area
composed of 12 Member States.
Until 31 October 2009, the Council will decide on the basis of weighted voting.
In a euro area composed of 12 Member States, a qualif ied majority requires 138
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56 Communication of the Commission, COM (2002) 247 f inal, 22 May 2002, p. 10.
57 Final Report, op. cit., p. 8.
58 This is illustrated in the transitional provisions contained in Article III-197 (2) and (4) or in Article III-194,
which provides that the Council will act, but that “only members of the Council representing Member States
whose currency is the euro shall take part in the vote”.
votes out of a total of 191 (i.e. 72%59). Thus, 54 votes are necessary to constitute
a blocking minority. In other words, just two large Member States are suff icient
to block a decision.60
From 1 November 2009 onwards, however, the double majority regime will apply.
In a euro area comprising 12 Member States, a qualif ied majority shall require
at least 55% of the participating Member States, representing together at least
65% of the population of those Member States. A blocking minority must include
Member States representing more than 35% of the population of the participating
Member States, plus one other Member State. Taking into account the respective
share of the Member States in the population of the euro area, we come to the
conclusion that at least three Member States will be needed to block a decision.61
This new regime should therefore facilitate the decision-making process as it
will be slightly harder to block a decision (i.e. requiring three Member States
instead of two).
Decisions relating to the euro area and its Member States are taken by the
Council without the Member States with a derogation participating in the vote,
but not in their absence. Hence, those Member States can take part in the
deliberations, which does not facilitate enhanced coordination among euro area
Member States.62 The authors of the Constitution were well aware of the fact that
enhanced coordination among euro area Member States needed an appropriate
forum in which not all Council members are present. Therefore, they decided
to formalise the role of the Euro Group, which was originally set up as an
informal body where euro area Member States could openly discuss questions
of common interest but were not able to take formal decisions.
4.4 MAKING THE EURO GROUP AN OFFICIAL ENTITY
Article III-195 of the Constitution declares that the “arrangements for meetings
between ministers of those Member States whose currency is the euro are laid
down by the Protocol on the Euro Group”.
Protocol No 12 on the Euro Group is rather brief. It contains two Articles which
lay down rules of a procedural nature. According to Article 1, the ministers of
the euro area will be able to meet informally to discuss questions related to the
specif ic responsibilities they share with regard to the single currency. The
Commission shall take part in the meetings, and the ECB shall be invited. The
meetings will be prepared by the representatives of the ministers of f inance and
62
59 See Article 2 (4) of Protocol No 34.
60 Or 72% of the votes of the other Member States when the Member State concerned does not take part in the
vote, for instance when the Council decides on the existence of an excessive deficit. In such a case, the threshold
to form a blocking minority will also be different.
61 Or, again, of the other Member States when the Member State concerned does not take part in the vote. However,
according to our calculations, the threshold to form a blocking minority (at least 35% of the population of
the Member States participating in the vote plus one member) remains the same, i.e. at least three Member
States are needed.
62 In this respect, a parallel can be drawn with the conditions relating to the functioning of the enhanced
cooperation (see Article III-416 et seq. of the Constitution). For an analysis of the working conditions of the
enhanced cooperation, see D. Servais, P. Vigneron and R. Ruggeri, “Le Traité de Nice. Son impact sur l’Union
économique et monétaire”, Euredia, 4 (2000), pp. 477-509.
the Commission.63 Article 2 adds that the ministers shall elect their president
for two and a half years.
On the substance, the Recitals of the Protocol contain some interesting
considerations. The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to promote
growth in the EU and, to that end, to develop an ever-closer coordination of
economic policies (which includes both the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
and f iscal discipline) within the euro area. They also aff irm that they are
“conscious of the need to lay down special provisions for enhanced dialogue
between the Member States whose currency is the euro, pending the euro
becoming the currency of all Member States of the Union”. The objectives of
the Euro Group are thus clearly stated: close coordination and enhanced
dialogue. In addition, the Recitals also make it clear that the Euro Group is of
a temporary nature and will only exist until all Member States have adopted the
euro.
What is the exact nature of the Euro Group? Article III-195 refers to
arrangements and meetings among ministers. In addition, the f irst Article of the
Protocol expressly stresses the informal nature of the Euro Group, which may
only discuss issues of common interest but does not take decisions, except to
elect its president.
In conclusion, the Protocol gives a legal basis to an existing body, which has
become the place where the euro area Member States can discuss issues that are
then (only) formally decided upon in the Council. As an increased number of
decisions will be decided with the votes of just the euro area Member States,
the role of the Euro Group should continue to increase. Moreover, the two and
a half year presidency introduced by the Constitution is a novelty. These elements
will certainly help assert the identity, the role and the economic governance of
the euro area, although much will depend on the personality of the president and
on the willingness of the euro area Member States to explore the ways that the
Constitution offers them.
5 OTHER RELEVANT ASPECTS OF EMU
In Chapters 3 and 4, we examined the economic governance of the Union and
the euro area, in particular regarding the budgetary rules and the coordination
of economic policies. We also mentioned the new voting rules within the
Council, when deciding in a Union or a euro area format. These rules also apply
to other provisions which were discussed in the IGC, some of which were
regarded as particularly sensitive by the Member States. In this last chapter we
will comment on the external representation, the measures governing the use
of the euro, entry into EMU, withdrawal from the Union and the revision
procedures.
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5.1 COMMON POSITIONS AND UNIFIED REPRESENTATION WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The provisions of the Treaty with regard to the position of the Community and
its external representation for issues relevant to EMU have never been
implemented. Instead, in 1998, the European Council of Vienna agreed on an
informal arrangement with regard to the external representation of the
Community in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G7 meetings, and urged
the institutions to come up with common positions on issues which are of
particular importance to EMU.64 This agreement has not been fully applied.65
Lastly, the Treaty of Nice modif ied the voting requirement in the Council to
decide on the external representation of EMU from unanimity to qualif ied
majority voting.66 However, the Council has not yet adopted such a decision.
Therefore, it is no wonder that, in its f inal report to the Convention plenary, the
Working Group on Economic Governance called for improved euro area
representation in international organisations. Unfortunately, the group could not
agree on the means to achieve this goal. While some group members favoured
better coordination, others considered that the President of the Euro Group should
have a stronger role. Finally, some members held the view that the Commission
should represent the euro area, as it represents the EU in trade policy.67
Under the current Article 111 (4) of the Treaty, the Council shall decide on the
position of the Community at international level with regard to issues of
particular relevance to EMU and on its representation. The Council acts by a
qualif ied majority, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
ECB. When adopting its decision, the Council shall comply with the allocation
of powers between economic policy and monetary policy, i.e. pay due respect
to the powers of the ECB in monetary matters. According to Article 122 (3) to
(5), the voting rights of the Member States with a derogation shall be suspended,
among others, for the decision referred to in Article 111 (4). In other words,
Council decisions relating to the position of the Community and its
representation at the international level with respect to EMU are adopted by the
euro area Member States.
Article III-196 (1) of the Constitution deals with the “euro’s place in the
international monetary system” and “common positions on matters of particular
interest for the EMU within the competent f inancial institutions and
conferences”. The second paragraph of Article III-196 provides that the Council
“may adopt appropriate measures to ensure unif ied representation within the
international f inancial institutions and conferences”. These provisions clearly
refer to the def inition of the euro area’s position and representation in the IMF
and G7/G8 meetings. The responsibility to establish common positions and to
adopt measures ensuring a unif ied representation belongs to the Council, acting
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB. The third
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64 Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council of Vienna, 11 and 12 December 1998, points 14 and 15.
65 European Commission, “EU Economy Review 2004”, p. 263.
66 See Servais, Vigneron and Ruggeri, op. cit., pp. 481-83.
67 Final Report of the Working Group on Economic Governance, op. cit., p. 8.
paragraph expressly states that decisions taken under the f irst or the second
paragraph will be adopted by those Member States whose currency is the euro,
and according to a qualif ied majority.
It should also be noted that neither Article 111 (4) nor Article III-196 involves
the European Parliament in the decision-making process.
In conclusion, be it on the substance or on the procedure, the two provisions are
very similar.68 However, a few differences should be noted:
– First, whereas the Council “shall adopt” a decision establishing common
positions under the f irst paragraph of Article III-196, the second paragraph
merely provides that the Council “may adopt” appropriate measures to ensure
unif ied representation. When the Council has an obligation to act in the f irst
case, it does not have such an obligation in the second. Article 111 (4) does
not make such a distinction. In both cases, the latter provides that the Council
“shall decide” and is therefore under an obligation to do so.
– Second, unlike Article 111 (4), Article III-196 does not refer to the allocation
of powers between the Council and the ECB with regard to economic and
monetary matters. Moreover, Article III-196 (1) seems to give the Council
a mandate “to secure the euro’s place in the international monetary system”,
possibly adding to the confusion. However, the duty to consult the ECB is
maintained in Article III-196 (1) and (2). Conflicts of competence should
therefore be avoided. In any case, the Council has to respect the exclusive
competence of the Eurosystem in the f ield of monetary policy.
– Third, another difference is to be found in the form of representation of the
euro area. Whereas Article 111 (4) does not specify how this representation
should be organised, Article III-196 (2) expressly refers to a “unif ied”
representation. Despite this new wording, a change in the present situation
seems unlikely as the Member States are still reluctant to abandon their seat
to a Union representative.69
5.2 MEASURES GOVERNING THE USE OF THE EURO
Article 123 (4), third sentence of the Treaty has often been compared to Article
308 (ex 235): a sort of implied powers clause for the euro area.70 It allows the
Council, acting by a qualif ied majority71 of the Member States without a
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68 This also holds true for the other provisions of Article 111 which are taken over in Article III-326 of the
Constitution.
69 One could argue that the legal personality given to the Union under Article I-7 of the Constitution could allow
it to become a member of international organisations and make it easier for the EU to speak with one voice
in these fora. However, membership of international organisations and conferences usually pertains to the realm
of Member States. Other constraints also have to be taken into account. First, the asymmetry of competence
between the Member States and the ECB with regard to economic and monetary matters is unchanged. Second,
not all EU Member States have adopted the euro as their single currency. Thus, the representation of the Union
would still be divided between the euro area and the other EU Member States. Third, it might be diff icult for
third parties to accept these internal EU arrangements.
70 However, Article 123 (4) of the Treaty does not apply to Member States with a derogation. Thus the Council
has to adopt a special legal act based on Article 308 of the Treaty each time it deems it necessary to extend
the effects of the measures adopted on the basis of Article 123 (4) to the Member States with a derogation.
71 Until the Treaty of Nice, the unanimity of the Member States without a derogation was required. In this respect
and more generally concerning the changes brought by the Treaty of Nice to the functioning of EMU, see
Servais, Vigneron and Ruggeri, op. cit., p. 483.
derogation, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB,
to “take the other measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the ECU as
the single currency of those Member States”.
Article III-191 of the Constitution introduces some changes in this provision.72
On the substance, the scope of the provision has been widened. It allows
measures to be taken that are necessary for the use of the euro in a broad sense
rather than just those measures necessary for its rapid introduction, as this was
considered too narrow a drafting. For instance, the Council Regulation on the
f ight against counterfeiting was adopted on the basis of Article 123 (4).73 No
one would argue that measures to protect the single currency are unnecessary,
but equally no one would say that they are linked to its rapid introduction either.
The letter of Article III-191 will thus better match its spirit and the reality. On
the procedure, Article III-191 expressly refers to European laws or framework
laws (which are legislative acts, based on a Commission proposal and adopted
according to the so-called co-decision procedure, whereby the Council and the
European Parliament are on an equal footing). Under the current procedure, the
European Parliament, though not mandatorily involved, is usually consulted.74
Although many measures have already been adopted, there might still be room
for using the new provision, which clearly reinforces the role of the European
Parliament. The new wording also provides that the measures to be adopted may
not prejudice the powers of the ECB and, as is now the case, that the latter has
to be consulted. As one of the merits of consulting the ECB is precisely to 
avoid any interference with its powers, we do not think that the provision of
Article III-191 adds anything new in this respect. Finally, as mentioned above,
Article III-191 is listed in Article III-197 (2) as one of the cases where only the
euro area Member States can take part in the vote.75
5.3 ENTRY INTO THE MONETARY UNION
To join the Monetary Union, a Member State must fulfil the convergence criteria.
The question of who should decide on whether these criteria have been fulf illed
gave rise to long discussions while the Maastricht Treaty was being negotiated.
The main conclusion was that one should avoid establishing a “club” whereby
the euro area Member States would co-opt new members. Therefore, according
to the Treaty, if the necessary conditions are met76, the Council, acting by a
qualif ied majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall abrogate the
derogation of the Member State concerned.77 Then the Council shall, acting this
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72 Article III-191 reads: “Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, European laws or
framework laws shall lay down the measures necessary for use of the euro as the single currency. Such laws
or framework laws shall be adopted after consultation of the European Central Bank”.
73 Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001, which lays down measures necessary for the protection
of the euro against counterfeiting, OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6.
74 For instance, the European Parliament has been consulted on Council Regulation 974/98 on the introduction
of the euro, or on Council Regulation 1338/2001, which lays down measures necessary to protect the euro
against counterfeiting.
75 This is also the case under Article 123 (4) of the Treaty.
76 The fulf ilment of the criteria is f irst discussed in the Council meeting in the composition of Heads of State
or Government, on the basis of reports from the Commission and the ECB and after consulting the European
Parliament.
77 Article 122 (2) of the Treaty.
time “with the unanimity of the euro area Member States and the Member State
concerned”, upon a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB,
adopt the conversion rate at which the euro shall be substituted for the currency
of the Member State concerned, and then take the other measures necessary for
the introduction of the euro in that Member State.78
The Constitution introduces an additional step in this procedure. According to
Article III-198 (2), second indent, besides the above-mentioned elements, the
Council shall act only after “having received a recommendation of a qualif ied
majority of those among its members representing Member States whose
currency is the euro”. It is further specified that “these members shall act within
six months of the Council receiving the Commission’s proposal”. On the other
hand, with regard to the f ixing of the conversion rate, the procedure remains
unchanged.
This additional step aimed to give euro area Member States greater say on the
entry of new Member States into the euro area. Since the 2004 enlargement, the
majority of EU Member States are not members of the euro area. Hence, the euro
area Member States feared that the majority would be able to force through the
entry of a Member State which does not fulf il the criteria by making the entry
of another Member State that fulf ils the criteria conditional upon the entry of
the one that does not. If there is def initely merit in increasing the role of the
euro area in the process, one may wonder whether adding a new step in an
already long and complex procedure was the best way of achieving this objective.
Besides, from a legal perspective, a “euro area recommendation” does not offer
the euro area Member States watertight protection: without such a
recommendation the Council may not act, but it does remain free to choose not
to follow it. To achieve the pursued objective, another solution could have been
to require that the f inal Council decision be taken by a qualif ied majority of the
euro area Member States as well as of the whole EU.
5.4 WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNION
Voluntary withdrawal from the Union is quite a novelty.79 Indeed, the European
integration process has often been considered as irreversible – or at the least,
the adoption of the euro is, as Jean-Victor Louis recalls in his contribution to
this volume.
Although the new provision does not explicitly deal with the possible withdrawal
of a euro area Member State from the EU, it goes without saying that the ECB
should be formally consulted in such a case for matters falling within its f ield
of competence. Nor does it deal with the case of a euro area Member State that
wants to recover its monetary sovereignty while still remaining a member of the
EU.
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78 Article 123 (5) of the Treaty.
79 See Article I-60 of the Constitution.
5.5 SIMPLIFIED REVISION PROCEDURES
The Convention and later the IGC aimed at making future amendments to the
Constitution and to the annexed protocols easier by introducing simplif ied
amendment procedures besides the ordinary revision procedure.
However, such flexibility is not completely new. Back in 1992, a specific procedure
was introduced in the EMU Chapter of the Treaty. Article 107 (5) of the Treaty
allows parts of the Statute to be revised according to a simplified procedure80, under
which the Council may act “either by qualified majority on a recommendation from
the ECB and after consulting the Commission or unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the ECB. In either case, the assent of the
European Parliament shall be required”. This provision is however only applicable
to some provisions of a very technical nature. The Constitution takes over this
specific procedure in Article III-187 (3), and moves it to the legislative procedure.
The Statute may therefore be amended by a European law, which means that the
European Parliament will co-decide with the Council. It should be noted that the
ECB’s right of initiative is nevertheless preserved.81
The Constitution introduces two further simplif ied revision procedures. As a
result, EMU provisions can be subject to four different revision procedures:
a) The above-mentioned specif ic procedure, which is applicable to the revision
of some parts of the Statute.
b) A simplif ied revision procedure with regard to Part III of the Constitution,
which may allow to move from unanimity to qualif ied majority voting in the
Council, as well as from a special legislative procedure to an ordinary legislative
procedure (i.e. the so-called co-decision procedure).82 This procedure could apply
to two EMU provisions:
– In Article III-184 (13), where the Council may adopt a European law acting
unanimously on a Commission proposal and after consulting the European
Parliament to adopt measures relating to the implementation of the Excessive
Deficit Procedure.
– In Article III-185 (6), where the Council may, acting unanimously and after
consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, adopt a European law
conferring specif ic tasks upon the ECB regarding the prudential supervision
of credit institutions and other f inancial institutions.83
Such changes require a European Decision adopted by unanimity by the
European Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, and
in the absence of any opposition notif ied by a national Parliament.
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80 Article 107 (5) of the Treaty and Article 41 of the Statute.
81 In this case, however, the qualif ied majority requirement will be higher than in the case of a Commission
proposal (see section 3.2 on the new double majority rule).
82 For more details concerning this procedure, see Article IV-444 of the Constitution.
83 It is worth noting that a move from unanimity to qualif ied majority in the Council was proposed in Nice and
during the last IGC. However, the Member States could not reach agreement on this proposal.
c) A simplif ied revision procedure, which opens the door for revising all or part
of the provisions of Title III of Part III on the internal policies and action of the
Union (including Chapter II on economic and monetary policy).84 The Member
States, as well as the European Parliament and the Commission, all have a right
of initiative to submit a proposal for revision to the European Council. After
consulting the European Parliament, the Commission and the ECB in case of
institutional changes in the monetary area, the European Council shall decide
by unanimity. This decision, which may not increase the competences of the
Union, shall then be ratified by all the Member States before it comes into force.85
Such a revision procedure could have a signif icant impact on the EMU
provisions as it allows all provisions of Chapter II to be amended. This includes
the procedure for coordinating economic policies, the f iscal rules (i.e. the
Excessive Def icit Procedure), and the tasks and organisation of the ESCB and
the ECB. It even allows the specific procedure applicable to the revision of some
parts of the Statute to be amended. As an illustration, Professor Jean-Victor
Louis recalls in his contribution a failed attempt to extend the list of provisions
contained in Article III-187 (3) to Articles 10 to 12 of the Statute (this attempt
aimed at modifying the composition, the functioning and the respective
responsibilities of the Governing Council and the Executive Board), and
mentions the strong opposition of the Eurosystem in this respect.86 Now, the
simplif ied revision procedure of Article IV-445 would precisely allow such an
extension of the list of provisions referred to in Article III-187 (3). It should
also be recalled that the Eurosystem advocated a reference to price stability in
Part I of the Constitution in order to protect its primary objective from a hasty
revision under the procedure of Article IV-445.87
d) The ordinary revision procedure will apply to the amendments to Part I (and
II) of the Constitution and to the annexed protocols. As regards EMU, it means
in particular the objectives of the Union, the euro as a symbol of the Union, the
categories of competence, the establishment of the ECB/ESCB/Eurosystem as
well as the protocols regarding the Statute, the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the
convergence criteria, the Euro Group and the specif ic position of the UK and
Denmark. The procedure can be initiated by any Member State, the European
Parliament or the Commission, but the ECB does not have such a right. The
procedure includes the convening of a Convention, prior to the IGC, unless the
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84 See Article IV-445 of the Constitution.
85 For more details, see Article IV-445 of the Constitution.
86 Under the present governance structure, monetary policy decisions are taken by the Governing Council of the
ECB, which is composed of the governors of the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro area and the six
members of the Executive Board of the ECB. For the sake of eff iciency, some observers consider that monetary
policy decisions should instead be taken by a restricted Monetary Policy Committee. Based on our participation
in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, we would like to note that this suggestion would run against one of the
basic principles of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations on EMU, i.e. that Member States abandon their monetary
sovereignty under the condition that they will continue to participate in the monetary policy decision-making
process. To reconcile this requirement with the need for independence of the monetary authority, it was decided
that, on the one hand, the governors of the NCBs would participate in the Governing Council but would not
receive or seek instructions and, on the other, that each member of the Governing Council would receive the
same voting power except when acting in his/her capacity as a shareholder of the ECB (with a weighted vote
according to the share of his/her respective NCB in the capital of the ECB). This compromise could explain
why the concept of participation “in a personal capacity” is only implicit in the Treaty.
87 See section 1.1 of this paper.
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European Council does not consider this to be justif ied by the extent of the
proposed amendments.
CONCLUSION
In a very synthetic way, the impact of the Constitution on EMU can be
summarised as follows:
– Looking at the substantive provisions that will apply when the Constitution
enters into force, no real progress has been achieved towards enhanced
coordination of economic policies: the structural weakness of the economic
pillar of EMU remains, since, as a rule, it only relies on non-binding
instruments (e.g. Broad Economic Policy Guidelines). Generally, the core
provisions still do not make any distinction between euro area and non-euro
area Member States. On the positive side, there are some minor achievements
to note (including the reference to the euro and more leeway to adopt measures
necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency).
– Progress has been made on economic governance: as an independent referee,
the Commission may address an early warning to a Member State, especially
in the case of a significant budgetary deviation; a Member State will no longer
vote on decisions regarding its economic and budgetary policies; the
autonomy of the euro area is increased, since in the f ield of economic and
budgetary policies it will now be able to take all decisions regarding its
members without the Member States with a derogation participating in the
vote; and the euro area Member States will also have a greater say regarding
entry into EMU, at least from a political point of view. However, the new
voting rules will not facilitate the decision-making process, and indeed the
large Member States will even see their position strengthened further.
– Some doors are still open: the Constitution allows the euro area Member
States to strengthen multilateral surveillance in the euro area, including the
preventive arm of the SGP. The revision procedures are more complex, but
at the same time make it possible to change rules, including important ones,
without convening an IGC.
This result can be explained by the need to maintain a delicate balance between
conflicting desires:
– The authors of the Constitution had to f ind a way to reconcile, on the one
hand, the request of the euro area Member States for enhanced economic
coordination among themselves and for greater autonomy, with, on the other,
the interests of non-euro area Member States, which were particularly opposed
to any weakening of the role of the ECOFIN Council.
– The euro area Member States had to reconcile their aspiration for more
symmetry between the economic and the monetary pillars of EMU and their
concern about losing autonomy in the conduct of their economic and budgetary
policies. As mentioned above, Member States were particularly keen to avoid
anything that could be seen as conferring on the Union itself a competence
to coordinate the economic policies of the Member States. This also explains
why no progress has so far been reached in the field of external representation.
To sum up, the Constitution does not introduce any important changes with
regard to the EMU provisions, nor does it create any new instruments. The real
added value is that the Constitution opens the door for an improved economic
and budgetary policy in the euro area, combined with reinforced multilateral
surveillance. As the autonomy of the euro area is increased for all decisions that
concern its members, euro area governance should in turn gain in consistency.
The rest depends on political will.
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ADJUSTING ECB DECISION-MAKING TO AN ENLARGED UNION
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Gerd Grum
ABSTRACT
Nel 1992 i Capi di Stato o di Governo europei hanno firmato il Trattato di
Maastricht sull’Unione Europea che apriva la strada dell’Unione monetaria e
gettava le basi del SEBC e della BCE. La struttura del più importante organo
decisionale della BCE e del SEBC, il Consiglio direttivo, prevedeva la
partecipazione, in qualità di membri, dei governatori delle banche centrali
nazionali di tutti gli Stati membri dell’area dell’euro.
Successivamente alla firma del Trattato di Maastricht il numero degli Stati
membri della UE si è più che raddoppiato, e  si attende ora il relativo
allargamento dell’area dell’euro. Di conseguenza la qualità di membro per tutti
i governatori delle BCN (“un paese, un voto”) nel Consiglio direttivo non può
essere sostenuta a tempo indefinito: la salvaguardia dell’efficienza del processo
decisionale richiede una limitazione di questo impianto.
Il Trattato di Nizza ha introdotto le modifiche fondamentali per adeguare i
processi decisionali degli organi della UE in un’Unione Europea allargata. Di
conseguenza, esso conteneva anche una disposizione per adeguare le modalità
di voto della BCE. A tal fine è stata inserita nello Statuto del SEBC/BCE  la
cosiddetta “clausola di abilitazione” (articolo 10.6), che dava facoltà al
Consiglio UE nella composizione dei Capi di Stato o di Governo di emendare
la procedura di voto del Consiglio direttivo della BCE (articolo 10.2).  I Capi
di Stato e di Governo hanno adottato tale emendamento il 21 marzo 2003, su
Raccomandazione della BCE, ed esso è entrato in vigore all’inizio di giugno
2004, a seguito della ratifica da parte degli Stati membri (tutti gli Stati membri
ad eccezione di quelli che sono entrati a far parte dell’Unione il 1° maggio
2004). Il nuovo regime avrà applicazione concreta soltanto quando il numero
degli Stati membri dell’area dell’euro sarà superiore a 15 o a 17, ove così decida
il Consiglio direttivo con una maggioranza dei due terzi. Da quel momento in
poi il processo decisionale del Consiglio direttivo della BCE sarà basato su uno
schema piuttosto complicato, caratterizzato da gruppi di paesi con differenti
rappresentatività nel voto.
Il contributo intende discutere e analizzare l’adeguamento delle modalità di voto
del Consiglio direttivo della BCE e paragonarlo con gli adeguamenti previsti
dal Trattato di Nizza per il futuro assetto istituzionale della Commissione
Europea. Viene infine valutato in che misura la Decisione del Consiglio UE
riguardante le nuove modalità di voto della BCE abbia raggiunto il suo obiettivo,
sia fondata su criteri adeguati e abbia trattato tutti gli Stati membri in una logica
di uguaglianza.
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„Doch teilt euch brüderlich darein!“
Friedrich Schiller, Die Teilung der Erde
“Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas”
Virgil, Georgics
1 INTRODUCTION
European integration is a fascinating peace project of a more or less
unprecedented dimension. 
What is unique about this process is that so many Member States have been
willing to transfer sovereign powers, in a democratic process, to a supranational
level. The political commitment to transfer sovereign rights to the European
Union (EU) and its institutions and bodies is even more impressive if one
considers that the loss of national self-determination is hardly ever offset by
equivalent gains in national influence in EU bodies. The enlargement of the EU
as envisaged by the Treaty of Nice and implemented in May 2004 through the
accession of ten new Member States has further limited individual countries’
possibilities of influencing European decision-making.
The decision to give up national competences did not come easily for the
Member States in any of the successive stages of European integration. This is
obviously also true for the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank (ECB), as
monetary sovereignty and monetary policy-setting have always been key
elements of national sovereignty. The diff icult struggle with the loss of national
influence became particularly clear when the EU Council agreed that the national
central bank governors’ permanent voting rights in the Governing Council of
the ECB, the EU’s supreme decision-making body in the f ield of monetary
policy, would have to be abandoned in the wake of euro area enlargement.
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established by the Treaty
on European Union (“the Maastricht Treaty”) signed in Maastricht on 7 February
1992. At that time the European Community consisted of 12 countries; the
number of its members had already doubled since its foundation, and six further
states were already in the waiting room for EU membership.1
Nevertheless, the basic organisational structure which had been in place since
the beginning of the European Economic Community was retained by the
Maastricht Treaty.
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1 In addition to Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, which at that time had already entered accession
negotiations and which, with the exception of Norway (a negative referendum), joined the EU on
1 January 1995, by 1992 Cyprus and Malta had also already submitted their applications for membership.
One of the fundamental ideas underlying this structure was that, in addition to
representation in the European Parliament, a representative2 of each state should
also contribute to decision-shaping in the other bodies involved in the legislative
process, i.e. the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.3
The Maastricht Treaty extended this principle to include the newly established
Governing Council of the ECB, which has ultimate authority over monetary
decision-making in the ESCB and the ECB. The Governing Council was to
consist of the six members of the Executive Board of the ECB and the governors
of the national central banks (NCBs) of all euro area Member States.
This “one representative per Member State principle” remained f irmly in place
until the second amendment4 to the Maastricht Treaty, namely the Treaty of Nice,
introduced a scheme which paved the way for the abandonment of this principle.
Based on this option, the Council (Heads of State or Government) decided that,
should the EU reach a certain number of Member States, no EU/EMU Member
State was to have permanent voting rights in the European Commission and
Governing Council of the ECB.
In the remainder of this paper, we will outline the adjustment of voting
modalities in the Governing Council of the ECB as envisaged by the Treaty of
Nice and compare it with the rotation scheme provided for the European
Commission (Section 2), before assessing the related EU Council Decision of
21 March 2003 (Section 3). The paper concludes with some f inal remarks
(Section 4).5
2 THE TREATY OF NICE 
2.1 ADJUSTMENTS TO DECISION-MAKING IN GENERAL
A long time before the establishment of the ESCB and ECB6, it had become
obvious that the number of European Union Member States was going to grow
considerably in the foreseeable future. Cyprus and Malta had applied for
membership as early as 1990; Hungary and Poland had followed suit in 1994,
and all other Member States which f inally joined the EU in 2004, as well as
Romania and Bulgaria, had submitted their applications for accession by 1995
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2 As far as the European Commission is concerned, these representatives are not to be understood as guardians
of national interests, but as persons nominated by a Member State.
3 It should be stated that the functions of Council and Commission members are completely different when it
comes to the consideration of national interests. While Commission members have to act fully independently
and must observe purely Community interests, the EU Council is the body that safeguards national interests.
However, even EU Council members are limited in pursuing national interests by virtue of Article 10 of the
Treaty (see for example A. Egger (2003), in H. Mayer, Kommentar zu EU- und EG-Vertrag, 11. Lieferung
(Vienna: Manz Verlag), Articles 202-210, p. 14; and I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (1996), Legal Issues of European
Integration, 1, p. 76).
4 Leaving aside the Accession Treaty concerning Austria, Finland and Sweden.
5 A detailed discussion of this Council Decision can be found in the ECB Monthly Bulletin of May 2003. See
also S. Dvorsky and I. Lindner (2003), „Anpassung der Stimmrechtsmodalitäten im EZB-Rat“, in
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Berichte und Studien, 2, pp. 144-53, who also review the literature on alternative
voting modalities.
6 I.e. 1 June 1998.
or 1996. In the autumn of 1998 the EU formally opened accession negotiations
with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (the so-called Luxembourg
group). At that point it became inevitable that the structure of the EU as a whole,
which dated back to the original Community of six nations, would have to be
reformed to adapt its bodies to a steadily increasing number of Member States,
in order to ensure and improve the eff iciency of the decision-making process.
Adjusting the size and composition of the European Commission and
reweighting the votes in the EU Council had in fact already been on the agenda
of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) convened in 1996 and concluded in
1997.7 This conference, which resulted in the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on
2 October 1997 and effective from 1 May 1999), did not, however, resolve these
issues.8 Thus, another reform of the Maastricht Treaty was needed in a further
attempt to solve structural def iciencies. 
In February 2000 a new IGC was convened to prepare further amendments to
the Maastricht Treaty. The key objective of this conference was to find a solution
to those problems which had not been solved by the Treaty of Amsterdam (the
so-called Amsterdam leftovers). These issues included the size and composition
of the European Commission, an expansion of those areas which only require
qualif ied majority voting in the EU Council9, and the reweighting of votes in
the EU Council.
The result of this Conference, the Treaty of Nice, which was signed on 26
February 2001 and came into effect from 1 February 2003, was largely met with
sceptical, critical and sometimes sneering10 comments in the media. According
to a Monitoring European Integration report by the Centre for Economic Policy
Research, the Treaty of Nice failed almost completely in two of the above-
mentioned areas: measures directed toward reforming the European
Commission’s composition and size and expanding those areas only requiring
qualif ied majority voting were considered insuff icient.
Nevertheless, the results of the Treaty of Nice do not seem to deserve such harsh
criticism, as formally the objectives of dealing with the “Amsterdam leftovers”
and of creating suitable conditions for enlargement were met.11 Even if the
proposed solutions were neither perfect nor self-suff icient12, they still paved the
way for enlargement.
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7 The legal basis for calling this conference was a clause on amending the EU Treaties in Article 48, paragraph
2, of the Maastricht Treaty (ex Article N).
8 The “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union” annexed to the
Treaty of Amsterdam merely stated that a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member
States was to be convened at least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeded 20
countries; at the same time, it shifted the focus for further amendments to the Treaty on the Commission’s
size and composition and on the weighting of votes to the EU Council.
9 See document SN 300/99, Recital 16.
10 See for instance a report entitled “Nice Try”, published in European Economic Perspectives (issue 29) of the
Centre for Economic Policy Research. The Times regarded it as “an ingenious voting system reminiscent of
the annual machinations of the Eurovision Song Contest”, while The Independent summarised the achievements
of the Nice Treaty as representing “hardly a great step forward for the European ideal”.
11 See for example K. H. Fischer (2003), Der Vertrag von Nizza (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag).
12 Article 10.6, which was added by the Treaty of Nice, merely opened up the possibility to alter voting procedures
in the Governing Council of the ECB through a unanimous decision of the Heads of State or Government.
In the following sub-section we will compare the regulatory adjustments for the
European Commission and the Governing Council of the ECB, and will elaborate
on the similarities and differences between the two.
2.2 ADJUSTING THE COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
With respect to the size and composition of the European Commission, the EU
Heads of State or Government reached the following compromise13:
– When the f irst Commission takes up its duties after 1 January 2005, the
Commission is to include one national of each of the Member States. The
number of Members of the Commission may be altered by the Council, acting
unanimously.
– When the f irst Commission takes up its duties after the number of Member
States has reached 27, the following regulation shall apply: “The number of
Members of the Commission shall be less than the number of Member States.
The Members of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation
system based on the principle of equality, the implementing arrangements for
which shall be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously.” The
implementing arrangements shall contain all the criteria and rules necessary
for determining the composition of successive colleges automatically and
shall comply with the following principles14:
– Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing as regards
determination of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as
Members of the Commission; consequently, the difference between the total
number of terms of off ice held by nationals of any given pair of Member
States may never be more than one;
– subject to the latter, each successive college shall be so composed as to
reflect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of all the
Member States of the Union.
With this formula, the European Union for the f irst time abandoned the existing
rule that each Member State should have at least one representative in all EU
bodies involved in legislation (even if this change was only to take effect in the
future). Although this principle had not been explicitly laid down anywhere, it
had nonetheless represented a driving element of EU legislation and thus
probably also of the EU’s identity up to this point – irrespective of the fact that
members of the Commission have always had to act exclusively in the interest
of the EU regardless of individual national concerns.
As from the accession of the 27th Member State, the “one member, one vote”
principle will be abandoned in the first European Commission to be subsequently
installed, and the number of Commissioners will have to be lower than the
number of Member States. The size of the Commission and all further details
will then have to be determined by the Council on the basis of a unanimous vote.
What has been decided by the Nice Treaty, however, is that the rotation system
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13 Article 4 of the “Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union” annexed to the Maastricht Treaty and
to the Treaties establishing the European Communities by the Nice Treaty.
14 Article 4, paragraph 3, of the above Protocol.
has to treat Member States on a strictly equal footing with regard to the sequence
of, and the time spent by, nationals as Members of the Commission. In addition,
the composition shall satisfactorily reflect the demographic and geographical
range of all Member States.
With respect to the size and composition of the Commission, the Treaty of Nice
thus resorted to a flexible model which provides a regulatory framework as well
as basic principles, while leaving more detailed, later specif ications to another
body (or several other bodies).
2.3 ADJUSTING THE VOTING PROCEDURES OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL 
OF THE ECB
In addition to the rotation system for the European Commission, the Treaty of
Nice resorted to a similar model for the ECB concerning the voting rights of
its Governing Council. By inserting a new provision (Article 10.6) in the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (“the
Statute”), the Treaty of Nice directly altered the Statute and offered the
possibility for the Heads of State or Government (“enabling clause”) to change
the voting procedures in the Governing Council of the ECB.
Article 5 of Part One (“Substantive Amendments”) of the Treaty of Nice added
the following paragraph in Article 10 of the Statute:
– “10.6 Article 10.215 may be amended by the Council meeting in the
composition of the Heads of State or Government, acting unanimously either
on a recommendation from the ECB and after consulting the European
Parliament and the Commission, or on a recommendation from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB. The
Council shall recommend such amendments to the Member States for
adoption. These amendments shall enter into force after having been ratif ied
by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. A recommendation made by the ECB under this paragraph shall
require a decision by the Governing Council acting unanimously.”
Thus the newly added Article 10.6 of the Statute introduced a specif ic and
somehow challenging procedure for amendments to the Statute. The amendment
procedure as def ined by Article 10.6 in fact resembles the procedure for
amending the Treaty, one signif icant difference being that the former does not
require a previous IGC. 
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15 Article 10.2 of the Statute, later amended by Decision 2003/223/EC of the Council, meeting in the composition
of the Heads of State or Government, of 21 March 2003, on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute (OJ
L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 6), used to read as follows: “Subject to Article 10.3, only members of the Governing Council
present in person shall have the right to vote. By way of derogation from this rule, the Rules of Procedure
referred to in Article 12.3 may lay down that members of the Governing Council may cast their vote by means
of teleconferencing. These rules shall also provide that a member of the Governing Council who is prevented
from voting for a prolonged period may appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing Council. Subject
to Articles 10.3 and 11.3, each member of the Governing Council shall have one vote. Save as otherwise
provided for in this Statute, the Governing Council shall act by a simple majority. In the event of a tie, the
President shall have the casting vote. In order for the Governing Council to vote, there shall be a quorum of
two-thirds of the members. If the quorum is not met, the President may convene an extraordinary meeting at
which decisions may be taken without regard to the quorum.”
2.4 DIFFERENCES IN ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNING
COUNCIL OF THE ECB
Like the new provision of the Treaty of Nice reforming the size of the European
Commission, Article 10.6 of the Statute requires unanimous action on the part
of the Council before pertinent measures can be implemented. Unlike the
regulation on the size of the Commission, however, Article 10.6 additionally
requires ratification by all Member States. On the one hand, this can be explained
by the fact that the Nice Treaty further specifies the framework for a restructured
composition of the Commission, while it does not outline any criteria for a new
voting procedure in the ECB Governing Council. On the other hand, this may,
to a certain extent, reflect the particular sensitiveness of decision-making in the
field of monetary policy in Europe. Changes to the regulatory framework of the
Governing Council of the ECB or a curtailment of voting rights in this supreme
monetary policymaking body – whatever form they might take – apparently
should not be possible without being confirmed by national parliaments, which
somehow compensates for the lack of any specif ications concerning the new
Governing Council voting structure.
The adjustments introduced by the Treaty of Nice to increase the eff iciency of
the Commission and those targeted at the Governing Council of the ECB also
differ signif icantly in that the number of Commissioners is supposed to be
downsized once EU membership exceeds a certain number, while Article 10.6
of the Statute does not affect the composition of the Governing Council of the
ECB or the right of participation therein, but merely members’ voting rights and
their execution. Although the voting rights of varying members are to be
temporarily suspended, all members of the Governing Council of the ECB shall
maintain the right to participate in Governing Council meetings. 
The provisions pertaining to the Commission’s size also comprise the important
stipulation that the number of Members of the Commission shall be less than
the number of Member States once the EU consists of 27 Member States, and
that the Members of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation
system based on the principle of equality expressed in predetermined criteria.16
Thus, the Council is only to determine the limit for the number of Commission
Members and the exact implementing arrangements for the rotation system, but
has in fact little room to manoeuvre. Article 10.6 of the Statute, by contrast, does
not specify how voting procedures in the Governing Council of the ECB should
be determined. It neither contains any indication with regard to timing nor does
it stipulate a limitation to the number of members with voting rights, nor a f ixed
procedure for their allocation. Although it might seem that this lack of
specif ication is politically compensated for by the requirement that all Member
States have to ratify prospective regulatory adjustments, it is nevertheless
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16 These criteria, which are to determine the composition of successive colleges automatically, are to be based
on the following principles: (a) Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing with regard to
determination of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as Members of the Commission;
consequently the difference between the total number of terms of off ice held by nationals of any given pair of
Member States may never be more than one; (b) subject to point (a), each successive college shall be so composed
as to reflect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of all the Member States of the Union.
striking, given that an important aspect of primary Community law has thus
formally been delegated to a Community body. In comparison with the new
provisions on the European Commission laid down in the Treaty of Nice, the
provisions enabling new voting modalities for the Governing Council of the ECB
are thus even more flexible and leave the Heads of State or Government with
a broad margin of discretion – even if the ratif ication requirement does not give
them exclusive responsibility.17 This does not, however, mean that the EU Council
(in the composition of the Heads of State or Government) is entirely free to
decide on whatever regulatory provisions it chooses. Every regulatory provision
which is issued in accordance with Article 10.6 of the Statute must correspond
to the general fundamental principles of Community law. In particular, such
decisions have to meet standards of proportionality and equal treatment as
endorsed by the European Court of Justice in the context of legislative acts.
3 COUNCIL DECISION OF 21 MARCH 2003
On 3 February 2003 the ECB issued a Recommendation18 which completely
corresponded to the later Decision 2003/223/EC19 regarding new voting
modalities for the ECB Governing Council in a future, enlarged euro area
(Article 1 of this Decision is set out in Annex 1).
3.1 BASIC CONCEPT OF THE COUNCIL DECISION
The new system of voting rights as adopted on 21 March 2003 by the EU Council
in Decision 2003/223/EC can be summarised as a two-tier rotation model which
allocates NCB governors to different groups with specif ic numbers of voting
rights. Governors will exercise their voting rights with different frequencies
depending on the size of their NCB’s economy within the euro area. Within each
group, governors have a voting right for equal amounts of time. The allocation
of governors to groups depends on the ranking of their NCBs’ Member State (see
Annex 2, showing a ranking based on the prospective Member States at that
juncture) measured against a weighted two-component indicator: The f irst
component, to which a 5/6 weight is attributed, is the gross domestic product
at market prices (GDP mp), while the second component, accounting for a weight
of 1/6, is the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions
(TABS-MFIs) of the respective Member State.
The following charts for the f irst and second tier show the basic concept of the
selected rotation model:
Tier one, which provides for two groups of governors, will start as soon as the
overall number of governors exceeds 15.
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17 In practice, however, the Heads of State or Governments’ scope of discretion is similar to that of a Treaty
amendment, the only difference being that no IGC has to intervene and the Council is strictly limited to the
given Treaty framework.
18 Recommendation ECB/2003/1, under Article 10.6 of the Statute, for a Council Decision on an amendment
to Article 10.2 of the Statute (OJ C 29, 7.2.2003, p. 6).
19 Cf. footnote 15.
With regard to tier one, it is explicitly stated that the frequency of voting rights
allocated to the f irst group will not be lower than the frequency of voting rights
for the second group.
The second tier, which already provides for three groups, will commence when
the number of governors exceeds 21.
The detailed implementing procedures are to be adopted by the Governing
Council, acting by a two-thirds majority of its members with and without a
voting right. By applying the same procedure, the Governing Council may also
decide to postpone the start of the rotation system until the date on which the
number of governors exceeds 18.
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Table 1 The two-group rotation system (first stage) – 
voting frequencies of governors in each group
First group Second group Sum
Governors Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting
in the Governing rights/ frequency rights/ frequency rights
Council governors (percentage) governors (percentage)
16 5/5 100 10/11 91 15
17 5/5 100 10/12 83 15
18 5/5 100 10/13 77 15
19 4/5 80 11/14 79 15
20 4/5 80 11/15 73 15
21 4/5 80 11/16 69 15
22 and more Second stage: rotation system with three groups (see Table 2)
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2003.
Table 2 The three-group rotation system (second stage) – 
voting frequencies of governors in each group
First group Second group Third group Sum
Governors Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting
in the rights frequency rights frequency rights rights rights
Governing governors (per- governors (per- governors (per-
Council centage) centage) centage)
16-21 First stage: rotation system with two groups (see Table 1)
22 4/5 80 8/11 73 3/6 50 15
23 4/5 80 8/12 67 3/6 50 15
24 4/5 80 8/12 67 3/7 43 15
25 4/5 80 8/13 62 3/7 43 15
26 4/5 80 8/13 62 3/8 38 15
27 4/5 80 8/14 57 3/8 38 15
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2003.
3.2 CONSULTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
Recommendation ECB/2003/120 triggered the Commission’s and the
Parliament’s right to be consulted.
The Commission presented its Opinion21 on the matter on 19 February 2003. It
supported the rotation model recommended by the ECB and checked it against
several criteria22 the Commission had developed.
The Commission noted that the rotation model was in line with the Treaty of
Nice and that it would prepare the ECB for a substantially enlarged euro area.
However, the Commission also saw some room for improvement and reached
the following conclusions:
– It could be advisable to lower the maximum number of voting rights, as this
could further increase the speed and eff iciency of decision-making.
– In view of the weighting formula intended to govern the frequency at which
the individual NCB governors are assigned voting rights in the Governing
Council of the ECB, the Commission emphasised the relevance of the
population criterion for reforming the voting rules in other institutions
(notably the EU Council), and stated that it deemed the ECB’s key for capital
subscription (50% GDP component, 50% population component) more
appropriate for assigning individual Member States to the various groups of
the rotation model, as this would more strongly reflect an unbiased and neutral
approach.
– To increase transparency, some issues should be regulated in greater detail
(e.g. rotation frequency, the order according to which voting rights are to be
assigned within each group), and the effective start of the rotation system
should be explicitly mentioned in Article 10.2. 
– Large-scale adaptations are not to be based on the enabling clause, but require
decisions taken within the framework of the EU Convention or IGCs.23
By comparison, the Opinion of the European Parliament on the ECB’s
Recommendation24 is much more critical. The European Parliament states that
it is fully conscious of the need to reform the voting procedures of the Governing
Council of the ECB in view of a possible enlargement of EMU. Nevertheless,
it rejects the ECB’s Recommendation. It points to the excessive complexity of
the proposed rotation model and to the fact that it has been widely criticised for
that reason. At the same time, it takes into account the diff iculty of coming up
with reform measures within the limits set by Article 10.6 of the Statute.
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20 Cf. footnote 18.
21 COM (2003) 81 f inal, which has to the best of our knowledge not yet been published in the Off icial Journal.
22 The Commission named the following conditions: “decisions should continue to be taken in a swift and efficient
manner; the decision-making bodies should act with the interests of the whole euro area in mind; the system
must be considered as neutral and unbiased by both existing and future Member States; the markets and the
general public should be able to understand the logic and the functioning of the new voting system.” However,
the Commission deemed that these criteria had not been fully met.
23 However, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe did not introduce any further adaptations to the
decision-making procedures of the ECB Governing Council.
24 Adopted on 13 March 2003, 6163/2003 – C5-0038/2003 – 2003/0803(CNS); (OJ C 61 E/274 10.3.2004).
According to the European Parliament, the present voting procedure in the
Governing Council of the ECB should be maintained for the time being. Reform
proposals should be left up to the European Convention, and decisions could
be taken in the course of the next IGC.25
As far as the composition of the Executive Board is concerned, the European
Parliament leans toward increasing the number of members to nine persons who
are to be competent for operational decisions. Moreover, the Parliament
envisages a Governing Council responsible for “strategic and general monetary
policy decisions”, acting on a double majority “based on the population of the
Member States, the total size of the economy and the relative size within it of
the f inancial services sector”.
After consulting the European Commission and Parliament, the EU Council
unanimously adopted an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute on 21 March
2003 (see Annex 1), which was fully based on the above-mentioned ECB
Recommendation.
3.3 THE MOTIVATION OF THE SELECTED ROTATION MODEL AS SET OUT IN THE
DECISION
The reasons and explanations for this complex regulation are laid out in the
“whereas” clauses of Decision 2003/223/EC:
In an introductory remark, the EU Council stresses that there “is a need to
maintain the Governing Council’s capacity for eff icient and timely decision-
making in an enlarged euro area, irrespective of the number of Member States
that adopt the euro. […] A rotation system is an equitable, eff icient and
acceptable way of assigning voting rights among the governors in the Governing
Council.” A number of 15 voting rights for the governors is deemed to strike
“an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, continuity with the existing
set-up including a balanced assignment of voting rights between the six members
of the Executive Board and the other members of the Governing Council and,
on the other hand, the need to ensure efficient decision-making in a substantially
enlarged Governing Council” (“whereas” clause (1)).
“Whereas” clause (2) indicates clearly that changes to the permanent voting
rights of the Executive Board members in the Governing Council have never been
an issue, as they are appointed at European level by a Treaty procedure. The
clause also makes reference to the fact that the Executive Board Members are
the only members of the Governing Council operating solely in the euro area
context and for the ECB without performing any NCB function at the same time.
As far as the composite indicator (the 5/6-1/6 GDP mp and TABS-MFIs split)
is concerned, the economic weight of a Member State as reflected by its GDP
mp is said to be “an appropriate component as the impact of central bank
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25 Cf. footnote 23.
decisions is greater in Member States with larger economies than in those with
smaller economies. At the same time, the size of a Member State’s f inancial
sector also has a particular relevance for central bank decisions, since the
counterparties of central bank operations belong to this sector. […] This choice
of weights is suitable, as this will mean that the f inancial sector is suff iciently
and meaningfully represented.”26
The shares of each Member State in the aggregate GDP mp and in the TABS-
MFIs of the Member States which have adopted the euro should be adjusted
whenever the aggregate GDP mp is adjusted in accordance with Article 29.3 of
the Statute or whenever the number of governors in the Governing Council
increases.
According to “whereas” clause (4), the chosen rotation principle reflects f ive
fundamental principles: 
1. “One member, one vote”: this is said to be the Governing Council’s core
decision-making principle; it continues to apply to all members of the
Governing Council that have a voting right; 
2. “Ad personam representation”: this refers to the fact that all members of the
Governing Council will continue to participate in its meetings “in a personal
and independent capacity”;
3. “Automaticity”: this means that the rotation system will be able to
accommodate any euro area enlargements up to the presently envisaged
maximum number of Member States27;
4. “Representativeness”: this principle pursues the objective of avoiding
insuff icient representation of the euro area economy as a whole;
5. “Transparency”.28
3.4 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
An analysis of Decision 2003/223/EC on the new voting modalities must above
all deal with the achievement of the objective of the Decision, the
appropriateness of its criteria and with the issue of equal treatment of Member
States.
3.4.1 DO THE NEW VOTING MODALITIES MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH THEY
WERE ESTABLISHED?
The objective of making the decision-making process more efficient in a larger
Governing Council of the ECB, which was implicitly set by the Treaty of Nice, has
been met to a certain extent through the establishment of a rotation system. As a
result of the thresholds introduced by Decision 2003/223/EC, the number of persons
voting on decisions of the Governing Council will gradually become smaller than
the overall number of Governing Council members, and will never exceed 15. Yet
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26 See “whereas” clause (5) of Decision 2003/223/EC.
27 The rotation system should be able to accommodate a number of Member States up to 27 (the present 25
Member States as well as Bulgaria and Romania, which already had the status of accession candidates when
the Treaty of Nice was signed). The ECB’s Recommendation also labelled this principle as the “robustness
principle”.
28 With regard to this principle, the EU Council Decision does not offer any further explanation.
the merits of the rotation system and its practical gains for the decision-making
process in the Governing Council are significantly reduced by one factor: the
rotation system does not reduce the number of governors actually participating in
the meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB – the non-voting members are
free to join the voting members in their discussions. (In this respect, it must be
noted that the new voting modalities do not necessarily effect a shift from present
practice, because so far the Governing Council has adopted the overwhelming
majority of its decisions by consensus rather than by formal voting.)
The fact that the practical relevance of Decision 2003/223/EC is limited must,
however, not be blamed on the Heads of State or Government that took this
decision. After all, the EU Council’s mandate under the Treaty of Nice to amend,
by unanimous vote, the Statute (Article 10.6, the “enabling clause”) is limited
to Article 10.2 of the Statute. As the enabling clause does not extend to Article
10.1, which regulates the basic composition of the Governing Council of the
ECB, the right to participate in Governing Council meetings that the Maastricht
Treaty granted to all Eurosystem NCB governors – including future members
without voting rights – was here to stay.
Moreover, while the Governing Council has so far adopted most of its decisions
without a formal voting procedure, this need not be the case in the future. The
very reason for which the enabling clause was inserted by the Treaty of Nice
was to secure an eff icient decision-making procedure in a Eurosystem
comprising more (than the current 12) NCBs.
Accordingly, the European Commission noted in its Opinion of 3 February 2003
that the three-group rotation model fully responds to the mandate received in
Nice and prepares the ECB for a substantially enlarged euro area. 
3.4.2 ARE THE CRITERIA ON WHICH THE DECISION WAS BASED APPROPRIATE
AND ADEQUATE?
Without any doubt, the principles of transparency and of involving the NCB
governors in a personal and independent capacity are appropriate and adequate.
The latter concept reflects the ESCB’s guiding principle enshrined in Article 108
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”), according
to which decision-making bodies shall seek or take no instructions from third
parties, as well as the principle that governors are to vote in a personal capacity
as laid down in Article 10.2 (substitution only being allowed in case of absence
for a prolonged period), plus the ESCB’s commitment to fully autonomous
decision-making. Indeed, it goes beyond this concept in so far as it rejects the
idea that several members should have to represent other members of the
Governing Council or the overall interest of a constituency.29 Furthermore, the
principle of automatic accommodation to any euro area enlargement up to the
presently envisaged maximum number of Member States seems very reasonable,
because this principle obviates the need for making adjustments upon every
single enlargement of the Eurosystem (up to 27 members, which appeared
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29 At the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, each Executive Director represents the countries
allocated to his/her constituency.
realistic when the Treaty of Nice was signed). This criterion is derived from the
Nice Treaty itself, which prescribed it for the Commission rotation model.
An interesting aspect that is not immediately understandable is that one of the
criteria by which the rotation system was chosen was the “one member, one vote”
principle. After all, the new voting modalities no longer reflect this principle.
Yet the Council Decision is based on the interpretation that this principle should
apply to all those members of the Governing Council that have been assigned
voting rights. In other words, one voting member, one vote. This principle would
not seem to be a key criterion. In the rotation model, votes are treated differently
by allocating them to different groups; in theory, it would also have been possible
to establish such an indirect form of weighting with a system of multiple voting
rights. From this perspective, this criterion does not appear to affect significantly
the adequacy of the chosen system. The decision to weight voting rights by
assigning different frequencies to them is at best the more “elegant” option, as
a system of staggered voting also implements the weighting principle, but in a
less obvious way. 
Finally, the criterion of “representativeness”, which is designed to avoid
situations of insuff icient representation of the euro area economy as a whole,
is of crucial importance.30 This criterion basically prescribes that the rotation
model must contain some kind of weighting element. It requires governors whose
Member States account for a greater share of the euro area economy to be
allocated larger shares in the voting key. A weighting based on the economic
role of the Member States within the euro area was not stipulated by the Treaty
of Nice, but reflects a policy judgement that the EU Council, meeting in the
composition of Heads of State or Government, endorsed on the basis of a
recommendation by the Governing Council of the ECB. As such, this judgement
is not to be contested and appears to be an adequate criterion, even though it
strongly restricts the range of options. 
To sum up, the criteria recommended by the Governing Council and eventually
endorsed by the EU Council which were to def ine the requirements for the
rotation model appear to be broadly appropriate and adequate. This brings us
to the question as to whether those criteria were suff icient or whether additional
criteria would have been called for. In this respect two criteria listed in the
European Commission’s Opinion of 3 February 2003 should be mentioned: 
– “the system must be considered as neutral and unbiased by both existing and
future Member States”;
– “the markets and the media should be able to understand the logic and the
functioning of the new voting system”.
The f irst of these two criteria is linked to the question discussed under sub-
section 3.4.3, i.e. whether the rotation system may lead to an unequal treatment
of Member States.
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30 This criterion is related to the requirement mentioned by the European Commission in its Opinion that “the
decision-making bodies should act with the interests of the whole euro area”. The European Commission’s
concept appears, however, more neutral than the criterion of “representativeness”.
However, the neutrality of a given system cannot be evaluated in an abstract
manner, but only in relation to a reference model – something that the Treaty
of Nice did not provide. Choosing a weighting model which is referred to in the
Treaty in a different context (such as the voting weights of EU Council members
or the ECB’s subscribed capital key) as a reference model again implies a policy
judgement, even if contextual differences are rather small. Against this backdrop,
it is not easy to recognise any objective assessment of the rotation system as
being fully neutral. The crucial point is that Member States must not be treated
unequally in a discriminatory way (see also sub-section 3.4.3). 
The second of the two Commission criteria mentioned above, which underlines
the importance of an understandable framework, is broadly in line with the
transparency principle advocated in Decision 2003/223/EC. However, the
Commission formulated this requirement in a more detailed and explicit way.
The Commission could have gone further than that – it could have called for the
new voting modalities to cut back signif icantly the number of voting governors
in the Governing Council. In fact, the Commission did argue along those lines
by indicating that it would be advisable to reduce the maximum number of voting
rights in order to strengthen the speed and eff iciency of decision-making, but
it did not actually go so far as to specify a criterion to this effect. This argument
was not followed through for political reasons. A stronger reduction of voting
rights would clearly have hit the smaller Member States most, which would have
made it unrealistic to expect unanimous support for a more sweeping reform of
the Governing Council.31
3.4.3 HAVE THESE CRITERIA BEEN MET, AND ARE THE NEW VOTING MODALITIES
IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL EU MEMBER
STATES?
At any rate, the voting modalities that were adopted in the end meet the criteria
that the governors shall act in a personal and independent capacity and that the
system shall be accommodated automatically for enlargements of the Eurosystem.
With regard to the transparency principle, however, a qualif ication is called for:
the logic of the system may not be deemed the most straightforward, and its high
degree of complexity does not foster immediate understanding. Yet as the causal
relationship on the basis of which the new voting modalities work is obvious,
it cannot be said that this criterion has not been met.
The new regime also reflects the principle of “one member, one vote” (in the
sense interpreted above). As mentioned earlier, this principle would not appear
to be particularly relevant for judging the adequacy of the system, as there are
different approaches to weighting votes, including the assignment of votes for
different frequencies, as at the ECB.
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31 The number of voting rights for governors never sinks below 15, which implies that the Governing Council
will at all times have at least 21 voting members. Moreover, this system does not take effect until the Eurosystem
consists of 16 NCBs.
What matters most for an overall assessment is whether the chosen rotation
system meets the criterion of a sufficient representation of the euro area economy
as a whole, or whether there is a bias in the system that clashes with the principle
of equal treatment.
In this respect it must be noted that the weighting formula governing the
frequency at which the individual NCB governors are assigned voting rights is
somewhat out of the ordinary. As indicated above, the ranking is based on a two-
component indicator, where a 5/6 weight is attributed to the shares that the
individual Member States have in the euro area’s gross domestic product at
market prices (GDP mp), and a 1/6 weight to the shares that the total aggregated
balance sheet of the monetary f inancial institutions (TABS-MFIs) of each
Member State has in the euro area’s TABS-MFIs.
The reason why this particular composite indicator was chosen is specif ied in
“whereas” clause (5): “The economic weight of a Member State as reflected in
its GDP mp is an appropriate component as the impact of central bank decisions
is greater in Member States with larger economies than in those with smaller
economies. At the same time, the size of a Member State’s f inancial sector also
has a particular relevance for central bank decisions, since the counterparties
of central bank operations belong to this sector. […] This choice of weights is
suitable, as this will mean that the f inancial sector is suff iciently and
meaningfully represented.”
Using GDP mp to rank the Member States’ economic signif icance is a fairly
widespread and adequate approach. Yet applying a “correction factor” (TABS-
MFIs) to adjust this measure – be it at a weight of just 1/6 – introduces a
discretionary element into this formula that cannot be deduced clearly or
conclusively from the Treaty or from the Statute. At the same time, it can be
argued that the size of the f inancial sectors of the Member States should indeed
be adequately reflected in the voting frequencies def ined for the highest
monetary policy decision-making body of the euro area.
A comparison of frequencies based on GDP mp alone with frequencies adjusted
for TABS-MFIs at a weight of 1/6 shows that small Member States with
comparatively high TABS-MFIs tend to benef it most from taking TABS-MFIs
into account. This is particularly true for Luxembourg. Once the Governing
Council has been divided into three groups (i.e. once the number of governors
reaches 22), the Governor of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg will probably
be assigned to the second group, and not to the third, owing to the TABS-MFI
criterion.32
The ranking of Member States def ined for the chosen rotation model, which
determines the NCB governors’ voting frequencies (see Annex 2), begs the
question whether this ranking may put certain Member States at a disadvantage
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32 See for example G. de la Dehesa (2003), “The New Governing Rules of the ECB”, Brief ing Paper for the
Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, 17 February. 
or discriminate against them in a legally problematic way. At a f irst glance, the
chosen weighting – 5/6 GDP mp and 1/6 TABS-MFIs – would appear to be
discretionary to a certain extent. A certain institutional uneasiness is also evident
from the fact that the EU Council stated in its minutes that the model “should
not be seen as a precedent for the future composition and decision-making of
other Community institutions.”33 Basically, however, the new voting modalities
are not discriminatory in a contestable way insofar as the NCB governors are
measured by a single criterion. The two elements of the chosen composite
indicator are not inadequate as such; only the percentages applied appear
deliberate. Yet at the same time, one could argue that the NCBs’ shares in the
capital of the ECB, which have been determined so as to reflect the shares of
the Member States in the euro area’s GDP and the individual Member States’
share in the population of the Eurosystem in equal parts, were set with a certain
amount of discretion as well; they could also have been determined on the basis
of a different calculation model.34
Besides, given the legal format applied in the Treaty of Nice, which empowered
the Heads of State or Government to adopt primary legislation (Article 10.2 of
the Statute), it would not have been easy to measure Decision 2003/223/EC
against other pieces of primary Community legislation. Only in the event that
this Decision had violated structural principles of EU legislation, such as the
principle of equal treatment of Member States, would it have been possible, in
theory, to take the Decision of the Heads of State or Government to the European
Court of Justice.35 The Decision contains no such contradiction. 
To sum up, the criteria def ined by the EU Council, meeting in the composition
of the Heads of State or Government,36 for adjusting the voting modalities of
the Governing Council are broadly met by the chosen rotation system. 
4 FINAL REMARKS 
The complexity of the new voting modalities for the Governing Council of the
ECB, as adopted by the EU Council meeting in the composition of the Heads
of State or Government on 21 March 2003, and in particular the discretionary
design of the composite indicator, are political weaknesses that cannot be glossed
over. The Council itself stated, as mentioned above, that the established rotation
model for the Governing Council of the ECB should not be seen as a precedent
for the future composition and decision-making process of other Community
institutions. The EU Council may thus have simply underlined the one-off nature
of its decision. At the same time, this statement reflects the understanding that
a complex regime which appears to have been tailored to produce specific results
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33 See ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2003, pp. 81-82.
34 In its Opinion the Commission highlights the particular relevance of the population criterion for reforming
the voting rules in other institutions (notably the Council), and refers to the option to use the ECB’s key for
capital subscription as an indicator.
35 To institute such a proceeding would, pursuant to Article 230, subparagraph 5, of the Treaty, have been
conceivable only within two months of the publication of the Decision in the Off icial Journal. 
36 These criteria were already contained in Recommendation ECB/2003/1.
may not be deemed a “best practice” model for cooperation at the European level.
Moreover, it also reflects the awareness that such a model is hard to communicate
to the citizens of Europe.
The EU Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government,
may however rightfully claim to have applied the enabling clause of the Treaty
of Nice with its Decision 2003/223/EC and to have managed to improve, by
unanimous vote as required, the eff iciency of the decision-making process in
a future, substantially larger Eurosystem to the extent that this was politically
feasible. By adopting this Decision, the Heads of State or Government also
signalled to the f inancial markets as well as the general public their willingness
to safeguard a smoothly working monetary policy framework, thereby also
fostering the stability of the euro.
ANNEX 1
Article 137 of the “Decision of the Council, meeting in the composition of the
Heads of State or Government of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article
10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank”, reads as follows:
“Article 1
The Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank is hereby amended as follows:
Article 10.2 of the Statute shall be replaced by the following: 
– (10.2) Each member of the Governing Council shall have one vote. As from
the date on which the number of members of the Governing Council exceeds
21, each member of the Executive Board shall have one vote and the number
of governors with a voting right shall be 15. The latter voting rights shall be
assigned and shall rotate as follows:
– as from the date on which the number of governors exceeds 15, until it
reaches 22, the governors shall be allocated to two groups, according to
a ranking of the size of the share of their national central bank’s Member
State in the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices and in the
total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary f inancial institutions of the
Member States which have adopted the euro. The shares in the aggregate
gross domestic product at market prices and in the total aggregated balance
sheet of the monetary f inancial institutions shall be assigned weights of
5/6 and 1/6, respectively. The f irst group shall be composed of f ive
governors and the second group of the remaining governors. The frequency
of voting rights of the governors allocated to the f irst group shall not be
lower than the frequency of voting rights of those of the second group.
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37 Article 2 of the Council Decision states that this Decision shall be ratif ied by all Member States in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements and “shall enter into force on the first day of the second month
following that in which the instrument of ratif ication is deposited by the last signatory state to fulf ill that
formality.”
Subject to the previous sentence, the f irst group shall be assigned four
voting rights and the second group eleven voting rights;
– as from the date on which the number of governors reaches 22, the
governors shall be allocated to three groups according to a ranking based
on the above criteria. The f irst group shall be composed of f ive governors
and shall be assigned four voting rights. The second group shall be
composed of half of the total number of governors, with any fraction
rounded up to the nearest integer, and shall be assigned eight voting rights.
The third group shall be composed of the remaining governors and shall
be assigned three voting rights;
– within each group, the governors shall have their voting rights for equal
amounts of time;
– for the calculation of the shares in the aggregate gross domestic product
at market prices, Article 29.2 shall apply. The total aggregated balance sheet
of the monetary financial institutions shall be calculated in accordance with
the statistical framework applying in the European Community at the time
of the calculation;
– whenever the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices is adjusted
in accordance with Article 29.3, or whenever the number of governors
increases, the size and/or composition of the groups shall be adjusted in
accordance with the above principles;
– the Governing Council, acting by a two-thirds majority of all its members,
with and without a voting right, shall take all measures necessary for the
implementation of the above principles and may decide to postpone the start
of the rotation system until the date on which the number of governors
exceeds 18.
The right to vote shall be exercised in person. By way of derogation from this
rule, the Rules of Procedure referred to in Article 12.3 may lay down that
members of the Governing Council may cast their vote by means of
teleconferencing. These rules shall also provide that a member of the Governing
Council who is prevented from attending meetings of the Governing Council for
a prolonged period may appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing
Council.
The provisions of the previous paragraphs are without prejudice to the voting
rights of all members of the Governing Council, with and without a voting right,
under Articles 10.3, 10.6 and 41.2. Save as otherwise provided for in this Statute,
the Governing Council shall act by a simple majority of the members having a
voting right. In the event of a tie, the President shall have the casting vote. In
order for the Governing Council to vote, there shall be a quorum of two-thirds
of the members having a voting right. If the quorum is not met, the President
may convene an extraordinary meeting at which decisions may be taken without
regard to the quorum.”
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Weighted two-component indicator 
(5/6 GDP mp and 1/6 TABS-MFIs (%))
1 Germany 23.45 15 Ireland 1.25 
2 United Kingdom 17.86 16 Luxembourg 0.69 
3 France 16.00 17 Czech Republic 0.57 
4 Italy 12.19 18 Hungary 0.49 
5 Spain 6.48 19 Romania 0.38 
6 Netherlands 4.59 20 Slovakia 0.21 
7 Belgium 2.82 21 Slovenia 0.20 
8 Sweden 2.52 22 Bulgaria 0.13 
9 Austria 2.31 23 Lithuania 0.11 
10 Denmark 1.91 24 Cyprus 0.10 
11 Poland 1.66 25 Latvia 0.07 
12 Finland 1.31 26 Estonia 0.05 
13 Greece 1.30 27 Malta 0.04 
14 Portugal 1.29 
Source: Dvorsky and Lindner, op. cit. footnote 5; data derived from publications from EUROSTAT, ECB and NCBs
for periods until 2001; GDP data calculated in accordance with Article 29.3 of the Statute.
LEGAL INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
OF CENTRAL BANKS: IS THERE METHOD IN ’T?
Frank Elderson
ABSTRACT
Che cosa significano le parole? Come arriviamo a stabilirne il significato? E’
questo ancora possibile? Il  contributo si incentra sull’utilizzo delle tecniche
stabilite di interpretazione giuridica nel contesto del Sistema Europeo di Banche
Centrali (SEBC). E’ stato pubblicato un ampio e crescente corpus di pareri della
Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) che ha posto in luce l’utilizzo
dell’interpretazione giuridica all’interno del SEBC. Analogamente si può dire
dei vari rapporti di convergenza e, inter alia, delle lettere inviate dalla BCE sulla
bozza del Trattato che istituisce una Costituzione per l’Europa. L’interpretazione
giuridica rappresenta il lavoro quotidiano del Comitato Legale (LEGCO) del
SEBC. Se già l’interpretazione giuridica è di per sé una sfida, lo diventa ancora
di più nell’ambiente multilinguistico e spesso multigiurisdizionale in cui opera
il LEGCO. Negli anni, i membri del LEGCO hanno fornito un contributo a tali
pareri, rapporti e lettere, per cui questi documenti possono essere
rappresentativi del loro lavoro. Tale rassegna mostra che la BCE (e prima ancora
il suo predecessore, l’Istituto Monetario Europeo) ha utilizzato un’ampia gamma
di metodi e tecniche per poter interpretare i provvedimenti giuridici del caso,
e ciò nell’ambito della struttura giuridica generale comunitaria di metodi e
tecniche interpretative. Vengono fatte alcune raccomandazioni, tra cui quella
di essere trasparenti sui metodi e sulle tecniche di interpretazione utilizzati, e
quella di usare una terminologia il più coerente possibile. Questo studio
chiarisce che la BCE, tramite ”interpretazione anticipativa”, cerca di evitare
problemi interpretativi futuri già quando gli strumenti giuridici sono ancora in
bozza, dimostrando così una lodevole consapevolezza dei problemi
interpretativi. Lo studio mostra anche come la BCE tenti di realizzare i suoi
obiettivi giuridici e di politica legislativa tramite le sue interpretazioni, pratica
che può essere paragonata all’atteggiamento tradizionale pro comunitate della
Corte di Giustizia e che è anche ben accetta.
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“Neque leges neque senatus consulta ita scribi possunt,
ut omnes casus qui quandoque inciderint comprehendantur,
sed sufficit ea quae plerumque accidunt contineri.”1
“Et ideo de his, quae primo constituuntur,
… interpretatione … certius statuendum est.”2
“Quamvis sit manifestissimum edictum praetoris,
attamen non est neglegenda interpretaio eius.”3
1 INTRODUCTION
“Words, words, words”; thus Hamlet’s reply to Polonius’ inquiry as to what he
was reading.4 What do words mean? How do we arrive at establishing their
meaning? Is this even possible? Great minds have struggled with these
questions.5 Theories of interpretation have been constructed, including a theory
of theories of interpretation.6 This contribution does not propose to add yet
another such theory, but will instead focus on the use of established methods
and techniques of legal interpretation in the context of the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB). Legal interpretation is the daily work of the Legal
Committee of the ESCB (LEGCO).7 While legal interpretation is a challenge in
itself, it is even more so in the multilingual and, often, multi-jurisdictional
environment in which LEGCO operates. Its Opinions, proceedings and documents
are however prevented from being published by the requirements of professional
secrecy as laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (“the Statute”). Fortunately
for the purposes of this contribution, a wide and increasing body of European
Central Bank (ECB) Opinions8 have been published which shed light on the use
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1 Dig. 1,3,3,10. IULIANUS libro LVIIII digestorum. “Neither laws nor decrees of the Senate can be formulated
so as to include any case that might ever occur; it will suff ice if they comprise matters that occur frequently”
(translation courtesy of the translation department of De Nederlandsche Bank).
2 Dig. 1,3,3,11. IULIANUS libro LXXXX digestorum. “Therefore [the sense of] that which has been originally
decided, must be […] determined further by interpretation.”
3 Dig. 25,4,1. ULPIANUS libro vicesimo quarto ad edictum. “Although the praetor’s edict may be perfectly clear,
yet its interpretation should not be disregarded.”
4 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act two, Scene two. 
5 See for an overview of recent thinking and thinkers on legal reasoning J. Dickson, “Interpretation and Coherence
in Legal Reasoning”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 2001 edition), available
at http://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/legal-reas-interpret.
6 See for the latter A. Peczenik, “Kinds of Theory of Legal Argumentation”, draft paper posted on
http://peczenik.ivr2003.net/documents/draft2005.pdf, referring to J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of
Law, ed. by Z. Bankowski and N. MacCormick (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992).
7 Currently, the legal basis for LEGCO is Article 9 of the ECB Decision ECB/2004/2 (2004/257/EC) of 
19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (OJ L 080, 18.3.2004, 
p. 33 et seq.). Article 9.1 of this Decision provides: “The Governing Council shall establish and dissolve
committees. They shall assist in the work of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and shall report to the
Governing Council via the Executive Board”. Article 9.2 provides, inter alia, that “Committees shall be
composed of up to two members from each of the Eurosystem NCBs and the ECB”.
8 On the basis of Article 105 (4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”). The limits
and conditions referred to in this Article of the Treaty were laid down in Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions  
(OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. See also A. Arda, “Consulting the European Central Bank: Legal Aspects of the
Community and National Authorities’ Obligation to Consult the ECB Pursuant to Article 105 (4) EC”, Euredia,
2004/1, pp. 111-52.
of legal interpretation within the ESCB. The same holds true for the various
convergence reports9 and, inter alia, the letters10 sent by the ECB regarding the
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Over the years, all LEGCO
members have contributed to these Opinions, reports and letters. These
documents, therefore, may serve as a useful proxy for the work of that
Committee. Together they constitute a small window through which the
interpretative work of LEGCO may be observed and commented on.11 Peeking,
as it were, through this window, this contribution is structured as follows. First
of all, Section 2 provides a very brief overview of what the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (“the Court of Justice”) and the learned writers have
had to say on legal interpretation within Community law. A small catalogue of
methods and techniques of legal interpretation is proposed for the purposes of
this contribution. Section 3 examines if and how these techniques are used in
the body of ECB Opinions and other documents mentioned above, while Section
4 considers some related subjects. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions.
It is then for the reader to establish whether we may agree with Polonius’
conclusion that “[t]hough this be madness, yet there is method in ’t.”12
2 A SMALL CATALOGUE OF METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
According to Article 220 of the Treaty, “[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that
in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. The
Court of Justice has ruled in a great number of cases on the aspects of what such
“interpretation” may entail. For the purposes of this section, it suff ices to
mention some of the more general statements made by the Court of Justice
regarding the interpretation of Community law. According to consistent case-
law, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider
“not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of
the rules of which it is part”.13 The Court of Justice sometimes uses slightly
different wording to express the same idea: “it is necessary to examine, apart
from their [i.e. the two secondary law instruments under scrutiny] wording and
structure, their context and purpose”14 and “since the interpretations […] based
on their wording and the history and the scheme of the Regulation do not permit
their precise scope to be assessed […], the legislation in question must be
95
9 On the basis of Articles 121 (1) and 122 (2) of the Treaty.
10 See the letter dated 5 June 2003 from Willem Duisenberg, President of the ECB, to President Valérie Giscard
d’Estaing, Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe; the letter dated 19 September 2003 from
Willem Duisenberg to Franco Frattini, President of the Council of the European Union, and the letter dated
16 April 2004 from Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, to Brian Cowen, President of the Council of
the European Union.
11 As a by-product of this search for interpretative methods, the examples given below show the wide variety
of legal issues dealt with within the ESCB and LEGCO.
12 Shakespeare, op. cit.
13 Case C-292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12. See also Case C-337/82
St. Nikolaus Brennerei v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10; Case C-223/98 Adidas Case
[1999] ECR I-7081, paragraph 23. Compare Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.
14 Case C-286/02 Bellio v Prefettura di Treviso of 1 April 2004, paragraph 40.
interpreted by reference to its purpose”.15 The Court of Justice sometimes also
refers to the “spirit” of the Treaty: in the Continental Can case it held that in
order to answer the question whether Article 82 (now 86) of the Treaty applies
to changes in the structure of an undertaking, “one has to go back to the spirit,
general scheme and wording of Article [82], as well as to the system and
objectives of the Treaty”.16 It follows from these citations that the Court of Justice
attaches importance to a wide range of factors, including, inter alia, wording,
structure, scheme, context, history, purpose and objectives. In the literature on
the methods of interpretation of the Court of Justice, these and other elements
have been categorised in various manners and under different headings.17
This diversity in categorisation indicates the subjective character of any such
exercise. The lowest common denominator seems to be a division into three
principal methods of interpretation: the (i) textual, (ii) systematic and (iii)
teleological18 methods. It is proposed for the purposes of this paper to follow
these three principal methods, each of which may serve as an umbrella for
various sub-techniques and principles.19 It should be noted that some of these
techniques can be used in the course of more than one of the principal methods.
For example, references to the preliminary considerations, or “whereas” clauses,
of a legal instrument, can be used both in a systematic approach (reading a
provision in the light of other provisions of the instrument) and in a teleological
approach (as the preliminary considerations often shed light on the purpose and
objective of the instrument). This is however not the place for academic hair-
splitting about the f inesses of categorisation. Therefore, the following
observations regarding the various methods and techniques of interpretation are
limited to what seems necessary to bring some order into the subsequent
discussion of the interpretative endeavours within the ESCB. 
We start with the textual method of interpretation and the various techniques
it has at its disposal. Although it certainly does not end there, interpretation starts
by simply reading the text. This basic idea is famously laid down in the maxim,
attributed to Vattel, that “in claris non f it interpretatio”.20 Vattel
notwithstanding, a purely literal interpretation is not suff icient, although the
textual method might be considered as primus inter pares in relation to the other
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15 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 148.
16 Case C-6/77 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215.
17 See, inter alia, H. G. Schermers and D. F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 6th
ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp. 10-27; A. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and
Community law (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978); M. M. Hintersteininger, “Zur
Interpretation des Gemeinschaftsrechts”, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 53 (1998), pp. 239-61; C. Gulman,
“Methods of Interpretation of the European Court of Justice”, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 24 (1980), 
pp. 187-204; J. Mertens de Wilmars, “Réflexions sur les Méthodes d’Interpretation de la Cour de Justice des
Communautés Européennes”, Cahiers de Droit Européen (1986), pp. 5-20; J. A. Usher, “The Interpretation
of Community Law by the European Court of Justice”, Law Teacher, 11 (1977), pp. 162-77.
18 From the ancient Greek word télos, meaning the end, the purpose.
19 Usher, op. cit., p. 162, refers to his former student textbook containing a grand total of “61 rules, presumptions,
maxims or aids to be used in statutory interpretation”, adding that “since that particular student textbook is
one of the more slender of its ilk, no doubts there are others which contain many more”. Usher in his article
did not endeavor to go through all these 61 rules. Neither will I.
20 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, 1758, Book II, Chapter XVII, paragraph 263: “La première maxime générale est
qu’il n’est pas permis d’interpréter ce qui n’a pas besoin d’interprétation; cited by Bredimas, op. cit., p. 26.
methods.21 The textual method of interpretation therefore comprises as a starting
point the strict literal and grammatical techniques of interpretation.22 In the
Community context, these include references to the various language versions
of the provision being interpreted, and elements such as the principle that
Community law is normally to be given its autonomous interpretation, without
reference to national legal orders, unless such express reference is provided for
in the Community provisions being interpreted. As a purely linguistic approach
does not always guarantee a single outcome, logic needs to be adhered to in order
to eliminate possible inconsistencies. Under the heading of logical interpretation
(which still falls within the realm of the textual method of interpretation), many
maxims have been coined over the centuries, such as lex specialis derogat
generali, lex posterior derogat priori, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
expressum facit cessare tacitum, a contrario, a fortiori, ab absurdo, to name but
a few. Although recourse to logic can hardly be deemed inappropriate under any
circumstances, logical interpretation has been criticised when reduced to a list
of maxims which are not always as useful in practice as they are well-known
in theory.23 The principle that exceptions to general rules are to be interpreted
restrictively is also part of such logical interpretation.24 The ECB sometimes uses
these maxims to arrive at its interpretative conclusions.25
Under the systematic method of interpretation, emphasis is shifted from the
meaning of the words in isolation to what they mean in the context of the
paragraphs, articles and the legal instrument as a whole. Systematic
interpretation comprises techniques such as references to the place of the
provision within the structure of the legal instrument and to its preliminary
considerations. In addition, the phenomenon termed “legalising interpretation”26
has been brought under the denominator of systematic interpretation, i.e. the
view of the Court of Justice that where the wording of secondary Community
law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given to the
interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty, rather than
the interpretation which leads to it being incompatible with the Treaty. As has
been seen, the references to the preliminary considerations of a legal instrument
may also be used when engaged in a teleological analysis. This is particularly
true for techniques such as the study of the legislative history and the travaux
préparatoires of the provision being interpreted, and to declarations and
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21 Mertens de Wilmars, op. cit., p. 10. This view is echoed by Schermers and Waelbroek, op. cit., pp. 11 and 12,
who observe that “the Court rightly still attributes most importance to the text of the law itself. In most cases,
the Court will f irst study the text of the provisions involved in all off icial languages. It is only when it f inds
that the text remains ambiguous that the Court may rule that the question may be examined in the light of the
purpose which the provision was intended to serve”.
22 See Bredimas, op. cit., p. 34, who also includes references to the context of a provision in the textual method
of interpretation. I prefer to categorise such contextual references under the heading of systematic interpretation.
23 See for this criticism (and more maxims), Bredimas, op. cit., p. 17.
24 See, among numerous examples, Case C-103/01 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2003] ECR 
I-5369, paragraph 32: “Since that provision constitutes an exception to the principle of free movement of goods
[…] it must be interpreted strictly”.
25 For an example of the restrictive interpretation of exceptions to general rules, see Opinion of the ECB of 
4 November 2004 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law introducing a tax on exchange
operations involving foreign exchange, banknotes and currency (CON/2004/34), paragraph 15. This ECB
Opinion, as are all those cited below, has been published on the ECB website at www.ecb.int.
26 Schermers and Waelbroeck, op. cit., pp. 19 and 20.
reservations made by (one or more of) the authors of the act at the time of its
adoption. For the purposes of this paper, these last techniques will be discussed
in the third of the three methods, the teleological method, as it is in this realm
that they have surfaced most often in ECB Opinions. 
This brings us to the third principal method of interpretation: the teleological
method. The teleological or functional method of interpretation puts the
emphasis on the function, utility (effet utile), aim and purpose that the legal
instrument has to fulf il: “l’interprétation téléologique  […] explique un texte
à la fois par les objectifs spécif iques qu’il poursuit et à la lumière de la
contribution qu’il apporte à la réalisation des objectifs généraux des traités”.27
Teleological interpretation is usually used for three purposes: to promote the
objective for which the provision was made; to prevent unacceptable
consequences to which a literal interpretation might lead; and to f ill lacunae
which would otherwise exist in the legal order.28 Although the Court of Justice
will generally try to combine all methods of interpretation29, it would seem that
a certain preference is given to interpretation by reference to the purpose of the
law.30 This teleological or purposive approach has been identified in the literature
as “peculiarly appropriate in Community law where […] [t]he Treaties provide
mainly a broad programme or design rather than a detailed blueprint”.31 In
addition, as every contemporary observer knows all too well, the Treaties are
diff icult to amend. Therefore, their development largely depends on the (often
teleological) interpretation accorded to them by the judiciary over the years. 
To a certain extent it could be argued that in the realm of the objectives and 
tasks of the ESCB, the ECB plays a similar role by way of, principally, its
Opinions.
3 APPLICATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ESCB OF METHODS AND
TECHNIQUES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
3.1 EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF METHODS OF TEXTUAL
INTERPRETATION
3.1.1 LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND DIFFERENT LANGUAGE VERSIONS
In its Opinions the ECB takes as a starting point the ordinary meaning of the
words of the provisions it is asked to analyse. Probably because of the self-evident
nature of this premise, there are few instances of the ECB explicitly engaging
in literal interpretation in its Opinions. One example of a literal approach is the
suggestion in the Opinion of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) of 6 April
1998 that the words “or continuing implementation” should be deleted from the
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proposed Article 1 (2) of the Council Decision of 29 June 199832 (as was
subsequently carried out). The stated reason for this suggestion was that “[t]he
meaning of these words is not clear and this uncertainty might give rise to
problems for the interpretation and application of the proposal”.33 A second
example of a literal approach can be found in the EMI’s Opinion of 23 February
1998, in which the EMI notes that “the wording of Article 10 of the draft law
[on the Autonomy of Banco de España] does not explicitly and unambiguously
recognise that the information to be given by the Governor to Parliament and
Government is an ex post information”, and stated that this wording should be
revised “in order to enhance legal clarity and certainty”.34 As is the case with
all European Union (EU) institutions and bodies, the ECB operates in a
multilingual environment. As lawyers within the ESCB might take as a starting
point of their legal analysis different language versions of the Treaties, the ESCB
Statute and the secondary legislation, the comparison of such versions is an
inherent feature of the legal discourse within the ESCB. However, no clear
examples have been identif ied in the body of studied ECB Opinions of the ECB
that explicitly engage in the comparison of different language versions.
Nevertheless, given that this issue is ever-present, and as a possible guide for
future instances, some of the main f indings of the Court of Justice regarding
different language versions are mentioned here. The starting point is that the
Treaties are authentic in all off icial languages.35 It is consistent case-law of the
Court of Justice that the “interpretation of a provision of Community law involves
a comparison of the language versions”.36 This means all language versions,
without discrimination according to the size of the population speaking a
particular tongue: “to discount two language versions, as the applicants in the
main proceedings suggest, would run counter to the Court’s settled case-law to
the effect that the need for a uniform interpretation of Community regulations
makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but
requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light
of the versions existing in the other off icial languages. […] Lastly, all the
language versions must, in principle, be recognised as having the same weight
and this cannot vary according to the size of the population of the Member States
using the language in question.”37 What happens if, despite the identical weight
to be given to them, there is nevertheless a discrepancy between language
versions? According to settled case-law, “the need for a uniform interpretation
of Community law requires in the case of divergence between different language
versions of a provision, that it be interpreted by reference to the purpose and
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general scheme of the rules of which it forms part”.38 This is an illustrative
example of how the Court of Justice combines various methods of interpretation
in order to safeguard the “uniform interpretation of Community law”.
3.1.2 THE UNIFORM INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW
Part of the textual method of interpretation in Community law is the issue of
the “autonomous meaning” of Community law terms. The Court of Justice has
held consistently that words in Community law provisions have Community law
meanings. In the words of the Court of Justice: “The need for uniform
application of Community law and the principle of equality require that the terms
of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law
of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must
normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the
Community”.39 Even without such a reference, however, national law is not off-
limits when interpreting Community law: “in the absence of an express
reference, the application of Community law may sometimes necessitate
reference to the laws of the Member States where the Community court cannot
identify in Community law or in the general principles of Community law criteria
enabling it to def ine the meaning and scope of such a provision by way of
independent interpretation.”40 One example of the ECB granting weight to, inter
alia, national laws when interpreting a Community legal instrument can be found
in its Opinion of 20 January 2000.41 In assessing a provision in the draft
Luxembourg law implementing Article 9 of Directive 98/26/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement f inality in payment
and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166, 11.6.98, p. 45) (the Settlement
Finality Directive), the ECB had to interpret the conflict of law rules in the
Directive. In doing so, the ECB noted that these (Community) rules are
consistent with “(i) the rule contained in Article 8 of the US Uniform
Commercial Code, (ii) the national laws already in place in several Member
States, and (iii) the current trend of academic authority on the complex matter
of the cross-border trading of securities”.42 Whereas such references by the ECB
to national law (and indeed US law as well as academic authority) while
interpreting Community law are rare, there are many examples of the reverse
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situation, i.e. the interpretation of national law in conformity with Community
law. The latter may also take the form of specif ic drafting suggestions, as in its
Opinions the ECB comments on draft legislative provisions. This illustrates how
the ECB seeks to ensure the uniform application of Community law, and is
indeed a logical consequence of the primacy of Community law. The following
examples should suffice to illustrate how the ECB typically addresses this issue:
“it would be advisable to adjust Article 39(1) of the Act [regarding Banka
Slovenije] more closely to the wording of Article 14.2 of the [ESCB] Statute since
differences in interpretation cannot be excluded”43; “it would be benef icial to
reproduce more literally the text of Article 2(i), f irst indent of the [First Banking
Co-ordination Directive (77/780/EEC)] Directive, since Article 3(1) of the Draft
Law could be interpreted in the sense that private persons would not fall under
its scope”.44 Instead of volunteering specific drafting suggestions, the ECB might
also subtly attempt to draw the attention of the guardian of the Treaties, the
Commission, to proposed national law provisions which in the ECB’s opinion
might not comply with Community law. One such example concerns the Finnish
so-called Rounding Act, which provides for the rounding downwards or upwards
of cash payments to the nearest multiple of f ive euro cents. The principal aim
of the Rounding Act is to restrict the use of one and two euro cent coins, the
reason being that the production costs of one and two cent coins greatly exceed
their face value. In its Opinion of 30 April 2002 the ECB had to evaluate a draft
proposal to extend the rounding rules for euro cash payments to cover payments
effected by bank or other payment cards as well.45 The ECB found that such an
extension runs the risk of breaching Community law, in particular Article 2 of
Council Regulation (EC) 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro.
The ECB then alerted the Commission to the Finnish legislative proposal: “[t]he
ECB considers it important for the competent Community institutions to assess
the compatibility of the proposed rule with Community law”.46 The same concern
with the uniform application of Community law plays a role in another specif ic
instance of the delicate interplay between Community law and national law, i.e.
the question whether Member States may reproduce in national legal instruments
parts of Community legislation that have all the features of direct applicability
and direct effect. Three arguments can be advanced against such practice. First,
“copy-pasting” in national law of directly effective Community law provisions
is unnecessary precisely because of their direct effect: the Community acts are
part of the legal order of each Member State without any further national step.
Second, when the reproduction is not identical to the wording of the Community
acts, it may jeopardise the simultaneous and uniform application of those acts
in the whole of the Community.47 Third, it may cast doubt on the hierarchy of
legal sources, as the reader may be confused whether the provision originates
in Community or national law. As regards this third objection, the Court of
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Justice has held that “Member States are under an obligation not to introduce
any measure which might affect the jurisdiction of the Court to pronounce on
any question involving the interpretation of Community law […] which means
that no procedure is permissable whereby the Community nature of a legal rule
is concealed from those subject to it”.48 However, under certain circumstances
the technique of incorporating Community provisions in a national act may be
acceptable. This may be the case, f irst, when a national law incorporates some
elements of Community regulations for the sake of coherence and in order to
make the national law comprehensible to the persons to whom it applies49, but
only if the Community nature of  the legal rule is clearly shown or disclosed.50
A second instance in which the incorporation of Community provisions into a
national act may be allowed is when the Community provision leaves room for
interpretation and demands a national supplementary act that grants a certain
discretion to the national legislator. In such instances, the Community provision
lacks the clarity, precision and unconditionality required for it to be directly
effective. 
In various of its Opinions, the ECB has had occasion to apply this case-law. A
first such example is the ECB Opinion of 21 July 1998 on the Spanish draft law
on the introduction of the euro (the so-called Umbrella law).51 The aim of the
Umbrella law was to supplement the EU Council Regulations 1103/97 of 17 June
1997 and 974/98 of 3 May 199852, concerning the introduction of the euro. The
overall intention was on the one hand to be pedagogic as far as the public was
concerned, while on the other hand to facilitate the smooth introduction of the
euro. While welcoming these intentions and the Umbrella law in general, the ECB
took issue with the specif ic application of the legislative technique of
incorporating parts of the said Council Regulations. The ECB pointed to instances
in the draft Umbrella law which contained incomplete reproductions of
Community provisions and variations on and additions to the Community
wording, all of which it recommended should be remedied invoking the above
mentioned case-law. The ECB even went as far as to deem it immaterial whether
or not the draft national law provisions constituted improvements vis-à-vis the
Community wording: “[w]hilst it may be said that the draft article improves the
Community text, the above considerations would warrant identical wording or
deletion”.53 Another clear application of this “leave to the Community what is
the Community’s” doctrine can be found in the ECB Opinion of 26 January
2001.54 Here the ECB drew attention to a provision in the Portuguese draft decree-
law under scrutiny which required in so many words that only a specif ic
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conversion rate (1 euro = 200.482 escudos) be applied for the exchange and
withdrawal of banknotes and coins and for the redenomination of bank accounts.
The ECB expressed doubt about the appropriateness of this provision in the light
of its content already directly following from the relevant Council Regulations.55
The ECB f irst recalled that “consistent case-law of the Court of Justice has
established that Member States should not pass any measures having the effect
of transposing a Community regulation into national legislation”. The ECB
continued by stating that “Community regulations are an integral part of the
national legal order and Member States are under the obligation not to introduce
measures that might affect the uniform interpretation and application of
Community law”. The ECB then warned that such uniform interpretation and
application of Community law might indeed be affected by converting the
provisions of a Community regulation into national legislation. However, the ECB
stopped short of advising that these references be struck out entirely,
acknowledging that “these provisions may be intended for reasons of clarity and
to reinforce the principle that the exchange and withdrawal of banknotes and
coins and the redenomination of bank accounts should be made without charge
and without mark-up or commission”. Therefore, the ECB argued for a cross-
reference to be incorporated into the Portuguese decree-law to the applicable
Community law provisions. The ECB seems to lean even further in the direction
of the national legislator in its assessment of another provision in the draft decree-
law, which unnecessarily mirrored Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) 1103/97.
The ECB admitted that such mirroring “would contribute to clarity and legal
certainty for the cash changeover in Portugal”. Here the ECB did not plead that
the draft decree-law should limit itself to a cross-reference to the applicable
Community law provision, apparently considering a “mirroring provision”
justif ied under the circumstances. The EMI also had to deal with national law
provisions which, given the Community law background, were unnecessary at
best. A clear example is a provision in the Austrian draft law amending the Central
Bank Act, stating that banknotes denominated in Austrian schillings would cease
to be legal tender on a date set specif ically by Austrian federal law.56 The EMI
noted that this provision “has to be interpreted in the light of the fact that the
latest date on which banknotes will cease to be legal tender will be def ined by
directly applicable Community legislation.”57 In the light of the relevant case-
law of the Court of Justice, the EMI might have added that the provision should
therefore be deleted. The considerations in the cited ECB Opinions seem to
indicate that on a case-by-case basis, the ECB seeks to strike a f ine balance
between safeguarding the Community law origin of provisions on the one hand,
and ackowledging that national law provisions may play a useful explanatory role
on the other. However, following in the footsteps of the Court of Justice, the ECB
makes it clear that national law wording can never stand in the way of the
fundamental importance of the uniform application of Community law. 
103
55 More specif ically, Articles 14 and 16 of Council Regulation (EC) 974/98 and Article 1 of Council Regulation
(EC) 2866/98 of 31 December 1998 on the conversion rates between the euro and the currencies of the Member
States adopting the euro (OJ L 359, 31.12.1998, p. 1). 
56 Opinion of the EMI at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Central
Bank Act and other related laws (CON/97/30).
57 CON/97/30, paragraph 12.
3.2 EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF SYSTEMATIC METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION
3.2.1 PLACE OF A PROVISION
The place of a provision in a particular chapter of the Treaty or under a particular
heading of an instrument of secondary law is relevant for its interpretation.
Provisions may be interpreted by examination of the system of the Treaty and
by comparison with other passages of the legal instrument. A telling example
of the application of such systematic thinking is laid down in the letter of 
19 September 2003 from the President of the ECB to the President of the Council
at the occasion of the issuance of the ECB Opinion on the draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitution).58 In this letter the ECB
proposed the “swapping of the headings of Title IV of Part I (currently ‘The
Union’s Institutions’) and Chapter I of Title IV (currently ‘The Institutional
Framework of the Union’), so as to clearly indicate that the ECB, as an ‘other
institution’ of the Union, is part of the institutional framework of the Union even
though it is not in the list of the ‘Union’s Institutions’ in Article I-18 [now 
I-19]”.59 Although this suggestion was not followed exactly60, it shows the
importance attached to the systematic approach. What is in a name?, one might
at f irst be tempted to ask, but the Court of Justice has also attached importance
to the wording of titles and headings: “It is settled case-law that where there is
a discrepancy between the wording of a provision and the title thereof, both must
be construed in such a manner that all the terms employed serve a useful
purpose”.61 The ECB Opinion on the Constitution also offers an example of the
use of systematic interpretation when the ECB observes that the term ‘monetary
policy’ in Article I-12 (now I-13) is to be read in a broad sense, namely “as
reflecting the title of Section 2 of Chapter II of Title III of Part III of the draft
Constitution and therefore considers that it encompasses all exclusive
competences related to the euro as described in the relevant provisions of the draft
Constitution, in particular Articles III-77 and III-78 (now III-185 and III-187]”.62
3.2.2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA 
The systematic method of interpretation includes the examination of the
preliminary considerations (“whereas” clauses, statements of reasons) of legal
instruments as well as, if available, explanatory memoranda. The Court of Justice
has recognised “the general principle that the operative part of an act is
indissociably linked to the statement of reasons for it, so that, when it has to
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be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption”.63
Examples can also be found in the so-called European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
judgement of the Court of Justice: “the contested decision must be read in the
light of its recitals”.64 In similar fashion, Article 253 of the Treaty provides, inter
alia, that “[r]egulations, directives and decisions […] shall state the reasons on
which they are based”. In its Opinions the ECB very frequently refers to the
explanatory memoranda attached to the draft legislative provisions under
examination, for example using the contents of an explanatory memorandum to
help it interpret the draft legislation in question. The ECB might also suggest
that in order to achieve legal certainty, discrepancies should be remedied between
the explanatory memorandum and the provisions it is supposed to explain or with
the Treaty. A few examples may illustrate these uses: “[t]he ECB deduces from
the wording of the Explanatory Memorandum that these securitisation entities
will not be considered to be credit institutions for supervisory purposes”65; “in
order to properly reflect the wording and meaning of Article 106 of the Treaty,
the ECB recommends to redraft the explanatory memorandum”66; “it might be
useful to conf irm this interpretation in the explanatory note”67; “it would […]
be useful to clarify [in the draft royal decree], in line with what is set out in the
explanatory memorandum, that the data coverage relates to transactions and
positions which should both be reported”.68 (Further examples are provided
below in sub-section 4.3 “Anticipative interpretation”).
3.2.3 “LEGALISING INTERPRETATION”
It is consistent case-law of the Court of Justice that “where it is necessary to
interpret a provision of secondary Community law, preference should as far as
possible be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent
with the EC Treaty and the general principles of Community law […] and, more
specif ically, with the principle of legal certainty”.69 This principle also applies
within the hierarchy of secondary legislation: “An implementing regulation must
also be given, if possible, an interpretation consistent with the provisions of the
basic regulation”.70 Interpreting in such a manner so as to uphold the inner
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coherence of the body of Community legal norms has been termed “legalising
interpretation”.71 An example in the context of the ECB of the application of this
legalising interpretation can be found in the judgment of the Court of Justice
in the already mentioned OLAF judgement.72 The ECB had submitted that
Regulation No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF73 must
be interpreted so as to exclude the ECB from its scope. It argued that “the
expression ‘bodies, off ices and agencies established by, or on the basis of, the
Treaties’ in Article 1(3) of the regulation lacks precision so that […] it may be
construed as not applying to ‘bodies’ whose f inancial interests are distinct from
those of the European Community and are not linked to the latter’s budget”.
According to the ECB’s submission, “such an interpretation is the only one which
preserves the legality of the regulation, for which reason it should, in accordance
with the Court’s case-law, be preferred”. Although this argument was rejected
by the Court (which, on the basis of an analysis of the preamble, the provisions
and the “clear terms” of the Regulation, concluded that there is no doubt that
the Community legislature intended the Regulation to apply to the ECB, thus
grouping together in typical fashion all three principal methods of
interpretation), it is an illustrative example of legalising interpretation at work.
3.3 EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL METHODS AND
TECHNIQUES OF INTERPRETATION
3.3.1 PURPOSE AND SPIRIT
As already noted in Section 2, the teleological or functional method of
interpretation puts the emphasis on the function, utility (effet utile), aim and
purpose that the legal instrument has to fulf il. There are a number of examples
of the ECB employing such teleological reasoning: “taking into account the spirit
of these provisions”74; “the spirit of the Treaty”75; “[t]he ECB understands that
this interpretation does not represent the intention of the drafters”76; “the true
underlying intention”77; “the reasoning behind this provision”78; “the overall aim
[of Articles 101 of the Treaty and 21.2 of the Statute]”.79 Another example of
the use of teleological interpretation in the context of the ESCB can be found
in the Opinion of the Advocate General in the OLAF case.80 The ECB had
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brought Article 105 (4) of the Treaty into play by arguing that because the
Council had failed to consult the ECB on the proposed Regulation81, the latter
had been adopted in breach of Article 105 (4) of the Treaty and should therefore
be declared inapplicable on the basis of Article 241 of the Treaty. When
examining the scope of the “f ields of competences” clause in Article 105 (4)
of the Treaty, the Advocate General, after resorting to practically all other
methods of interpretation available (systematic, historic and grammatical (in that
order))82, had recourse to a teleological interpretation, stating that the purpose
of the consultation under Article 105 (4) of the Treaty is “to ensure that the
legislature is well informed when it adopts measures relating to subjects of which
the ECB has particular knowledge or expertise, in particular, monetary policy”.
The purpose of Article 105 (4) of the Treaty is “to enhance the quality of the
Community legislation to the advantage of the European polity as a whole”.83
The Court of Justice followed this teleological approach, although it held that
with regard to the specific subject at hand (i.e. the prevention of fraud), the ECB
did not enjoy such a high degree of expertise as to make it particularly well
placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged. Thus, the Court
of Justice rejected the ECB’s argument that Regulation No 1073/1999 should
be declared inapplicable on the ground that it was adopted in breach of Article
105 (4) of the Treaty.
3.3.2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES
As noted in Section 2, while the study of the legislative history of a provision
may not be the exclusive domain of the teleological method of interpretation, it
is in that context that this technique is used most frequently. One may distinguish
travaux préparatoires stricto sensu, i.e. various written documents reflecting the
attitudes of the negotiators of the Treaties through the successive stages of
drafting, and travaux préparatoires lato sensu, i.e. opinions of governments
submitted to parliaments in the course of ratification debates.84 The first category
of travaux of the Community Treaties are secret and therefore cannot be used by
the Court of Justice.85 However, the second category of travaux are available with
regard to the Treaties. In addition, the Court of Justice can make use of the
preparatory documents of secondary Community legislation. An example of the
latter can be found in the Mecklenburg case: “[t]hat interpretation is borne out
by the history of the directive. Article 8(1) of the proposal for a directive
submitted by the Commission […] was as a result of the opinion given by the
Economic and Social Committee”.86 The Stauder case offers another example:
“[t]his interpretation is […] confirmed by the Commission’s declaration that [the]
amendment […] was proposed by the Management Committee to which the draft
of [the] Decision was submitted for its opinion”.87 However, even in the context
of secondary legislation, the Court of Justice remains cautious with the use of
travaux préparatoires: “As regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the
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legislative history of the Regulation, it is necessary, when interpreting a
legislative measure, to attach less importance to the position taken by one or other
Member State when the measure was drawn up than to its wording and
objectives”.88 Unilateral declarations by a Member State issued at the time of the
adoption of the instrument being interpreted, even if laid down in the minutes
of the meeting concerned, hardly ever serve the Court of Justice as interpretative
guidance: “it should be borne in mind that declarations recorded in minutes are
of limited value, since they cannot be used for the purposes of interpreting a
provision of Community law where no reference is made to the content of the
declaration in the wording of the provision in question and the declaration
therefore has no legal signif icance”.89 It remains to be seen whether the Court
of Justice will make a more liberal use of the  travaux préparatoires of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, which to a great degree have been made
available on the internet.90 Regarding the use of travaux préparatoires within the
context of the ESCB, it should be noted that although the travaux regarding the
relevant Articles of the Treaty are secret, as are all those regarding the Treaty,
to a large extent those regarding the ESCB Statute (which forms part of the
Treaty) are not.91 One explicit example of the ECB referring to travaux
préparatoires can be found in its Opinion of 3 February 2005. The ECB had to
evaluate the compatibility of a draft Italian law with the prohibition of monetary
f inancing laid down in Article 101 of the Treaty, which prohibits, inter alia,
overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the national central
banks in favour of central governments. In making its analysis, the ECB delved
into legislative history: “[a]lready in 1993 the Committee of Governors of the
central banks of the Member States of the EEC notes that this prohibition is of
‘essential importance’ to ensure that ‘monetary policy [is not] hindered in the
pursuit of its primary objective of price stability. Furthermore, central bank
financing of the public sector lessens the pressure for f iscal discipline’”.92
Although there are few such explicit examples, the preparatory documents of the
Committee of Governors constitute a wealth of legislative history which lawyers
within the ESCB frequently turn to when interpreting the ESCB Statute.
3.3.3 FURTHERANCE OF EU AND EUROSYSTEM OBJECTIVES
As we have seen, teleological methods of interpretation focus on the purpose,
the aim and the function of the provision to be interpreted. From here, it is but
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a small step to introducing the furtherance of the objectives of the EU and the
ESCB in the interpretative activity undertaken by the ECB when drafting its
Opinions or other instruments. In this context, the objectives of the ESCB are
to be understood not just as the primary objective to maintain price stability and
the secondary objective to support the economic policies in the Community as
laid down in Article 105 (1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the ESCB Statute,
but as the policy objectives it pursues within its mandate embodied by these
primary and secondary objectives. There are a number of examples of the ECB
playing such a proactive role. A f irst such example shows the ECB promoting
the creation of a Single Euro Payments Area in its Opinion of 23 December
2004.93 The ECB started by noting that a certain interpretation of a provision
in the draft Spanish law “would theoretically allow for direct remote participation
in SNCE [Sistema Nacional de Compensación Electrónica, National Automated
Clearing System], which the ECB considers should in principle be possible”.
Then the ECB recalled that “a very important Eurosystem objective and
European banking industry project is the creation of a Single Euro Payments
Area (SEPA). […] Decisions related to the next generation of national systems
should in the future be made from a pan-European perspective to ensure
compliance with SEPA instruments and standards and the overall SEPA
infrastructure”.94 In the same vein of furthering its objectives, sometimes the
ECB advances an interpretation which is not strictly necessary for providing an
opinion on the draft national provisions at hand (obiter dicta, one might say):
“The ECB has no objection with regard to the proposed abolition of the liquidity
criterion for certain monetary policy operations, though would observe that the
requirement of ‘adequate collateral’ may be interpreted as also containing an
element whereby the collateral must be realisable without undue delay. However,
to expressly maintain a specif ic statutory liquidity requirement in addition to
the requirement of adequate collateral is not necessary for the operations now
under consideration”.95 Another example of such reasoning which borders on
obiter dicta is the ECB Opinion on two draft Directives amending Directive
85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities (UCITS) (the UCITS Directive).96 First, the ECB stated
that instead of expressing its opinion in two different Opinions on these two draft
Directives, for the sake of clarity, transparency and legal certainty, a discussion
of a complete and integral new version of the UCITS Directive would be
preferable. Then the ECB added: “This is all the more the case since the UCITS
Directive appears to have been interpreted differently by Member States. Such
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different interpretations are undesirable in the context of a single money and
f inancial market and may lead to competitive distortions and misallocation of
funds.”97 Yet another example: “[t]he ECB welcomes that proposed
introduction of a harmonised definition of public offer, which will avoid different
interpretations of Community rules and ensure the same level of investor
protection throughout the EU”.98 While directives are good, regulations are better.
At least, this appears to follow from the ECB’s citing in its Opinion of 12 June
2003 of the Committee of Wise Men statement that “[directives] leave more
latitude for Member States to implement Community Law but too often lead to
uneven transposition and different interpretations”. Then the ECB added: “The
ECB notes that indeed regulations offer signif icant advantages as opposed to
directives, as they are directly applicable in the Member States without any need
of implementation through national legislation.”99 Yet another example of the
ECB’s proactive approach is that although the obligation of the authorities of
the Member States to consult the ECB on draft legislative provisions within the
field of competence of the ECB does not apply to “draft provisions, the exclusive
purpose of which is the transposition of Community directives into the law of
Member States”100, nevertheless, when asked, the ECB might gladly accept the
invitation and take the opportunity to promote its own objectives. An example
can be found in the ECB Opinion of 20 January 2000 at the request of the
Luxembourg Ministry for the Treasury and the Budget on the implementation
of the Settlement Finality Directive in Luxembourg.101 Although noting that the
Luxembourg authorities “were not, strictly speaking, legally obliged to consult
the ECB”, the ECB stated that it “very much welcomes the opportunity to give
its opinion on the Draft Law”. The ECB justif ied this stance as follows: “[t]he
ECB is seeking to promote pro-actively a harmonised EU-wide implementation
of the Directive in the legislation of the Member States, in order to foster
maximum transparency and legal certainty for the closely connected payment
and securities settlement systems, and to ensure a level playing-field throughout
the European Union”.102 In a nutshell, we see that (i) the ECB is willing to issue
an Opinion although, strictly speaking, the national authority was under no
obligation to consult; (ii) the ECB does not hesitate to pronounce itself in favour
of the rethinking of existing Community directives and of the use of regulations
when possible; and (iii) promotes a series of policy objectives, among which
“the creation of a Single Euro Payments Area”, “the promotion of a single money
and f inancial market”, “the avoidance of competitive distortions and
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misallocation of funds”, “ensuring the same level of investor protection
throughout the EU”, “the promotion of the harmonised EU-wide implementation
of directives in the legislation of the Member States”, “the fostering of maximum
transparency and legal certainty for the closely connected payment and securities
settlement systems” and “ensuring a level playing-field throughout the European
Union”.
4 SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
4.1 CONSISTENCY IN THE DENOMINATION OF METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
Words, as it is hoped should be clear from the above, obviously matter. Given
the complications that arise when seeking to establish their meaning, they should
be chosen with great care. This is all the more so because the very act of
describing how one arrives at certain interpretations of words requires in turn
more words. Hence, the need to employ consistent terminology when using
methods and techniques of interpretation is paramount. Unfortunately, in its
Opinions the ECB does not always use such consistent language. This may be
illustrated most clearly by quoting from a number of the examples mentioned
in sub-section 3.3.1 of the ECB, which employ a single (the teleological) method
of interpretation, while using all sorts of terminology: “the spirit of these
provisions”103; “the spirit of the Treaty”104; “the intention of the drafters”105; “the
true underlying intention”106; “the reasoning behind this provision”107; “the overall
aim [of Articles 101 of the Treaty and 21.2 of the Statute]”.108 As 
single words – especially vague ones like “spirit”, “aim” and “intention” – may
already have different meanings, different words may have many different
meanings. Many vague words could end up being meaningless. Therefore, 
it is proposed that the ECB should henceforth attempt to use as consistent a
wording as possible. Though this be not madness, there might be a little more
method in ’t.
4.2 TRANSPARENCY REGARDING THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
As we have seen, the ECB uses a wide range of interpretative techniques. Often
it specifies which method it uses, although, as noted above, improvements might
be made in the consistency of the terminology used. However, sometimes the
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ECB simply “interprets” and the reader is left guessing which method of
interpretation the ECB has used to arrive at the stated conclusion. A number of
examples may serve to illustrate this point: “[t]he ECB is […] of the view that
interests in securities held through one or several f inancial intermediaries can
be […] interpreted as […]”109; “[t]he ECB understands that […] all credit
institutions in the EU can be considered as ‘operating in Spain’”110; “[t]he ECB
understands that this interpretation does not represent the intention of the
drafters”111; “[t]he reference in Article 1 of the draft law to Articles 105(1),
105(2) and 105(5) may be interpreted as an exhaustive enumeration”112; “[t]he
ECB interprets Article 9(1) as setting out mandatory obligations of the
competent authorities to cooperate and share information, both generally and
in specif ic instances”.113 By “being of the view that”, “understanding” and
“interpreting as”, the ECB makes it clear that it is engaged in an interpretative
process, but it leaves the reader in the dark as to the method used. By enhancing
the transparency regarding the method of interpretation used, the ECB’s
reasoning in its Opinions would be easier to verify and thus be more convincing. 
4.3 “ANTICIPATIVE INTERPRETATION”
This sub-section does not deal with a specif ic method of interpretation, but
instead with the many instances in the body of ECB Opinions and other relevant
instruments that show that the drafters are acutely aware of the importance of
interpretation and the need to avoid misunderstandings when drafting legal
instruments.114 Thus, also in this indirect and often implicit way, these Opinions
shine light on the use of methods of interpretation within the ESCB. It should
be recalled that interpretation is not the exclusive domain of the courts. Indeed,
interpretation is an inherent feature of all the links in the entire chain from the
very initial stages of drafting a legal provision right up to the establishment of
its meaning by the highest court in the land. Precisely because of the length of
this chain, and the many actors engaging in interpretative activity along it, it
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falls upon the shoulders of those drafting a legal instrument in the f irst place
to anticipate how it might be interpreted at a later stage, and to draft the legal
instrument, its considerations, preamble, structure and explanatory memorandum
in such a way as to ensure as far as possible the coherence between its intended
meaning and its later actual interpretation. The ECB’s Opinions on draft
legislative provisions places the ECB at the very beginning of the chain just
depicted. Hence a need to anticipate how draft provisions might be interpreted
in the future and to evaluate in a proactive manner whether such interpretations
are to be welcomed or whether the draft provisions should be reworded to avoid
undesired interpretative outcomes. There are many examples of drafting
proposals based on such “anticipative interpretation”. A number of those
anticipate textual methods of interpretation: “[i]t is suggested that […] the words
[a, b, c] are deleted. The meaning of these words is not clear and uncertainty
might give rise to problems for the interpretation”115 (anticipation of literal
interpretation). A clear example of the anticipation of a contrario reasoning, and
thus another example of the anticipation of a textual method of interpretation,
is the following: after f irst expressing “its concern that the exclusions listed
under Stage I should not be interpreted as being the only adjustments which may
be made to the national price indices”, the EMI suggests to add “in particular”
in order to express the non-exhaustive character of the enumeration.116 Another
example of the anticipation of a contrario reasoning is the following: “to avoid
misinterpretations when comparing Section 14 (1) (containing a reference to
Article 106 (1) of the Treaty) and Section 14 (2) (which does not include that
reference), the ECB recommends either that both sub-sections of Section 14 of
the Bundesbank Act be merged or that an explicit reference to Article 106 (1)
of the Treaty be made in Section 14 (2) so as to mirror the wording of Section
14 (1)”.117 Examples of drafting proposals based on the anticipation of systematic
methods of interpretation may also be found: “in order to properly reflect the
wording and meaning of Article 106 of the Treaty, the ECB recommends to
redraft the explanatory memorandum on Article 3 [of the Drittes Euro-
Einführungsgesetz] […] accordingly”118 (anticipation of interpretation by
reference to the explanatory memorandum); “some uncertainty could possibly
arise […] from the combined reading of the relevant articles of the draft proposal
and the comments on these articles. […] The ECB would appreciate a
clarif ication of this issue”119 (another example of anticipation of interpretation
by reference to the explanatory memorandum); “the EMI expresses its concern
about the fact that […] the reader might conclude that the Community, contrary
to the Treaty provisions, does not envisage the start of Stage Three of EMU until
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after January 1998. To avoid this interpretation, it is suggested that: (a) The
following paragraph is included in the Preamble”120 (anticipation of systematic
interpretation). No examples of drafting proposals by the ECB based on the
anticipation of teleological methods of interpretation have been identif ied,
although these may very well be imagined in theory.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This overview shows that in its Opinions and other cited instruments, the ECB
(and before it, its predecessor, the EMI) has used a wide range of methods and
techniques in order to interpret the legislative provisions before it. It has done
so within the overall Community law framework of interpretative methods and
techniques, many of which stem from centuries and even millennia-old legal
traditions. A few recommendations are made, including the suggestion to be
transparent about the methods and techniques of interpretation used and the
suggestion to use as consistent a terminology as possible. This paper clearly
demonstrates that the ECB, by means of “anticipative interpretation”, tries to
prevent future interpretative problems already in the drafting stages of legal
instruments, which shows a commendable awareness of interpretative issues. The
paper also shows how the ECB attempts to further its legal and policy objectives
through its interpretations, a practice which can be compared with the traditional
pro comunitate stance of the Court of Justice and can be welcomed. Through
all this, albeit in an indirect way, the lawyers within the ESCB and among them
the LEGCO members  may be seen at work, as they have contributed over the
years to this growing body of “jurisprudence”. As the Union grows, and with
it the number of jurisdictions and languages, the meaning of words, whether
examined on their own, in the context of the relevant legal instrument or seen
in the light of the purpose thereof, will continue to be the subject of legal debate
and interpretation. It is unlikely that on the subject of words, anyone will ever
have the f inal word.
120 CON/95/1, paragraph 5 (D).
NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS AND EXCLUSIVE
COMMUNITY COMPETENCES – A CRACK IN THE DAM?
Chiara Zilioli1
ABSTRACT
Alla metà degli anni cinquanta sei Stati europei decisero di impegnarsi insieme
in una sfida senza precedenti: rafforzare i loro legami a tal punto da prevenire
guerre future. Vincolandosi al raggiungimento di un medesimo obiettivo, ovvero
la realizzazione di una unione sempre più stretta tra popoli e mercati europei,
istituirono una Comunità che fin dalle sue origini si differenziò da altre entità
sovranazionali  per la sua capacità di elaborare le proprie politiche in modo
autonomo attraverso l’adozione, da parte delle sue istituzioni, di norme
direttamente applicabili ai cittadini. 
Con l’adesione, altri Stati accettarono in seguito di limitare la sovranità
nazionale trasferendo alla Comunità e alle sue istituzioni alcuni dei propri
poteri, fino al punto di rinunciare  totalmente al potere decisionale in campi
specifici per i quali la Comunità gode di competenze esclusive. Di fatto, con
l’ingresso della Comunità nella terza fase dell’unione monetaria, la maggior
parte dei suoi Stati membri ha trasferito irrevocabilmente alla Banca centrale
europea la competenza in materia di politica monetaria.
Dopo l’attacco alle torri gemelle del World Trade Center, mentre gli Stati
occidentali riesaminavano gli strumenti, anche giuridici, atti a far fronte ad
attacchi terroristici, il governo finlandese modificò la propria legislazione
autorizzando, in situazioni di emergenza e previa adozione di un decreto
presidenziale, l’introduzione di misure in conflitto con il diritto comunitario e
con l’esercizio della politica monetaria unica. Secondo il governo finlandese,
l’articolo 297 del trattato consentirebbe agli Stati membri, in situazioni di
emergenza, di adottare unilateralmente misure contrastanti col diritto comunitario
e persino di “avocare” competenze precedentemente trasferite alla Comunità.
L’obiettivo di questo capitolo è di analizzare “il contenuto e l’obiettivo”
dell’articolo 297 del trattato per valutare se effettivamente attribuisca agli Stati
membri, in situazioni di emergenza, una completa discrezionalità sulle misure
da adottare, persino quando tali misure comportino l’esercizio della competenza
monetaria esclusiva, trasferita irrevocabilmente dagli Stati che hanno adottato
l’euro alla Banca centrale europea. Se così fosse, sarebbe possibile agli Stati
membri distruggere in pochi giorni e unilateralmente anni di costruzione della
“casa comune”.
Dopo aver esaminato la necessità di uniforme applicazione del diritto
comunitario in tutti gli Stati membri (con la conseguente impossibilità per 
gli Stati di optare unicamente a favore di alcune politiche) e la possibilità 
di denuncia unilaterale del trattato di Roma, questo capitolo analizza la 
funzione dell’articolo 297, clausola derogatoria e non norma che riserva una
sovranità nazionale, e le condizioni secondo le quali è permesso invocarne
l’applicazione. 
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1 I would like to thank Florence Feyerbacher for her support in the research for the preparation of this article.
Emerge chiaramente dall’analisi che non è possibile dare all' articolo 297 una
interpretazione confliggente sia con l’obiettivo primario della Comunità, ossia
una unione sempre più stretta fra i suoi Stati membri, che con l’evoluzione
dell’intero diritto comunitario verso una maggiore integrazione. Dal punto di
vista giuridico, l’articolo 297 non consente agli Stati di recuperare competenze
che erano state  trasferite alla Comunità affinché siano esercitate su un piano
sovranazionale in nome dei cittadini europei. Inoltre, nello stato attuale dello
sviluppo comunitario le situazioni di emergenza e gli attacchi terroristici non
possono più essere affrontati unilateralmente. É pertanto necessario uno sforzo
comune teso ad affinare gli strumenti comunitari di reazione per poter affrontare
le sfide del ventunesimo secolo con strumenti adeguati. 
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I INTRODUCTION
When the twin towers of the World Trade Center fell on 11 September 2001, a
new era began for the western world and for international law. As terrorist acts
have come to be considered acts of war2, preventive strikes have been claimed
in the US national security strategy to be legitimate means of self-defence3. At
the same time, all western States, feeling under threat, have reconsidered their
emergency legislation and the powers and procedures available to face cases of
serious terrorist attack. Most governments have also examined the possible
impact of such attacks on f inancial markets, although this was not a problem
on September 11: international cooperation among central banks proved to be
very effective in preventing and solving temporary liquidity shortages and in
maintaining the stability of the global f inancial system4. 
The amendments proposed in 2002 by the Finnish government to the existing
national emergency powers legislation, increasing the government’s capacity to
regulate the f inancial markets, has to be seen in this context, as the individual
attempt of a State to react to these events. However, since Finland is a Member
State of the European Union, the adoption in 2003 of this new legislation raises
concerns as to whether, within the Union, individual (re)action is still effective
and legally possible, as it may conflict with the Treaty establishing the European
Community (the Treaty). 
Taking this recent case as the starting-point, this article aims to analyse the scope
of Article 297 of the Treaty to answer the question of whether or not it constitutes
the legal basis allowing the Member States to take back, unilaterally, the
competences attributed to the European Community (the Community) by the
Treaty. After discussing the (ir)reversibility of the transfer of competences to
the Community and the possibility of and limits to withdrawing from the
Community, the article analyses the conditions for invoking the application of
Article 297 of the Treaty and the procedural and substantive requirements it
imposes on the Member States. The article concludes that Article 297 does not
give the Member States a reserve of sovereignty and that there is no legal “crack
in the dam” through which the competences of the Community can flow back
to a Member State.
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2 Cassese, “Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law”, EJIL 2001 (12),
at 996/7: “Practically all states … have come to assimilate a terrorist attack by a terrorist organization to an
armed aggression by a state … Thus, aiding and abetting international terrorism is equated with an ‘armed
attack’ for the purpose of legitimizing the use of force in self-defence.” Contra, Bothe in Graf Vitzthum (Eds)
Voelkerrecht, 2. Ed., No 15, p. 611, No 11: “Ein weiteres wesentliches Element der Bestimmung des Inhalts
des Gewaltverbots besteht darin, dass es sich um Gewalt in den internationalen Beziehungen, d. h. zwischen
Staaten handeln muss. … Die Duldung oder Foerderung terroristischer Aktivitaeten ist deshalb nicht ohne
weiteres der eigenen Gewaltausübung des Staates gleichzuachten.“ 
3 Cf. Bothe, “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force”, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003)
No 2, 227-240, at 236 and 239: “the legal reasoning developed in the national Security Strategy may also be
understood as an advocacy de lege ferenda .… a change in the law to the effect of opening up broader
possibilities for anticipatory self-defence is not desirable.”
4 Cf. ECB opinion of 31 October 2002 (CON/2002/27), No 9, www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2002_
27_f_sign.pdf, second paragraph.
II THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FINNISH EMERGENCY POWERS ACT
In the summer of 2002, the Finnish government proposed to the parliament that
the Valmiuslaki 1080/1991 (Emergency Powers Act of 1991, or, “the Act”) be
amended in order “to secure the livelihood of the population and the national
economy, to maintain legal order and constitutional and human rights, and to
safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of Finland in emergency
conditions”5. In the Statement of Reasons supporting the proposal, the Finnish
legislator argued that the emergency powers as currently embodied in the
Emergency Powers Act were insuff icient with regard to f inancial market
regulation in emergency situations; that the competencies listed in Section 12
of the Act needed to be amended and a new Section 12a introduced; and that
the new powers could be exercised by decrees, enabling the Finnish government
also to impose measures on the Finnish national central bank (Suomen Pankki)
or on other Finnish public authorities. 
The exercise of these emergency powers requires the cumulative fulf ilment of
three conditions: (a) an emergency situation which the authorities cannot control
through the exercise of their regular powers;6 (b) the adoption of a decree by the
President of the Republic recognising the situation and authorising the use of
(some of the) powers as provided for in the Emergency Powers Act7 and (c) the
use by the government only of those powers necessary to achieve the aim of the
Act (proportionality principle)8. The proposed Act confers important new
competencies upon the government in the event of an emergency, many of which
overlap or interfere with monetary policy competencies9. 
According to Section 10 of the Act, its scope of application shall be limited in
accordance with the restriction of the scope of national law foreseen in
international agreements binding Finland. Therefore, to justify the
compatibility of these legislative changes with the Treaty, the Finnish
government invoked Articles 58 and 297 of the Treaty, claiming that the latter
in particular would allow exceptions from all Treaty rules, and Article 14.4 of
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
118
5 Chapter 1, Section 1(1) Emergency Powers Act, unoff icial translation of the Finnish Ministry of Justice. 
6 Chapter 1, Section 1(2) of the Emergency Powers Act contains an exhaustive list of situations that would
constitute “emergency conditions”. Such situations would be: (i) armed attack against Finland, as well as war
or the aftermath of war; (ii) serious violation of the territorial integrity of Finland or a threat of war against
the country; (iii) war or a threat of war between foreign countries or a serious international crisis constituting
a threat of war, requiring immediate action to increase Finland’s defences …; (iv) a serious threat to the
livelihood of the population or to the foundations of the national economy brought about by … serious
disruption of international trade; and (v) a catastrophe, “provided the authorities cannot control the situation
with regular powers” (unoff icial translation of the Finnish Ministry of Justice). 
7 Chapter 2, Section 3(1) and 3(2).
8 Chapter 3, Section 8: “The government shall be authorised to use only those emergency powers that are
indispensable for the achievement of the purpose of this Act. The emergency powers shall be used and
implemented only in ways that are indispensable for the achievement of the purpose of this Act.” (unoff icial
translation of the Finnish Ministry of Justice).
9 The new competencies would empower the government to prohibit or impose conditions on the export and
import of means of payment; oblige persons resident in Finland to repatriate different currencies, securities
or bonds allocated abroad; regulate the interest rates applicable in the Finnish f inancial market; prohibit or
restrict issuance and trade of securities; regulate and restrict lending and deposit-taking activities as well as
payment transfers and payment systems; suspend or restrict the functioning of clearing and settlement systems;
and lay down provisions concerning the accounting and f inancial statements of credit institutions (Sections
12 and 12(a) of the Act).
Bank (the Statute)10, which, it was claimed, would authorise the government to
assign national tasks to the national central bank.
In accordance with Article 105 (4) of the Treaty and Council Decision 98/415/EC11,
the Finnish Ministry of Finance consulted the European Central Bank (ECB) on
the draft Act. In its Opinion, the ECB concluded that “the proposal affects some
very core principles of Community law”.12 In particular, some of the new
competences assigned to the government conflict with the rules on free movement
of capital, while others conflict with the exercise of monetary policy and therefore
interfere with an exclusive Community competence. The ECB stated that, in the
framework of the Community monetary policy, it is f irst and foremost the task
of the competent authority (the Eurosystem) to react to and remedy the
consequences of an emergency situation; a unilateral and national approach to what
would necessarily be a common problem would be bound to be inappropriate in
practice and legally vitiated. Moreover, the ECB criticised the reference to Article
14.4 of the Statute as the legal basis for the attribution of certain tasks to the
Finnish national central bank – as this Article, the application of which in any case
requires the agreement of the Governing Council, only refers to the non-
Eurosystem activities that a national central bank can be asked to perform by its
government, and not to the performance of Eurosystem functions. It should be
mentioned that, even though most Member States have specif ic provisions for
legislation in the event of an emergency13, the Finnish legislation is the only case
in which powers are foreseen that clearly conflict with the rules of the Treaty.
On 13 June 2003 the Finnish parliament adopted the proposed amendments
despite the objections of the ECB14. However, on 17 December 2003 the Finnish
Ministry of Justice set up a committee to evaluate the need for an overall reform
of the Act and to “make the Emergency Powers Act fully compliant with the
Constitution, consistent and up-to-date”. On 17 May 2004 the committee issued
an interim report15 which focused on matters of Finnish constitutional law; in
addition, the report acknowledged that the emergency situations enumerated in
the Act were more extensive than the cases foreseen by Article 297. 
At the end of 2004 the Commission asked the Under-Secretary of State in the
Ministry of Finance, Martti Hetemäki, to consider, in the framework of the work
of the committee, various aspect of the Act which appear to be problematic from
the perspective of Community law.
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10 According to Article 14.4 of the Statute: “National central banks may perform functions other than those
specif ied in this Statute unless the Governing Council f inds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that
these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility
and liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.”
11 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the Consultation of the European Central Bank by national
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.
12 ECB opinion, cit., fn. 4, No 14.
13 In one specif ic case, the Dutch Noodwet financieel verkeer (Emergency Act for Financial Services) of 25 May
1978, as amended, foresees the adoption of emergency legislation to regulate the f inancial markets by the
Minister of Finance, subject to a Royal Decree ascertaining the status of emergency. However, this legislation
pre-existed the Maastricht Treaty and therefore has to be interpreted in a way consistent with the principles
of Community law as they stand after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (ECB opinion, cit., fn. 4, n.13)
14 An English language translation of the Emergency Powers Act, as amended by the Act of 18 July 2003 
(date of entry into force), Statute No 696/2003 amending the Emergency Powers Act, can be found at
www.f inlex.f i/f i/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911080.pdf.
15 The Interim Report can be found at www.om.f i/25607.htm.
The mandate of this committee has recently been extended until 30.09.2005. A
proposal for amendment of the Act is said to be under preparation, but no
information about its contents has been made public. If amendments to the
Emergency Powers Act are proposed, the Finnish Constitution states that they
will have to be agreed by two parliaments. This means that any amendment to
the Act could enter into force, at the earliest, in 2007. 
III FIRST QUESTION: IS THE TRANSFER OF COMPETENCES TO THE COMMUNITY
IRREVERSIBLE? 
With the ratif ication of the Treaty of Rome, the Member States agreed to assign
the Community a number of powers. Through a gradual transfer, the competences
of the Community have increased over time and have come to include actions
in different f ields and of different depth (exclusive, shared and concurrent
competences). However, the Treaty (except in the case of Monetary Union16) does
not specify whether this process is an irreversible one17. Given this situation and
the steadily evolving European integration process, the question has been raised
as to whether Member States may unilaterally take back certain specif ic powers
they have conferred on the Community or, in an extreme case, withdraw from
the latter.
a) The national constitutions
Before examining the Treaty itself, it is useful to look at the national
constitutions of the Member States. As the competences conferred by the Treaty
on the European Community were previously exercised by the Member States
which agreed to the transfer, provision needed to be made in each constitution
allowing for such transfer.
Looking at the wording of such provisions, one f inds a wide variety of
definitions. There is the temporary devolution of attributions of the State (Article
49bis of the Luxembourg Constitution), where the temporal limitation clearly
underlines the possibility of the State to withdraw at any time. There is the  joint
exercise, with the other Member States, of certain competences (Article 88-1
of the French Constitution; Article 7.6 of the Portuguese Constitution), which
seems to lean towards an intergovernmental approach and supports the idea of
a State maintaining full control of its sovereignty18. There is the limitation of
sovereignty (Article 11 of the Italian Constitution; Paragraph 15 of the Preamble
of the French Constitution), which is clearly unilateral and, it seems,
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16 European Council of Madrid, Presidency Conclusions of 16.12.1995, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressData/en/ec/032a0001.htm (point 1.3.4); compare also the wording of Article 88.1 “exercer en commun”
and of Article 88.2 “transfert” of the French Constitution. 
17 Obradovic, “Repatriation of Powers in the European Community”, 34 CMLR (1997), pp. 59-88.
18 “La souveraineté internationale consiste en effet précisément dans le pouvoir de conclure des traités ayant
pour objet de transférer ou de partager des compétences … un État est souverain si la liste des compétences
qu’il continue d’éxercer ne dépend que de lui même”, Troper, “L’Europe politique et la souveraineté, des États”,
lecture given in the context of the symposium organised by the Centre Marc Bloch and the Institut Water
Hallstein of the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin on “L’avenir de l’Union européenne: pour un bilan critique
de la Convention européenne”, 7-8 November 2003, p. 6.
discretionary. There is the attribution of the exercise of State competences
(Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution; Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution),
where assigning only the exercise of the competences to the Community (and
presumably keeping the competences themselves for the State) implies the
possibility to withdraw. There is the transfer of competences (Article 23 (1) of
the German Constitution; Article 9 (2) of the Austrian Constitution; only for
monetary policy and the free movement of persons, Article 88-2 of the French
Constitution), the provision which goes furthest and seems to imply an
irrevocable transfer and a permanent loss for the future of such powers in the
Community’s favour. 
At f irst sight, it could be concluded that most Member States never really
intended to permanently transfer their competences to the Community. However,
this conclusion can be challenged on two grounds. First, the national
constitutional provisions deal in general with the power of the State to conclude
an international treaty: the special nature of the Treaty is, not reflected in these
constitutional provisions19. Second, since the signing of the Treaty, there has
been, with the participation of the Member States, a progressive process of
integration which binds them now in a different way. In this context, it is
interesting to note that there has been a development in the French Constitution:
Article 88-2 talks of the “transfer of competences”, and not anymore of the joint
exercise of competences, in the case of Monetary Union. The question is whether
this further concession is a reflection of the higher integration achieved and a
sign of development towards the transfer of competences to the Community, or
whether it is only determined by the specif icity of the subject, Monetary Union,
which requires an irrevocable transfer of competences20. 
b) Withdrawal from a specific Community policy
In the past, the question has been raised of whether it would be possible for a
Member State not to join21, or to unilaterally withdraw from, individual
Community policies22. On the second question, the European Court of Justice
has stated very clearly in its case law that there may be no reservations of
Member States in their membership of the Communities and that Member States
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19 In some cases however, as in the Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution, the article was specif ically drafted
for the entry of the country into the European Community.
20 Cf. Obradovic, cit. fn. 17, p. 62.
21 In two cases Member States have been allowed not to join a Community policy. First, the Protocol on Social
Policy was adopted to overcome the disagreement of the United Kingdom: the other 11 Member States wishing
to continue along the path laid down in the 1989 Social Charter adopted among themselves an agreement
additional to the provision of the Treaty. The United Kingdom subsequently joined the agreement and its
provisions became part of the Treaty. Second, the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark were adopted
to allow these two Member States to opt out of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union while allowing
the Community and the other Member States to move into that phase. This is the most extreme example of
differentiated integration in Community law, cf. Zilioli, “The Constitution for Europe and its impact on the
Governance of the Euro”, in Torres, Verdun, Zimmermann (eds.), Governing EMU, in print, Nomos. The
obligation of new Member States to join the Community in its present state of development, the obligation
to accept and introduce in their legislation the whole of Community law, without exceptions (acquis
communautaire) are also based on the principles of equality of Member States before Community law and
Community solidarity, analysed below.
22 During the preparations for the IGC on Economic and Monetary Union in 1990, the question was also raised
as to whether a third country could join Monetary Union without joining the Community, and was answered in
the negative, cf. Zilioli/Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2001, 10.
cannot apply provisions of secondary Community law in an incomplete or
selective manner as that would lead to the undermining of Community
solidarity23. The Court has emphasised that there is an “equilibrium between the
advantages and obligations flowing from [a Member State’s] adherence to the
Community”24. The selective or incomplete application of Community law
constitutes a unilateral break of the obligation to respect the Community’s rules,
leading to a disturbance in the equilibrium of advantages and obligations and
thereby endangering the equality of Member States before Community law. “This
failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their
adherence to the Community strikes at the very root of the Community legal
order”25. In another case26, the Court similarly concluded that “the complexity
of certain situations in a State cannot alter the legal nature of a Community
provision …, and this is particularly the case considering that the Community
rule must have the same binding force in all Member States.” Finally, as already
mentioned, the Court has stated the irreversibility of the transfer of powers to
the Community.27
Experience confirms that withdrawal from a single Community policy has never
been seriously considered. In the only case of withdrawal from the Community
of (a portion of the territory of) a Member State, the case of Greenland, even
though the problem was only related to the f isheries policy, Greenland withdrew
from the Community as a whole28. In the case of the 1975 British referendum,
the question was on whether or not to withdraw from the European Communities,
not from one of its policies. Finally, the possibility explicitly provided for by
the Constitution for Europe is to withdraw from the European Union; it is clear
that exit from a sole policy is not foreseen29.
It is therefore clear that, once certain powers have been conferred on the
Community and certain rules have been adopted, there cannot be cherry-picking
in Community law and there is a clear obligation on all Member States to abide
by the totality of Community law. 
In the specif ic case of monetary policy, this prohibition to withdraw has been
stated more explicitly30: it is commonly agreed that it is not possible for Member
States to take back the monetary competences assigned to the Community by
the Maastricht Treaty they have ratif ied. There are at least two reasons why in
this case the irrevocability of the transfer of competences has been stated
explicitly. First, differentiated integration implies increased flexibility but also
a risk of legal uncertainty; in this situation it is necessary to ensure that the
122
23 Case 128/78, Commission v United Kingdom [1979] ECR 419, judgment of 7 February 1979, paragraph 9.
24 Case 128/78, cit., fn. 23, para. 12.
25 Commission ./. United Kingdom, para. 12.
26 Case 13/68, Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453, judgment of 19 December 1968, 
p. 462.
27 See below, text related to fn. 40.
28 OJ L 29, 01.02.1985, p.1.
29 Cf. Smits, The European Constitution and EMU: an Appraisal, 42 CMLR 2005, 425-463, at 464; Zilioli, cit.
fn. 21.
30 Cf. Conclusions of the European Council of Madrid, cit., fn.16 and Protocol (No 10) on the transition to the
third stage of economic and monetary union, in which the irreversible character of the Community’s movement
to the third stage of economic and monetary union has been declared. Cf. also Obradovic, cit., fn. 17, p.61.
movement from the different stages of integration is in one direction only.
Second, as monetary policy cannot be efficiently performed unless the decision-
making power is fully centralised31, it was always clear32 that monetary policy
can only be an exclusive Community competence33. Conceptually, it is even more
diff icult to imagine the exit of a Member State from an exclusive competence
of the Community; this is another reason why the irrevocability of the transfer
of competences has been explicitly addressed.
Different from the case of withdrawal is the case where a special differentiated
regime has been agreed beforehand, as in the case of the exemption from 
Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union foreseen by the UK and 
Danish Protocols. Even in a situation of differentiated integration, for those 
who have no exemption there is no possibility to withdraw from the 
Community policy.
c) Unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty
If it is not possible to unilaterally take back some competences that have been
assigned to the Community, is there another way for a Member State to show
its disagreement and detach itself from a policy it no longer shares? The question
is whether total (unilateral) withdrawal from the Union is possible.
Until the entering into force of the Constitution for Europe34, there will be no
provision for the withdrawal of a Member State from the Treaty. The absence
of any such provision has led a part of the doctrine35 to the conclusion that
Member States may not unilaterally withdraw from the Community36. 
According to international law, the non-inclusion of a clause regarding the
denunciation of or withdrawal from an international treaty may not in all cases
be understood as granting indef inite duration37. If “it is established that the
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31 Cf. Zilioli/Selmayr, cit. fn. 22, 55.
32 Cf. Zilioli, cit. fn. 21. 
33 This has now been confirmed in Article I-13 (1) c) of the Constitution, which, it is submitted, has a declaratory
nature.
34 Article I-60 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe reads: “Any Member State may decide to
withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. A Member State which decides
to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the
European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union …”.
35 Arndt, Europarecht, 3. ed., p. 64. For other voices sharing the view that Member States cannot unilaterally
withdraw, see also: Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen
Konstitutionalisierungsprozess, Berlin 2003, 613 ff; Hilf, “Kommentar zu Artikel 240”, point 5, in von der
Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann (eds.), EU-/EGV Kommentar, 5th edition, Baden-Baden 1997; Ipsen,
Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen 1972, p. 99 and 211; Schwarze, The Role of the European Court
of Justice in the Interpretation of Uniform Law among the Member States of the European Communities, Baden-
Baden 1988, p. 11. In the same direction, Tomuschat, “Wer hat höhere Hoheitsgewalt?”; 8 Humboldt Forum
Recht 1997. 
36 However, the EC Treaty does not remain entirely silent about the duration of the Treaty. According to Article
312, “th[e] Treaty is concluded for an unlimited period.” Article 51 of the Treaty on the European Union contains
identical wording (the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community differed in this respect,
as it was concluded for a period of 50 years, cf. Article 97 of the ECSC Treaty). The expression “unlimited
period” refers to the temporal dimension and may as such not be read as granting “indissolubility”. The same
conclusion is reached via an analysis of historical backgrounds in: Roettinger, “Kommentar zu Artikel 240”,
No. 1, in: Lenz (ed.), EG-Vertrag Kommentar, 1st ed. (1994).
37 According to Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty which contains no provisions
regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal”, www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or a right
of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty”38, 
then withdrawal is possible. Accordingly, whether Member States may withdraw
from the Community depends on the question of whether they intended to admit
this possibility and/or whether it is implied by the nature of the Treaty. Looking
at the Preamble of the Treaty, which states that the Treaty serves as a basis for
creating “an ever closer union”, as well as at the ever increasing integration and
cooperation process already sought by the fathers of the Treaty and at the ever
evolving character of the Community, this part of the doctrine concludes that
the nature of the Treaty does not imply a right to withdraw. These scholars have
found support in the case law of the European Court of Justice. Already in its
early days, the Court clarif ied that the Treaty is “more than an agreement which
merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. … It is also
conf irmed more specif ically by the establishment of institutions endowed with
sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their
citizens. …the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited f ields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but
also their nationals”39. At the time, no clear position was taken on the question
of whether the Member States could do away with the limitation of sovereignty
they had agreed to. More recently, however, the Court has clarif ied its position
and has explicitly stated that the transfer of powers is definitive and irreversible:
“powers thus conferred could not … be withdrawn from the Community, nor
could the objectives with which such powers are concerned be restored to the
f ield of authority of the Member States alone”40. 
On the basis of this case law of the Court of Justice, several scholars41 have
identif ied the peculiarity of Community law and the way in which it differs from
international law. While in international law the States always remain the masters
of the treaties they conclude, the peculiarity of the Treaty is that the Member
States have committed themselves to an irreversible project and have irrevocably
transferred, i.e. lost forever, some of their competences to the Community. 
A very different position has been taken by some national courts, which have
stated that, as the Treaty is nothing other than an international law treaty, by an
equal and contrary instrument the States can change their agreement, in some
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38 Article 56, para. 1 a) and b) of the Vienna Convention, cit. fn. 37.
39 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 judgement of 5 February 1963, at 12.
40 Case 7/71, Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, 1018. Similarly, cf. Case 804/79, Commission v United
Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, 1073; and Case 24/83, Wolfgang Gewiese and Manfred Mehlich v Colin Scott
Mackenzie, [1984] ECR 817, 833.
41 Cf. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law, 2004, pp. 307-308: “the status of a Member State constitutes
an exclusive matter of Community law [which is also] demonstrated in particular by the case law on the division
of competences laid down in the Treaty. This division is irreversible in the sense that as long as Community
law does not provide otherwise, the competences of the institutions continue to exist. … Member States are
not allowed to act unilaterally but are obliged to act in the interest of the Community. … The division of
competences between the Member States and the institutions is exclusively based on the Treaty, which precludes
Member States from unilaterally changing the scope of Community law or invoking the existence of a ‘domaine
reservé’ … for not fulf illing their obligations. … More generally, the case law has made clear that the status
of Member State under Community law involves a prohibition of unilateral action”. 
cases even concluding that unilateral withdrawal is also possible42. While the
latter conclusion is not shared by all scholars in the f ield43, some agree that a
consensual exit from the Treaty through an international law agreement is
possible44. 
The inclusion in the text of the Constitution for Europe of Article I-6045,
explicitly allowing for the withdrawal of a Member State from the EU, now
makes clear that the intention of the drafters is to permit, under certain
conditions and following certain procedures, such withdrawal. As the foreseen
procedure requires negotiations of the modalities for exit, one wonders, however,
whether it will still be legitimate to talk of “unilateral” exit. Looking at the
question of the transfer of competences, it can be argued that the need for a
negotiated procedure arises not only from practical necessity – the complexity
of “excluding” a State from the internal market – but also from the very reason
that the Community would need to transfer back (the State itself not being in
a position to repatriate) the powers and competences previously conferred upon
the Community46. In this respect, it should be underlined that the withdrawal
agreement would be negotiated by the Union (and not by the Member States,
as the accession treaties are) and the withdrawing Member State. Not even
Article I-60 of the Constitution can, therefore, provide a def initive answer to
the question of the irrevocability of the transfer of competences. 
125
42 The possibility of unilateral withdrawal was the conclusion in  the Factortame judgement of the House of 
Lords, Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2) [1991], 1 AC 603, 659, where it was stated 
that the Parliament, when adopting the European Communities Act, did not lose the competence to repeal 
that act in the future, even in a purely unilateral way. It is not clear whether the same conclusion was reached
in the Maastricht decision, see below. Cf. Hailbronner, “The European Union from the perspective of the
German Constitutional Court” (1994), German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 93-112, 103. Cf. the
Maastrichter Urteil of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) (for 
the English text, see CMLR 1994, p.57), where the Court stated in para. 55 of the judgement that the state
could withdraw from the Community by an international law act. On this case, among many interesting 
articles, cf. Weiler, “Demos, Telos und die Maastricht-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”,
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9507ind.html; Smits, “A Single Currency for Europe and the Karlsruhe
Court” (1994) LIEI, pp. 115-133, 124; Hirsch, Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht -
Kooperation oder Konfrontation?, 38 NJW (1996) 2457-2466. It is clear that political motivations have played
a substantial role in the decisions of the national courts: it is very diff icult for the judges of the supreme court
of a state to recognise the hierarchical superiority of the ECJ, and it is very diff icult for a national parliament
to recognise that the European Parliament is as democratically legitimate as itself and that many, but no longer
all, competences remain with the national parliament, as some have been transferred to the Community.
Obradovic, cit., fn. 17, p. 72, considers these national judicial decisions tools for the repatriation of powers.
43 According to the Vienna Convention, unilateral exit from a treaty is possible only under very special
circumstances. Cf. Article 56 (in principle, no possibility for unilateral denunciation) and Articles 60 to 62,
especially 62, rebus sic stantibus (which contain the extraordinary circumstances in which a unilateral
denunciation is possible) of the Vienna Convention, cit., fn. 37. For arguments against unilateral withdrawal,
see Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: constitutional constraints for an ‘ever closer
union’”, 31 CMLR 235-245, 242; Diez Picazo, “Les pièges de la souveraineté”, in Dehousse (ed.), Une
constitution pour l’Europe?, Presses de Sciencer Po 2002, 39, 59. Contra, de Witte, “The Process of Ratification
of the Constitutional Treaty and the Crisis Option: A Legal Perspective”, EUI Working Paper LAW No 2004/16,
1-19, 16, who mentions the fact that when in 1975 the British government called a referendum on whether
the United Kingdom should remain in the EC, none of the other Member States lodged a formal protest.
44 Puttler, “Sind die Mitgliedstaaten noch ‘Herren’ der EU? - Stellung und Einfluss der Mitgliedstaaten nach dem
Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrages der Regierungskonferenz”, 39 Europarecht (2004), pp. 669-690, 676; Folz,
“Austritt und Ausschluss aus der Europäischen Union”, in Ginther (ed.), Völker- und Europarecht, Vienna 2001,
145, 154; Troper, cit., fn. 18.
45 Cit., fn. 34.
46 As a counterargument it could be argued that in case no agreement can be reached, the unilateral withdrawal
is effective as from two years after the notif ication to the European Council of the intention of the Member
State to withdraw, Article I-60 (3).
d) Conclusions: withdrawal from Monetary Union is not possible
The Finnish Emergency Powers Act foresees that, in certain cases of serious
emergency, the government can introduce obstacles to the free movement of
capital and can assign certain powers, which according to the Treaty belong to
the ECB, to the Finnish national central bank (Suomen Pankki) and to other
national authorities, thereby (temporarily) separating Finland from the Monetary
Union of the Community. 
The question of whether the Treaty allows Member States to unilaterally exit
from Monetary Union has thus been examined. There is agreement in the
doctrine and in the case law on the impossibility of unilaterally withdrawing from
a specif ic Community policy. In particular, it is clear that the movement of the
Community into Monetary Union is irreversible and that there can therefore be
no “repatriation” of competences. On the other hand, there is no agreement as
to whether unilateral withdrawal from the whole of the Treaty is possible as 
(i) the Treaty does not contain an explicit clause to this effect, (ii) the wording
of the national constitutions is diverse and not clear and (iii) the question of
whether the nature of the Treaty allows for a withdrawal is answered in different
ways by the scholars, the European Court of Justice and the national courts. Once
the Constitution enters into force, its Article I-60 will clarify the situation and
allow withdrawal, subject to a procedure requiring negotiations involving the
European Council, the Commission and the Parliament and, if the withdrawing
Member State has adopted the euro, certainly also the ECB47. 
IV SECOND QUESTION: DOES THE EXCEPTION OF ARTICLE 297 OF THE TREATY
ALLOW MEMBER STATES TO UNILATERALLY “SUSPEND” THE TRANSFER OF
POWERS TO THE COMMUNITY?
As the Emergency Powers Act does not envisage a withdrawal from the
Community, but only a future, conditional and (probably) temporary national
exercise of Community powers, the question is whether the legal basis that has
been invoked – Article 297 – grants Member States these powers. First, the
function of Article 297 and the question of whether it grants, by its nature, a
“reserve of sovereignty”, or is rather a hedge clause, will be examined.
Thereafter, the conditions for the applicability of Article 297 will be analysed
to clarify whether allowing the Member States under certain circumstances to
introduce legislation creating obstacles to the free movement of capital and the
internal market also allows the Member States to adopt legislation in an area
of exclusive Community competence. In substance, the question is whether
Article 297 is the crack in the dam through which the monetary policy
competences irrevocably attributed by the Treaty to the Community can, under
certain conditions, flow back to the Member States.
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47 Cf. Opinion of the ECB of 19 September 2003 at the request of the Council of the European Union on the
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CON/2003/20), OJ C 229/7 of 25.9.2003.
a) Is Article 297 still necessary?
Article 297 is one of the original articles of the Treaty of Rome (at the time,
Article 224). Its main function when it was adopted was to create a link between
the (at the time) completely national external politics48 of the Member States
and the Community objective to achieve a common market. While admetting that
Member States, in some extremely serious situations, have the right to take
emergency measures that might have an impact on the common market, the
Article nevertheless prescribes a consultation procedure to prevent such negative
effects.
When in 1991 the IGC on political union started to discuss the “Common
External Policy”, which would later become the second pillar of the European
Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the question was raised
as to whether it still made sense to allow Member States to adopt individual
measures to react to external threats, which would by def inition concern the
whole European Union, and whether it would not be more appropriate to delete
such an anachronistic provision and rely on the reaction of the European Union49.
Today, with the adoption of the CFSP, the objectives of which conflict with the
adoption in emergency situations of unilateral measures by the Member States,
this question is even more topical. It is questionable whether this Article still
maintains a function in today’s European Union, particularly if, as in the case
of the Finnish Act, the measures to be individually adopted by the Member State
are bound by definition, in a single Monetary Union, to cause further disruption
to the market rather than stabilising it.
b) “Reserve of sovereignty” or exceptional derogating clause?
It has been argued, in particular by Member States50, that Article 297 of the
Treaty grants them a “reserve of sovereignty”51 or that, under certain
circumstances, it is a tool for the repatriation of competences from the
Community to a Member State52. However, such a reading is supported neither
by the wording of Article 29753, nor by the history or nature of the Communities54.
In fact, the historical and legal development of the Community until the
establishment of European Union, which provided for a CFSP55, clearly indicates
another, more restrictive, reading. 
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48 Article 297 also talks of “serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order”; this aspect
relates to internal security. On this aspect, see below, chapter IV c) 1). 
49 The deletion was proposed by the Commission, cf. CONF-UP 1788/91 of 15 April 1991, p. 23.
50 The German and British governments took this position in some cases at the ECJ: cf. Case 15/69,
Württembergische Milchverwertung-Südmilch-AG v Salvatore Ugliola [1969] ECR 363; C-273/97, Angel Maria
Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, [1999] ECR I-7403, 7415; C-285/98, Tanja Kreil
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2000] ECR I-69. See also Ehlermann, Communautés européennes et sanctions
économiques internationales – une réponse à J. Verhaeven, Revue Belge Droit International 1984-1985, no.
1 , pp. 96-112; contra, Koutrakos, “Is Article 297 EC a ‘Reserve of Sovereignty’?”, 37 CMLR (2000), 1339-
1362 at 1342.
51 This is challenged by Koutrakos, cit., fn. 50.
52 Obradovic, cit., fn. 17, makes the point that it is not clear whether the process of gradual transfer to the
Community of Member States’ powers is irreversible or not, with one exception: Monetary Union, p. 61.
53 See below, chapter IV c).
54 Cf. Koutrakos, cit., fn. 50, p. 1342; Gilsdorf, “Les réserves de sécurité du traité CEE, à la lumière du traité
sur l’Union européenne”, 374 Rev. Marché commun et de l’Union européenne (janv.1994) 17-25, especially
fn. 3 and 4 at p. 18.
55 Mentioned above, chapter IV a).
Article 297 is one of the f ive articles56 that provide for derogation from the rules
of the Treaty. It is settled case law that Member States can derogate from the
obligations imposed on them by the provisions of the European treaties only on
the conditions laid down in the treaties themselves57. All articles of the Treaty
allowing derogation are of an exceptional nature and only apply in clearly
defined cases58, while the derogating measures must be proportionate59, i.e. have
the least impact on the market60. 
Therefore, Article 297 has to be interpreted in a restrictive manner. Although
Article 297 attaches particular importance to the interests of Member States,
“it must be observed that [it] deal[s] with exceptional cases which are clearly
def ined and which do not lend themselves to any wide interpretation”61. 
As the special cases listed in Article 297 deal with the issue of public security,
it is interesting to examine the position taken by the ECJ on the exceptions
allowed in this f ield. First, the Court stated that “[i]t is not possible to infer from
those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception excluding
from the scope of Community law all measures taken for reasons of public
security”62. Second, even in the case of the CFSP, where what in substance
remains a national competence is coordinated, the European Court of Justice has
clearly stated that “Member States have retained their competence in the f ield
of foreign and security policy, [but that these] powers retained … must be
exercised in a manner consistent with Community law. … Consequently, while
it is for Member States to adopt measures of foreign and security policy in the
exercise of their national competence, those measures must nevertheless respect
the provisions adopted by the Community in the field of the common commercial
policy. … It follows from the foregoing that, even where measures have been
adopted in the exercise of national competence in matters of foreign and security
policy, they must respect the Community rules adopted under the common
commercial policy”63. Therefore, even in an area which falls within the
competence of the Member States the latter have nevertheless to ensure the
respect of measures adopted to achieve the objectives of an exclusive Community
competence. In areas which are within the Community competence, as it is the
case for Article 297, the conditions under which a State can (temporarily)
unilaterally deviate from Treaty provisions must be very stringent and
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56 Articles 30, 39, 46, 296 and 297 of the Treaty. 
57 Joined Cases 6 and 11/69, Commission v French Republic, ECR [1969], 523; Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para.
16; cf. also Nicolaysen, Europarecht I – Die Europaeische Integrationsverfassung, 2nd ed. (2002), p. 108.
58 Case 222/84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] ECR 1651, judgment of
15 May 1986, para. 26; Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain, [1999] ECR I-5585, judgment of 16 September
1999, para. 21; Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 16.
59 The ECJ has stated, in respect of Article 30, that “the purpose of this Article is not to reserve certain matters
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States; it merely allows national legislation to derogate from the
principle of free movement of goods to the extent to which this is and remains justif ied in order to achieve
the objectives set out there”, Steiner/Woods, EC Law, 7th ed. (2000), p. 172, referring to Case 153/78
Commission v Germany, [1979] ECR 2555. Cf. also Case 222/84, cit., fn. 58, para. 38; Case C-285/98, cit.,
fn. 50, para. 23.
60 In addition, it has been argued that where there is a Community measure covering the specific subject, a Member
State cannot rely on the derogation provided by the Treaty itself: cf. Steiner/Woods, cit, fn. 59, p. 191.
61 Case C-13/68 Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade, [1968] ECR 453.
62 Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 16; Case C-273/97 cit., fn. 50, para. 16.
63 Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, [1997] ECR I-81 para. 24, 25, 27, 30.
exhaustively described. Finally, concerning the limits of the legal review, the
Court has stated that “depending on the circumstances, national authorities have
a certain degree of discretion when adopting measures which they consider to
be necessary in order to guarantee public security in a Member State”64. However,
the Court may question whether the measures taken in exercise of this discretion
actually have the purpose of guaranteeing public security and whether they are
appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim65. 
It is clear that the aim of Article 297 is not to enable Member States, in areas
touching the very core of their sovereignty, freedom to act by taking any measure
they consider appropriate without any regard for the procedures established in
the Treaty. On the contrary, as pointed out by Koutrakos, Article 297 “is focused
on the consultation between the Member States rather than the measures ‘which
a Member State may be called upon to take’”66. While a certain discretion with
regard to the measures to be taken remains to the Member State, respect of the
foreseen procedures is of the essence, precisely because this Article contains
a “wholly exceptional clause”67 which allows derogation, not from one aspect
of the common market (as Article 30 of the Treaty does), but from the rules of
the common market in general68. According to Article 297, unilateral measures
of Member States are, as a rule, prohibited; the protection of national interest
can only take place according to the rules of Community law and the procedure
foreseen for this purpose69.
It appears therefore that Article 297 of the Treaty cannot be understood as a
reserve of sovereignty, but rather as a hedge clause (“Schutzklausel”)70. 
This is conf irmed by the very content and aim of Article 297, which is, as
mentioned above, to establish a procedure for consultation and cooperation to
prevent negative impacts on the internal market from unilateral action. This
consultation should precede, or when this is impossible immediately follow71,
the adoption of the national measure. Two further steps, aiming at guaranteeing
that Article 297 is used in a restrictive way, are built into the following Article
298. First, in the event of the measure, despite the consultation and cooperation,
having negative effects on the internal market, the Commission shall take action
with the Member State to adjust the national violating provisions to the Treaty.
Second, the question can be submitted directly to the ECJ, without the
preliminary stages foreseen in Articles 226 and 227, both by the Commission
and by other Member States. These further guarantees that Article 297 be strictly
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64 Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 24.
65 Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 25.
66 Koutrakos, cit., fn. 50, p. 1340.
67 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-120/94, Commission v Greece, [1996] ECR I-1513 (emphasis
in the original); cf. also Case 222/84, cit. infra, fn. 58.
68 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-120/94, cit. fn. 67.
69 Cf. Nicolaysen, Europarecht I – Die Europäische Integrationsverfassung, 2nd ed. (2002), p. 108.
70 Gilsdorfer/Brandtner, “Vorbem. zu den Artikeln 296 bis 298 EG”, No 3-5, Bardenhewer-Rating/
Grill/Jakob/Woelker, EG- und EU-Kommentar, 6th ed. (2004), p. 1534.
71 Cf. the well-known Caroline formula, pleaded by the United States in 1841: “necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”, State Secretary Webster, British
and Foreign State Papers, 29 (1840-1841), at 1129, 1138.
interpreted and not abused support the interpretation that its objective is not to
maintain a reserve of sovereignty for the Member States in the exceptional cases
foreseen, but to limit their possibility to act unilaterally even under these
exceptional circumstances.
c) Conditions for invoking Article 297 
1 – Serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law
and order
According to Article 297, a Member State might be called upon to take certain
measures in the event of “serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance
of law and order”. This must be “a breakdown of public order on a scale much
vaster than the type of civil unrest which might justify recourse to Article 36
… a situation verging on a total collapse of internal security”72. Where the notion
“public security” refers to both a Member State’s internal security and its
external security73, as in Articles 30, 39 and 46 of the Treaty, the notion “serious
internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order” must be
interpreted in a much narrower manner, in order not to endanger the “wholly
exceptional nature” of Article 297. Neither a general strike nor violent
demonstrations by agricultural workers74 nor purely economic reasons75 can
suff ice for a State to have recourse to this exceptional Article. Isolated terrorist
attacks, environmental catastrophes or temporary supply crises also cannot
provide justif ication for recourse to this Article76.
2 – War and serious international tension constituting a threat of war 
The concepts of “war” and “threat of war” are not reflected in the UN Charter
or the Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, where reference is made instead
to “aggression”77. The first interesting question is whether or not acts of terrorism
can be assimilated to a “threat of war” for the purpose of applying Article 297.
While experts are divided on the issue78, Article 3 of the Council Common
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72 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, cit, fn. 67, para. 47
73 Case C-367/89 Richardt and “Les Accessoires Scientifiques”, [1991] ECR I-4621, para. 22; Case C-83/94 Leifer
and Others, [1995] ECR I-3231, para. 26; Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 17; Case C-273/97, cit., fn. 50,
para. 17.
74 Case C-265/95, Commission v France, ECR 1997, I-6959, para. 54-58.
75 Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal, [2002] ECR I-4809, para. 52: “it is settled case law that economic
grounds can never serve as justif ication for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty”. 
76 Cf. Karpenstein, “Artikel 297 EGV”, in Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, Nomos 2000, 2344. 
77 The UN Charter does not use the expression “war”, but refers to “threats and breaches to international peace
and security”, “aggression”, “international disputes”, “local disputes”, “threats and use of force”. The UN
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) defines “Aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Def inition. …
Any of the following acts … qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military
occupation however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation …
(b) Bombardment …
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts …
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State …
(e) The use of armed forces
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory … to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries.”
78 Cf. Cassese, cit. fn. 2, p. 996-997: “practically all States … have come to assimilate a terrorist attack by a
terrorist organisation to an armed aggression by a State… Thus, aiding and abetting international terrorism
is equated with an “armed attack” for the purpose of legitimizing the use of force in self-defence”. Contra,
Bothe, “Terrorism…”, cit, fn. 2.
Position on the application of specif ic measures to combat terrorism79 def ines
a “terrorist act” as “an intentional act which… may seriously damage a
country…as defined as an offence under national law where committed with the
aim of …(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental, political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country…”80. 
The second interesting question is who is responsible for evaluating the existence
of a suff iciently serious threat. Advocate General Jacobs has clarif ied81 that it
is for the Member State concerned to evaluate whether international tensions
can be qualif ied as a threat of war; “the scope and the intensity of the review
that can be exercised by the Court is severely limited … by the absence of any
appropriate legal criteria capable of judicial application”82. Therefore, it can be
argued that it is for the concerned State to decide whether signif icant and
destabilising terrorist acts are to be considered as a threat of war.
3 – Obligations accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and
international security
Even in the case of this specif ic condition, it could be argued that Article 297
is anachronistic. The international obligations which could have an impact on
the common market are mostly military obligations. With the development of
the CFSP, and given that all Member States are members of the UN and most
are members of NATO, a joint reaction and joint obligations are much more
probable than individual ones. In any event, it is diff icult to imagine that these
international obligations might be so different among Member States as to
impose the creation of barriers between them, given the fact that they are under
an obligation to coordinate their actions on these issues. 
4 – Is “preventive” legislation allowed?
Even if one of the three objective above-mentioned conditions were to be
satisf ied, another question to be raised in the case of the Finnish Act is whether
a Member State can invoke Article 297 to enact legislation to deal with a future
potential emergency situation. 
The wording of Article 297 does not support an interpretation including such
a preventive element, as it uses the expression “in the event of ”. The exceptional
nature of Article 297 therefore excludes the possibility of adopting
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79 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specif ic measures to combat terrorism
(2001/931/CFSP), OJ L 344/93 of 28.12.2001.
80 Even if terrorism is not considered to be an act of war, it appears from this def inition that, in some extreme
situations, it could constitute a case of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order.
81 Agreeing with the decision of the German courts, as referred by Advocate General Jacobs, cit. fn. 67, I-1527,
point 51.
82 Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, case C-120/94, cit, fn. 67, para. 50-51. When evaluating public
security, the Court has always granted a certain discretion to the Member States: “depending on the
circumstances, national authorities have a certain degree of discretion when adopting measures which they
consider to be necessary in order to guarantee public security in a Member State”, case C-273/97, cit., fn. 50,
para. 27; Case C-83/94, cit., fn. 73, para. 35; Case C-285/98, cit., fn. 50, para. 24. Also regarding the exercise
of derogation powers pursuant to Article 120 of the Treaty, the Court has held that “in the event of urgency
and when a decision of the Council is not forthcoming immediately, Article [120] allows, as a precaution,
unilateral action by a Member State and leaves this latter to decide the circumstances which render such action
necessary”, Joined Cases 6 and 11/69, cit., fn. 57, para. 28.
“precautionary” or “preventive” legislation in the absence of the necessary
conditions83.
It could be argued that the Finnish Act did not imply the adoption of preventive
legislation but only of an enabling clause, on the basis of which, if and when
the necessary conditions came into existence, emergency legislation could be
adopted. However, the ECJ has clearly stated that Member States have a duty
to eliminate from their legal system any legislation which is in conflict with the
Treaty even when it is not applied, to foster transparency and certainty of law84.
In this case, either the limits and conditions (including procedural) of the
enabling law would coincide with what is foreseen in Article 297, and its only
function would be to determine which organ is competent according to national
law to issue the emergency legislation, or the limits and conditions would differ
(and be broader), in which case the national provision would violate the Treaty
since, as mentioned above, Article 297 must be interpreted in a restrictive way.
In this latter case, the Finnish government would be under an obligation to
eliminate the inconsistency with the Treaty even though no concrete emergency
measure violating the Treaty has yet been adopted.
V CONCLUSION
The analysis has shown that, according to the Treaty, Member States can only
adopt provisions which conflict with those of the Treaty and create obstacles
to the four freedoms when specif ically allowed by a Treaty provision, strictly
within its limits and following the required procedure. It has also been
demonstrated that Member States cannot take back competences transferred to
the Community, particularly in the case of the competences related to the
Community monetary policy85, where the Treaty explicitly states that the move
is irrevocable, unless Member States withdraw from the Community as a whole
(and even in this case they have to negotiate their exit and cannot withdraw
unilaterally). Finally, the analysis of Article 297 has shown that the objective
of the Article is not to maintain a reserve of sovereignty for the Member States,
but rather to establish conditions and specif ic procedures for the individual
reactions of Member States to such extremely exceptional situations.
If one of the events listed in Article 297 occurs, the Member State concerned
is allowed, after consultation with the other Member States, to take the measures
within its competence that least affect the common market, if Community
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83 The case law of the Court also indicates that unilateral action by a Member State in the event of urgency can
“only [be] temporary pending an examination of their validity”, Joined Cases 6 and 11/69, cit., fn. 57, para. 29.
84 Cf. Case 159/78, Commission v Italy, [1979] ECR 3247, where the Court stated that keeping in force in the
national legislation provisions that conflict with the Treaty, even though they are not applied as the Treaty
rules prevail, constitutes a violation of the Treaty obligations because it creates ambiguity and uncertainty
for the citizens as to which is the applicable law. In the same direction, Case 169/85, Commission v Italy,
complete and Zilioli “Recenti sviluppi sul contrasto tra norme nazionali e disposizioni comunitarie”, in XXVI
Diritto Comunitario e Scambi Internazionali 1987, 105-113. The present case is similar: the legislation at stake
is not applicable as a necessary condition has not yet materialised, but it is in force and in the legal system
and it conflicts with the Treaty.
85 Article 105 talks of the Community monetary policy, even though such policy is effective only in the
participating Member States.
institutions are unable to act. It is not possible on this basis to “repatriate”
exclusive Community competences instead. The Finnish government hence
cannot invoke Article 297 of the Treaty for the amendment of its Emergency
Powers Act, as the Act suffers from both procedural and substantive defects.
It can be concluded therefore that there is no f issure in the Treaty through which
the competences transferred to the Community can flow back to the Member
States. If the Treaty is respected, in particular in f ields of exclusive Community
competence, the States do not have any residual power to adopt provisions that
conflict with the Treaty.
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INSIDE EU, OUTSIDE EMU: INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM II
Kirsten Rohde Jensen1
ABSTRACT
I nuovi Stati membri hanno espresso la propria intenzione di adottare l’euro il
prima possibile, probabilmente prima della fine del decennio. La
partecipazione ai nuovi accordi europei di cambio (ERM II) è uno dei criteri
che dovranno essere soddisfatti prima che sia possibile considerare il passaggio
all’euro. Lo studio intende fornire un esame generale del contesto giuridico e
istituzionale dell’ERM II. Al fine di inserire l’analisi dell’ERM II in una
prospettiva più generale vengono anche ripercorsi gli sviluppi storici e i
negoziati che hanno condotto a tale accordo. Viene infine trattato il ruolo
dell’ERM II nel criterio di convergenza relativo al tasso di cambio.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since 1 January 1999, the EU Member States have been divided in terms of
participation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Currently, 12 out of the
25 Member States in total have moved to the third stage of EMU and have
adopted the euro (the “euro area Member States”). The remaining 13 EU Member
States have not introduced the euro; two of these, Denmark and UK, both have
a Treaty-bound special right not to participate in the euro. 
As long as not all Member States have adopted the euro, Articles 121 and 124
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”) stipulate the
existence of an exchange rate mechanism. The present Exchange Rate
Mechanism II (ERM II) links the currencies of the Member States participating
in ERM II to the euro. This provides incentives among the participating Member
States to pursue stability-oriented economic and monetary policies, which helps
to create convergence and to foster exchange rate stability. This stability supports
the functioning of the single market and facilitates later full integration into the
euro area. In this paper we take a closer look at the legal and institutional
framework of ERM II. This analysis is placed into a more general perspective
that includes the historical developments and negotiations leading up to 
ERM II. In addition, the role of ERM II in the exchange rate convergence
criterion is also briefly discussed.  
2 THIRTY YEARS OF MONETARY COOPERATION
In 1972, following the launch of the Werner Plan for Economic and Monetary
Union, the Governors of the national central banks (NCBs) of the then six
Member States and of the three countries that would join the European
Community (EC) on 1 January 1973, established through the Basel Agreement
a f ixed exchange rate system with fluctuation bands of ±2.25%, known as the
“Snake”. During its existence from 1972 to 1978, the Snake was characterised
by frequent exchange rate adjustments as well as the coming – and especially
going – of participating Member States. The lack of success of the Snake,
coupled with the dismal economic situation at the beginning of the 1970s, caused
the Werner Plan to suffer a major setback.
The idea of monetary stability in Europe was revived with the creation of the
European Monetary System (EMS) in December 1978. The aim of the EMS,
which started operations in March 1979, was to promote monetary stability and
closer economic cooperation. At its core was the Exchange Rate Mechanism. A
central parity against the European Currency Unit (ECU) was f ixed for each
participating currency. Based on these rates, bilateral “central rates” were
established against all other member currencies of the ERM, constituting the so-
called parity grid. The fluctuation bands around the bilateral central rates were
±2.25%.2 The first few years of the EMS were characterised by frequent exchange
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rate realignments, which closely resembled a continuation of the Snake, with no
more substantial change than that of a broader group of participating countries.
However, from 1983 onwards the economic policies of a number of countries
became stability-oriented to a degree that made it possible to maintain a stable
exchange rate against the Deutsche Mark, which had the status of anchor currency.
Regular realignments of central rates still occurred, however, until 12 January
1987, when the system changed in nature as the participating countries shifted
towards avoiding such realignments. From January 1987 to September 1992 there
were no realignments in the system. The system was supported by improved
convergence of prices and costs.3 Positive, albeit declining, inflation differentials
accumulated over time, however, and, coupled with fixed nominal exchange rates4,
resulted in a deterioration in competitiveness, especially in Italy and Spain. The
increasing fundamental divergences and the full capital liberalisation adopted
from 1 July 1990 by most Member States, as well as speculative attacks5, led to
crises in September 1992 when the UK and Italy left the ERM. The Spanish peseta
and the Portuguese escudo were devalued in November 1992 and again in May
1993, while the Irish pound was devalued in January 1993. In August 1993 the
EMS was partly suspended when its fluctuation limits were extended to ±15%
to remove potential “one-way” speculative bets and to restore stability. After
ratification by all Member States, the Maastricht Treaty, which established among
other things the political and institutional framework for the process of
convergence towards EMU, came into force on 1 November 1993. The EMU
project of the Maastricht Treaty, with its well-determined objectives, institutions
and deadlines, turned out to be a catalyst for the path towards Monetary Union.
The establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) at the beginning
of 1994 also provided new momentum. The EMI helped in preparing the
subsequent stages of the EMU process which led to the introduction of the euro
in 1999.
3 NEGOTIATIONS ON ERM II
Deliberations on the establishment of a new exchange rate mechanism in the
third stage of EMU commenced in autumn 1995. The blueprint of the mechanism
developed gradually through discussions in EMI and in the EC Monetary
Committee, as well as in the informal ECOFIN meetings between central bank
governors and f inance ministers in Verona, Dublin and Noordwijk from spring
1996 to spring 1997. 
The natural starting point for these discussions was the existing exchange rate
arrangement, the ERM. Given the lack of Treaty provisions specifying
institutional arrangements regarding internal exchange rate regimes, there was
an absence of clear authority and a lack of clear legal basis in the Treaty on how
to regulate the new ERM, labelled ERM II. Some countries, as well as the
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at the Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute (London School of Economics).
4 In Spain a nominal appreciation took place during part of the period.
5 P. De Grauwe (1997), “Exchange Rate Arrangements between the Ins and the Outs”, CEPR Discussion Paper,
No 1640.
Commission, argued that in monetary and exchange rate matters the exclusive
competence, at least for the “ins”, should belong to the Community.6 The
majority of countries, however, found it appropriate to retain from ERM I the
structure of two parallel agreements among governments and among central
banks, given the respective competences and responsibilities. Another issue
raised in the discussions was whether participation in the new system should
be made compulsory, or remain voluntary as in ERM I. The Commission argued
that Member States with a derogation (the “pre-ins”) would be expected to join
the new mechanism. Those existing countries with a special status constituted
a unique case in the view of the Commission. If the convergence situation were
favourable, they should have the same opportunity to join as Member States with
a derogation. Most Member States, with a few exceptions, favoured some degree
of voluntariness, with the UK insisting on this.7
A central parameter of the discussions on the design of the new system was of
course the new economic and institutional environment that the move to the third
stage of EMU would create. Clearly, the euro was expected to play a central role
in the mechanism, given the expected stability and size of the euro area8, as well
as the fact that the non-participating Member States would be expected to
participate in the euro at a later stage. Two options regarding the fundamental
arrangement of the system were put forward. The f irst was a continuation along
the lines of ERM I, with the f ixing of central parities and fluctuation bands
between all participating currencies, thereby creating a parity grid. In such a
system, the fluctuations of each currency against the other currencies would be
limited. The second option – supported by the EMI and the Commission – was
purely to def ine central parities for the non-euro currencies vis-à-vis the euro.
Under this option, there would only be limitations to the fluctuations relative
to the euro. The euro would thus be the hub of the system, while the non-euro
currencies would constitute the spokes. This solution resembled that of the
Bretton Woods system, in which the dollar acted as the hub. Under a hub-and-
spoke system there are no bilateral central exchange rate parities or fluctuation
margins between the spokes. Hence, fluctuations among the spokes could in
principle be up to twice the size of the currency fluctuations against the euro.
Depending on the size of the permitted fluctuations against the euro, the
fluctuations between the participating non-euro currencies could potentially be
of a size detrimental to the eff icient working of the single market. It turned out
during the discussions that there was almost unanimity among the countries in
favour of the hub-and-spoke model, assuming that the decision on the central
parities were to be multilateral. Since the currencies would no longer be on an
equal footing, it was not possible to copy all the rules directly from the previous
exchange rate agreements into the new agreement (although naturally a large
number of new rules have their roots in the previous agreements, as further
elaborated below).
138
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Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997).
7 See De Grauwe, op. cit. 
8 In ERM I the Deutsche Mark was normally considered to play the role of an informal anchor, but the role was
not formalised and was occasionally challenged.
The question concerning the size of the standard fluctuation band, and whether
to allow narrower bands, proved to be the most contentious issue during the
negotiations. The majority of countries found that the latest period in ERM I,
with relatively broad bands of ±15% around the central parities, had worked quite
well and had secured a certain degree of stability. A few others, however, argued
that a system with such broad bands was tantamount to a “non-system”. While
central parities could still play a role as exchange rate objectives, interventions
at the margins of the fluctuation bands would, according to this view, be highly
unlikely. Rather, such interventions would be preceded by a realignment of the
central parities. The experience in the period 1993-1996 showed that the
currencies in ERM I had not moved to the margins of the fluctuation bands, and
hence mandatory intervention had not been needed. Regarding the
possibilities for formal or informal narrower bands, the discussion again revealed
differences in opinion. Some felt that narrower bands could invite speculators
to test these bands, creating the risk of losses for the NCBs involved, as happened
during the crisis of 1992-93. Furthermore, some feared that the possibility of
narrower bands might influence the interpretation of the exchange rate criterion
in the Treaty and hence potentially discriminate against later entrants to EMU.
Others argued for narrower bands, based on the convergence position of the
Member State in question. Some countries also argued that arrangements on
narrower bands should be decided on an ad hoc basis, while others expressed
a preference for a standard arrangement for narrower bands, to avoid a
proliferation of all kinds of arrangements. A compromise was reached, namely
that the agreement should explicitly state that narrower bands do not influence
the interpretation of the exchange rate criterion. The agreement on an escape
clause from mandatory intervention if this conflicted with the primary objective
of price stability also helped quell fears of losses from speculative attacks. 
4 ERM II LEGAL DOCUMENTS
ERM II is an intergovernmental arrangement based on the following two legal
documents:
– Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange rate
mechanism in the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union, Amsterdam,
16 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 5).
– Agreement of 1 September 1998 between the European Central Bank and the
national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down
the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in Stage Three of
Economic and Monetary Union (OJ C 345, 13.11.1998, p. 6), as amended by
the Agreement of 14 September 2000 (OJ C 362, 16.12.2000, p. 11), by the
Agreement of 29 April 2004 (OJ C 135, 13.5.2004, p. 3) and by the Agreement
of 16 September 2004 (OJ C 281, 18.11.2004, p. 3).
The main features of the mechanism are described in the Resolution and include
the following:
– Voluntary participation in the mechanism for all non-euro area Member States
(Article 1.6);
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– A central rate against the euro (Article 2.1), which explicitly makes the euro
the anchor currency;
– A standard fluctuation band of ±15% around the central rate (Article 2.1);
– Automatic and unlimited interventions at the margin, in principle. However,
the Resolution explicitly states that participating NCBs can suspend
intervention if this were to conflict with their primary objective, i.e. the
maintenance of price stability (Articles 1.5 and 2.1);
– The right of all parties to the agreement to initiate a conf idential procedure
aimed at reconsidering central rates (Article 2.3), which has to be done in a
timely fashion (Article 1.5);
– The possibility of formal narrower fluctuation bands than the standard one,
backed up in principle by automatic intervention and f inancing (Article 2.4),
as is the case with the standard band;
– The availability of very short-term f inancing, with the details determined in
the central bank agreement (Article 2.6).
While participation in the mechanism is voluntary for all non-euro area Member
States, Member States with a derogation are nevertheless expected to join the
mechanism at some stage. The Resolution makes no mention of entry conditions
and provides no reasons for a refusal of an application. The only provision in
this regard in the Resolution is the demand for common agreement on the central
rates and standard fluctuation band by the ministers of the euro area Member
States, the ECB and the ministers and central bank governors of the non-euro
area Member States participating in ERM II, following a common procedure
involving the European Commission and after consultation of the Economic and
Financial Committee (EFC). Ministers and NCB governors of the non-euro area
Member States not participating in ERM II will take part in the procedure but
will not have voting rights (Article 2.3).
Compared with the EMS Resolution from 1978, the ERM II Resolution is less
detailed and at the same time more flexible in a number of areas.9 The size of
the standard fluctuation band allows for a signif icant degree of flexibility in
exchange rate movements. At the same time, the ERM II Resolution makes it
possible to take Member States’ different degrees of convergence into
consideration. If economic performance has converged very closely to that of
the euro area, a Member State can request a formal narrower band. The ministers
of the euro area Member States, the ECB and the minister and NCB governor
of the non-euro area Member State in question take a decision after a request
following a common procedure involving the European Commission and after
consultation of the EFC. Ministers and NCB governors of other Member States
will take part in the procedure, but will not have voting rights (Article 2.4). The
central bank agreement makes it possible to conclude informal bilateral
agreements between the ECB and the participating non-euro area NCBs on closer
exchange rate arrangements (Article 15.3). Furthermore, the participating non-
euro area NCBs naturally still have the option to unilaterally stabilise their
exchange rates within the band.
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The possibility of suspending intervention, as well the possibility of
reconsidering central rates, makes maintaining price stability a priority. However,
any decision to suspend compulsory intervention would have to take all relevant
factors into account, including the credible functioning of the ERM (Article 2.1).
In ERM I, NCBs were subject to the obligation to intervene when the exchange
rate reached the limit of the band. This difference is also found in the ERM I
and ERM II central bank agreements. The latter explicitly mentions in 
Article 3 the possibility of suspending intervention if this conflicts with the
primary objective of price stability. The ERM I agreement, on the other hand,
does not mention any suspension of intervention. However, the difference
between ERM I and ERM II has been questioned. The Bundesbank thus had an
informal agreement with the German government to ensure that the Bundesbank
could suspend intervention if the Bundesbank considered Germany’s monetary
stability to be at risk.10 Conversely, Padoa-Schioppa (2003)11 concludes that the
safeguards granted to the Eurosystem in ERM II are much stronger than those
granted to the Bundesbank in ERM I. 
5 OPERATIONAL FEATURES OF ERM II
The central bank agreement lays down the operating procedures of the
mechanism. The agreement covers interventions, very short-term f inancing and
monitoring. 
At the margins of the fluctuation band, the NCBs involved shall intervene by
buying the weak currency or selling the strong one to market participants. To
avoid settlement risk, a “payment after payment” procedure is employed.
According to this procedure (in Annex I of the agreement), in interventions at
the margins, the NCB concerned shall release its payment only after receiving
conf irmation that the amount due has been credited to its account. The
participating non-euro area NCBs act as correspondent banks of the ECB and
of the “in” NCBs. So-called intramarginal interventions between margins of
exchange rate fluctuation, either unilaterally or coordinated, can also be
conducted (Article 4). Depending on the intervention currency, such non-
compulsory interventions may be subject to prior approval. If the intervention
currency is different from the euro and exceeds the agreed limits, prior
agreement must be obtained from the issuing non-euro area Member State
(Article 5.1). If the intervention currency is the euro, a non-euro area NCB shall
immediately notify the ECB if it has used euro in amounts exceeding the agreed
limits (Article 5.2). The distinction between non-euro intervention currencies
and the euro is a result of the increased international role of the euro. 
For the purpose of intervention, the ECB and the participating non-euro area
NCBs have established “very short-term f inancing facilities”. This ensures that
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Review, 1st Quarter 2002, pp. 19-31.
11 T. Padoa-Schioppa (2003), “Trajectories towards the Euro and the Role of ERM II”, International Finance,
6:1, pp. 129-44.
all participants have access to suff iciently large amounts of partner currencies
and enhances the credibility of intervention commitments. For interventions at
the margin, the f inancing is in principle available automatically and is unlimited
in amount (Article 7.1), but can be suspended if it conflicts with the primary
objective of maintaining price stability (Article 7.3). The financing has an initial
maturity of three months (Article 6.1), but can be renewed subject to restrictions
on duration and size (Articles 10 and 11). The very short-term financing facility
can also be used for intramarginal intervention, subject to the agreement of the
NCB issuing the intervention currency. The ceilings of the ECB and of the NCBs
of the “ins” are set at zero, which indicates that these banks will not engage in
intramarginal intervention.12 NCBs wanting to draw on the facility, whether for
interventions at the margin or intramarginally, should f irst make appropriate use
of their foreign reserves (Articles 7.2 and 8b). 
A direct comparison of the two central bank agreements under ERM I and 
ERM II also reveals a number of differences regarding operational issues. Most
of the differences, although not all, follow from the introduction of the euro and
the change of the mechanism from a parity grid into a hub-and-spoke system. 
From an economic point of view, the most important difference relates to the
methods for settling financing operations. Under the ERM I agreement, a creditor
central bank was obliged to accept settlement by means of ECUs of an amount
equal up to 50% of its claim, unless the creditor central bank’s assets in ECU
were smaller than its forward sales of ECUs to the European Monetary Co-
operation Fund (Article 16.1). This represented a compromise between the NCBs
that wanted an upper limit on the amount of ECUs they were obliged to accept,
and those NCBs that wanted an unlimited use of ECUs for settlement.13 The ECU
was a standard basket of all currencies in the European Community, so in case
a currency after a period of intervention were to devalue, it would also result in
a lower value of the ECU vis-à-vis the rest of the participating currencies. Hence,
a creditor central bank ran the risk of facing a loss on its credits due to settlement
in ECUs if there were any changes in the central parities. In ERM II, settlement
in principle shall be carried out by means of holdings in the creditor’s currency
(Article 14). This removes the risk of losses to the creditor central bank. In both
agreements the methods of settlement are without prejudice to other forms of
settlement agreed by creditor and debtor central banks. 
Second, the ERM II agreement leaves intramarginal intervention to the discretion
of the participating NCBs. In ERM I, intramarginal intervention was also a tool
for NCBs according to Article 2.2 in the Agreement. However, according to
Article 3.1 in the ERM I Agreement, rates for the currencies in terms of ECUs
that constituted “thresholds of divergence”14 were established with the help of
a divergence indicator. If a currency crossed the divergence threshold, it was
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presumed that the authorities concerned would correct the situation by taking
adequate measures as set out in Article 3.6 of the ERM I/EMS Resolution. The
measures listed in Article 3.6 of the Resolution are a mixture of intervention,
domestic monetary policy measures, changes in central rates, and other measures
of economic policy. The proponents of the divergence indicator saw it as an
objective indicator to trigger consultations in case of divergence and as a tool
to oblige participating Member States with stronger currencies to shoulder part
of the necessary adjustments instead of leaving the Member States with the
weaker currencies to shoulder the burden. However, there was no obligation to
conduct policy measures when a Member State had crossed the divergence
threshold, so in practice the divergence indicator did not have any appreciable
impact on the functioning of the ERM I system.  
The General Council of the ECB, comprising the President and Vice President
of the ECB’s Executive Board, as well as the governors of the NCBs of all EU
Member States, monitors the functioning of ERM II. The General Council also
serves as a forum for monetary and exchange rate policy coordination as well
as the administration of the intervention and f inancing mechanism specif ied in
the agreement.
6 ERM II AS A CONVERGENCE CRITERION
While the main feature of ERM II is to help participating Member States to
secure a stable economic environment, participation in ERM II is also one of
the convergence criteria to be fulf illed in order to join the euro.15 Article 121
of the EC Treaty and Article 3 of the Protocol (on the convergence criteria
referred to in Article 121 of the Treaty) state that the national currency in
question must remain within the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the
ERM of the EMS without displaying any severe tensions for at least two years
prior to the date of examination. In particular, each Member State must not have
devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other Member State’s
currency on its own initiative during the same period. 
Regarding the duration of ERM participation, historical experience shows that
the criterion has been interpreted somewhat more freely. When Italy and Finland
were approved for euro participation in May 1998, both respective currencies
had only been participating in ERM I for around 18 months. However, at the
onset of the euro on 1 January 1999, both Member States had been participating
for more than two years. At the time of the EMI and the Commission’s
assessment of the state of convergence of the Member States in the convergence
reports of March 1998, the EMI chose to consider the reference period to be the
time spent by the two countries in the ERM up to the assessment, while the
Commission chose to analyse the preceding 24 months up to the assessment,
even though not all of this time was spent in the ERM. 
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The extension of the fluctuation bands from ±2.25% to ±15% after the ERM
crisis in August 1993 and thus preceding the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty on 1 November 1993 has since given rise to alternative, though not
necessarily conflicting, views and practices when interpreting the criterion.16 It
is evident that exchange rate fluctuations of 30% are too wide to be interpreted
as exchange rate stability in an economically meaningful way.17 Therefore it is
interesting to study how the convergence reports have interpreted the criterion.
It turns out that the EMI/ECB and the Commission used somewhat different
measures regarding the assessment of currency stability. The EMI/ECB
convergence reports emphasised exchange rates measured by ten-day moving
averages that were close to the ECU/euro central rates without explicitly defining
the “close to” criterion. Up to the introduction of the euro, the Commission used
the concept of the median ERM currency to take partial account of the wider
band. The median currency is def ined as the currency with the “median”
deviation from its ECU central parity among the participating currencies. This
currency was chosen on a daily basis. For a currency to fulf il the exchange rate
criterion, its bilateral exchange rate against the median currency’s off icial
bilateral parity should be kept within a fluctuation band of ±2.25%. The use of
the median currency allowed a higher degree of flexibility, as bilateral exchange
rates between two participating currencies using this approach could deviate by
up to ±4.5%, instead of the original ±2.25% in ERM I. The Commission
explicitly mentioned that this assessment was not mechanical. Whether larger
fluctuations constitute severe tensions depends on their size and duration, and
on whether they occur on the weaker or stronger sides of the fluctuation band.
As Egert and Kierzenkowski have shown18, regardless of the method chosen there
have been occasions when currencies which would later be irrevocably f ixed
traded outside a range close to their central rates. This shows that the f inal
judgement on the fulf ilment of the criterion involves a degree of flexibility and
discretion. The deviations, however, tended to be limited and temporary and were
mainly found at the beginning of the reference period. The primary exceptions
to this are Ireland and Greece, whose currencies traded on the stronger side of
the central rates. Furthermore, both countries revalued their currencies. This
illustrates the asymmetric nature of the exchange rate criterion, which is more
lenient towards revaluation (on which the criterion remains silent) and
appreciation than towards devaluation or depreciation. The underlying economic
rationale for this differentiation is that revaluations or appreciations are not
viewed as dangerous for price stability and do not adversely affect the
competitiveness of other Member States. 
In accordance with the principle of equal treatment, future assessments of the
exchange rate criterion will follow the same approach. The Informal ECOFIN
Meeting in Athens stated that the assessment of exchange rate stability against
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18 Egert and Kierzenkowski, op. cit.
the euro for the new Member States will focus on their exchange rates being
close to the central rate, while also taking into account factors that may have
led to an appreciation, in line with past policy.19
7 THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES
Ten countries joined the EU on 1 May 2004, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Upon
entering the EU, the new Member States also became members of EMU as
“Member States with a derogation”. The new Member States have all expressed
their intention to adopt the euro as soon as possible, probably before the end
of the decade.20 The next step in this monetary integration is participation in
ERM II. With effect from 28 June 2004, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined
ERM II, joining Denmark, which had been a member of ERM II since it began
on 1 January 1999 (and the sole participant in ERM II between 1 January 2001,
when Greece joined the euro area, and 28 June 2004). Subsequently, Cyprus,
Latvia and Malta joined ERM II with effect from 2 May 2005, bringing the
number of participating countries to seven.  
All new countries were smoothly admitted into ERM II with the standard
fluctuation band of ±15%.21 It was mutually agreed that Estonia and Lithuania
would join the mechanism with an unchanged central parity against the euro as
the central ERM II parity. The two countries would also continue their currency
board arrangements as unilateral commitments, thus placing no additional
obligations on the ECB. In the case of Slovenia, it was agreed that the market
exchange rate of the Slovenian tolar against the euro on Friday 25 June 2004
would be chosen as the central rate. Cyprus and Latvia joined with an unchanged
central parity against the euro as the central ERM II parity. The Latvian
authorities have declared that they will unilaterally maintain the exchange rate
of the Latvia lats against euro at the central rate with a fluctuation band of 
±1%. Upon entry to ERM II the Maltese lira was re-pegged to the euro from a
basket of currencies including the euro, the pound sterling and the US dollar.
The market rate of the Maltese lira against euro on Friday 29 April 2005 was
chosen as the central rate. The Maltese authorities have declared that they will
unilaterally maintain the exchange rate of the lira at the central rate. When the
new countries joined ERM II, all six of them took upon themselves policy
commitments regarding f iscal policies and structural reforms as detailed in the
communiqués on ERM II participation. This represents something new compared
to the communiqué on the entry of Denmark and Greece to ERM II. 
In the period of less than a year that Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia have been
members of ERM II, the fluctuations of the nominal exchange rates inside the
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fluctuation bands have been very limited in Slovenia, while the nominal
exchange rates of Estonia and Lithuania have not diverged from their respective
central rates due to these countries’ unilateral commitment to a currency board
arrangement. The period of time that Cyprus, Latvia and Malta have been
members of ERM II is too short to make conclusions regarding the exchange
rate behaviour. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY OF CENTRAL BANK DOCUMENTATION:
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE UK
John Heath
ABSTRACT
Le questioni relative alla confidenzialità sono pane quotidiano per l’avvocato
di una banca centrale. Lo studio esamina un particolare aspetto della
confidenzialità – la consulenza legale fornita alle banche centrali – alla luce
degli ultimi sviluppi nel Regno Unito e nella Comunità Europea. Viene esaminato
il giudizio della Camera dei Lords nella vertenza del novembre 2004 tra il Three
Rivers District Council e la Banca d’Inghilterra, relativa all’inviolabilità della
consulenza legale; in tale giudizio venivano prese in considerazione le
circostanze nelle quali la consulenza legale fornita alla Banca d’Inghilterra era
protetta dall’obbligo di divulgazione e cosa costituisse effettivamente una
consulenza legale a tale fine. Viene considerato inoltre come l’Atto per la Libera
Informazione nel Regno Unito (UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 – FOIA),
entrato in vigore nel gennaio 2005 e che prevede un diritto di accesso di ordine
generale alle informazioni in possesso delle autorità pubbliche (inclusa la Banca
d’Inghilterra), si occupa in modo specifico della consulenza legale. Lo studio
va poi a verificare se la vertenza e il FOIA possano essere più in generale di
utilità in ambito del SEBC, e in modo particolare alla luce della gestione del
rischio legale, della controversia e delle questioni legate all’accesso alle relative
informazioni. Ciò posto, lo studio prende in considerazione la Decisione della
BCE del marzo 2004 (2004/3) sull’accesso ai documenti BCE e il giudizio della
Corte di Prima Istanza del novembre 2004 nella causa tra Turco e il Consiglio
dell’Unione Europea, analizzando in ogni caso l’eccezione relativa alla
consulenza legale nell’ambito della legislazione sull’accesso ai documenti.
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Issues surrounding confidentiality are part of the daily fare of a central bank
lawyer. Central banks handle vast amounts of sensitive information. Duties of
confidentiality derive from a myriad of national, Community and foreign law
sources, many of which may overlap. There is an equally impressive array of
countervailing provisions which may require or permit disclosure. Add to that
an increasingly diverse range of provisions, covering such matters as data
protection, copyright and human rights, which may also impact on the legal status
of information. The legal environment itself is forever changing, triggered in part
by developments in information technology and calls for greater transparency
within the public sector and for more extensive information-sharing regimes. 
This article examines one particular aspect of conf identiality – legal advice
provided to central banks – in the light of recent UK and EC developments. It
focuses on the House of Lords Three Rivers judgment of November 2004 on legal
advice privilege, which considered the circumstances in which legal advice
provided to the Bank of England was protected from disclosure in litigation and
what actually constituted legal advice for this purpose. It also considers how
the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), which came into force in
January 2005 and provides a general right of access to information held by public
authorities, deals specif ically with legal advice. The article goes on to explore,
somewhat more tentatively, whether the judgment and the FOIA may be
instructive in the ESCB framework more generally, particularly in the light of
legal risk management, litigation and public access issues. It considers the ECB
Decision of March 2004 (2004/3) on public access to ECB documents and the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of November 2004 in Turco v Council
of the European Union, focusing on the legal advice exceptions. The article is
a short excursion into one small corner of a complex landscape, rather than an
encyclopaedic review of the law of conf identiality or the law relating to legal
professional privilege. 
THREE RIVERS DISTRICT COUNCIL VERSUS BANK OF ENGLAND – HOUSE OF LORDS
JUDGMENT – NOVEMBER 2004 
Following the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
in 1991 an independent inquiry into the supervision of BCCI was conducted under
the chairmanship of Lord Justice Bingham. The Inquiry reported in October 1992.
The Bank of England was assisted by external lawyers in the preparation and
presentation of the Bank’s evidence and submissions to the Inquiry. 
In subsequent litigation between the liquidators of BCCI and the Bank of
England, the liquidators sought disclosure by the Bank of a large number of
documents relating to the Inquiry, which the Bank claimed were covered by legal
advice privilege and did not therefore need to be disclosed.1 The matter came
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1 Under English law there are two main types of legal professional privilege: litigation privilege covers
communications that come into being after litigation is in reasonable prospect or is pending (including
communications between the lawyer and his client and the lawyer or client and third parties eg an expert
witness); and legal advice privilege which is considered below. 
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before the Court of Appeal, twice, which held in 2003 and 2004 that legal advice
privilege only covered material constituting or recording communications
between clients and lawyers seeking or giving advice about the clients’ legal
rights and obligations and that legal advice sought or given for presentational
purposes (even to an inquiry) was not protected from disclosure.2
The Bank of England appealed to the House of Lords. In its judgment of 
11 November 2004, all f ive Law Lords (Lords Scott, Brown, Rodger, Carswell
and Baroness Hale) unanimously rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach and re-
established the fundamental position of legal advice privilege in English law and
the right to obtain legal advice in confidence.3 The judgment confirmed that legal
advice necessarily goes wider than just advising on rights and obligations and
could include advice on presentational matters provided in a relevant legal context. 
In addressing the issue, the Lords considered the basic policy underlying legal
advice privilege. They acknowledged that there are many relationships, where
the common law recognises the conf identiality of communications (eg
doctor/patient, accountant/client), but where nevertheless there may be strong
public interest or administration of justice reasons why such material may need
to be disclosed when relevant to issues in subsequent litigation. In contrast, once
a communication or document between a lawyer and the client qualifies for legal
advice privilege, the privilege can be waived by the client and it can be
overridden by statute, but it is otherwise absolute. 
The Lords accepted that there was a long series of authorities which supported
this special protection for communications between lawyers and their clients. For
example, in R v Derby Magistrates, ex parte B [1996] AC 487 Lord Nicholls at
510 said: “The law has been established for at least 150 years, since the time of
Lord Brougham LC in 1833 in Greenough v Gaskell 1 M & K 98: subject to
recognised exceptions, communications seeking professional legal advice, whether
or not in connection with pending court proceedings, are absolutely and
permanently privileged from disclosure even though, in consequence, the
communications will not be available in court proceedings in which they might
be important evidence.” In the same case Lord Taylor CJ at 507 et seq said: “In
Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch. 317 the basic principle justifying legal professional
privilege was again said to be that a client should be able to obtain legal advice
in confidence. The principle which runs through all these cases … is that a man
must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since otherwise he might hold
back half the truth. The client must be sure that what he tells his lawyer in
confidence will never be revealed without his consent” and that “… once any
exception to the general rule is allowed, the client’s confidence is necessarily lost”
(pp 507 and 508). In R (Morgan Grenfell Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income
Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 Lord Hoffmann described legal professional privilege as “a
fundamental human right” and continued (p.607) that “such advice cannot be
2 Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] EWCA
Civ 474 and Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2004]
EWCA Civ 218. 
3 Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48.
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effectively obtained unless the client is able to put all the facts before the adviser
without fear that they may afterwards be disclosed and used to his prejudice.”4
The Lords accepted that there was well established jurisprudence supporting
legal professional privilege in foreign jurisdictions and at an EC level.5 The
judgment records the comments of Advocate-General Slynn (as he then was),
who considered the justif ication for legal professional privilege in A M & S
Europe Ltd v European Commission [1983] QB 878 at 913: “[The privilege]
springs essentially from the basic need of a man in a civilised society to be able
to turn to his lawyer for advice and help, and if proceedings begin, for
representation; it springs no less from the advantages to a society which evolves
complex law reaching into all the business affairs of persons, real and legal, that
they should be able to know what they can do under the law, what is forbidden,
where they must tread circumspectly, where they run risks.”
Lord Scott observed that the cases had in common the idea that, in a society in
which the restraining and controlling framework is built upon a belief in the rule
of law, communications between clients and lawyers should be secure against the
possibility of scrutiny from others. Baroness Hale added that it was in the interests
of the whole community that lawyers give their clients sound advice, accurate as
to the law and sensible as to their conduct and that there was little or no chance
of the client taking the right or sensible course if the lawyer’s advice was inaccurate
or unsound because the lawyer had been given an incomplete or inaccurate picture
of the client’s position. In similar vein Lord Rodger noted that the public interest
justification for legal professional privilege was the same today as it was 350 years
ago: if the advice given by lawyers is to be sound, their clients must make them
aware of all the relevant circumstances of the problem. Clients would be reluctant
to do so unless they could be sure that what they said about any potentially
damaging or embarrassing circumstances would not be revealed later.
The Lords went on to consider the kind of communications and documents
covered by legal advice privilege and referred approvingly to the Court of Appeal
decision in Balabel v Air India [1988] 1 Ch 317, where Taylor LJ said said at
page 330: “Privilege obviously attaches to a document conveying legal advice
from solicitor to client and to a specif ic request from the client for such advice.
But it does not follow that all other communications between them lack privilege.
In most solicitor and client relationships, especially where a transaction involves
4 Although not cited expressly by the House of Lords, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the
principle that a “person who wishes to consult a lawyer should be free to do so under conditions which favour
full and uninhibited discussion” is protected by Art 6 where litigation is contemplated and Art 8 where it is
not – see Campbell v United Kingdom 15 EHRR 137, 160-1(1992) paras 46,48. 
5 For example in Upjohn Co. v United States (1981) 449 US 383, a decision of the US Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist said, at p.389, that the purpose of legal professional privilege was “… to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice…The privilege recognises that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client.”
Similarly, in Jones v Smith [1999] 1 SCR 455, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, privilege was
justif ied on the ground that - “Clients seeking advice must be able to speak freely to their lawyers secure in
the knowledge that what they say will not be divulged without their consent. …. The privilege is essential if
sound legal advice is to be given ….. Without this privilege clients could never be candid and furnish all the
relevant information that must be provided to lawyers if they are to properly advise their clients”.
protracted dealings, advice may be required or appropriate on matters great or
small at various stages. There will be a continuum of communication and
meetings between the solicitor and client. … Moreover, legal advice is not
conf ined to telling the client the law; it must include advice as to what should
prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context.”
The concept of the relevant legal context is key to understanding legal advice
privilege. In the case in question the “relevant legal context” was the Bingham
Inquiry and whether the Bank had properly discharged its public law duties under
the Banking Acts. The Lords saw no reason why presentational advice sought
from lawyers to parties in such an Inquiry should not also be privileged. When
the Bank of England consulted external lawyers about the presentation of their
evidence to the Bingham Inquiry Unit, Lord Rodger considered it was asking
them to put on legal spectacles when reading, considering and commenting on
the drafts. It was seeking their comments and assistance as lawyers, how the
Bank’s evidence could be most effectively presented to the Inquiry. Legal advice
privilege applied therefore to those communications. The Lords considered a
wide range of other scenarios (ie besides inquiries) where lawyers provide advice
and assistance, which would qualify for legal advice privilege, even where the
lawyer’s role is essentially presentational in character. 
The judgment re-established the fundamental position of legal advice privilege
in English law and the right to obtain legal advice in conf idence. Will it be the
last word on the subject? Probably not. The Lords recognised that there may
occasionally be marginal cases where it is not always clear whether legal advice
privilege covers all documents passing between clients and their lawyers. In such
cases the courts may from time to time have to decide whether the seeking of
advice from lawyers has a relevant legal context and whether it was reasonable
for the client to consult the special professional knowledge and skills of a lawyer.
Furthermore, the judgment only concerned legal advice privilege (not litigation
privilege) and left open the question who precisely is the client (in the case of
a company, partnership or public body) for legal advice privilege purposes. 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000
Legal professional privilege is f irst and foremost a rule of evidence in litigation.
However, the concept surfaces in other contexts, notably legislation, which need
to be interpreted consistently with the House of Lords judgment. One particular
example is the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the “FOIA”) which came into
force in the UK on 1 January 2005.6
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6 In Scotland the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 applies, which also came fully into force on 
1 January 2005.
The FOIA provides a general right of access to information held by public
authorities in the UK.7 Information for this purpose means recorded information
held by the public authority (it is not a right to documents as such). The general
right of access is subject to certain procedural requirements, cost-compliance
limits and various exemptions in sections 21 to 44 of the FOIA. Some of the
exemptions (including legal professional privilege and law enforcement) are
“qualif ied” in that the public authority must f irst decide whether the exemption
applies to all or part of the information requested.8 If so, it must then consider
whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public
interest in disclosing the information. The other exemptions (including
information provided in conf idence to the authority and court records) are
“absolute” in that there is no supplementary public interest test.9 In practice,
many of the exemptions in the FOIA are likely to overlap. The Information
Commissioner (IC) and the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) have
both issued detailed guidance on the scope of the exemptions and the related
public interest test.10
The legal professional privilege exemption in section 42(1) FOIA covers
“information, in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege…could
be maintained in legal proceedings”. Accordingly, issues of legal advice privilege
(being one type of legal professional privilege) would need to be assessed against
prevailing case law (including the House of Lords judgment of last November).
In an FOIA context, there is then a separate public interest assessment. The DCA
guidance on legal professional privilege is particularly interesting as to the kind
of factors that may be relevant when balancing the public interest considerations: 
– The public interest arguments that may weigh in favour of disclosure might
include: circumstances where the Government would waive its privilege if
litigation were afoot; the public interest in public authorities being
accountable for the quality of their decision making; ensuring that decisions
have been made on the basis of good quality legal advice as part of that
process. The weight to be attached to these public interest factors will differ
according to the case in question. Given the very substantial public interest
in maintaining the confidentiality of material protected by legal professional
privilege, the guidance concludes that the public interest is only likely to come
down in favour of disclosure in “exceptional circumstances”. 
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7 There are over 100 000 such authorities in the UK, including for example Government Departments, schools
and many general medical practitioners. The Bank of England is one such authority but is in a special position
since information held by the Bank with respect to certain of its functions (monetary policy, lender of last
resort and its private banking and related business) is not subject to the FOIA at all.
8 “Qualif ied” exemptions include in summary: (s 22) information intended for future publication; (s 24) certain
matters relating to national security; (s 26) defence; (s 27) international relations; (s 28) relations within the
United Kingdom; (s 29) the economy; (s 30) investigations and proceedings conducted by a public authority;
(s 31) law enforcement; (s 33) audit functions; (s 35) formulation of government policy; (s 36) prejudice to
the effective conduct of public affairs; (s 37) health and safety; (s 38) environmental information; (s 40) some
personal information; (s 42) legal professional privilege; and (s 43) commercial interests. 
9 “Absolute” exemptions include in summary: (s 21) information accessible to the applicant by other means; 
(s 23) information supplied by or relating to the security services; (s 32) information relating to court records;
(s 40) certain personal information; (s 41) information provided in conf idence to the public authority; and 
(s 44) information prohibited from disclosure (eg by statute or Community law obligations).
10 The Information Commissioner is responsible for promoting observance by public authorities of the
requirements of the FOIA. The Commissioner has various review and enforcement powers under the FOIA.
The Department for Constitutional Affairs is the lead Government Department responsible for freedom of
information. 
– The public interest arguments which may argue against disclosure might
include: the need to ensure that a client can obtain legal advice in confidence
and the adverse consequences of less than adequate disclosure by the client;
the need to ensure that decisions taken by Government are taken in a fully
informed legal context with a full appreciation of the facts; the importance of
the lawyer being able to present the full picture to his/her client, including
arguments for and against (and perceived weaknesses of) his/her f inal
conclusions; a recognition that disclosure of legal advice may unfairly exposing
the authority’s legal position to challenge; the risk that lawyers and clients will
avoid making a permanent record of the legal advice that is given (or make only
a partial record) and the associated risk, as policy develops or litigation
decisions are made, of being unable to refer back to advice given along the way.
There may even be a reluctance to seek advice at all, resulting in decisions that
are legally flawed and attracting successful legal challenges which could
otherwise have been avoided; and a recognition that legal advice given in one
context may be helpful or relevant to subsequent issues. Disclosure by reference
to particular facts might thus prejudice future legal interests in other contexts. 
The DCA guidance also considers the situation where parties to actual or
prospective litigation might argue for disclosure of the legal advice provided
to Government departments concerning the interpretation of legislation on the
grounds that there is a public interest in knowing the perceived strength of the
case against the department and the legal basis on which the department had
decided to defend the case. The guidance notes the countervailing public interest
arguments (eg the department’s right to consult its lawyers on a conf idential
basis, the importance of the department having access to thorough and candid
legal advice and in not being considerably disadvantaged in the conduct of its
litigation) and concludes that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, such
advice would not normally be disclosed. 
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE ESCB?
Are the House of Lords judgment and the FOIA and related guidance instructive
in the ESCB context more generally? The judgment concerns procedural matters
of English law and the FOIA applies to public authorities in the UK, so they may
not at f irst sight score very highly on the search engine “relevance” indicator.
But, if the uniquely English law aspects of the judgment and the FOIA are put
to one side, there may be rather more common ground. Three particular areas
come to mind – legal risk management, litigation/investigations and public
access legislation – where it is tentatively suggested that they may serve as useful
sources of comparative approach in their own right and may highlight
considerations which may be relevant in other jurisdictions.
LEGAL RISK
Central banks need sound legal advice and assistance. This goes to the heart of
how central banks manage legal risk. In order to provide such advice and
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assistance, central banks need to be able to discuss matters freely and frankly
with their lawyers (in-house or external), who in turn need to be aware of all
relevant circumstances and need to be able to convey the full picture to the client,
including any weaknesses. The House of Lords judgment highlights the
importance in this respect (in the UK context at least) of clients being able to
obtain legal advice on a conf idential basis and lays down some parameters as
to what may constitute legal advice for this purpose. 
Are these relevant considerations for central banks in other jurisdictions?
Principles of conf identiality and professional secrecy are of course well-
embedded at a national and EC level. At an ESCB/Eurosystem level, for example,
various confidentiality provisions may be relevant (eg Art 38 of the ESCB Statute
and the ECB Rules of Procedure of February 2004 and the General Council Rules
of Procedure of June 04).11 It might nevertheless be worth considering whether
national law, EC law, other provisions (eg European Convention on Human
Rights) and/or local professional rules provide adequate safeguards regarding
lawyer/client communications, whether there are any limitations to such
safeguards (eg depending on who holds the material) and whether it is clear to
whom advice and assistance is being provided. 
LITIGATION/INVESTIGATIONS
The status of legal advice provided to central banks might also be relevant in
litigation involving central banks (directly or as third parties) or investigations
(eg by the European Anti-Fraud Office – OLAF). Various factors may be relevant
in this respect. For example, in contrast to the position in many Civil law
jurisdictions, in the UK there is a general and wide duty on a party involved in
litigation to disclose to the other party documents and material relevant to the
dispute, including any documents which may adversely affect his case. On the
other hand, in-house lawyers under English law have the same status as external
lawyers on matters of legal professional privilege, whereas this would not appear
to be the case in all EU jurisdictions. 
The position of in-house lawyers under EC law is still developing. The general
principle of privileged lawyer/client communications was recognised in 1982
in AM&S Europe Ltd v European Commission, when the ECJ held that such
communications in EC competition proceedings would be protected, but only
if the communication was for the client’s “right of defence” and the lawyer was
in private practice (ie not an in-house lawyer).12 That position may perhaps
change. In an interim decision of the Court of First Instance in October 2003
in Akzo Nobel Chemicals v Commission (another competition-related case), the
President of the CFI acknowledged that the question whether communications
involving in-house lawyers should also benef it from legal professional
privilege now merited “very special attention”, particularly since the AM&S
decision was “based...on an interpretation of the principles common to the
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11 ECB Decision of 19 February 2004 (ECB/2004/2) and ECB Decision of 17 June 2004 (ECB/2004/12)
respectively. 
12 Case 155/79. 1982 ECR 1575.
Member States dating from 1982’.13 The President went on to say that the
evidence “tends to show that increasingly in the legal orders of the Member
States and possibly, as a consequence, in the Community legal order, there is
no presumption that the link of employment between a lawyer and an undertaking
will always, and as a matter of principle, affect the independence necessary for
the effective exercise of the role of collaborating in the administration of justice
by the courts if, in addition, the lawyer is bound by strict rules of professional
conduct, which where necessary require that he observe the particular duties
commensurate with his status”. Although a subsequent ECJ ruling of 
27 September 200414 overruled the CFI’s interim order, a ruling from the CFI
on the main case is still awaited. 
The importance of legal privilege in relation to investigations is reflected in the
ECB’s Decision of 3 June 2004 (ECB/2004/11) concerning the terms and
conditions for European Anti-Fraud investigations of the ECB.15 Recital (4) of
the Decision notes that internal investigations by OLAF are subject, inter alia,
to “Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union [this refers to the European
Convention on Human Rights] and to other principles and fundamental rights
common to the Member States and recognised by the Court of Justice, such as,
for instance, the conf identiality of legal advice (legal privilege).”
PUBLIC ACCESS LEGISLATION
Public access legislation exists, or is currently under consideration, in a number
of EU Member States. Such legislation (as with the FOIA) typically provides
a general right of access to information or documents subject to certain
procedural requirements and exemptions/exceptions. The ECB has itself recently
adopted a Decision on public access to ECB documents.16 Where such acts are
qualif ied in relation to legal advice or legal professional privilege, the kind of
issues raised in the House of Lords judgment and the FOIA guidance may be
of interest.
The ECB Decision confers a general right of access to ECB documents.17 It is
aimed primarily (though not exclusively) at documents held by the ECB.18 The
right of access is subject to certain procedural requirements and ‘exceptions’
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13 Joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 of 30 October 2003. 
14 C-7/04 P (R).
15 The ECB Decision was adopted pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Off ice (OLAF).
16 ECB/2004/3 of 4 March 2004 on public access to ECB documents. The Decision was adopted pursuant to Art
12.3 of the ESCB/ECB Statute and the ECB Rules of Procedure of 19 February 2004 (ECB/2004/2) and repealed
the earlier ECB Decision on public access to ECB documents of 3 November 1998 (ECB/1998/12). The Decision
was adopted in line with the Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
of 30 May 2001 calling on the other institutions and bodies of the Union to adopt internal rules on public access
to documents which take account of the principles and limits set out in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
17 An ‘ECB document’ means any content whatever its medium drawn up or held by the ECB (thus including
documents received by the ECB from third parties) and relating to its policies, activities or decisions, as well
as documents originating from the European Monetary Institute and from the Committee of Governors of the
central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community.
18 Art 5 provides that national central banks may only disclose documents drawn up by the ECB (or documents
from the European Monetary Institute or Committee of Governors) following prior consultation with the ECB
(unless it is clear that the document shall/shall not be disclosed).
listed in Art 4 of the Decision.19 One of the exceptions covers court proceedings
and legal advice (Art 4(2): “where disclosure would undermine the protection
of … court proceedings and legal advice,… unless there is an overriding public
interest in disclosure”). As with the FOIA legal professional privilege exemption,
the Art 4(2) exception is subject to a public interest override and may overlap
with one or more of the other exceptions. The ECB Decision is largely modelled
on Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p 43). The court proceedings and
legal advice exception in Art 4(2) of the ECB Decision is effectively the same
as that in Art 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001.20
This latter provision was recently assessed by the Court of First Instance in Turco
v Council of the European Union (Case T-84/03 of 23 November 2004). The case
concerned a public access request to the Council for a Council Legal Service
opinion on a proposed Council Directive, to which the Council had refused
access on the grounds of the Art 4(2) legal advice exception. The Court rejected
the applicant’s submission that the court proceedings and legal advice exception
in Art 4(2) only covered legal advice drawn up in the context of actual or
prospective legal proceedings and did not cover legal advice relating to
legislative proposals (paras 53-67). The Court noted that legal advice drawn up
in the context of court proceedings is already covered by the court proceedings
exception (see eg Interporc v Commission, Case T-92/98 [1999] ECR II-3521)
and that the express reference to “legal advice” in Art 4(2) therefore has a
distinct meaning from the cour t proceedings exception.21 The
Court acknowledged that the Council had to consider specif ically whether
“disclosure of the legal opinion would undermine the protection to which that
type of document may be entitled” (ie simply because the document was a legal
opinion was not enough in itself to justify application of the exception), but
nevertheless concluded that the legal opinion was indeed “legal advice” and that
it was entirely compatible with the Regulation for the Council to withhold the
whole of the opinion (paras 69-74). The Court also accepted that the
independence of legal opinions of the Council Legal Service constitutes an
interest to be protected and that the applicant failed to explain how disclosure
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19 Art 4(1) provide that the ECB shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the
protection of: (a) the public interest as regards: the conf identiality of the proceedings of the ECB’s decision-
making bodies; the f inancial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State; the internal
f inances of the ECB or of the NCBs; protecting the integrity of euro banknotes; public security; international
f inancial, monetary or economic relations; (b) the privacy and the integrity of the individual…; and (c) the
conf identiality of information that is protected as such under Community law. In addition to the court
proceedings and legal advice exception (commented on in the main text), Art 4(2) provides that the ECB shall
refuse access where disclosure would undermine the protection of the commercial interests of a natural or legal
person (including intellectual property) or the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits unless there
is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
20 The Commission’s 2004 Report on the implementation of the principles in EC Regulation 1049/2001 provides
a useful summary of the key case law on the court proceedings and legal advice exception in Art 4(2).
Commission 30 January 2004 COM (2004) 45 – see para 3.4.2.
21 The Court, drawing on the Interporc judgment, noted (para 63) that the term court proceedings within the
meaning of Decision 94/90 covered not only pleadings and other documents lodged and internal documents
concerning the investigation of the case before the Court, but also correspondence concerning the case between
the directorate-general concerned and the legal service or a lawyer’s practice. NB the Interporc judgment goes
on to make clear (para 45) that the court proceedings exception would not cover “documents drawn up in
connection with a purely administrative matter”.
of the legal opinion in question would help to protect the Council’s Legal Service
from improper external influences (para 79). 
As regards the public interest override in Art 4(2), the Court also rejected the
applicant’s arguments that the Council had not examined whether there was such
an interest and that the principles of transparency, openness and of democracy
or of the participation of citizens in the decision-making process, are overriding
public interests which warrant the disclosure of the legal opinion (paras 81–85).
In the Court’s view these principles were implemented by Regulation No
1049/2001 as a whole; the overriding public interest in Art 4(2) was, as a rule,
distinct from the general principles underlying the Regulation. Moreover,
although the institution may itself identify an overriding public interest, it was
for the applicant to invoke such an interest in his application so as to invite the
institution to give a decision on that point. Since the Council did not make an
error of assessment in its f inding on the overriding public interests invoked by
the applicant, the Court concluded that the Council could not be criticised for
not having identif ied other overriding public interests. 
The Turco case provides an interesting and up-to-date insight into the Court’s
approach to Community public access legislation. It may prove to be equally
relevant when applying the parallel legal advice exception and the related public
interest assessment in the ECB Decision 2004/3.22
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on legal advice provided to central banks in the light
of recent UK and EC developments. The Three Rivers case – published two
weeks before Turco – highlights the importance of clients being able to obtain
legal advice on a conf idential basis and provides some parameters as to what
may constitute legal advice for this purpose. This raises a broad range of
associated issues, including the manner in which central banks manage legal risk.
The UK FOIA and the ECB Decision 2004/3 both provide mechanisms for
protecting legal advice provided to central banks; the related FOIA guidance
and the Turco case suggest a broad similarity in the range of considerations that
may need to be taken into account in applying the legal advice
exception/exemption. In turn, this draws on Community and national
jurisprudence on legal professional privilege. Looking ahead, it might reasonably
be expected: f irst, that there will be further developments in the legal
environment at a national and Community level concerning matters in the f ield
of legal professional privilege, conf identiality and information issues more
generally (driven by various legal, political and technological considerations);
second, that there will be increasing overlap and convergence between
Community and national instruments, laws and jurisprudence in this f ield; and
third that central bank lawyers will remain busy in this f ield in the coming
months and years. 
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22 The applicant has since hiled an appeal against the judgement of 23 November 2004 (Case C-52/05 
P-OS C 106, 30.04.2005, p.14).
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ABSTRACT
L’Eurosistema è composto dalla Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) e dalle Banche
Centrali Nazionali (BCN) degli Stati membri la cui valuta è l’euro.
Dall’introduzione dell’euro nel 1999, il termine “Eurosistema” è stato
diffusamente utilizzato, soprattutto nelle pubblicazioni delle banche centrali.
Il Trattato di Maastricht ha introdotto il concetto del tutto innovativo del Sistema
Europeo di Banche Centrali (SEBC), concetto che però rimane ambiguo perché
non fa distinzione tra il SEBC nella sua composizione più ampia, che comprende
le BCN di tutti gli Stati membri, e il SEBC nella sua composizione di
Eurosistema, che agisce come vera e propria banca centrale per l’euro. La
Costituzione firmata nell’ottobre 2004, pur mantenendo il SEBC, introduce e
definisce il concetto di Eurosistema. Nel  contributo, l’Eurosistema viene
presentato come un organismo pubblico europeo unico, organizzato
conformemente a due principi generali: il suo carattere federale e la sua
indipendenza. Nella seconda parte dello studio, sono riportati alcuni sviluppi
giuridici relativamente alle attività dell’Eurosistema negli ultimi sei anni.
Il contributo si concentra sulla descrizione della realtà giuridica
dell’Eurosistema nei suoi aspetti sia istituzionali sia operativi.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) represents a
remarkable institutional innovation of the Maastricht Treaty. However, in contrast
to the ESCB, the concept of the Eurosystem is not defined by either the Treaty
establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”) or the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (“the Statute”).
The Eurosystem has only existed since January 1999, when the euro was
introduced in the new euro area (composed at that time of 11 Member States).
The ESCB was created in the previous year (on 1 June 1998), and comprised
the European Central Bank (ECB) and one new national central bank1 created
on that same day, together with the 14 existing national central banks (NCBs)
of the European Union (EU) Member States.
The underlying raison d’être of these two new concepts is derived from the
coexistence within the EU of Member States whose currency is the euro, and
Member States with a derogation or an exemption, in which the new currency
of the Union was not introduced. This imbalance is corrected by the fact that
for most purposes in the Statute, the term “national central banks” means the
central banks of the euro area Member States; the NCBs of the Member States
with a derogation are in principle excluded from Eurosystem operations. 
The term “Eurosystem” has been used from the beginning of the third stage of
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) not only in communication documents,
but also in many legal acts of the ECB, including its Opinions concerning
European and national legal acts.2 The paradox is that the Eurosystem is
systematically referred to in off icial European, especially central banking,
publications without a precise legal basis.
The new Constitution for Europe3 formally def ines the term Eurosystem as
follows:
“The Eurosystem, which comprises the European Central Bank and the national
central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro, is the monetary
authority of the euro area.”4
This contribution aims to provide some answers to a number of simple questions.
The f irst general question is to establish whether a system may have a life of
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1 According to Article 1.2 of the Protocol on the Statute, “the Institut monétaire Luxembourgeois will be the
central bank of Luxembourg”; in consequence the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) was created on 
1 June 1998 by the Law of 22 April 1998, replaced by the law of 23 December 1998; see: E. de Lhoneux, 
O. Partsch, I. Schmit and E. Simoes Lopes: “La Banque centrale du Luxembourg”, in Droit bancaire et financier
au Luxembourg (Brussels: Larcier, 2004), Vol. I, pp. 73-114; and M. Palmer, “The Banque centrale du
Luxembourg in the European System of Central Banks” (Luxembourg: Banque centrale du Luxembourg
Publications, 2001).  
2 The term was f irst introduced in the January 1999 ECB Monthly Bulletin. 
3 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004, OJ C 310, 16.12.2004,
Article I-30 (1).
4 Also def ined in the “Eurosystem Mission Statement” of 5 January 2005 adopted by the Governing Council,
see the websites of the ECB and the NCBs of the Eurosystem.
its own: is such a system a legal reality, or does it purely exist through its
components? If the former is true, what are the specif ic differences between the
Eurosystem and the ESCB in the European monetary legal order, and if the latter
is the case, is this new formula merely of a symbolic or cosmetic nature, rather
than representing an addition of substance? The goal of this contribution is to
present the Eurosystem as an institutional and operational reality.
1 THE EUROSYSTEM AS AN INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT
1.1 THE EUROSYSTEM AS AN EU BODY
The Treaty5 def ines the ESCB by its tasks, objectives and components, but not
by its nature. The ESCB is not formally recognised as an EU institution.6 As it
was established on the basis of Article 108, it is an EU constitutional body.7 The
ESCB has no legal personality8; as a public body, a quasi-institution, it has to
perform the tasks imposed on it by the Treaty.
An equivalent status should apply to the Eurosystem, which comprises a
substantial part of the ESCB.
1.1.1 THE ESCB AND THE EUROSYSTEM
The ESCB concept was agreed during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
negotiating the Treaty, but without a clear def inition. The desire to introduce
some kind of federal dimension to the new monetary power seems to have been
the driving force behind this spectacular but mysterious institutional innovation.
The ESCB was conceived to avoid the abrupt setting up of a new centralised
European bureaucracy, to prevent the devastating social effects of an imposed
merger of central banks, and to ensure the decentralisation principle.9 The ESCB
is designed to achieve the “checks and balances”10 which characterise the
institutional framework of the EU.
Both the ESCB and the Eurosystem are systems which, until now, did not
correspond to a formal def inition in public law. The concept of a “system” may
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5 Article 107 of the Treaty and Article 1.2 of the Statute.
6 Under the new Constitution Article I-30, the ECB will be ranked among the “other institutions”; the same
quality may apply to the Eurosystem itself as far as the ECB together with the NCBs are an integral part of
it; the Eurosystem, as the encompassing entity, is considered to be “over” its components. 
7 See in particular R. Smits, “The European Central Bank: Institutional aspects” (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1998).
8 This in itself is not unusual; none of the EU institutions has its own legal personality. It can be assumed that
the Eurosystem may engage the EU when acting in its own f ield of competence. As it has a similar statute to
that of the EU institutions, it may engage the legal personality of the Community when acting in the
international f ield; for its operational tasks, the Eurosystem will rely on the legal personality of its components,
namely the ECB and the NCBs. 
9 The larger NCBs are currently engaged in restructuring plans affecting thousands of jobs. So far the social
conditions of the staff of the Eurosystem’s central banks have not been harmonised.
10 See C. C. A. van den Berg’s recently published thesis, The Making of the Statute of the European Central Banks
– An Application of Checks and Balances (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2004). The concept of
a system had previously been proposed by influential authors, see in particular J. V. Louis et al., Vers un système
européen de Banques centrales (Brussels: Université de Bruxelles, 1989), but their proposals were more focused
on the ECB as the core element of the proposed system; the Committee of Governors and subsequently the
IGC preferred to replace the ECB by the ESCB in various provisions. Interestingly, Smits presents the ESCB
extensively but under the title The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, op. cit.
have been commonplace for a long time in academic discussions on cybernetics
or political science, but it has only recently made its appearance in legal texts.11
In central banking terminology, this concept is mainly used by economists, as
in for instance the notion of a “financial system” as mentioned in various central
bank publications; this phrase is used as a broad concept, which includes
markets, institutions and infrastructure. 
In Community f inancial law, a system has in the f ield of payment and securities
settlement been def ined as “a formal arrangement […] governed by the law
[…]”12. Such arrangements not only cover technical operating systems, but also
include regulatory provisions.
The political intention to set up a system was clear, but the legal clarif ication
remained ambiguous.13 Legal experts of the former Committee of Governors
noted in 1991 that: “the term ‘system’ should thus be understood to describe
the existence of the ECB and the national central banks as integral parts of the
system, governed by a common set of rules and committed to the objectives of
and tasks assigned to it.” 
The system cannot be limited to the sum of its components. It has its own existence
and its own functioning which have enabled it to assume its role and set up its
organisation. The system not only ensures the coexistence and coordination of the
different entities which are part of it; it is also a system of action with common
rules, rights and duties for its members, which have legal personality.
1.1.2 THE EUROSYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Article I-30 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe14 def ines the
Eurosystem in the following terms:
“The European Central Bank, together with the national central banks of the
Member States whose currency is the euro, which constitute the Eurosystem,
shall conduct the monetary policy”. 
This is one of the few drafting changes in the monetary provisions of the Treaty.
It was introduced by the IGC at the initiative of the ECB in its formal Opinion.15
The Opinion states that:
164
11 The success of the European Monetary System (EMS) since 1979 may have contributed to the positive
acceptance of the concept. It would be misleading to consider that the US Federal Reserve System was the
envisaged model; the drafters of the Statute focused their attention on a basic uniform model provided in Europe
by what appeared at the time to be the most successful central banks. Paradoxically, the central bank is a
centralised institution in all the EU Member States. 
12 See Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on
settlement f inality in payment and securities settlement systems, OJ L 166, 11.06.1998, p. 45. 
13 The Delors Report states that “Considering the political structure of the Community and the advantages of
making existing central banks part of a new system, the […] monetary policy-making of the Community should
be organised in a federal form in (the) ESCB. This new System would have to be given the full status of an
autonomous Community institution” (“Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community”,
presented by the Committee for the study of economic and monetary union, under the direction of Jacques
Delors, President of the European Commission, approved by the European Council in June 1989).
14 Signed in Rome on 29 October 2004; OJ C 310, 16.12.2004. 
15 Opinion of the ECB of 19 September 2003 at the request of the Council of the European Union on the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 229, 25.9.2003, p. 7.
“Under the acronym ‘ESCB’ two realities coexist. On the one hand, ESCB refers
to the ECB and the NCBs of all the EU Member States. On the other hand, and
by the effect of other provisions, ‘ESCB’ also refers to the ECB and the central
banks of only those EU Member States which have adopted the euro. This second
concept is different from the f irst, since it embodies the exclusive competence
for defining and conducting monetary policy, including the issue and the overall
management of the euro, the management of the off icial foreign reserves of the
Member States that have adopted the euro, and promoting the smooth operation
of payment systems. The actions required to implement this competence require
a high degree of harmonisation of procedures, instruments and infrastructure,
and a single decision-making body with regulatory capacity.
The EU Treaty has created these two realities by introducing in the EC Treaty
and in the Statute a single concept without distinguishing which provisions apply
to one composition or to the other. This legislative technique does not serve the
aim of clarity and comprehension of the EC Treaty. In order to distinguish the
second concept of “ESCB”, the Governing Council adopted and has been using
since 1998 the term “Eurosystem” in its communications with the public. With
a view to simplifying and making the Constitution more accessible for European
citizens and, in so doing, to bringing the Union’s institutional framework closer
to the general public, the ECB suggested that the historic reform that the draft
Constitution represents would represent a suitable opportunity to introduce the
term “Eurosystem” into the Constitution”.16
The Constitution will also formally introduce the euro into primary law,
definitively replacing the former denomination of the European Currency Unit,
or ECU. It qualif ies the euro as the “currency of the Union” (Article I-8), and
provides that “European laws or framework laws shall lay down the measures
necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency” (Article III-191).
Beyond its symbolic value (Article I-8), the euro is the key element of the EU
monetary policy, and is listed as an exclusive Union competence for those
Member States whose currency is the euro (Article I-13); it is established as the
anchor of EMU (Article III-194). The concept of the “euro area” is only
informally introduced in the Constitution via the expressions “the Member States
whose currency is the euro” and the “participating Member States” (Articles 
I-13 and III-194).17 In so doing, the Constitution consecrates the already widely
used concept of the Eurosystem. 
However, the ambiguity of the Maastricht Treaty will not disappear with the entry
into force of the Constitution, which does not clarify the status of the ESCB.
If it recognises the Eurosystem as a distinct body, it does not make clear its
concrete content vis-à-vis the ESCB, the ECB or the NCBs. No clarif ication is
to be found in the ESCB/ECB Statute. The IGC has considered it inappropriate
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16 The drafting suggestion of the ECB has been changed by the IGC to avoid introducing the dubious expression
“Member States which have adopted the Union currency, the euro” into the Constitution.
17 There is no legal need for such a def inition because the institutions of the Union automatically serve the euro
area; the Eurogroup is the only specif ic case.
to adapt systematically the provisions of the Statute to indicate where the ESCB
has to be read as the Eurosystem. In so doing, it follows the Opinion of the
ECB.18
In Protocol No 4, annexed to the Constitution, Article 1 (1) has been redrafted
in order to def ine the ESCB in the f irst sentence and the Eurosystem in the
second, in accordance with Article I-30 of the Constitution.19 The Constitution
will also confer a constitutional value on the Eurogroup. The Eurosystem shall
be associated with the Eurogroup20, but the relationship between the Eurogroup
and the EU Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance (ECOFIN)
is different from that between the Eurosystem and the ESCB. The Eurogroup
remains basically an informal meeting that does not interfere in the competence
of the formal Council, ECOFIN, while the Eurosystem is the core of the ESCB.
The General Council only contributes to the tasks of the Governing Council,
which is the supreme decision-making body of the whole ESCB.   
1.2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROSYSTEM
The Eurosystem combines the two basic characteristics of the monetary authority
of the European Union; by its nature, its composition and its functions, it is
federal and independent in a specif ic way, as this paper will later demonstrate. 
1.2.1 THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE
Monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the Union. It is not however
administered according to the classical model for most European policies, the
well-known principle of indirect administration. Instead, it is operated directly
throughout the entire euro area, with the participation of the NCBs forming an
integral part of the Eurosystem.
The relationship within the ESCB/Eurosystem between the ECB and the NCBs
should in no way be compared to the situation of the other EU institutions vis-
à-vis corresponding national bodies. The relationship between the European
Parliament and the national parliaments, the Council of the EU and the national
governments or the European Court of Auditors and the national courts of
auditors are very different from the relations between Eurosystem members.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to consider that on the one hand EU institutions
are only subject to EU law, whereas on the other hand NCBs are only be subject
to national law. The legal order of the EU is unique. It combines European rules,
which are directly applicable and enjoy primacy, with national regulations. Both
166
18 Paragraph 14 of the ECB Opinion of 19 September 2003, last sentence, reads: “This terminological change
will require a general provision indicating that ‘ESCB’ is to be read as ‘Eurosystem’ in those provisions of
the Constitution that refer to tasks or functions related to the euro or to the Member States that have adopted
the euro.”
19 Article 1 “The European System of Central Banks” (title unchanged) states: “1. In accordance with Article
I-30 (1) of the Constitution, the European Central Bank and the national central banks of those Member States
whose currency is the euro shall constitute the Eurosystem.”
20 In anticipation of the Constitution, a chairman for the Eurogroup has already been appointed for two years
from 1 January 2005; the President of the ECB is invited to Eurogroup meetings, where it may be assumed
that he then acts on behalf of the whole Eurosystem.
the ECB and the NCBs have to comply with a mixed set of rules, at both
European and national level.21
The coexistence of 13 legal personalities inside the system is an element of
heterogeneity together with the autonomy of management and action that is left
to the discretion of each central bank, either at the centre or on the periphery.
Basically the Eurosystem, governed by centralised decision-making bodies and
acting as a single entity, assumes public tasks of general interest. The Eurosystem
was not conceived as a group of commercial undertakings subject to competition
law.22 The rules of company law f ind no specif ic application. The ECB’s
shareholders’ rights are not to be compared with those of shareholders in limited
companies: there is no right of appointment to the Executive Board, no right to
withdraw or to change the Statute. The Eurosystem is basically a concept of
public law, but it can be adapted to private obligations through legal mechanisms
such as co-ownership or solidarity.
The Eurosystem is unique, a sui generis institution created by the Treaty, but
leaving a considerable degree of latitude for internal organisation and regulation
to its decision-making bodies. In accordance with Article 107 (3), it “shall be
governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB which shall be the
Governing Council and the Executive Board.” In consequence, these decision-
making bodies have a dual role, acting for the ECB as a legal entity but also
competent vis-à-vis the whole Eurosystem (and the ESCB).
The Eurosystem has one supreme authority, the ECB Governing Council23; the
latter has the remarkable power24 to make regulations of general application
similar to the regulations issued by the Parliament, Council or Commission,
which are directly applicable in the euro area. The Eurosystem contains elements
of heterogeneity but also, in many ways, of unity. It conducts and applies a single
policy; it has a single decision-making process; it has a single voice25; and it
has a single working language.26
The NCBs are subject to the guidelines and the decisions adopted by the
Governing Council as well as to the instructions of the Executive Board with
a view to implementing them. It is generally agreed on the basis of Articles 12.1
and 14.3 of the Statute that the guidelines adopted by the Governing Council
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21 Indeed, even the ECB must, in some respects, comply with national regulations.
22 As a public service it does not appear as a commercial undertaking subject to competition law; the author
considers that it would be inappropriate to compare the Eurosystem to a group of undertakings, and that the
exclusion of its public tasks from competition law is not derived from the “single group doctrine”. 
23 See E. de Lhoneux, “Du Conseil des gouverneurs de la Banque centrale européenne”, in Mélanges en hommage
à Jean-Victor Louis (Brussels: Institut d’Etudes Européennes/Editions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
2003),Vol. 2, pp. 239-57.
24 This power is used less in practice; only a few ECB Regulations have been formulated in the f ield of minimum
reserves statistics and the balance sheet of monetary f inancial institutions and sanctions. 
25 See the various presentations of the Eurosystem communication policy in the ECB Monthly Bulletin, on the
ECB website and in other ECB publications.
26 Which is English; certain facilities are provided for French, German and Italian; according to Article 17.8 of
the Rules of Procedure of 19.2.2004 (referring to the principles of a Council Regulation determining the
language to be used by the EEC of 15 April 1958, the ECB legal acts generally published in the Official Journal
of the European Union, as well as the ECB official publications, are to be made available in the various national
languages of the EU; the NCBs provide translation services to this end.
are binding only on Eurosystem members: usually the NCBs in the framework
of the decentralisation principle, but also the ECB.27
According to Article 34.2 of the Statute, the opinions and recommendations of
the Governing Council shall have no binding force. Nevertheless, they are legal
acts to be respected by all Eurosystem central banks. It can even be argued that
to the extent that the Governing Council, with the contribution of the General
Council, adopts Opinions, these may not be circumvented, even by the central
banks of non-participating Member States.28
The Governing Council shall remain the supreme ECB decision-making body of
the enlarged European Union. The modification of its voting rules in accordance
with the new Article 10.2 of the Statute29 will ensure its proper functioning in
respect of the fundamental voting principle of “one member, one vote”.30
The Statutes of the NCBs have been only partly harmonised31, and the Statute
purely contains basic common rules ensuring the smooth functioning of the
decision-making process in the system.
Article 38 imposes a single regime of professional secrecy for “members of the
governing bodies and the staff of the ECB and the national central banks”. This
regime allows for the exchange of confidential information inside the Eurosystem.
It may impose “Chinese walls” between the ESCB and the Eurosystem, so that,
for example, the documents of Eurosystem/ESCB Committees meeting in
standard composition may not be circulated to the other members of these
committees meeting in extended composition. On the basis of this Article,
common rules for confidentiality, classif ication and management of documents
are adopted.32 The committees “shall assist in the work of the decision-making
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27 A good example is provided in the area of payment systems, one of the basic tasks of the Eurosystem. The
TARGET 1 payment system , and the future TARGET 2, which should become operational in 2007, are both
organised by a Guideline containing obligations for the ECB, which has a certain operational capacity in this
area, as well as for the NCBs. An Agreement is concluded between all the ESCB central banks for the
participation of the central banks of the Member States with a derogation or exemption. Nevertheless, this
Agreement imposes on these central banks the responsibility to respect the same provisions as those of the
Guideline; it is a mere “contrat d’adhésion” that is not individually negotiable. 
28 The Governing Council is the supreme decision-making body not only of the Eurosystem but also, by virtue
of Article 107.3 of the Treaty, of the ESCB as a whole. The General Council is only a decision-making body
to a very limited extent.
29 As amended by the Decision of the Council meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government
of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute, OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 66, after a
Recommendation of the ECB on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of Nice.
30 The new Article 10.2 can be seen as a remarkable success for the Eurosystem, taking into account the particularly
rigid framework given by Article 10.6; ECB President Duisenberg said during the Press Conference of 6 February
2003, presenting the Recommendation agreed unanimously by the Governing Council: “And I challenge anyone
to come up with a model that is as transparent, as equitable and as simple as the one we have come up with.”
According to a well-informed commentator: “Mêlant raison et audace, le nouveau mode de fonctionnement du
conseil des gouverneurs concilie la nature fédérale de la BCE avec la préservation des équilibres existant entre
les gouverneurs des BCN”, in F. Allemand, “L’audace raisonnée de la réforme de la Banque centrale européenne”,
Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, No 469 (2003), pp. 391-98.
31 See the Convergence Reports adopted originally by the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in 1998, then by
the ECB in 2000, 2002 and 2004; these Reports imposed by Article 222 of the Treaty contain an assessment
of the requirements and progress of legal convergence on the part of the Member States adopting the euro.
32 Confidential information may only be used for the performance of a public task at the origin of its collection;
this speciality principle restricts the circulation of information inside the ESCB or the Eurosystem or even
inside each central bank; so for instance, individual pieces of statistical information may not be used without
specific legal provision for the performance of supervisory tasks. ECB documents are subject to confidentiality
rules contained in Administrative circulars.
bodies of the ECB and shall report to the Governing Council via the Executive
Board.” Basically, these committees belong to the Eurosystem; they are composed
of up to two members from each of the Eurosystem NCBs and the ECB, appointed
by each Governor and the Executive Board respectively […]”.33 Additionally,
“whenever it deals with matters falling within the f ield of competence of the
General Council”, a committee will also include up to two staff members
appointed by the non-participating NCBs (i.e. non-Eurosystem NCBs). They also
may be invited “whenever the chairperson of a committee and the Executive
Board deems this appropriate”.34 The same rule applies for “representatives of
other Community institutions and bodies and any other third party”.35
The documents of the committees are subject to the conf identiality rules of the
ECB. Normally they may only circulate within the Eurosystem, as they are
preparatory documents for the ECB decision-making bodies. After these bodies
have taken their decision, they can be released by the ECB, in particular to the
General Council members, by the President in accordance with Article 47.4 of
the Statute and Article 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Council.36
It is also the President’s responsibility to organise the way in which the General
Council shall contribute to the tasks of the ECB in accordance with the Statute.
Basically, the draft measures for these specific tasks are submitted to the General
Council for observation.37
1.2.2 THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE EUROSYSTEM
The ECB and the NCBs respectively are independent by virtue of the Treaty
(Article 108) and in accordance with the Statute (Article 7) and the national
legislation organising each NCB.
The ECB insisted on the recognition of the ESCB and Eurosystem in the
institutional framework of Part I of the Constitution, and suggested a reference
in the Constitution to the independence of the NCBs.38 There are indeed good
reasons to consider that the independence regime affects the system as a whole,
not only its entities that have legal personality. The independence of central
banks contributes to the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem; the NCBs’
independence is therefore limited by their participation in the Eurosystem. The
independence of the other central banks of the ESCB is also guaranteed, but has
a very different meaning in the absence of their participation in the Eurosystem.39
The institutional, personal and functional aspects of independence have been
extensively analysed and explained by the ECB.40 The Convergence Reports
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33 Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure (RoP) of the European Central Bank, ECB Decision 2004/2 of 19 February
2004, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 33.
34 Article 9 of the RoP.
35 Ibid.
36 Decision of the ECB of 17 June 2004 to adopt the Rules of Procedure of the General Council of the European
Central Bank, ECB Decision 2004/12, OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 61.
37 See Article 6, ibid.
38 See Paragraph 11 of the ECB Opinion of 19 September 2003.
39 The subject of the independence regime of the “out” central banks lies outside the focus of this paper. 
40 The types of independence are summarised in the legal chapters of the Convergence Reports of the ECB, following
the f irst Convergence Report drawn up in 1998 by the EMI in accordance with Article 121 of the EC Treaty. 
addressed these issues before the entry of the new NCBs into the Eurosystem.
However, the f inancial independence requirements after their entry, with the
concept of the financial independence of the Eurosystem, still need to be defined
concretely, although some aspects of this question have been addressed in recent
ECB Opinions.
Article I-30 (3) of the Constitution provides that the ECB “shall be independent
in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its f inances”.41 The
f inancial independence of the NCBs and the Eurosystem is to be clarif ied on
the basis of the Statute42 in conjunction with their organic national provisions.
Each NCB has its own funds, resources and expenses expressed in its annual
accounts established on the basis of national provisions and the standardising
accounting and reporting rules established by the Governing Council on the basis
of Article 26.4 of the Statute. No national contribution is imposed; the NCBs
have to f inance the subscription of the capital of the ECB – the initial
subscription as well as the capital increases as determined by the Governing
Council43 – as well as the coverage of any eventual losses and the transfer of
foreign reserve assets to the ECB.
By setting up the Eurosystem, the Treaty nevertheless imposes on each Member
State the duty of ensuring that its NCB fully performs its tasks in that system.
The Statute44 provides for the annual distribution among NCBs of the monetary
income accruing to them from their performance of the Eurosystem’s monetary
policy. In turn, according to national law, their own benef its may be distributed
to the respective Member States. The rule according to which “the national
central banks are an integral part of the ESCB” (Article 14.3 of the Statute) also
covers the f inancial assets of each NCB. If this were not so, the Eurosystem
would be one of the weakest central banks in the world; this was surely not the
vision of the founders of EMU.
The following aspects may be clarif ied concerning, respectively, budgetary
autonomy, the protection of own funds, the distribution of prof its and the
protection of reserve assets with central banks. The accounting and reporting rules
have to be harmonised in view of the financial statements, among other reasons.45
A. Budgetary autonomy
Each central bank preserves its budgetary autonomy: it decides its expenditures
and allocates adequate funds to its provisions and reserves in order to ensure
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41 Nevertheless, the resources and expenditures of the ECB are part of the “financial interests of the Community”
mentioned in Article 280 of the EC Treaty, CJEC, Case C-11/00 Commission v European Central Bank (2003)
ECR I-7147, point 95.
42 The Governing Council has clarif ied elements of these aspects in some recent Opinions, in particular the ECB
Opinion of 20 January 2004 at the request of the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament on the
governmental proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts (see the ECB’s website,
www.ecb.int, for more details).
43 Article 28.1 of the Statute.
44 Article 32.
45 See Articles 15 (Reporting requirements) and 26 (Financial accounts).
that its f inancial stability is secured and that its Eurosystem tasks are not
endangered.
This is also the case with the ECB. Its yearly budget is adopted by the Governing
Council, according to the normal voting procedure of one member, one vote.
For obvious reasons of independence, the Statute does not include the approval
of the budget among those financial provisions to be adopted by the shareholders
by weighted voting.
On the other hand, the ECB may not impose charges in the budgets adopted by
the NCBs in accordance with their national legislation and in excess of the
revenues they receive from the ECB. The Statute organises the pooling of
revenues and their redistribution to the NCBs. For the ECB, specif ic
arrangements are decided by the Governing Council, acting unanimously.46
Eurosystem operations generate prof its which are then redistributed, thus
enabling the NCBs to finance their own participation in the Eurosystem. Specific
compensation can be granted by the ECB for any specif ic costs that they incur.47
In terms of specif ic tasks, such as payment systems, the costs of the Eurosystem
shall be recovered by the customers or, if it is considered to be a service of
general interest, shall be supported directly by the ECB budget or by the
Eurosystem as a whole in accordance with the capital key determining the
distribution of prof its and the contribution to losses or charges.
B. The protection of own funds and the distribution of profits
The Eurosystem is deemed to make profits, most notably in the case of monetary
operations, with the inclusion of the seigniorage income from banknote issuance,
which is fundamentally prof it-making. The annual prof its of the central banks
may be transferred to their shareholders (for the NCBs, the respective Member
States; and for the ECB, the NCBs). However, the policy of provisioning and
transfers to the reserve shall not be left entirely to the discretion of the
shareholders in pursuit of their own f inancial interests. Moreover, each NCB
has to ensure adequate provisioning. An NCB “should not be deprived of the
opportunity of protecting itself against the erosion of the real value of its capital
in the longer term.”48 The ECB may also consider that the accounting rules to
be established by the Governing Council in accordance with Article 26.4 of the
Statute additionally cover provisioning measures at the NCB level.
It may be argued that the own funds of a Eurosystem central bank can be reduced
through the sole intervention of national authorities.
The Treaty has established a system in which the shareholders are the f inal
guarantors of the ECB, whose own funds are very limited. This is why the NCBs
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46 See in particular the Decision of the ECB of 6 December 2001 on the issue of euro banknotes, ECB/2001/15,
OJ L 337, 20.12.2001, p. 52, which contains in an annex the banknote allocation key since 1 January 2001,
whereby the share of the ECB is f ixed at 8% of the issued banknotes.
47 For monetary policy functions, the Statute explicitly provides that “The Governing Council may decide that
national central banks shall be indemnif ied against costs incurred in connection with the issue of banknotes
or in exceptional circumstances for specif ic losses arising from monetary policy operations undertaken for
the ESCB.” (Article 32.4, No 2). 
48 ECB Opinion of 20.1.2004, paragraph 11.
may be called on in the future to f inance any capital increases of the ECB. The
principle of stable capital for the ECB, with the possibility of increase – and
the prohibition of reimbursement or decrease – is logically correlated with the
same dynamics at the level of the participating NCB. Any other approach might
imply the renationalisation of a Community body.  
The assets and liabilities of each entity are affected by the rules of the system.
The f inancial independence of each central bank is aimed at protecting the
independence of the Eurosystem as such, in view of the performance of its tasks.
Each entity of the Eurosystem must be self-supporting; there is no reverse
guarantee from the ECB to the NCBs.
In creating the Eurosystem and the ECB, the Treaty did not discharge the
Member States of their obligation to create and maintain their own effective,
stable and independent central bank. On the contrary, Article 1.2 of the Statute
clearly states this commitment, in explicitly imposing on the only Member State
without a central bank the obligation to create one.49 In this sense “NCBs should
be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means to ensure that their
ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulf illed.”50 This is why the Treaty does not
authorise Member States to reduce unilaterally the financial means of their NCB;
it can be argued that these means, even if they belong to the NCBs, are also part
of the Eurosystem.
It should be noted that, for the national Treasuries, the right to receive NCB
profits does not include the right to treat a reimbursement of capital as ordinary
f iscal revenue for the year, i.e. a reimbursement of capital. The reduction of
capital is not the attribution of a prof it. It is equivalent to an element in the
liquidation of the NCB. Such partial liquidation of an entity of the Eurosystem
is contrary to the Treaty if it entails the risk that the NCB could be unable to
fulf il its tasks; it is in any case subject to the opinion of the ECB, which may
consider either that such a reduction requires its approval, or that it should invite
the Commission to bring the case before the European Court of Justice. If the
Member State in question is not allowed to receive credit from its central bank,
it could be argued that a fortiori it may not take over its central bank’s own funds.
The general line of argument whereby the risks of the NCBs have been assumed
or dramatically diminished since the setting up of the Eurosystem may be
contested. The Treaty does not guarantee any minimum prof it for the NCBs.
Situations of very low interest rates, decrease in the demand for banknotes or
increased financial stability may not be considered as purely hypothetical. NCBs
have to be prepared to act in the case of an emergency.
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49 The Article states that “The Institut monétaire luxembourgeois will be the central bank of Luxembourg”. As
this provision was implemented after 1998, it will be deleted according to the new version of the Statute annexed
to the Treaty on the Constitution.
50 EMI Convergence Report 1998; this may also apply to the “out” NCBs, but in a different context.
C. The protection of foreign reserve assets
The ECB considers that a law forcing an NCB to sell foreign reserve assets in
order to pay its Member State shall be subject to its previous approval in
accordance with Article 31.2 of the Statute.51 Such approval has to be justif ied
by reference to the exchange rate and monetary policies of the Community. In
any event, the NCB must be able to transfer additional reserves according to
Article 30 of the Statute.
It can be argued that with the introduction of the Eurosystem, several risks have
diminished for the national monetary authorities. However, it would be wrong
to consider that Member States are totally free to continue to determine the level
of their foreign reserves. More fundamentally, the question of whether a Member
State has the right to impose the sale of foreign reserve assets has to be answered
in view of the basic Eurosystem task “to hold and manage the off icial foreign
reserves of the Member States”. Article 31.2 refers to the management of these
reserves. The “holding”, for its part, implies that these reserves should be
maintained by the NCBs; it can be argued that any reimbursement to the
respective Member States implies the need for authorisation by the Governing
Council, which is the supreme decision-making body of the Eurosystem. One
could consider that even if the Treaty mentions the “reserves of the Member
States”, that is simply by reference to their origin or possibly to their
beneficiaries in case of liquidation. Since the creation of the Eurosystem, these
national reserves are also to be considered as “Eurosystem reserves”.
2 THE EUROSYSTEM AS AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The Eurosystem started with an already def ined monetary policy framework
before the introduction of the euro in 1999; since then, other Eurosystem
operations have been developed. An exhaustive overview implies a detailed
analysis that would exceed by far the scope of this paper; however, some general
considerations regarding the decentralisation principle and the organisation of
activities may be helpful in presenting the Eurosystem.
2.1 THE DECENTRALISATION PRINCIPLE
According to various Statute provisions, Eurosystem activities are carried out
by “the ECB and national central banks.”52 As a rule, each central bank has to
be able to conduct all the basic Eurosystem operations, even if it may decide
not to perform certain functions or to cooperate with other Eurosystem entities
in the execution of specif ic tasks. At the same time, the Eurosystem does not
allow competition among its members for services of general interest.
The general organisational principle of the Eurosystem is a preference for the
decentralisation of activities inside the system. The Treaty’s preference for
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decentralisation is expressed in various provisions, but most clearly in 
Article 12.1 of the Statute. It is f inally for the Governing Council to determine
how, in practice, the operations shall be carried out. In most cases, centrally
adopted decisions are implemented through the action of the NCBs.
The Governing Council has the general competence to def ine the modalities of
decentralisation “to the extent deemed possible and appropriate”. The Treaty
itself allows for a certain flexibility in the organisation of the Eurosystem and
the division of labour between the ECB and the NCBs. One should of course
not exaggerate the tensions present in any federal structure between the centre
and the periphery. Some very pragmatic solutions exist, and the decentralisation
model has proven to be flexible. The centralisation of some activities and even
specialisation may be decided in respect of the general principle of equal
treatment. All the NCBs within the Eurosystem are to be treated without
discrimination or preference. Derogations to this principle are only possible on
a voluntary basis. The application of internal rules such as guidelines and
instructions taken on the basis of Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute may not
be left to the discretion of the addressee. No permanent opt-out may be allowed
to NCBs for basic Eurosystem tasks. An NCB may not be authorised to apply
national solutions forever, in derogation from the Eurosystem’s operational
organisation, as this would introduce discrimination among NCBs and distort
the uniform application of ECB decisions. Formal differentiation requirements
need support in primary law (which appears very restrictive in that regard) or
unanimous support at the level of the Governing Council.
It does not appear compatible with this rule to f ix minimum quotas restricting
a priori the number of participating NCBs. Similarly, it may be argued that a
distribution of work inside the Eurosystem, for certain activities, making use
of the capital key formula, is not in line with the rule of equal treatment. The
capital key is conf ined by the Statute to the f inancial rights and obligations of
the shareholders, and is not intended to provide a measure for the effective
contribution of the NCBs to the Eurosystem. It should furthermore be
remembered that other criteria are also used in the Treaty to differentiate some
NCBs from the others – in particular, the three criteria for the new voting
modalities in the Governing Council, as mentioned in the amended Article 10.2.
Any f ixed division of activities requires the unanimous agreement of the
governors in so far as it implies an exceptional measure unforeseen in the Treaty,
to be justif ied and accepted by all as specif ic circumstances.
The decentralisation principle should not be seen as a cost factor, but mainly
as an efficient way of conducting operations with full respect for equal treatment
and a level playing-f ield.
Flexibility is realised by the systematic use by the Governing Council of
“guidelines”. These are obligatory for the NCBs so long as the latter are not
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53 The President of the ECB has already had to write to one national government in view of entrusting its NCB
with the adequate legal and administrative resources to comply with statistical requirements.
entrusted with the adequate legal and f inancial means; they appear more as
“obligations de moyens” than as “obligations de résultat”.53 They may not contain
direct obligations for third parties; in such cases, the NCBs are only allowed
to use their national instruments. The same applies in the case of sanctions
imposed on operators: if these fall outside the scope of the EC Regulations for
which the ECB is basically competent, the NCB in question acts purely on its
own behalf. 
Outside the scope of its exclusive European competence, the Eurosystem may
provide a forum for the coordination of central bank activities. This is the case
for the function of oversight of payment and securities settlement systems, which
is currently carried out by the NCBs, mainly on the basis of national law; this is
also the case for the contribution to prudential supervision and financial stability.
For the participation of the NCBs of countries with a derogation or exemption,
in the absence of the possibility of relying on ECB guidelines, contractual
arrangements may be concluded; however, these will be subject to possible
amendments of the guidelines that are binding for the Eurosystem. 
Whereas the Statute organises the redistribution of ECB prof its, the f inancing
of Eurosystem operations is not specif ied. Article 32.4 provides for possible
indemnification of NCBs against costs in connection with the issue of banknotes
or, in exceptional circumstances, for specific losses arising from monetary policy
operations undertaken for the ESCB. This rule is applicable in the f ield of
monetary operations, for which the NCBs are globally remunerated by the
Eurosystem. For other Eurosystem tasks, it is for the Governing Council, in its
capacity of budgetary authority, to decide by which modalities the participating
central banks shall be compensated, either by the operators or by the Eurosystem
itself, in respect of its f inancial provisions. When, as is often the case, cost
recovery is made through fees imposed on the external counterparties, then a
single tariff shall apply. The same prices are applied to Eurosystem services
throughout the euro area.54 Whereas services of general interest are provided by
the Eurosystem as a public good, the costs shall be assumed by the Eurosystem
itself in respect of the f inancial provisions of the Statute.
As far as the NCBs’ activities remain national, their f inancing is exclusively
subject to national regulations, in conformity with Article 14 of the Statute and
in respect of competition law.
2.2 THE ORGANISATION OF EUROSYSTEM ACTIVITIES
Monetary policy operations offer the most visible application of the
decentralisation principle. 
For other operations, specif ic rules shall be applied. In the f ield of payment
systems, three NCBs will develop a common platform to be used by all the
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54 This will be the case, for instance, with the new payment system TARGET 2, starting in 2007.
central banks of the ESCB for TARGET 2, which is a Eurosystem service
replacing the existing interlinking mechanism between national systems. 
In the f ield of management of foreign reserve assets, six central banks have
agreed to offer standardised services decided by the Governing Council.
For banknote production, it is foreseen, in the medium term, to rely on one single
Eurosystem tender procedure.
In the f ield of statistics, the legal framework governing Eurosystem activities,
based on Article 5 of the Statute, is composed of a large number of European
and national regulations. EU regulations55 and ECB regulations allow the transfer
of data from NCBs to the ECB. Considering the functional use of these data for
the performance of either ESCB or Eurosystem activities, such data are
exchanged between the central banks concerned under the protection provided
by the common conf identiality regime on the basis of Article 38 of the Statute. 
In the field of contribution to prudential supervision and financial stability, each
NCB has to act on its own in a system of mutual cooperation, as long as the ECB
has neither activated its competences under Article 22 of the Statute nor has been
entrusted by the Council with specif ic tasks in accordance with Article 105 (6).
Even in this area, the Eurosystem has a role to play.56 The oversight of payment
and securities settlement systems is a core competence of the Eurosystem. As
long as the ECB has not adopted regulatory measures, each NCB must act on
its own. For such Eurosystem activities, the NCBs’ competences are not confined
to the implementation of operations, but also imply the exercise of decision-
making power. This is a sector in which the existence of regulatory power for
NCBs remains of particular importance. 
A detailed examination of the f ield of external relations is not the aim of this
paper, although a few general comments can be made in this regard.
The role of the Eurosystem in the international f ield is basically founded on
Articles 6 and 23 of the Statute, and is essentially of an operational nature. The
Eurosystem has to contribute in its area of competence to the implementation
of international agreements binding on the EU or its Member States. The
problems may be exemplif ied by the situation with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The NCBs are the f iscal agents of their respective Member States
in their capacity as IMF members. In the IMF, there is no common position
systematically expressed by the ESCB57, the Eurosystem or the Eurogroup. The
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55 See in particular Council Regulations (EC) 322/97 and (EC) 2533/98 concerning the collection of statistical
information by the ECB, OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8; ECB Regulation 2423/2001 concerning the consolidated
balance sheet of monetary f inancial institutions, OJ L 333, 17.12.2001, p. 1; and ECB Regulation 63/2002
concerning statistics on interest rates applied by monetary f inancial institutions to deposits and credits, OJ
L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 24.
56 See K. Liebscher, “Das Eurosystem trägt eine besondere Verantwortung für die Stabilität des Finanzsystems
und die Förderung der Finanzmarktintegration in Europa”, in Das Leitbild des Eurosystems, Vienna, 13 January
2005, available at www.oenb.at.
57 It is so far mainly within the International Relations Committee (IRC) that coordination among ESCB central
banks is sought, notably for issues related to the IMF.
EU does not have a single chair and does not speak with one voice: although
EU Member States represent 32% of the total votes in the IMF (compared with
17% for the United States), they take part in ten constituencies, in a number of
which they are in a minority position.
This is basically not in line with the transfer of exclusive competence, which
would imply that both the internal and external aspects of the single currency
are dealt with exclusively by the competent European bodies.
The Constitution provides that “in order to secure the euro’s place in the
international monetary system, the Council, on a proposal of the Commission,
shall adopt a European decision establishing common positions on matters of
particular interest for economic and monetary union within the competent
international f inancial institutions and conferences” (Article III-196). This
Article goes on to state that “The Council, on a proposal from the Commission,
may adopt appropriate measures to ensure unif ied representation within the
international f inancial institutions”. In both cases, “The Council shall act after
consulting the European Central Bank” and decide in its Eurogroup
composition.58 This procedure may contribute to the clarif ication of
responsibilities and support various pragmatic solutions adopted by the EU and
national authorities for their external relations.
CONCLUSION
The Maastricht Treaty was particularly innovative in establishing the ESCB
together with the ECB. The def inition of the ESCB was however limited to its
tasks and composition.
There is no ex ante definition of the ESCB’s reality as a “system”. An assessment
requires more of an inductive than a deductive approach. A system is an original
and evolving concept; it possesses flexible rules designed to accommodate the
evolution of both its organisation and its activities.
The situation created in 1999 by the decision of some Member States not to
introduce the euro resulted in the transformation of most of the ESCB into a new
system, the Eurosystem. Six years after the introduction of the euro, this paper
examines the reality of the Eurosystem. It concludes that the Eurosystem works;
indeed, its reality is assessed by its effectiveness and its successes.
Some confusion will nevertheless remain. The distinction between the ESCB and
the Eurosystem is not clear-cut. The Eurosystem is not only derived from legal
texts but also, to a signif icant extent, from practice.
From a communication point of view, replacing the acronym “ESCB” with the
term “Eurosystem” was almost certainly a positive step. The Constitution, which
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58 Paragraphs 1 and 2.
it is hoped will enter into force in 2006, following the completion of the
cumbersome approval procedure in the Member States, will transform the
Eurosystem into a permanent concept within the EU institutional framework.
At the moment, the ESCB and the Eurosystem are very different; the one mainly
a collection of entities with legal personalities, while the other functioning as
an operational body in charge of the performance of the tasks transferred from
the EU Member States to the Union with the introduction of the single currency.
When, hopefully, the euro becomes the currency in all the Member States that
presently have a derogation or exemption, the ESCB will then come to an end
and will simply be replaced by the Eurosystem. Such a progressive approach is
not unusual in European constitutional law. Indeed, the whole history of the EU
is marked by progressive evolutions whereby institutional experiments are later
sanctif ied by law. 
By recognising the Eurosystem, the Constitution provides welcome elements of
cohesion and clarif ication. The way forward will be through the transformation
of the ESCB into the Eurosystem.
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THE ISSUE OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE
EUROSYSTEM – A SKETCH
Phoebus Christodoulou
ABSTRACT
I poteri della indipendente Banca Centrale Europea previsti dal Trattato hanno
legittimazione costituzionale e democratica sostanziale (I).
Il contributo valuta la possibilità di un’applicazione dello slogan sul “deficit
democratico” delle istituzioni e degli organismi della UE agli atti giuridici della
BCE, oltre ad analizzare se i regolamenti, le decisioni, le direttive o i pareri
della BCE non siano solo misure amministrative o misure tese, in definitiva, a
regolamentare la condotta delle persone. In quest’ultimo caso, la domanda è
rilevante: tali misure sono coerenti con il requisito della accountability a livello
politico (II).
In vista dei meccanismi di controllo politico previsti nel Trattato al riguardo
(III), si sostiene che la pratica della trasparenza adottata dalla BCE comporta
una responsabilità che genera credibilità e fiducia, diventando così di per sé
un elemento di legittimazione democratica. Si sostiene inoltre che la
responsabilità potrebbe sostanzialmente compensare l’eliminazione dello
scrutinio parlamentare dei provvedimenti giuridici dell’Eurosistema -
eliminazione intenzionalmente adottata dal Trattato (IV).
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1 THE ISSUE OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) contains three fundamental provisions on monetary
policy. First, the Treaty explicitly enshrines price stability as a guiding principle
of the European Community.1 Second, it separates monetary policy from other
economic policies and establishes the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), to which it entrusts the responsibility for the single monetary policy
in the European Community, whereby the primary objective of the ESCB is to
maintain price stability.2 Third, the ESCB, the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the national central banks (NCBs) enjoy independence when exercising the
powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaty.3
Such provisions were subsequently included, without any changes in substance,
in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was adopted by
European governments on 18 June 2004. 
As long as there are Member States that have not yet adopted the euro, it is
necessary to make a distinction between the ESCB and the Eurosystem. The term
“Eurosystem” denotes the ECB and the NCBs of those Member States that have
adopted the euro. The term “euro area” refers to the area comprising those EU
Member States that have adopted the euro.4
The principle of central bank independence as provided in the Treaties has given
rise to the issue of the legitimacy of central bank actions. One particular slogan,
the so-called democratic def icit, has become something of a catchphrase in the
relevant discussions.5 This issue is usually raised more generally with respect
to EU institutions and bodies, most notably the Council of Ministers and the
European Commission. The case of the Eurosystem has, however, some specif ic
features as far as political legitimacy is concerned which warrant a more nuanced
approach.6
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1 Article 4 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
2 Article 105 (1) and (2).
3 Article 108. Independence refers to functional, institutional, personal and f inancial features. These features
were first described in the 1998 European Monetary Institute (EMI) Convergence Report, and have subsequently
been further specified. See EMI, Convergence Report. Report Required by Article 109j of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (1998), p. 11
4 ECB, The Monetary Policy of the ECB 2004, p. 9.
5 G. Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Def icit’: The Question of Standards”, European Law Journal 4 (1998) 
pp. 5-28 (15). L. Gormley and J. De Haan, “The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank”, European
Law Review 21 (1996), pp. 95-112. L. Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London: Penguin, 2000), 
pp. 102-21 (119). R. M. Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, London School of Economics (1996), 
p. 20. However, see Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, “The Amsterdam Treaty and after. Is There Still a “Democratic
Def icit?”, in: G. C. Rodrigez Iglesias et al. (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 389-98.
6 P. Magnette, “Towards ‘Accountable Independence’? Parliamentary Controls of the European Central Bank and
the Rise of a New Democratic Model”, European Law Journal (2000), pp. 326-40. P. Leino, The European Central
Bank and Legitimacy. Is the ECB a Modification of or an Exception to the Principle of Democracy? Harvard
Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/01 (2000). C. Zilioli, “Accountability and Independence: Irreconcilable Values
or Complementary Instruments for Democracy? The Specific Case of the European Central Bank”, in Mélanges
en hommage à Jean-Victor Louis (Brussels: Editions de l’Universite de Bruxelles, 2003), pp. 395-422.
2 THE MODERN THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE7
Painful past experiences with monetary instability and inflation as well as
developments in economic and political thinking have prompted a radical change
in how inflation and its consequences are generally perceived. Price stability
has come to be widely regarded as highly desirable, which in turn made it
possible to establish price stability as a guiding principle of the European
Community and its Member States.
Economic analysis has shown that inflation is not only an impediment to economic
growth, but also unfair, because it ultimately hits those who are entirely dependent
on their wages and pensions. The economic literature as well as first-hand negative
experiences have supported the perception that inflation is very undesirable, as
opposed to monetary stability, as reflected in price stability, which is highly desirable. 
Experience has also shown that inflation can only be dealt with by making a
long-term effort. Initially, this effort will involve some sacrif ices, but will
eventually yield good results. Petty politics driven by short-term considerations
are unlikely to result in the implementation of far-reaching measures and are
thus doomed to failure. Related developments in political thinking have,
therefore, led to the broadly accepted view that combating inflation is also a
matter of overcoming the shortcomings of the parliamentary system, which in
the current era represents democracy in the political f ield.8
At the same time, there is a growing awareness that the design of a proper anti-
inflationary policy requires expertise and access to timely and reliable information
as well as efficient compilation and evaluation of data. This therefore requires the
advice of experts who are capable of addressing the problem objectively, as
professionals unaffected by either external pressures or petty political considerations.
3 FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMACY OF THE POWERS OF THE
INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK 
As a result of such developments and discussions, a broad consensus was reached
that is reflected in the Treaty establishing the European Community.9 The Treaty
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7 R. Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), pp. 152-54. L. Gormley and J. De Haan, op. cit., p. 109. A. S. Blinder, “Is Government
Too Political?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No 6 (Nov/Dec 1997), pp. 115-26 (116, 126). N. T. Skaggs, Monetary
Policy, in T. Cate, G. Harcourt and D. C. Colander (eds), An Encyclopedia of Keynesian Economics (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 436-40. J. Cornwall, “What Remains of Keynes”, in T. Cate, G. Harcourt and D. C.
Colander (eds), op. cit., pp. 299-308. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Liberal
Principles of Justice and Political Economy, Vols I-III, complete edition in a new one-volume paperback
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), Vol. I pp. 25, 69, 72, 154, 161-62, Vol. III pp. 58, 95. E.-J.
Mestmaecker, Regelbildung und Rechtsschutz in marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnungen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
1985), pp. 30, 33-35, E.-J. Mestmaecker, “On the Legitimacy of European Law”, Rabel’s Zeitschrift (1994),
pp. 615-35 (626-29, 629-32).
8 A. N. Tsirintanes, Modern Times in the Light of Christianity. A Spiritual Approach to Politics (Athens: Union
for Hellenic Civilization (Syzetesis Publishers), 1986), pp. 189-208, 210.
9 Articles 2, 4 (2) and (3), 98 and 105 (1) and (2).
enshrines price stability as a guiding principle of the European Community, and
entrusts once and for all the definition and implementation of monetary policy to
a supranational body, the ESCB. It endows this body not only with administrative
and financial self-sufficiency, but also with functional independence, by insulating
the ESCB and its decision-making bodies against any interference from political
bodies that could exert political, f inancial or any other influence. Above all, it
insulates the ESCB against political pressure from parliamentary majorities. In so
doing, the Treaty effectively elevates the ESCB to the status of a quasi-fourth power
independent from the other powers of the state. 
The endorsement and enactment of all the aforementioned provisions was thus
a political decision made by the competent Community bodies and ratif ied by
the respective national bodies in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. Such a decision has, therefore, full constitutional legitimacy
deriving from the Member States, and this will continue under the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. It is the Member States that confer
competences (powers) on the Union and its respective institutions and bodies.10
However, the decision also has substantive democratic legitimacy, since it is in
line with the principle of the separation of powers. Matters relating to distributive
justice, that is to say distributional fairness and wealth-sharing, as well as matters
def ining which national or, by extension, supranational body will exercise a
given function or responsibility, must, according to the principle of the
separation of powers, be dealt with and decided upon by the legislative branch.11
This indeed is what happened in the case under discussion.12
4 THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL ACTS OF THE INDEPENDENT
CENTRAL BANK
Any alleged “democratic def icit” can therefore only refer to the democratic
legitimacy of the ECB’s actions regarding monetary policy. 
Monetary policy measures are actions taken by the executive branch. They are
aimed at defining and implementing on each occasion the binding political platform
of price stability which has been constitutionally established as a guiding principle
of the European Union by the decision taken by the competent legislative bodies.
Admittedly, legislative and executive functions often intersect in modern
democratic states; indeed, they even tend to be confused in the practice of
rulemaking by the executive branch.13 However, the Maastricht Treaty has removed
any confusion between the legislative and the executive functions as far as
monetary policy is concerned by elevating the task of defining and implementing
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11 F. A. Hayek, „Die Anschauungen der Mehrheit und die zeitgenössische Demokratie“, ORDO XV/XVI (1964/65),
pp. 19-41 (24-28).
12 Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, op. cit., pp. 631-32.
13 See F. A. Hayek, op. cit., p. 26; K. Tsatsos, Politics. A Theory of Political Deontology, 2nd ed. (Athens: O
Edreiy  Uk, 1975), pp. 186-202 (190); L. Siedentop, op. cit., p.117.
monetary policy to a separate, autonomous and independent function which it
delegated to the ESCB, governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB.14
Therefore, the legal acts of the ECB – whether regulations, decisions,
recommendations or opinions15 – are measures of the executive branch16 as far as
the requirement of separation of powers in its original sense is concerned.17
In principle, administrative measures are generally not subject to the prior
approval of parliament or – much less – the electorate. Nevertheless, public
administration in general is currently considered to be indirectly legitimised by
being subjected to parliamentary scrutiny and, thus, is ultimately accountable
to the people.18
It is in this context that a key question has been raised, namely whether or not
the ECB’s acts, which are rules that aim at regulating the conduct of people,
should, in one way or another, accommodate the requirement for political
accountability or not.
5 MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL CONTROL UNDER THE TREATY 
In terms of pure reason, there is in principle a conflict between independence
and accountability, whereas practical reason would endeavour to reconcile
independence and democratic control by making a synthesis of the two. Such
a synthesis would call for a conceptual clarif ication of the nature of central bank
independence.
In the f irst place, central bank independence is not an end in itself. Under the
Treaty, it is only an instrument for attaining and ensuring the goal of monetary
stability. The principle of independence requires that the Eurosystem and its
members are not subject to any governmental or administrative hierarchy, neither
seeking nor receiving any instructions whatsoever regarding the performance
of their duties. More importantly, it requires them to be legally independent from
both the European Parliament and the national parliaments. 
Nevertheless, mechanisms are in place for monitoring and controlling the
operation of the Eurosystem as well as the acts of the ECB. Six types of control
mechanisms can be identif ied according to the Treaty and the Statute, and are
listed below.
First, the ECB’s actions are subject to a substantive restraint, namely the
Eurosystem’s mandate. The principle of independence is binding insofar as it
is used for the purpose of monetary stability. The Treaty states that the primary
objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to
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14 Article 8 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB.
15 Ibid., Article 34.
16 K. Ballerstedt, „Über wirtschaftliche Maßnahmegesetze“, in: Festschrift Walter Schmidt-Rimpler (Karlsruhe:
Verlag C. F. Müller, 1957) , pp. 369-402 (377, 380, 390, 399, 402).
17 F. A. Hayek, op. cit., p. 26. 
18 A. Bleckmann, „Das europäische Demokratieprinzip“, Juristenzeitung (2001), pp. 53-58 (58).
the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic
policies of the Community.19
Second, in the exercise of its responsibilities, the Eurosystem is subject to the
general restraint of rule of law. The decision-making bodies of the Eurosystem
operate on the basis of off icial rules of procedure, and the acts and omissions
of the ECB are open to review or interpretation by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.20
Third, the President, the Vice-President and the other members of the ECB’s
Executive Board are appointed from a pool of persons of recognised standing
and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by the common
accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of the Heads of State
or Government, on a recommendation from the Council of Ministers after it has
consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB.21 The
latter comprises the members of the Executive Board and the governors of the
NCBs, who are appointed in accordance with the provisions of national law, and
in any case by a decision of the respective government.
Fourth, the members of the ECB’s governing bodies may be removed from office
before the end of their term if there are serious grounds for so doing (e.g. serious
misconduct).22 
Fifth, the Treaty regulates the relations of the ECB with other Community
institutions and bodies, in particular the Council of Ministers, the European
Commission and the European Parliament.23
Sixth, the ECB is required to produce an annual report on the activities of the
ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the previous and the current year for
the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, as well as for the
European Council. Moreover, this report is presented by the President of the ECB
to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, which may hold a
general debate on that basis.24
Thus, the European Parliament takes note of the ECB’s annual report, and the
Council of Ministers may each time hold a general debate on this report.
However, neither of these bodies has the power (competence) either to approve
or to reject the ECB’s report on monetary policy. 
Article 113 (3) of the Treaty clearly illustrates the idea of the Eurosystem’s
independence from the representative bodies. However, it may just as easily be
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19 Article 105.
20 Article 35 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB.
21 Ibid., Article 11.2.
22 Ibid., Article 11.4, regarding the members of the Executive Board; national provisions regulate, according to
Article 14.2 of the Statute, the removal from off ice of each of the other members of the Governing Council.
23 Article 113.
24 Article 113 (3).
perceived, as some have indeed done, as proof of a “democratic def icit” with
regard to the functioning of the Eurosystem.25 This is an important issue which
is addressed in detail in Section 6 below.
6 THE ECB’S PRACTICE OF TRANSPARENCY
This paper submits that such reasoning is unfounded for three main reasons. In
the first place, the assertion of a democratic deficit is based on sophistry. In view
of the shortcomings of the parliamentary system, what the drafters of the Treaty
had in mind was to safeguard the central bank’s administrative and political
independence in def ining and implementing monetary policy, mainly as a
counterweight to the preponderance of parliamentary power in general. Secondly,
this argument conveniently disregards the control mechanisms that are in place
as described above. Finally, and more importantly, it also fails to consider the
fact that, apart from and beyond any statutory requirements, the independent
central bank declares itself legally and politically obligated to explain properly
and justify each time its decisions to the citizens of the euro area and their
elected representatives, thereby making itself responsible for fulf illing its
objectives under the Treaty.26
Moreover, the ECB has since its inception practised a policy of dialogue with
the general public, based on the ideals of transparency, accountability and
credibility.27
The ECB def ines central bank transparency as an environment in which the
central bank provides the general public and the markets with all relevant
information on its strategy, assessments and policy decisions as well as its
procedures, and does so in an open, clear and timely manner. The ECB considers
that transparency constitutes a crucial component of its monetary policy
framework, thereby emphasising the importance of effective communication and
proper interaction with the public. 
Transparency entails accountability, which is in turn essential for democracy
as far as the latter encapsulates the idea of freedom in public affairs.
Accountability is consistently applied by the ECB, and is as a result gradually
developing into standard central bank practice. It remains somewhat premature
to decide whether such practice and understanding of the concept already qualify
for customary law. However, accountability itself is certainly an element of
democratic legitimacy. The ECB in this regard legitimises itself as a democratic
body by consistently acting like one, which is to say, by offering greater
transparency and accountability as a matter of political obligation.
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25 L. Siedentop, op. cit., p. 119.
26 ECB, The Monetary Policy of the ECB 2004, pp. 66-70.
27 See for example C. Noyer, “Politics and Central Banks”, ECB (speech held in Tallinn, 3 May 1999); W. F.
Duisenberg, “The Role of the Central Bank in the United Europe”, ECB (speech held in Warsaw, 4 May 1999),
p. 8; O. Issing, “The ECB and Its Watchers”, ECB (speech held in Frankfurt, 17 June 1999), p. 24.
7 CREDIBILITY
All efforts to enhance transparency (and through this, accountability) aim at
ensuring that monetary policy is better understood by the public and is as a result
more credible and effective.
Modern economic theory confirms that if monetary policy is to be credible, the
targets set must be consistently pursued. As Robert Lucas argues in his well-
known critique as well as in his paper about rational expectations, monetary
policymakers should avoid surprises, and only a credible policy can be
considered to be “optimal monetary policy”. Market participants have no
conf idence in a particular policy when policy measures are inconsistently
implemented. Credibility, as modern economic theory teaches us, is built on
consistency.28
Advances in information technology corroborate these findings. In the high-tech
era, f inancial markets can support or disapprove of and ultimately counteract
monetary policy measures on a daily basis, depending on whether such measures
are consistent with the announced targets and the proclaimed principles which
their respective rational expectations have been based upon. In this specif ic
sense, it can be said that the f inancial markets “vote”. Strange though it may
sound in today’s increasingly globalised world, this statement recalls the idea
of direct and participatory democracy.29 However, this topic lies outside the scope
of this paper. 
Jürgen Habermas, the noted German social philosopher, has remarked that, apart
from any formal concept of legitimacy, the main problem with democracy in the
European Union is how to prevent a non-transparent, arbitrary and authoritarian
bureaucracy from growing to a menacing size. To prevent this, new life should
be breathed into the Treaties through dialogue. This would, according to
Habermas, promote understanding and lead to the building of a European
collective consciousness.30
In other words, the legal framework alone cannot build trust: instead, a synergy
of many other aspects is needed. The European Union and each of its bodies need
to connect with the way people think and feel, yearn and aspire. 
The building of trust is, after all, primarily a matter of character and moral
commitment. The latter is implicitly attributed to the policymaker by the general
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28 N. E. Savin and C. H. Whiteman, “Lucas critique”, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance,
Vol. II (New York: Stockton Press, 1994), pp. 618-23. D. W. Jansen, R. E. Lucas, Jr., in T. Cate, G. Harcourt
and D. C. Colander (eds), op. cit., pp. 380-83. R. M. Lastra, op. cit., pp. 14-15. O. Issing, “Monetary Targeting
in Germany: The Stability of Monetary Policy and the Monetary System”, Journal of Monetary Economics,
Vol. 39, No 1 (1997), pp. 67-79. G. Alogoskouf is, “The Bank of Greece and Inflation: Independence and
Democratic Accountability”, in D. Demopoulos, P. G. Korliras and P. G. Prodromidis (eds), Essays in Economic
Analysis in Honor of Professor R. D. Theoharis (Athens: Sideris Publishers, 1998), pp. 200-25 (208-09). 
29 L. Siedentop, op. cit., pp. 47-63.
30 J. Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’”, European Law Journal (1995),
pp. 303-07 (304). Habermas further developed and expanded these ideas in his Zeit-Stiftung “Hamburg Lecture”
of 26 June 2001; see F.A.Z., 28 June 2001, No 147, p. 45. See also J. Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen, Kleine
Politische Schriften X (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), pp. 68-84 („Ist die Herausbildung einer
europäischen Identität nötig, und ist sie möglich?“).
public.31 However, this parameter, no matter how cardinal it may be, is also
beyond the scope of this paper.
To cut a long story short, these preliminary thoughts can be summed up by
rephrasing the well-known distinction between law in action and law in the
books. It can be reasonably affirmed that only committed accountability in action
can establish credibility and trust and, despite any slogans to the contrary,
materially compensate for the planned and justif ied elimination of formal
parliamentary scrutiny of the day-to-day measures of monetary policy.
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31 C. Stark, „Menschenbild, Institutionen und Ethos“, Juristenzeitung (2000), pp. 927-29 (929). H. Schmidt, Auf
der Suche nach einer öffentlichen Moral, 2nd edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), pp. 43, 173,
197, 210.
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ABSTRACT
L’obiettivo dello studio è di sottolineare gli aspetti principali che devono essere
valutati quando ci si riferisce al “principio di decentramento”, considerato una
delle caratteristiche chiave alla base della struttura del Sistema Europeo di
Banche Centrali.
Il sistema SEBC/BCE delinea un’unica struttura organizzativa che condivide
elementi propri della decentramento e della delega, senza essere identificabile
con nessuno dei due. Le competenze per l’esecuzione dei compiti da parte delle
Banche Centrali Nazionali sono assegnate direttamente dallo Statuto e dalle
rispettive legislazioni nazionali, mentre la competenza per la gestione del
Sistema (dal punto di vista degli aspetti di decisione e controllo) è accentrata
presso la BCE.
Nell’ultimo paragrafo dell’Articolo 12.1, lo Statuto stabilisce il principio del
decentramento esecutivo, a condizione che esso sia “possibile ed adeguato”.
Pertanto, solo nel caso in cui tali requisiti non siano rispettati, la BCE può
optare per la centralizzazione delle funzioni del Sistema che essa è in grado di
svolgere da sola. Sia tale decisione, sia la possibile applicazione di un modello
di “decentramento selettivo” comportano rilevanti problematiche legali, in
considerazione delle caratteristiche  istituzionali del sistema e dell’ambigua
stesura dell’Articolo 12.1.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The legal configuration of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is an
original construction given shape in the Treaty on European Union, passed in
the Dutch city of Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The ESCB, which comprises
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs)1 of the
euro area, is charged with the implementation of the functions and activities
envisaged in the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”) and
its Statute.2 With regard to the management of the ESCB, it is stated that “The
ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB”.3 One of
the principles that the ECB needs to take into account when determining how
the ESCB is to operate is the so-called principle of decentralisation, which
basically derives from Articles 9.2 and 12.1, in the third paragraph of the
Statute.4 In this paper we aim to analyse this principle, and to highlight how it
represents one of the essential principles in the def inition of the legal
construction of the ESCB. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
study the concept of decentralisation and how it differs from other similar
concepts; in Section 3 we consider the treatment of the principle of
decentralisation in the legal framework of the ESCB; in Section 4 we examine
the issue of the different levels of decentralisation; and in Section 5 we offer
some reflections on the ideas of selective centralisation and decentralisation.
Finally, we end in Section 6, which provides some conclusions.
2 DECENTRALISATION: THE CONCEPT AND DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION
As mentioned in the preceding section, there is no doubt that the principle of
decentralisation is one of the essential def ining features of the ESCB’s legal
framework. Nevertheless, its def inition, which belongs at national level to the
realm of constitutional law and administrative law, has not received the treatment
it deserves in either the Treaties or the secondary law of the European Union.5
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1 Article 107, f irst paragraph of the Treaty, Article 1.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank (“the Statute”).
2 Article 8 of the Treaty, Article 1.1 of the Statute.
3 Article 107, third paragraph of the Treaty, Article 8 of the Statute.
4 Article 9.2 states that “The ECB shall ensure that the tasks conferred upon the ESCB under Article 105 (2),
(3) and (5) of this Treaty are implemented either by its own activities pursuant to this Statute or through the
national central banks pursuant to Articles 12.1 and 14.” Paragraph three of Article 12.1 states that “To the
extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the ECB shall
have recourse to the national central banks to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB”.
5 M. P. Chiti, Derecho Administrativo Europeo (Madrid: Civitas, 2002), p. 179, considers that there are basically
two reasons for the scant attention paid to administrative organisation in Community law: “f irstly, the original
conf iguration of the Community as a variant of international organisations, which normally lack a structure
of their own, and secondly, the emphasis placed on the production of regulations in the service of the
development of Community policies and as the main instrument of integration. These are diverse reasons, to
which must be added the fact that the tasks of the Community were limited and, at least initially, could not
be interpreted in a broad sense, meaning that no particularly complex administrative apparatus was needed
for their implementation” (text translated by authors). In addition, J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992), p. 24, notes that “Taking into account also the many mixed forms of
administration and the types of action which have developed within administrative practice, in particular in
intra-administrative relations, a comprehensive and complete explication of the concept of European
Administration hardly seems attainable”. This author outlines the massive recourse by the Community to the
so-called Indirect Administration, that is to say, by means of the activities of the Member States. 
To def ine the concept of decentralisation, it is therefore necessary to have
recourse to doctrine and comparative law. As Giannini points out,
decentralisation “has been the subject of discussion more among politicians and
political sociologists than among lawyers, resulting in an uncommon degree of
confusion”.6 No sooner does one try to tackle the issue, than one confronts the
fact that there is no single unambiguous definition of it. As the World Bank says,
“Decentralization – the transfer of authority and responsibility for public
functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent
government organizations and/or the private sector – is a complex multifaceted
concept. Different types of decentralization should be distinguished because they
have different characteristics, policy implications, and conditions for success”.7
In this regard, an initial distinction is usually made, due to their differing scope,
between political decentralisation and administrative decentralisation.8 Even
though the dividing line between these two concepts is not clear-cut, it would
seem to be the case that the former f inds a natural place in constitutional texts,
and customarily refers to the question of the form of the state, whereas the latter
is generally found in the norms governing the principles of organisation of a
government or public administration. 
It is undoubtedly the legal/administrative doctrine that has made the most
decisive contribution to the def inition of the concept of decentralisation and
other related concepts, such as that of delegation. Thus the most common feature
of decentralisation is the transfer of a competence to another organisation. (This
possibility must be envisaged by the relevant legislation.) This transfer takes
place through a general provision; a resolution or administrative act by the body
responsible would not suff iciently allow for such a transfer. This transfer of
competence, which will be exercised in the name of the new holder of the
competence, will nevertheless be under the supervision, oversight or control of
the administration transferring its competence.9
DELEGATION
Delegation consists of the transfer of the mere exercise of a competence from
one body or organisation to another. The distinctive features of the delegated
competence are that it is exercised in the name and under the responsibility of
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6 M. S. Giannini, Derecho Administrativo (Madrid: Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas, 1991), p. 289,
in F. Garrido Falla, Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, 3rd edition (Madrid: Técnos, 2002), p. 424 (text
translated by authors).
7 World Bank, “What Is Decentralization?”, available at http://www.ciesin.org/decentralization.
8 In a similar way, the doctrine distinguishes between territorial decentralisation and functional decentralisation,
or decentralisation according to services.
9 According to G. Ariño Ortiz (1988), “Principios de descentralización y desconcentración”, Documentación
Administrativa, No 214, April/June, pp. 28-30, these powers of control “may have as their cause and purpose the
upholding of the legal order (control of legality…) or they can be determined by reasons of a political or economic
order, or for reasons of moral character or technical criteria (opportunity control...)” (text translated by authors).
the delegating body. The legal commission to exercise this competence is made
through a simple administrative act or resolution.10
From the point of view of Community law, it should be pointed out here that
Community precedent has tended to look unfavourably upon delegation to bodies
other than Community institutions, following the precedent set by the Meroni
case. However, the specif ic features of the legal structure of the ESCB, as
expressly envisaged in the Treaty, means that it lies outside the scope of the
aforementioned doctrine.11
OUTSOURCING
The difference between decentralisation and outsourcing would seem to be clear-
cut. The latter consists fundamentally of the external performance of a particular
task, i.e. one that is entrusted to a third party, normally a private company,
through a contract for the provision of services. In the case of outsourcing, the
outsourced tasks are “instrumental” and in no way suppose the exercise of public
functions or powers by the company receiving the commission.
SUBSIDIARITY
Lastly, regarding the relationship between the principle of decentralisation and
subsidiarity, which is envisaged in the Treaty (Article 5, second paragraph), it
should be noted that on occasions the two may share the same purpose, i.e.
achieving greater eff iciency, bringing decision-making by Community or
national bodies closer to those they affect. However, subsidiarity is only
applicable in the case of competences that are shared by the Community and the
Member States, and not when the issue concerned is the sole competence of the
European Community. There is no question that the functions of the ESCB are
the sole competence of the Community, ruling out the application of subsidiarity.
Nor should it be confused with decentralisation.12
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10 See A. Gallego Anabitarte (2000), “Conceptos y principios fundamentales del Derecho de Organización”, in
Lecciones de Derecho Administrativo, 1 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), pp. 79-80. Nevertheless, there is also
a great deal of confusion surrounding the concept of delegation. Part of the doctrine conceives it as a legal
agreement through which there is a “deconcentration” or bureaucratic decentralisation, which implies “the
permanent transfer of competences from a higher to a lower body. Its essential characteristic is that it takes
place between bodies within the same legal person. It therefore does not involve two different legislations,
as in the case of territorial decentralisation, nor two different legal persons as in the case of functional or service
decentralisation.” (Garrido, op. cit.) (text translated by authors).
11 Case 9/56 Meroni v ECSC High Authority, [1958] ECR, 133. Regarding the limits of delegation in Community
law, see T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
In addition, X. A. Yataganas (2001), “Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union”, Jean Monnet
Working Paper, 3/01, advocates the creation of European regulatory agencies to increase the eff iciency and
legitimacy of the decision-making process in the EU, indicating that the doctrine of the Meroni case, duly
revised and corrected, does not present an obstacle to the creation of such bodies.
12 On this subject, see R. Smits, The European Central Bank. Institutional Aspects (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), pp. 111-12; C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Portland,
OR: Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 70-71.
3 DECENTRALISATION IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ESCB
In the previous section we sought to approach the theoretical concept of
decentralisation. We now need to assess the specif ic legal framework def ined
by the Statute. This is not the place to analyse the different conceptualisations
of the system that have been put forward, which range from seeing it as a federal
or quasi-federal structure, to regarding it as a system that is basically
characterised by a hierarchy in which the NCBs are reduced to the role of mere
operating arms of the ECB, without making a signif icant contribution to it.13
Moreover, it should be noted that there is also a degree of debate about the
suitability of decentralisation, with positions ranging from those who see it as
a weakness in the way the ESCB is constructed14, to those who consider it to be
one of the elements giving it strength and credibility.15 In this paper we will limit
our analysis to questions of lege data, as otherwise we would need to enter into
a discussion of how the Maastricht Treaty should have def ined matters.
What is clear is that the Articles of the Statute that deal with this issue (9.2, 12.1
and 14.3) are not reducible, prima facie, to any of the classic types of
decentralisation or delegation.16 We can state already that they have elements
of both, which in the end leads us to conclude that the legal structure is atypical.
In our view, in order to analyse it, it is necessary to break down the different
elements involved in realising the tasks of the ESCB by the NCBs.
1. From the point of view of the authorities involved in the process, we have on
the one hand the ECB, a body created by primary Community law, whose
governing bodies govern the ESCB17; and, on the other hand, the NCBs, which
have their roots in the national legislation of their respective countries but
form an integral part of the ESCB under Community law.18 Moreover, the legal
framework applicable to the NCBs, as set out in their statutes, fully empowers
them to contribute to the exercise of the functions of the ESCB. This gives
them the legitimacy to carry out tasks not only by virtue of a legal instrument
of the ECB, but from their status as national central banks within the legal
framework of the ESCB.
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13 Zilioli and Selmayr, op. cit., pp. 53-81. 
14 Thus, for example L. Bini Smaghi & D. Gros, in Open Issues in European Central Banking (London: MacMillan
Press, 2000), pp. 5-26, hold that “the main reason for decentralization is the desire to protect the employment
of specialized staff in the NCBs”, envisaging a progressive de facto centralisation among the NCBs that has
an increasing impact on operations over time. 
15 M. Goodfriend (1999), “The Role of a Regional Bank in a System of Central Banks”, Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond Working Paper, No 99-4 (July), pp. 18-28, holds that “A regional presence facilitates the
acquisition of specialized information on the economy and positions the staff to reach out to the public with
an explanation of the central bank’s policy objectives and practices. Presidents (Governors) of regional central
banks bring analytical diversity to the monetary policy committee. Above all, a system of central banks promotes
a healthy competition that stimulates innovative thinking on operational, regulatory, research, and policy
questions. Federal Reserve experience teaches that a decentralized system needs a strong center”. 
16 Zilioli and Selmayr, op. cit., p. 66, appear to uphold the thesis of delegation. Nevertheless, the Statute uses
the term delegation, but only to refer to the transfer of the tasks of the Governing Council to the Executive
Board (Article 12.1, second paragraph).
17 According to Article 8 of the Statute, “The ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB”.
18 According to the Statute, the statutes of the national central banks must be compatible with the Treaty and
the Statute (Article 14.1), and “the national central banks are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. The Governing Council shall take the necessary
steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB, and shall require that any necessary
information be given to it” (Article 14.3).
2. From the point of view of the tasks transferred to the NCBs by the ECB, the
following points should be made. The exercise of tasks is most commonly
transferred by means of Guidelines. These instruments are legal acts under
Community law, which are typical of the ESCB. The NCBs are obliged to translate
the content of these Guidelines into their own national law and have sufficient
powers to do so, not by virtue of the ECB Act transferring the task, but out of
the national legal framework regulating the NCBs. Lastly, the ECB reserves
powers of verification not only over the translation of the Guidelines into national
legislation, but also in the execution of the transferred task, and it can appeal to
the Court of Justice to demand compliance (Articles 14.3 and 35.6 of the Statute). 
The tasks (contracts concerning monetary policy, operations in the payments
system, etc.) are performed by the NCBs in their own right and in their own
name, in accordance with national law, charged against their own balance sheet,
and with responsibility for their actions out of their assets, without prejudice
to the fact that in certain matters the provisions of the Statute allowing the
sharing of the losses between the members of the ESCB may come into effect.19
This legal structure is not entirely compatible with the view of the NCBs as
agents, which has no explicit support in any legal text.20
4 THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DECENTRALISATION
Having reached this point, it makes sense to examine to what extent the Statute
allows different levels of decentralisation.
Unfortunately, this is not a subject to which the various authors who have
attempted to analyse the structure of the ESCB have devoted much attention,
despite its being crucial to any evaluation of the ESCB’s real (and not merely
conceptual) functioning. 
As noted earlier, the answer to this question can be found in Article 12.1, last
paragraph of the Statute, which states that the ECB “to the extent deemed
possible and appropriate […] shall have recourse to the national central banks
to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB”.
At f irst reading, this wording offers little scope for doubt as to its imperative
nature, which imposes the obligation that the System’s tasks be executed in a
decentralised way, unless, in the judgement of the Governing Council of the
ECB, this is impossible or inappropriate.21
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19 Article 32.4 states that “The Governing Council may decide that national central banks shall be indemnif ied
against costs incurred in connection with the issue of banknotes or in exceptional circumstances for specif ic
losses arising from monetary policy operations undertaken for the ESCB. Indemnif ication shall be in a form
deemed appropriate in the judgment of the Governing Council; these amounts may be offset against the national
central banks’ monetary income”.
20 See Zilioli and Selmayr, op. cit., p. 78.
21 According to Smits, op. cit., p. 112, “Article 12.1, last sentence, ESCB Statute, is evidence of a presumption that
the operations and activities of the System should, where ‘possible and appropriate’, take place at a decentralized
level rather than be centralized at the ECB”. The same reasoning is followed by Zilioli and Selmayr, op. cit., 
p. 116: “By this, the discretion enjoyed by the ECB under Article 9.2 of the Statute is directed in such a way that
it makes a legal requirement (‘shall’) to choose indirect implementation of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions”. 
Even though this interpretation does seem fairly clear, recourse to the use of
ill-def ined legal terms raises inherent diff iculties in weighing up the degree of
discretion open to the Governing Council when modulating the level of
decentralisation of the System.
Obviously, the wording of the Article is clear in so far as the Governing Council’s
decision is not free, but must be justif ied by the degree to which the
decentralised execution of a given task is impossible or inappropriate.
We shall not dwell upon the f irst of these requirements (i.e. regarding
“possibility”), as its analysis is relatively free of shades of meaning. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to take the view that the “possibility” requisite is related to
the operating capacity of a particular NCB, which probably refers us to episodes
of temporary centralisation linked to exceptional cases of force majeure. More
doubts, however, are raised by the analysis of whether the decentralised execution
of a given task is “appropriate” or not. In principle, the subjection of the ECB
to the rule of law obliges it to decide on objective grounds in accordance with
the principles underlying the System. In the event of a disagreement over the
compliance of the decision with the Treaty, the last word obviously lies with the
Court of Justice.22
Independently from the above, however, it is undoubtedly the case that the use of
a term in the Statute so closely linked to subjective considerations greatly widens
the room for discretion by the Governing Council when delimiting its scope.23 As
we have already pointed out, “the two essential characteristics defining the
institutional design of the ESCB are its uniqueness with respect to the traditional
scheme in the Treaty and its open character, which places in the hands of the
system, to a large extent, a noteworthy capacity for self-definition”.24
Although Article 12.1 is part of an instrument whose legal force is beyond doubt
(the Statute), its deliberately ambiguous wording tends to empty it of concrete
legal content, which approximates it de facto to what is known generically as
“soft law”.25 This fact will determine in the f inal instance its real imperative
scope, although, as has already been noted, “[o]ur binary law is well capable
of handling all kinds of subtleties and sensitivities; within the binary mode, law
can be more or less specif ic, more or less exact, more or less determinate, more
or less wide in scope, more or less pressing, more or less serious, more or less
far-reaching; the only thing it cannot be is more or less binding”.26
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22 See Articles 230 of the Treaty and 35 of the Statute.
23 In fact, the term “appropriate” is the same as that used generically in Recommendation No R (80) 2 adopted
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the exercise of discretionary powers by
administrative authorities, which def ines “discretionary power” as that “which leaves an administrative
authority some degree of latitude as regards the decision to be taken, enabling it to choose from among several
legally admissible decisions the one which it f inds to be the most appropriate”.
24 F. J. Priego, El andamiaje institucional del Sistema Europeo de Bancos Centrales (Madrid, La Ley, 1998), 
D-125 (text translated by authors).
25 An excellent exposition of the phenomenon of “soft law” at Community level can be found in R. Alonso García
(2001), “El soft law comunitario”, in Revista de Administración Pública, num.154. 
26 J. Klabbers (1996), “The Redundancy of Soft Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 65, Issue 2,
February, p. 181, quoted by A. Mazuelos (2004), “El soft law: ¿mucho ruido y pocas nueces?”, Revista
Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, No 8, p. 37, available at www.reei.org.
5 CENTRALISATION VERSUS SELECTIVE DECENTRALISATION?
Without prejudice to the answer to the question concerning the ECB’s degree
of discretion in determining the level of decentralisation of the System, the f inal
paragraph of Article 12.1 of the Statute raises a number of further questions
regarding the possible scope of the decision. It seems clear that, having observed
the impossibility or inappropriateness of a task being carried out by the NCBs,
the natural decision for the Governing Council to adopt would be to assign its
execution to the ECB itself, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9.2 of
the Statute.
However, could the ECB decide to centralise all ESCB tasks? In our view, the
answer has to be negative. Not all the ESCB tasks may potentially be centralised.
One task which is particularly signif icant in this regard is related to the holding
and managing of the off icial foreign reserves of the Member States. Given that
these foreign reserves have not been transferred to the ECB and undoubtedly
remain assets of the Member States, it is the NCBs’ responsibility, as national
authorities, to implement this function.27 Identical considerations would be
applicable to the function of “conducting foreign exchange operations”, in so
far as these are executed using the national reserves held by the NCBs, and
without prejudice to the fact that this management is subject to the decision-
making powers of the ECB, “in order to ensure consistency with the exchange
rate and monetary policies of the Community”.28
Concerning the remainder of the functions listed in Article 3 of the Statute (“to
def ine and implement the monetary policy of the Community” and “to promote
the smooth operation of payment systems”), the Statute shows careful neutrality
with respect to the question of the possible attribution of its execution to the
ECB or to the NCBs, with the exception of the decision-making power (which,
as we have seen, always lies with the ECB). In this regard, it suff ices to say that
all Articles of Chapter IV of the Statute (‘Monetary functions and operations
of the ESCB’)29 systematically mention the ECB and the NCBs when def ining
the regulations for the executive functions in the framework of both ESCB
tasks.30
This technique is also the same as the one used in the Statute regarding the
issuance of euro banknotes, a function jointly assigned to the ECB and the NCBs
in Article 106, f irst paragraph of the Treaty and Article 16. In this case, however,
the logistical requirements of the circulation of banknotes (which are intimately
linked to the power of issuance) make it diff icult to imagine this power being
taken over solely by the ECB.
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27 With regard to the foreign reserve assets transferred by the NCBs to the ECB pursuant to Article 30.1 of the
Statute, and the relevant transactions conducted with them, the same considerations made in the following
paragraphs related to the functions listed in Article 3 apply.
28 Article 31.1 of the Statute.
29 Apart from Article 20, which relates to a typical regulatory capacity.
30 Both the ECB and the NCBs can open accounts and accept assets as collateral (Article 17), perform open market
and credit operations (Article 18), hold minimum reserve accounts (Article 19), enter into transactions with
public entities (Article 21), and provide facilities to ensure eff icient and sound clearing and payment systems
(Article 22).
Now that we have tried to outline the potential decision-making scope under the
last paragraph of Article 12.1 of the Statute, its application raises an additional
question: is it possible that this decision might only affect certain NCBs?
Apart from exceptional and transitional cases of force majeure, “selective
decentralisation” raises huge questions, even though future expansions of the
Eurosystem make it legitimate to speculate about the possible advantages and
drawbacks of the System in a scenario in which the ESCB comprises the ECB
and 25 NCBs or more. 
From a legal perspective, the f irst diff iculty we face when considering selective
decentralisation is that the Statute does not contain any clause enabling
discrimination among NCBs. All the NCBs enjoy, as members of the System
(Article 1.2 of the Statute), an identical legal position. It would certainly be
diff icult to question this statement by referring to the differing weight of the
vote of the governors on patrimonial issues (Article 10.3 of the Statute). The
same conclusion may be drawn regarding the voting differences that apply when
the Eurosystem has 15 NCBs or more (Article 10.2 of the Statute in the version
amended by Council Decision 2003/223/EC of 21 March 2003 on an amendment
to Article 10.2 of the Statute – OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 66), although the recitals
of Decision 2003/223/EC seems to suggest a kind of ranking between NCBs.31
In view of the above, it is hard to imagine that the ECB would, when weighing
up the requirements established in the f inal paragraph of Article 12.1 of the
Statute, be able to decide that decentralisation was only “possible or appropriate”
with respect to some NCBs, and not others. For these purposes, particular
attention is merited by one of the basic principles (“Equality before the law”)
in Recommendation No R (80) 2 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the exercise of discretionary powers by administrative
authorities. The Explanatory Memorandum of this Recommendation states: “(22)
The purpose of this principle is to prevent unfair discrimination by ensuring that
persons in the same ‘de facto’ or ‘de jure’ situations enjoy similar treatment
where the exercise of a given discretionary power is concerned”; “(23) If a
distinction in treatment is based on reasonable grounds whereby it can be
objectively justif ied having regard to the purpose to be pursued, there is no
infringement of the principle of equality before the law. There is unfair
discrimination only where the distinctive treatment has no reasonable
justif ication having regard to the purpose and consequences of the measure
envisaged”. 
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31 Recital 5 of the above-mentioned Decision reads as follows: “The allocation of governors to groups is thus
dependent on a ranking of their NCB’s Member State based on an indicator with two components: the size of
the share of their NCB’s Member State (i) in the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices (hereinafter
GDP mp) of the Member States which have adopted the euro; and (ii) in the total aggregated balance sheet
of the monetary f inancial institutions (hereinafter TABS-MFIs) of the Member States which have adopted the
euro. The economic weight of a Member State as reflected in its GDP mp is an appropriate component as the
impact of central bank decisions is greater in Member States with larger economies than in those with smaller
economies. At the same time, the size of a Member State’s f inancial sector also has a particular relevance for
central bank decisions, since the counterparties of central bank operations belong to this sector. A 5/6 weight
is attributed to GDP mp and a 1/6 weight to TABS-MFIs. This choice of weights is suitable, as this will mean
that the f inancial sector is suff iciently and meaningfully represented”.
The above points refer exclusively to the capacity of the ECB in order to impose
a specif ic selective decentralisation structure. Other possibilities, such as the
establishment of different levels of execution to which NCBs could adhere on
a voluntary basis, will not be subject to such legal constraints. 
6 CONCLUSIONS
1. From a theoretical point of view, decentralisation entails the transfer of a
competence to another organisation. Delegation, on the other hand, consists
of the transfer of the mere exercise of a competence, but not the competence
itself, which remains that of the delegating body. Both decentralisation and
delegation should be distinguished from outsourcing, in that the latter does
not have an effect upon public powers or functions and takes the form of the
provision of an auxiliary service by a third party.
2. On the Community level, decentralisation should not be confused with the
subsidiarity principle, to which Community institutions are subject in the case
of non-exclusive competences.
3. The ESCB/ECB system is a unique organisational structure which shares
elements proper to decentralisation and delegation, without being identifiably
either. The competences for the execution of tasks by NCBs are assigned to
them directly by the Statute and their respective national legislations, while
the competence for the management of the System (in terms of its decision
and control aspects) is centralised with the ECB. 
4. In the last paragraph of Article 12.1, the Statute lays down a principle of
executive decentralisation, provided that this execution by NCBs is “possible
and appropriate”. Therefore, only in the case that these requirements are not
met can the ECB decide to centralise those functions of the System that it
is able to perform itself. Both this decision and the possible application of
a selective decentralisation model raise diff icult legal questions, given the
institutional characteristics of the System and the ambiguous drafting of
Article 12.1.
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THE ROLE OF THE ESCB IN BANKING SUPERVISION
René Smits
ABSTRACT
Il contributo esamina l'interpretazione da dare alle previsioni in materia di
vigilanza prudenziale relative al SEBC, alla luce del dato storico della loro
inclusione nel Trattato CE e nello Statuto del SEBC. Si osserva che tali previsioni
implicano un campo di competenza più ampio di quanto talora ritenuto. Si
descrivono alcuni dei contributi offerti dalla BCE, in funzione consultiva, nel
campo dell'evoluzione degli standards prudenziali e della vigilanza sul rispetto
dei medesimi. Il testo, in linea con l’opinione della BCE, suggerisce un maggiore
ricorso allo strumento dei Regolamenti al fine di stabilire standards a livello
europeo per l'industria dei servizi finanziari e argomenta in favore di un intenso
coinvolgimento del SEBC nell'ambito di un processo evolutivo orientato verso
una più accentuata allocazione a livello europeo delle responsabilità per la
vigilanza su banche, assicurazioni e imprese finanziarie. Tale maggiore
accentramento delle responsabilità non dovrebbe peraltro portare ad un ulteriore
livello di burocrazia, bensì basarsi sulle autorità nazionali aventi funzioni di
vigilanza, in un contesto di stretta cooperazione e condivisione di informazioni
- che le entità commerciali operanti sul mercato interno potrebbero così
preferibilmente fornire ad un'autorità soltanto - e svolgendo tale attività sotto
l'egida di un'Autorità dotata di un mandato esteso all'intero mercato in Europa.  
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Memories of Paolo Zamboni
As a member of the Legal Committee (LEGCO) of the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) until September 2001, I witnessed many interventions by the head
of the Banca d’Italia delegation, Paolo Zamboni. Paolo did not ask the floor on
every subject we discussed, but, when he spoke, it was with conviction and clarity.
Indeed, his interventions were made even more eloquent by his use of the Italian
language, interspersed with English terms from the European Central Bank (ECB)
documents that formed the basis for our discussions. Paolo was forthright 
in proposing solutions which the non-legal audience that LEGCO worked for 
(i.e. the Governing Council and Executive Board of the ECB) would accept. 
I will never forget his staunch support for my personal project, the writing of
a thesis on the ECB’s institutional aspects – of which he kept saying that an
Italian version had to be made – and his welcome every time I visited Rome for
lectures on Economic and Monetary Union at LUISS University, when he had
a vegetarian lunch prepared for me at the Banca d’Italia. 
His early departure from life was a loss for the central banking legal world and,
for many, a personal one too.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will sketch the provisions on the involvement of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) in the prudential supervision of the banking
industry, evoke the origins of these provisions, and offer my own interpretation
of what they mean. I will also try to elaborate how they can best be put to use
in an integrating European f inancial market.
2 HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
A FIRST PROPOSAL
Since central banks have traditionally always been involved in the prudential
supervision of banks or, in the wording of the legal acts1 of the European
Community (EC) on this matter, “credit institutions”, a role for the ESCB in this
area would seem a logical extension of the history of the national central banks
(NCBs) that form the majority of the legal entities in the ESCB. In the
preparations for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a role in banking
supervision was, indeed, envisaged. An academic proposal for legal provisions
to be inserted into the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty2 envisaged
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1 Notably, Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the taking
up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1, as most recently amended by
Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 amending Council
Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directives 94/19/EC,
98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organisational
structure for f inancial services committees, OJ L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9.
2 Study group chaired by J.-V. Louis, Vers un système européen de banques centrales – Projet de dispositions
organiques (Études européennes, Éditions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1989).
giving the European Central Bank (ECB) a basic task to contribute to the proper
functioning of the f inancial markets.3 The study further proposed to entrust the
ECB with the task of coordinating the supervision of credit institutions with their
seat or a branch within the Community, as well as similar undertakings placed
on the same footing under EC law. The ECB was to ensure a coordinated
interpretation and implementation of Community legislation in this area by the
national supervisory authorities, as well as making sure that credit institutions
and similar undertakings respect these norms. The ECB should be given the right
to intervene in individual cases. The national supervisory authorities were to
be placed under the ECB’s authority for the application of this provision. A
further role that this study proposed to give to the ECB concerned the adoption
of general decisions in the implementation of Community legislation in this area.
Finally, in the proposals put forward by the “Groupe Louis”, the ECB should
be entrusted with its own direct role as a supervisor of credit institutions if an
organic law4 were adopted to this effect. Furthermore, it should have the capacity
to enter into agreements with authorities of third countries or international
organisations to facilitate its supervisory function and, by regulation, could be
given tasks concerning credit institutions in diff iculty or undergoing
restructuring, whereas further tasks could also be given to the ECB.
THE DELORS COMMITTEE
Similarly, the Delors Committee Report (1988) had proposed that, in line with
traditional central bank tasks in the area of the stability of the f inancial system,
the ESCB should be entrusted with a “macro-prudential” role and should
“participate in the coordination of banking supervision polices of the supervisory
authorities”.
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE LEADING TO MAASTRICHT
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which led to the adoption of the 1992
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (EU), the legal instrument which, inter
alia, amended the EEC Treaty by inserting the provisions on EMU, had worked
on the basis of a draft text for the Statute of the ESCB (“the Statute”) proposed
by the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the EEC (the
“Committee of Governors”).5 In their proposal, the Governors had envisaged that
the ESCB should participate in the formulation, coordination and execution of
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3 In Article 4 (“Missions de base”) the ECB is entrusted with the basic tasks of conducting the Community’s
internal and external monetary and credit policy, of safeguarding the stability of the currency, of managing
the Community’s reserve assets, of ensuring the proper functioning of money markets and payments systems
and, to these ends, of contributing to the proper functioning of the f inancial markets. (The last two tasks are
described as follows: “Elle veille au bon fonctionnement des marchés monétaires et des systèmes de paiements.
A ces f ins, elle contribue au bon fonctionnement des marches f inanciers.”). See Vers un système européen de
banques centrales (op. cit., footnote 2), p. 42.
4 I.e. a legal act to be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting with qualif ied majority, 
on a proposal of the European Commission. See Article 3 of the draft provisions of the Groupe Louis 
(footnote 2).
5 See Europe, Document Nos 1669/1670, 8 December 1990 for the draft sent by the Committee of Governors
to the Italian Presidency of the Council on 27 November 1990. The Committee of Governors also submitted
an explanatory note to its proposals.
banking supervisory policies. After much discussion6, the IGC adopted less far-
reaching texts. Reluctant to attribute to the ECB more than an auxiliary role,
the authors of the EMU provisions of the EC Treaty (“the Treaty”)7 and of the
Statute8 refrained from explicitly mentioning those coordinating tasks proposed
by the Study Group headed by Professor Louis, the Delors Committee and the
Committee of Governors. 
THE TEXTS AS ADOPTED
Without going further into the details of the legislative history, the texts 
that were adopted mention as tasks of the ESCB (note: not of the ECB alone)
that it 
“shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
stability of the f inancial system.”
To that end, Article 25.1 of the ESCB Statute, the sole provision in Chapter V
headed “Prudential supervision”, entrusts the ECB (alone) with the following
advisory functions:
“The ECB may offer advice to and be consulted by the Council, the
Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States on the scope
and implementation of Community legislation relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the f inancial system.”
In line with Article 105 (6) of the Treaty, Article 25.2 of the Statute provides
that the Council may entrust the ECB (again: the ECB alone) with the task of
performing
“specif ic tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other f inancial institutions with the exception of
insurance undertakings”.
APPLICABILITY
These provisions entered into force on 1 November 1993, the date on which the
Maastricht Treaty became effective. Nevertheless, their actual application would
have to wait until the date that the ESCB was to assume full powers. In the
interim period (1994-1999), the so-called Stage Two of EMU, the European
Monetary Institute (EMI) prepared the ground for Europe’s new monetary
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6 For an overview of the history of the provisions on prudential supervision, see C. C. A. van den Berg, “The
Making of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks – An Application of Checks and Balances”
(thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 271-287.
7 In Article 105 (5). Note that the Maastricht Treaty renamed the EEC Treaty as “The Treaty establishing the
European Community”, leaving out the adjective “Economic” from the Community’s name. Hence, after 1993,
all references are to the EC Treaty (henceforth “the Treaty”).
8 In Article 3.3.
authority. The EMI had itself been entrusted with a supervisory task among its
six main functions of a coordinating and preparatory character.9 It was to: 
“hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the
national central banks and affecting the stability of f inancial institutions and
markets”.10
This was a function that its predecessor, the Committee of Governors, had also
performed.11
With the establishment of the ESCB and the ECB on 1 July 1998, the EMI’s
powers were taken over by these new EC bodies.12 They only assumed the “full
exercise of their powers”13 on the first day of Stage Three, i.e. on 1 January 1999.
In view of the monetary split of the EU, with the (then) majority of Member
States14 adopting the single currency with a few remaining, for the time being,
outside monetary union, these powers were limited in respect of the non-
participating or “out” Member States.15 As Article 122 (3) of the Treaty and
Article 43.1 of the Statute make clear, the task-setting provisions concerning
prudential supervision, i.e. Article 105 (5) of the Treaty and Article 3.3 of the
Statute, do not apply to Member States with a derogation.16 Nevertheless, the
provision which was considered to implement this task-setting provision, i.e.
Article 25 of the Statute, does apply to the “out” Member States17, as does the
provision containing a potential own supervisory function for the ECB (Article
105 (6) of the Treaty, reflected in Article 25.2 of the Statute).
Although the ESCB, when performing tasks for those Member States that have
adopted the single currency, is known as the “Eurosystem”18 in order to
distinguish it from the ESCB in its overarching functions for the EU as a whole
– a term that comprises the ECB and the NCBs of the “in” Member States 
only –, this contribution will mainly use the term employed in the Treaty and
the Statute. This is based on the fact that, whereas Article 105 (5) applies only
to the “in” Member States, Article 25.1 applies to all States within the Union,
as does the enabling clause.
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9 See Article 117 (2) of the (EC) Treaty (numbering following the Amsterdam Treaty’s renumbering of EC Treaty
provisions) and Article 4.1 of the Statute of the EMI.
10 Article 117 (2), fourth indent of the Treaty, and Article 4.1, fourth indent of the EMI Statute.
11 Pursuant to Article 3 of Decision 64/300/EEC on cooperation between the central banks of the Member States
of the European Economic Community (OJ No 77, 21.5.1964) establishing the Committee of Governors, as
amended by Decision 90/142/EEC (OJ L 78, 24.3.1990, p. 25), the decision which inserted new language into
the original basic charter of the Committee of Governors with a view to enhanced cooperation during Stage
One of EMU (1 July 1990-31 December 1993).
12 Article 123 (2) of the Treaty.
13 Article 123 (1), in fine, of the Treaty.
14 Since then, the members of the euro area have numerically become in a minority, as the ten States that acceded
on 1 May 2004 have the status of Member States with a derogation pursuant to Article 4 of the 2003 Act of
Accession (OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 33).
15 Off icially, Member States with a derogation (Article 122 (1), in fine, of the Treaty), or States with an opt-
out (i.e. Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK); see, respectively, Protocol Nos 25 and 26 (current numbering)
to the Treaty).
16 For the UK, see paragraphs 5 and 8 of its Opt-out Protocol. The Danish Opt-out Protocol makes it clear that
Denmark is to be treated as a Member State with a derogation.
17 Note, however, that the general consultative function of the ECB in respect of draft legislation in its f ields
of competence (Article 105 (4) of the Treaty and Article 4 of the Statute) does not apply to the UK.
18 The European Constitution – on which more below – mentions, in Article III-30 (1), the Eurosystem.
THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
The European Convention was called upon to reframe the EU’s founding Treaties
into a single constitutional text, while enhancing the transparency, democratic
legitimacy and efficiency of the Union. The Convention did not come forward with
amendments to the texts adopted in Maastricht.19 The IGC that adopted the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (“the European Constitution”)20 likewise
largely refrained from altering the provisions, except in consequence of general
amendments. Thus, the European Constitution requires a “European law” to make
use of the enabling clause on specific supervisory tasks for the ECB (Article III-
185 (6)). However, the text of the enabling provision has been changed in that,
whereas the Council, acting unanimously, nowadays needs the assent of the
European Parliament, the European Constitution still requires it to act unanimously
but only to consult (rather than seek the assent of) the European Parliament, as
well as the ECB itself.21 Just as a Commission proposal is required under Article
105 (6) of the Treaty, the European Constitution requires an initiative from the
European executive to make use of the enabling clause. This follows from the
general provisions on law-making.22 Furthermore, the Statute, as amended, will
refer to the provisions of the European Constitution rather than to the Treaty. As
is the case at present, the Member States with a derogation will not be bound under
the Constitution to the objectives of the ESCB, meaning that the general
supervisory objective of Article III-185 (5) does not apply to them.23 The enabling
clause will still apply to the “out” Member States.
3 INTERPRETATION
A narrowly historic view of Article 105 (5) of the Treaty and Article 25.1 of the
Statute might imply that the supervisory task of the ESCB exhausts itself in the
mere possibility for the ECB to give advice. As set out before24, my reading of
the provisions, both on textual and contextual grounds, suggests a wider
interpretation. The discrepancies between Article 105 (5), entrusting the ESCB
to contribute to the smooth conduct of supervisory policies, and Article 25.1,
allowing the ECB alone to offer and to be sought advice from on Community
legislation relating to prudential supervision and to the stability of the f inancial
system, are too great to accept that the two provisions fully overlap.25 It cannot
be assumed that the Treaty authors intended the ESCB to perform a task without
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19 See Article III-77 (5) and (6) of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18 July 2003, available
at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf.
20 OJ C 310, 16.12.2004.
21 In view of the general thrust of the European Constitution towards enhancing the role of the European
Parliament, this change introduces a regrettable novelty in the area of EMU. On further EMU aspects of the
Constitution, see R. Smits, “The European Constitution and EMU”, 42 CML Rev. (2005), pp. 425-468.
22 Article I-34 of the European Constitution on legislative acts.
23 See Article III-197 (2) (c) of the European Constitution and Article 42.1 of the Statute in the version of Protocol
No 4 attached to the Constitution. For the UK, see Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 13 to the Constitution; for
Denmark, see Protocol No 14. In the area under consideration, both provide for the same applicability of
prudential provisions as the Treaty and the relevant Protocols thereto. For the ten new Member States since
1 May 2004, see Article 4 of Protocol No 9 to the Constitution.
24 R. Smits, The European Central Bank – Institutional Aspects (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997)
(2000 reprint), Chapter V.
25 In addition, the divergent f ield of applicability (euro area versus EU) argues in favour of a teleological reading.
equipping it with the necessary powers. Therefore, I read Article 105 (5) as making
the ESCB competent to use more instruments to perform its prudential task. Not
only will the NCBs, as well, have to ensure that Article 105 (5) is implemented26,
but the ECB will also have to make use of more instruments than just its
consultative role under Article 25.1. For the ESCB to pursue its prudential task,
various methods may be put to use, such as its required advice in draft legislation
at the Community and national levels27, its statistical function28, the largely market-
oriented operations which the ECB and the NCBs are competent to perform under
Chapter IV of the Statute29, the possibility for the ECB to take part in international
monetary30 institutions, as well as other, more informal methods. The close
connection of prudential and financial stability concerns with the fourth basic task,
i.e. to promote the smooth operation of payment systems31, forms an additional
argument in favour of reading more into Article 105 (5) than purely what is stated
in Article 25.1.
One element that may be considered to be implicit in the f inancial stability-
related task set out in Article 25.1, i.e. operation in crisis management, including
the function of lender of last resort, is not further explored here, for two main
reasons. First, I consider providing lender-of-last-resort assistance a core central
banking function that also pertains directly to its monetary functions, as it may
both concern general liquidity supervision to the financial system and assistance
to individual f inancial institutions experiencing liquidity problems.32 Second,
the debate on the proper system of supervision is not focused on the crisis
element – which, moreover, has been covered by specif ic measures.33 Rather, the
issue is how to organise the prudential supervision of the EU’s f inancial sector.34
Broadly in line with the ECB’s memorandum on “The Role of Central Banks
in Prudential Supervision”35, a distinction can be made between:
– investor protection activities, focusing on conduct-of-business rules and
disclosure of information;
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26 Moreover, Article 109 of the Treaty requires that national legislation is made compatible with the (EMU
provisions of) the Treaty and the Statute before the establishment of the ESCB. Note that Article III-189 of
the European Constitution states this requirement without reference to the date of 1 July 1998.
27 Article 105 (4) of the Treaty (Article III-185 (4) European Constitution) and Article 4 of the Statute. See also
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding
draft legislative provisions, OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.
28 Article 5 of the Statute.
29 Articles 17-24 of the Statute.
30 Article 6 ESCB of the. As set out in my thesis, the term “monetary” needs to be read as encompassing all central
banking tasks of the ESCB. See The European Central Bank – Institutional Aspects, op. cit. (footnote 24),
pp. 426-427.
31 Article 105 (2), fourth indent of the Treaty (Article III-185 (2) (d) European Constitution) and Article 3.1,
fourth indent of the Statute.
32 Hence, I read it as subsumed under Article 18.1 of the Statute. See The European Central Bank – Institutional
Aspects, op. cit. (footnote 24), pp. 269-271.
33 See the ECB’s Press Release of 10 March 2003 on the Memorandum of Understanding on the high-level
principles of cooperation between the banking supervisors and central banks of the European Union in crisis
management situations, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html.
34 It should be acknowledged that any assistance beyond the granting of lender-of-last-resort facilities may exceed
the competence of the ESCB, as it might imply that public funds should be channelled to f inancial institutions.
In addition, the European Commission may have to play a role in any lending that would amount to public
aid, which is prohibited in principle pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty. Collateralised lending is certainly
permitted under the Statute. These wider issues, however, cannot be discussed in the context of this contribution.
35 See “The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision”, 30 March 2001. This paper sets out the views of the
Governing Council of the ECB and is available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/prudential supcbrole_en.pdf.
– micro-prudential supervision, geared towards the safety and soundness of
individual f inancial services providers in the interest of depositors and other
creditors;
– macro-prudential supervision, geared towards the avoidance and containment
of systemic risk, and therefore concerned with macroeconomic and f inancial
market developments and market infrastructures.
4 PRACTICE AND TRENDS
BANKING SUPERVISION COMMITTEE
The ESCB has been an active contributor to developments in the area of prudential
supervision. Among the committees which have been established to assist the
decision-making bodies of the ECB, a special committee representing all NCBs
and the ECB, as well as supervisory agencies in those States where these are not
the respective NCB, has been created, following a similar committee that previously
existed under the Committee of Governors and the EMI.36 The Banking Supervision
Committee (BSC), which combines central bankers and outside supervisory
agencies from across the EU, is one of the main fora for the coordination of
supervisory policies. In addition, the ECB has issued many opinions on draft
legislation in the area of supervision. It actively promoted the role of central banks
in the ongoing debate about the proper place of prudential supervision.37
THE DEBATE ON THE PROPER PLACE OF PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
The current debate on the proper place of supervision, whereby the third area
of concern mentioned above is almost invariably that of the central bank, but
the f irst hardly ever so, roughly began with the entry into force of the new
arrangements for monetary policy. It seemed to have purely a national dimension.
In many Member States, the proper organisation of supervision was the subject
of study and debate, with departments of f inance often taking a stance against
the (continuation of) attribution of (micro-)prudential tasks to the now
independent NCBs.38 Developments in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK over the past seven years
all involved a restructuring of the supervisory landscape and, in some instances,
a hiving-off of prudential tasks from the central bank.39 In most of these States,
central banks are in either still in charge of or are involved in banking
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36 See Article 9 of the ECB’s Rules of Procedure in the version as adopted in Decision ECB/2004/2 of 19 February
2004, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 33, and Article 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Council of the ECB
in the version as adopted in Decision ECB/2004/12 of 17 June 2004, OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 61, available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbinstitutionalprovisions2004en.pdf.
37 See most notably the paper mentioned in footnote 35.
38 Of course, many central banks had enjoyed independence to a greater or lesser degree before 1998, but by
that time their independence had become established as guaranteed in the Treaty and def ined in Convergence
Reports. (The Commission and the ECB [previously, the EMI] investigate the measure of legal convergence
pursuant to the Treaty requirement of a two-yearly study into the progress towards meeting the convergence
criteria for adopting the single currency. See Articles 121 (1) and 122 (2) of the Treaty, and Article III-198
of the European Constitution.)
39 For a defence of the establishment of single national supervisory agencies, see C. Briault, “The Rationale for
a Single National Financial Services Regulator”, JIFM (November 1999), pp. 249-256.
supervision. A European dimension is only slowly entering the debate. Especially
in the f ield of securities regulation and supervision, the search for greater
consistency and the desire to alleviate the regulatory burden on players points
in the direction of a further strengthening of cooperation mechanisms. Calls for
a Europe-wide supervisor have even been voiced.40 The euro area represents a
special case in the debate as the single currency is helpful in the integration of
payments systems and has stimulated the formation of large banking groups,
although a single market and monetary union do not necessarily require a single
regulatory framework, as the US example proves. However, the integration of
payments systems and the creation of f inancial conglomerates make it more
likely than before that disturbances will affect other markets, and not only that
of the State in which a diff iculty arises. The EU-wide mandate for monetary
policy that the NCBs of the “in” States have may help in seeking a coordinated
solution to any risk-related problems that may arise.41
THE LAMFALUSSY APPROACH
In the field of securities regulation, a new approach to regulation and supervision
was adopted, the Lamfalussy approach, named after the Chairman of the
Committee of Wise Men which had been asked to investigate the possibilities
of speedier adaptation of European rules to market change.42 The Lamfalussy
approach practically coincided with the adoption of the Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP)43, a set of proposed (and, by now, almost entirely adopted)
legislative measures to supplement the 1992 internal market programme and to
achieve integrated, eff icient and stable f inancial markets in the EU.
The Lamfalussy approach entails the following:
1) Framework principles are adopted in basic EU legislation, for which the
Council and the European Parliament are responsible according to the so-
called co-decision procedure44;
2) Implementing legislation setting out the technical details is to be adopted by
the Commission after consultation of a regulatory committee, composed of
representatives of the ministries of f inance and the national supervisory
agencies45;
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40 For an early proposal for a Europe-wide securities commission, see G. Thieffry, “Vers la creation d’une
commission européenne des marchés de valeurs mobilières”, Banque et Droit, 68 (1999), pp. 19-25, English
version: “Towards a European Securities Commission”, JIFM (1999), pp. 300-307. For a more critical approach
towards centralisation, see R. M. Lastra, “The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision
in Europe”, Columbia Journal of European Law, 10 (2003), pp. 49-68. For a recent compilation of views, see
J. J. M. Kremers, D. Schoenmaker and P. J. Wierts (eds), Financial Supervision in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2003).
41 This reasoning is derived from the ECB’s paper of 30 March 2001 mentioned above.
42 See the “Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets”, 
15 February 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/
f inal-report-wise-men_en.pdf.
43 See the Commission’s document “Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets”,
11 May 1999, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/f inances/docs/actionplan/index/
actionen.pdf.
44 Article 251 of the Treaty (Article III-396 of the European Constitution).
45 Based on Articles 202, third indent and 211, fourth indent of the Treaty and the Comitology Decision of the
Council (Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission, OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 26, as amended). In the European Constitution, see
Article I-36 and the Declaration on Article I-36, which notes the Commission’s intention to continue to consult
national experts in the preparation of draft delegated European regulations in the area of f inancial services.
3) Enhanced cooperation and networking of supervisory authorities should
ensure a uniform approach in all Member States to the rules thus adopted;
4) Strengthened enforcement of implementation with a central role for the
Commission in overseeing the implementation.46
Although the Lamfalussy approach is widely seen as a success47, allowing the
Union to provide a regulatory response to market change with greater speed and
eff iciency, and in a more transparent fashion48, it should not be forgotten that
it still entails a f ive-level system of preparation of rules, as follows:
1) Global agreement on the norms and standards at G10 level, in the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Basel
Committee, the FATF49, etc.; 
2) EU directives, adopted in co-decision by the Council and the European
Parliament (Lamfalussy level 1);
3) EU implementing legislation, adopted by the Commission in cooperation with
regulatory committees (Lamfalussy level 2);
4) National legislation (national Acts of Parliament);
5) National regulatory implementation, i.e. rules and standards adopted by
regulators and supervisors, with this implementation overseen by the
Commission (Lamfalussy levels 3 and 4).
The Lamfalussy approach has meanwhile been expanded to the other segments
of the financial services industry, leading to the establishment of a new European
Banking Committee, in which the ECB has observer status50, and the Committee
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)51, in which the ECB sits.52 Very
recently, a Directive amending the supervisory directives with the aim of creating
“a new organisational structure for f inancial services committees” has been
adopted and has entered into force.53
As the above steps indicate, the preceding f ive-step approach usually has to be
followed before any change in market practice can be reflected in new rules
applying to those same markets. Not only is the Lamfalussy approach still time-
consuming, but it does not guarantee uniform trading rules either, since the
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46 Based on the Commission’s “guardian of the Treaty” function (Article 226 of the Treaty; Article III-360 of
the European Constitution).
47 See the ECB’s “Review of the Application of the Lamfalussy Framework to EU Securities Markets Legislation”,
17 February 2005, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/lamfalussy-reviewen.pdf.
48 This is because of the required consultation mechanisms, which are modelled in such a way that the industry and
other interested parties can make their voices heard in the preparation of both framework rules and detailed standards.
49 Financial Action Task Force (Groupe d’action financière sur le blanchiment de capitaux) is an independent
forum for cooperation on measures to combat money laundering. It was initiated by the G7, and has its
secretariat at the OECD in Paris. See http://www.fatf-gaf i.org/.
50 See Article 3 of Commission Decision 2004/10/EC of 7 November 2003 establishing the European Banking
Committee, OJ L 3, 07.1.2004, p. 36.
51 See the Commission’s Decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, p. 28. For a graphic depiction of the role of the London-based CEBS, see its
website at f ile:///D:/Documenten%20en%20Settings/Ren%E9%20Smits/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20
Internet%20Files/Content.IE5/UHOZUHU5/594,8,CEBS.
52 As one of “the central banks which are not directly involved in the supervision of individual credit institutions,
including the European Central Bank”; see Article 3 sub c of the Decision establishing the CEBS.
53 See Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 amending Council
Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directives 94/19/EC,
98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organisational
structure for f inancial services committees, OJ L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9.
possibility remains of different interpretation of the EU-wide framework
standards, the addition of State-specif ic rules, or of the divergent application
of the standards by national enforcement agencies. For this reason, new ideas
have developed to counter the extent of regulatory divergence and to ensure a
true level playing-f ield for f inancial services providers and clients alike. 
RECENT IDEAS DEVELOPING IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
After tracking the progress of the FSAP54, and in the midst of the implementation
phase, the focus now is on new methods of ensuring uniform rule-making and
their consistent application. In this context, I intend to sound out a few voices
among the many tones that can be heard in the current concert accompanying
the supervisory landscaping.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)55 has published a
report that sets out which supervisory tools may be useful in the coming years.
The consultation report56 is f irmly wedded to the Lamfalussy approach, yet
includes proposals such as a database of supervisory decisions to ensure
consistency, the use of joint teams of supervisors, the possible future attribution
of “one-stop shop” decision-making powers in certain f ields where, nowadays,
25 agencies decide matters57, sometimes without EU rules to base themselves
on.58 Although a different tune can be heard from across the Channel59, with the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England advocating no new
supervisory arrangements60, it is clear that a discussion of how best to organise
the supervisory landscape is developing in an EU-wide setting.61
The ECB itself, in its contribution to the public consultation on the application
of the Lamfalussy process to securities market legislation62, has made several
proposals that would enhance supervisory consistency and introduce a single
set of Europe-wide standards. Specif ically, the ECB welcomes alterations to the
Lamfalussy process that would “develop a common set of harmonised technical
rules that would satisfy the needs both of regulators and market participants”.
It calls for the adoption of regulations as a means to implement the framework
principles set out in the level 1 directives, so that “a unique source of rights and
obligations in the EU harmonised regulatory fields” would ensue. Thus, the long
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54 See the last progress report of 2 June 2004, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
f inances/docs/actionplan/index/progress10-annex_en.pdf.
55 See http://www.c-ebs.org/. 
56 CESR (2004), “Himalaya Report” – Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Markets? Preliminary
Progress Report”, 25 October 2004, available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/. One can f ind the responses to the
consultation document on CESR’s website.
57 The admission of prospectuses is mentioned as an example where single decisions for the entire market may
make sense.
58 The supervision of rating agencies is a case in point.
59 CESR’s headquarters are in Paris.
60 See the discussion paper issued by the FSA and the Bank of England, “Supervising Financial Services 
in an Integrated European Single Market: A Discussion Paper – January 2005”, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tripartite_dp.pdf.
61 Some of the responses, e.g. that of the European Banking Federation, indicate that the banking industry itself
prefers to see CESR focus on the current framework rather than proposing “one-stop shop” decision-making,
as this would imply a rewriting of recent directives. See CESR’s website at: http://www.cesr-eu.org/.
62 See footnote 47.
implementation process and the inconsistencies in national implementation could
be remedied.
The ECB, in its Opinion on the implementation in the EU of the so-called Basel
II agreement63, the set of standards that will replace the current Basel solvency
rules64, calls for more consistency and a single source of EU-wide rules based
on so-called level 2 measures (i.e. the implementing measures of the framework
directives), as it did in its earlier Opinion on the proposed extension of the
Lamfalussy approach to the other sectors of the f inancial services industry.65
Quoting from the latter Opinion, the ECB endorses a development under which
Level 2 acts would emerge 
“as the main body of technical rules applicable to EU f inancial institutions.
At the same time, those aspects that could be more appropriately dealt with
in EU legislation could be transferred from national legislation to Level 2 acts.
The ECB is convinced that such a harmonised, simplif ied set of European
rules would contribute signif icantly to further integrating f inancial markets,
would considerably reduce regulatory costs for f inancial institutions and
would enhance consumers’ rights in relation to f inancial services.” 
Its most recent Opinion specif ically calls for Community regulations to be used
for implementation.
Apart from the issue of a single and consistent source of f inancial market
regulation, the question of coordination among supervisors is a recurring theme
in the papers and opinions mentioned above.
The coordinating role played by the supervisor on a consolidated basis of
f inancial conglomerates66, and the possibility of group-wide use of the internal
ratings-based (IRB) approach to solvency67, requiring coordinated competences
of national supervisors, are examples of cases which alter the supervisory
landscape.
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63 Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework,
adopted by the Governors of the Central Banks and heads of banking supervision of the G10 on 26 June 2004.
See the BIS’s website at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf.
64 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 February 2005 at the request of the Council of the European Union
on a proposal for directives of the European Parliament and of the Council, recasting Directive 2000/12/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions and Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of
investment f irms and credit institutions (CON/2005/4) (2005/C 52/10), OJ C 52, 2.3.2005, p. 37.
65 Opinion of the ECB of 20 February 2004 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC,
85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council, in order to establish a new Financial Services Committee
organisational structure (COM (2003) 659 f inal) (CON/2004/7) (2004/C 58/11), OJ C 58, 6.3.2004, p. 23. See
footnote 53 for this Directive.
66 According to Article 10 of Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment f irms
in a f inancial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC,
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council, OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1, a single coordinator, responsible for coordination and exercise
of supplementary supervision, shall be appointed from among the competent authorities of the Member States
concerned.
67 See paragraph 16 of the ECB’s Opinion on the EU’s implementation of Basel II, mentioned in footnote 64.
5 POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
All of these developments and tentative scenarios still fall short of a European
banking supervisory agency, or a Europe-wide f inancial services supervisory
authority, in either case linked to or coinciding with the ESCB. Arguments in
favour of such an agency have however been put forward. Information-related
synergies between supervision and core central banking functions, the central
banks’ focus on systemic risk, their independence and expertise, as well as the
historic involvement of central banks in supervision and the possibilities opened
by the close networking of supervisors already in the Eurosystem, all argue in
favour of central banks’ close involvement in prudential supervision at the very
least, if not of a full attribution of exclusive supervisory powers to central banks.
They also suggest that a systematic and overall regulation of the facility of
exchanging supervisory information is required, instead of the current patchwork
of rules and roadblocks.68 Regulatory and supervisory overlaps and the heavy
regulatory burden for commercial undertakings in the financial services industry
support the need for schemes that allow reporting to a single agency.
Additionally, they argue for, if possible, a single agency to be the counterpart
of an undertaking for the entirety of its supervisory compliance within the single
market. Preferably, this agency should be “close at hand” yet should act in 
a coordinated fashion according to a European mandate with EU-wide
responsibility for the proper execution of the single market’s standards.
Moreover, the necessity for home State supervisory authorities to include the
externalities of their decisions which apply to a company’s Europe-wide financial
services provision should be brought into sharper focus. Stronger coordinating
mechanisms and central responsibilities for the overall stance of supervision
would be helpful in this respect, especially when cross-border f inancial services
groups are concerned
Issues of accountability and the concentration of power are valid concerns that
should be given careful consideration. It is submitted that accountability can
be properly organised at the EU level as well. It may vary in relation to the area
concerned, with the level of independence from other public bodies and
institutions the greatest in the core Eurosystem task, namely the pursuit of price
stability, with four basic tasks that form an exclusive European competence, and
with far more involvement of non-central bank policymakers in the area of
prudential supervision. In addition, the size of the European market, and the
vastness of the area of supervision, should not lead to a large bureaucracy, but
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68 Although Article 12 of Directive 2000/12/EC, as amended by Article 29 (2) of the Directive on supplementary
supervision in particular (mentioned in footnote 66), provides an exhaustive set of rules on exchange of
supervisory information in the context of professional secrecy, other sets of supervisory rules contain different
provisions. A comparison of this provision with Article 107 of the Prospectus Directive (Directive 2001/34/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to off icial stock
exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities (OJ L 184, 6.7.2001, p. 1), as amended
by Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing
and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16 (codif ied version available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/2001/L/02001L0034-20030412-en.pdf), and
Article 13 of the latter Market Abuse Directive, shows marked differences. These, and the possibility of
withholding information exchange for reasons of national sovereignty (Article 16 (2) of the Market Abuse
Directive), must hinder across-the-board supervisory information exchange in the case of integrated f inancial
services undertakings.
rather should result in a central body responsible for overall decision-making
that relies on local supervisors who know their parts of the market and their
supervised undertakings best. The 2004 proposal by the European Financial
Services Round Table (EFR) to designate a home State supervisory authority
to oversee the EU-wide activities of f inancial services groups operating in
various Member States represents an intermediate step towards more centralised
responsibilities for prudential supervision. 
The adoption of regulations as the main instruments for setting Europe-wide
standards for the f inancial services industry would represent an important f irst
step in the right direction, as this would create a common set of norms, no longer
unduly influenced by the specif ic aspects woven into current f inancial services
law in the process of national implementation. State-centred enforcement is the
second element which should be tackled to end what can only be described as
the current “balkanisation” of the single market in f inancial services, at least
at the retail level.
In my view, the ESCB should be closely aligned with any developments towards
enhancing Europe-wide regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. A legal basis
for the establishment of central supervisory responsibilities can be found in
Article 308 of the Treaty (Article I-18 of the European Constitution, the so-called
flexibility clause). The ESCB’s involvement – whether directly or as closely
involved in the supervisory authority’s activities – could, additionally, be based
on its competences as discussed in this paper.69 It should provide the coordinating
role, bringing into instances of major decision-making a perspective which
reflects the implications for the entire market and its citizens, as well as for the
single currency. A further debate on the proper place of supervision of f inancial
services industry in an integrated Europe is called for. To my mind, the single
currency and the internal market provide important arguments for Europe-wide
responsibilities that would make supervisors not only look at their national
audience, but also to address a wider European constituency.70
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69 Despite the fact that the continued exception for “insurance undertakings” from the enabling clause (Article
III-185 (5) of the European Constitution and Article 25.6 of the Statute) is an anomaly, the more so when one
acknowledges that this exclusion was proposed by the Dutch in 1991 even though in the Netherlands the central
bank and the Insurance Inspection Board have since merged, making De Nederlandsche Bank competent for
insurance supervision as well. Mario Grande, in his commentary on Article 25.2 of the Statute (in H. von der
Groeben and J. Schwarze (eds), Kommentar zum Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründung der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 6th edition (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2003), p. 487), remarks that the
reasoning underlying this restriction, namely that the insurance sector is more remote from central bank
functions than the banking and securities markets, is no longer valid in the view of recent developments in
the f inancial markets.
70 For a proposal to give national supervisors a European mandate as well, see D. Schoenmaker, “Financial
Supervision: From National to European?”, Financial and Monetary Studies, NIBESVV, 22:1, Rotterdam, 2003.
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ABSTRACT
La vigilanza delle istituzioni creditizie e finanziarie non rientra tra i compiti
attribuiti dal Trattato al SEBC. Il contributo descrive come, in pratica, tale tipo
di vigilanza sia organizzato secondo un’ampia varietà di strutture giuridiche
nei venticinque Stati membri, con diversi gradi di coinvolgimento da parte della
banca centrale. Lo studio descrive il nuovo assetto giuridico creato in Irlanda
dal 2003, secondo cui la vigilanza della pressoché totalità del settore
finanziario, istituti di credito compresi, è competenza di un organismo
indipendente, ricompreso nella personalità giuridica della Banca Centrale
Nazionale (BCN). Secondo tale schema, alla BCN compete, in termini giuridici,
l’esclusiva  responsabilità degli atti di vigilanza e regolamentari dell’autorità
di vigilanza finanziaria. Ciò solleva la questione, ai sensi della legge irlandese,
dei limiti della responsabilità della banca centrale per atti di vigilanza
finanziaria. Il contributo analizza la giurisprudenza in Irlanda, nel Regno Unito
e della Corte Europea di Giustizia in materia di responsabilità dell’autorità di
vigilanza finanziaria secondo la legge irlandese e comunitaria, nonché le
immunità statutarie di cui gode la banca centrale secondo la legislazione
irlandese applicabile. I limiti della responsabilità della banca centrale per
l’autorità di vigilanza finanziaria hanno rappresentato un punto critico nel
parere rilasciato dalla BCE alle autorità irlandesi, allorché nel 2002 la BCE
veniva consultata sulla ristrutturazione della Banca Centrale d’Irlanda. Il parere
della BCE ha messo in luce che, istituendo un organo statutario dotato di
funzioni indipendenti, ma ricompreso nella personalità giuridica di una BNC,
la BCN sarebbe responsabile degli atti svolti da una parte costitutiva della banca
centrale (l’autorità di vigilanza finanziaria), atti che rimarrebbero al di fuori
del controllo dell’organo decisionale della banca centrale responsabile dello
svolgimento dei compiti collegati al SEBC (il Governatore della banca centrale).
La BCE ha considerato che tale struttura potesse causare dei rischi per
l’integrità di una BCN, minacciando la sua indipendenza, contrariamente ai
principi dell’Articolo 108 del Trattato. Il contributo descrive come la
legislazione, nella sua attuazione, affrontasse le preoccupazioni della BCE,
attribuendo al Governatore un ruolo preminente, relativamente alle
problematiche connesse con la stabilità finanziaria. Lo studio conclude
osservando che, nel suo parere sulla ristrutturazione della Banca Centrale
d’Irlanda, la BCE ha chiaramente stabilito i limiti della riorganizzazione
proposta, ammonendo contro il rischio che le funzioni di autorità di vigilanza
finanziaria violino l’indipendenza della banca centrale.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The supervision of credit and f inancial institutions is not among the tasks
attributed to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) under the Treaty
establishing the European Community (the “Treaty”). This paper will describe
the wide variety of legal structures under which the supervision of credit and
f inancial institutions is, with varying degrees of central bank involvement,
organised in the 25 Member States (see Section 2). It will analyse the novel legal
structure deployed in Ireland since 2003, whereby the supervision of practically
the entire f inancial sector, including credit institutions, is carried out by an
autonomous body forming part of the legal personality of the national central
bank (NCB) (see Section 3). Under this construction the NCB bears, in legal
terms, sole liability and responsibility for the acts of the f inancial supervisor.
This raises the important question as to the extent of the NCB’s liability for the
f inancial supervisor under Irish law. The paper will discuss in some depth the
relevant case law in Ireland, the United Kingdom and the European Court of
Justice shedding light on the scope of the NCB’s liability for the f inancial
supervisor under Irish and EC law, as well as the statutory immunities enjoyed
by the NCB under applicable Irish legislation (see Section 4). 
The paper will describe how the NCB’s liability for the financial supervisor was
a critical issue in the opinion provided by the ECB on the draft Irish legislation
which restructured the Central Bank of Ireland by establishing the autonomous
Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) as a constituent part of
the renamed Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland. The paper
will conclude by explaining how, in its opinion on the draft legislation restructuring
the Central Bank of Ireland, the ECB clearly set the limits of the proposed
reorganisation by warning against the risk of the IFSRA’s supervisory functions
encroaching upon the NCB’s independence. As a result, the legislation, as enacted,
ensured that the Governor of the CBFSAI has a signif icant role with respect to
financial stability matters in order to protect the independence required of an
ESCB national central bank under the Treaty (see Sections 5 and 6). 
2 ROLE OF ESCB IN SUPERVISION OF CREDIT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
2.1 PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISORY ROLE OF EUROSYSTEM UNDER TREATY
Although many NCBs in the ESCB are closely involved in the prudential
supervision of credit and other f inancial institutions, such supervision is not one
of the tasks attributed to the ESCB under the Treaty.2 These functions are therefore
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1  The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the contribution that the late Paolo Zamboni made to some
of the main ideas in this paper. The authors would also like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Kristine
Drevina, Legal Counsel, ECB, Luc Roeges, former Principal Legal Counsel, ECB, Pedro Teixeira, Principal
Expert, Financial Supervision Division, ECB, and helpful comments received from colleagues in the CBFSAI.
2 Article 105(6) of the Treaty contemplates the possibility that the EU Council may confer upon the ECB specific
tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other f inancial
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings. For background information regarding the discussions
on the appropriate role for the ESCB in banking supervision during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, see
Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects (Kluwer Law International 1997), pp. 334-38.
performed on the responsibility and liability of NCBs and are not regarded as being
part of the functions of the ESCB.3 However, reflecting the close historical link
between central banking and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, the
Treaty prescribes a contributory role for the Eurosystem in the performance of
supervisory tasks. In particular, Article 105(5) of the Treaty requires the
Eurosystem to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
and the stability of the f inancial system.4 The European Central Bank (ECB) has
taken the policy position that an institutional framework in which the Eurosystem’s
responsibilities for monetary policy in the euro area are coupled with extensive
supervisory responsibilities of NCBs in domestic markets, and with reinforced
co-operation at an area-wide level, would seem appropriate to tackle the changes
triggered by the introduction of the euro, and that when viewed from a Eurosystem
perspective, the attribution of extensive supervisory responsibilities (i.e., both
macro and micro-prudential) to NCBs are likely to prove beneficial.5
2.2 SUPERVISORY ROLE OF NCBS UNDER NATIONAL LAWS
In practice, the supervision of credit and financial institutions is organised under
a wide variety of legal structures in the 25 EU Member States, with varying
degrees of central bank involvement. At one end of the spectrum, in nine Member
States NCBs are directly and fully responsible for the supervision of credit
institutions.6 In some of these Member States (Greece,7 Italy8) the NCB is, or
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3 Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European Central Bank and of the European System of Central Banks (the
“ESCB Statute”).
4 In accordance with Article 122(3) of the Treaty, Article 105 of the Treaty does not apply to Member States
which have not adopted the euro.
5 See European Central Bank, The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision, 2001, p. 3, published on
the ECB website at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2001/html/pr010322.en.html. As noted by Dr. Duisenberg,
former ECB President, “[t]he Eurosystem strongly supports a continued involvement of national central banks
in prudential supervision, although the institutional set-up of f inancial supervision needs to be tailored to the
structure of the respective national f inancial system. Any solution other than direct responsibility should be
coupled with close co-operation and operational involvement of central banks in order to allow the potential
synergies between central banking and prudential supervision to be exploited.” Dr. Willem F. Duisenberg,
President of the European Central Bank, Amsterdam, 24 April 2002.
6 Cyprus: Section 26(1) of the Banking Law (No 66(I) of 1997); Section 6(2)(d) of The Central Bank of Cyprus
Law of 2002 (No 138(I) of 2002); Czech Republic: Act on the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka), Articles
2(2)(d) and 44; Greece: Law No. 2548, Provisions relating to the Bank of Greece, Articles 2(1)(d), 8; Italy:
Consolidated Banking Law, Article 4; Lithuania: Lietuvos Bankas Act, Article 8 (6) and Chapter 7; Portugal: Banco
de Portugal Organic Law, Article 17; Decree-Law No. 298/92 of 31 December of 1992, Article 93(1); Slovakia:
The National Bank of Slovakia (Národná banka Slovenska) Act, Article 36; Slovenia: Bank of Slovenia (Banka
Slovenije) Act, Article 23; Banking Act, Article 123; Spain: Law of Autonomy of Banco de España, Article 7 (6). 
7 The Bank of Greece is responsible for the supervision of a small number of f inancial institutions in addition
to credit institutions, including financial leasing companies, factoring companies, mutual guarantee companies,
counterguarantee funds, bureaux de change and money market broker companies. Law No. 2548, Provisions
relating to the Bank of Greece, Articles 2(1)(d), 8.
8 The Banca d’Italia has supervisory powers over credit institutions and f inancial intermediaries, and also has
responsibility for the prudential supervision of investment f irms and asset management companies.
Consolidated Banking Law, Articles 4 and 5. A draft Law on Measures for the Protection of Savings was recently
proposed, one of whose aims was to reform the institutional framework in Italy for the regulation and
supervision of f inancial markets and intermediaries. The draft Law envisaged that the Banca d’Italia would
be responsible for safeguarding f inancial stability and the prudential regulation and supervision of credit
institutions, insurance companies, investment f irms and other f inancial intermediaries. A newly established
authority, the Authority for the Financial Markets (Autorità per I mercati f inanziari – AmeF), would be
responsible for conduct of business regulation and supervision. See Opinion of the European Central Bank
of 11 May 2004 on a draft Law on Measures for the Protection of Savings (CON/2004/16), published on the
ECB’s website at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2004_16_f_sign.pdf.
will shortly become (Slovakia9), responsible for the supervision of not only credit
institutions, but also other f inancial institutions and activities. In these Member
States NCBs would appear, logically, to be liable for their supervisory decisions
to the extent provided under applicable national laws. At the other end of the
spectrum, in eight Member States an independent public authority that is legally
and operationally separated from the NCB is responsible for the supervision of
practically the entire f inancial sector.10 In some of these Member States
(Austria,11 Latvia12) the NCB has an institutional role in the appointment and
dismissal of the members of the supervisory authority’s decision-making body.
Also, given the important f inancial stability role of NCBs, for example in
connection with a central bank’s traditional lender-of-last-resort function,
arrangements for co-operation between the supervisory authority and the NCB
in these Member States are prescribed by law (e.g., Hungary13) or by less formal
instruments (e.g., United Kingdom14). However, it would seem clear that in these
Member States the NCBs are not in any way liable for supervisory decisions.
The remaining eight Member States have adopted nuanced variations on these
two contrasting structures, laying down mechanisms allowing for varying
degrees of central bank involvement in the conduct of supervision. In legal terms
there are certain similarities with the structures deployed in four of these
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9 A legislative reform is underway in Slovakia as a result of which responsibility for the supervision of the non-
banking f inancial sector (capital markets, insurance business and pension schemes) will be transferred to the
Národná banka Slovenska on 1 January 2006. See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 September
2004 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law on supervision of the f inancial market
(CON/2004/31), published on the ECB’s website at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1341/1345/html/index.en.html.
10 Austria: Federal Act on the Institution and Organisation of the Financial Market Authority (Finanzmarktaufsichts-
gesetz); Denmark: Financial Business Act; Hungary: Act CXXIV of 1999 on the Hungarian Financial Supervisory
Authority (Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete); Latvia: Law on the Financial and Capital Market Commission
of 20 July 2000; Luxembourg: Law of 23 December 1998 establishing the Financial Sector Supervisory Commission;
Malta: Malta Financial Services Authority Act; Sweden: Ministry of Finance Regulation (1996:596) of 6 June 1996
Förordning med instruktion för Finansinspektionen; United Kingdom: Financial Services and Markets Act.
11 The Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) names persons for the function of deputy chairperson of the
Supervisory Board, as well as two additional members of the eight-member Supervisory Board and one member
of the two-member Executive Board of the Austrian Finanzmarktaufsicht (Financial Market Authority or FMA),
who are appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance (in the case of the Supervisory Board members) and
the Federal Government (in the case of the Executive Board members). The Federal Minister of Finance is
required to hear the OeNB prior to the dismissal of a member of the FMA Supervisory or Executive Boards
that the OeNB named, except in case of imminent danger. Federal Act on the Institution and Organisation of
the Financial Market Authority (Finanzmarktaufsichtsgesetz), Sections 5, 7 and 8.
12 The Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson of the Council of the Latvian Financial and Capital Market
Commission (FCMC) are appointed by the Parliament for a period of six years upon a joint proposal of the Governor
of Latvijas Banka and the Minister of Finance. One of the grounds for dismissal of the Chairperson and his/her
Deputy by the Parliament is where an application for dismissal is submitted jointly by the Governor of Latvijas
Banka and the Minister of Finance. The Chairperson of the FCMC appoints and removes the other members of
the FCMC’s Council, and is required to co-ordinate his/her decision with the Governor of Latvijas Banka and the
Minister of Finance. Law on the Financial and Capital Market Commission, Articles 13(3), 13(4) and 14(4).
13 The Act on the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) explicitly addresses the FSA’s relationship
with the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), requiring the FSA to co-operate with the NBH in the course of
performing its tasks, and requiring the FSA, in the cases specif ied by law, to issue or withdraw licenses after
requesting the preliminary opinion or agreement from the NBH. Act. No. CXXOIV of 1999 on the Hungarian
Financial Supervisory Authority, Article 6/C.
14 A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK Treasury, the Bank of England and the UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) establishes a framework for co-operation between the Treasury, the Bank and the
FSA in the f ield of f inancial stability. The MoU clarif ies that the Bank of England is responsible for the overall
stability of the f inancial system as a whole, which will involve, inter alia, being able in exceptional
circumstances to undertake off icial f inancial operations in order to limit the risk of problems in or affecting
particular institutions spreading to other parts of the f inancial system. See Memorandum of Understanding
Between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA, para. 2, published on the Bank of England’s website
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/legislation/mou.pdf.
Member States (Belgium,15 France,16 Germany17 and Poland18) insofar as the NCB
makes a substantial contribution to the performance of supervisory tasks, but
is not as such responsible for supervision. Notwithstanding the substantial role
of the NCBs it would appear to be clear that in these four Member States the
NCBs are not, logically, liable for supervisory decisions. 
In the Netherlands a legislative reform is currently being implemented as a result
of which De Nederlandsche Bank will be assigned responsibility to carry out
prudential supervision (i.e., the f inancial soundness of f inancial enterprises and
contributing to the stability of the entire f inancial sector), while an independent
body, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) or Authority for Financial Markets,
will be assigned responsibility to carry out the supervision over the conduct of
business in the f inancial markets.19 Under this functional, so-called ‘twin peaks’
structure, both De Nederlandsche Bank and the AFM will supervise the entire
financial sector in close cooperation with one another in matters concerning their
respective f ields of competence. It would be interesting to ascertain whether it
is possible for the boundaries between the liability of these two public authorities
for supervisory decisions affecting individual institutions to be clearly drawn.
A somewhat novel legal structure is deployed in Estonia, Finland and Ireland
whereby the supervision of practically the entire financial sector, including credit
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15 In Belgium the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, an independent body with legal personality, is the
single supervisor of the f inancial sector. The Commission and the Banque Nationale de Belgique (BNB)/
Nationale Bank van België (NBB) are obliged to collaborate closely on all issues of common interest and in
particular with regard to international co-operation in respect of prudential matters, inter-sectoral aspects of
prudential policy relating to various providers of financial services, macro-prudential analyses and legal studies.
Staff members of the BNB/NBB may be seconded to the Commission and vice-versa. Also, three of the seven
members of the Commission’s Management Committee are required to be appointed from among the members
of the Board of Directors of the BNB/NBB. Law of 2 August 2002 relating to the supervision of the f inancial
sector and on financial services, Article 44 et seq., particularly Articles 49, § 6, third sentence, 55, 117 and 118.
16 In France the prudential supervision of credit institutions is carried out by the Commission Bancaire, a service
of the French State (service de l’État). The Governor of Banque de France chairs the Commission Bancaire,
and the Banque de France provides the General Secretariat of the Commission Bancaire with staff and resources
necessary for carrying out on-site inspections of credit institutions. See in this respect the relevant provisions
of the Financial and Monetary Code, and in particular the provisions concerning the Commission Bancaire
(Articles L.613-1 to L.613-34).
17 In Germany the BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – Federal regulatory agency for
f inancial services and f inancial markets) is the consolidated supervisor of the f inancial sector under the legal
and professional supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance. The BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank are
required to work together, and this cooperation includes ongoing monitoring of credit institutions by the
Bundesbank, including analysing and assessing documents, audit reports and annual accounts submitted by
credit institutions, conducting and analysing banking audits to determine the reasonable equity capital and
risk management procedures of credit institutions and evaluating audit f indings. The cooperation between the
Bundesbank and the BaFin is further def ined in an inter-institutional agreement in which the details of their
respective roles in day-to-day supervision are def ined. The Bundesbank is required to follow the BaFin’s
guidelines when performing its extensive operational functions in the supervision of credit institutions. Law
on the Federal agency for f inancial services regulation, Articles 1, 2; Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (KWG or
Banking Law), Article 7; Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-
aufsicht und der Deutschen Bundesbank bei der Beaufsichtigung der Kredit- und Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute,
available on the web page of BaFin at www.baf in.de. 
18 In Poland banks are supervised by the Commission for Banking Supervision, which is chaired by the President
of the Narodowy Bank Polski. The decisions of the Commission are carried out and co-ordinated by the General
Inspectorate of Banking Supervision, a separate organisational unit within the structure of the Narodowy Bank
Polski that is designated by law as the executive body of the Commission for Banking Supervision. The General
Inspector of Banking Supervision is appointed and recalled by the President of the Narodowy Bank Polski,
acting in agreement with the Minister of Finance. The Act of the National Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank
Polski), Articles 25(1), 26(1), 29.
19 See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 7 June 2004 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the
Netherlands on a draft Financial Sector Supervision Act (CON/2004/21), published on the ECB website at
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1341/1345/html/index.en.html.
institutions, is carried out by an autonomous body forming part of the legal
personality of the NCB.20 The focus of this article is the liability implications
of this structure for Ireland’s NCB. 
3 ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY
OF IRELAND AND IRISH FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003 (the
“Act”) reorganised and re-named the “Central Bank of Ireland” as the “Central
Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland” (CBFSAI).21 As was
previously the case within the Central Bank of Ireland, the Governor of the
CBFSAI continues to have sole responsibility for the performance of the central
bank’s ESCB-related functions,22 consistent with his position as a member of the
ECB Governing Council.23
The main reform introduced by the Act was the establishment of a new “body”
called the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) as a constituent
part of the CBFSAI, whose statutory functions and powers broadly relate to the
supervision of virtually all credit and f inancial institutions and insurance
undertakings in Ireland, as well as the protection of consumers of f inancial
services.24 The IFSRA comprises no fewer than eight and no more than ten
members appointed by the Minister for Finance, three of whom are a
Chairperson, a Chief Executive responsible for the day-to-day management of
the IFSRA and a Consumer Director responsible for monitoring the provision
of f inancial services to consumers.25
The IFSRA is stated to be a “body” that is separate from its members and
continues in existence despite any vacancy or change in its membership.26
Notwithstanding this semi-personif ication of the IFSRA, the IFSRA is also
stated to be “a constituent part of ” the CBFSAI.27 Only the CBFSAI has been
endowed with legal personality, with the body corporate formerly called “Central
Bank of Ireland” being continued, but with the corporate name of “Central Bank
and Financial Services Authority of Ireland”.28
“Except as expressly provided by the Act”, the CBFSAI’s affairs are managed
and controlled by its board of directors.29 The CBFSAI’s board of directors
comprises twelve persons: the Governor, who is also the Chairperson of the
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20 Estonia: Financial Supervision Authority Act; Finland: Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority; Ireland:
Central Bank Act, 1942, as amended.
21 See, e.g., section 5 of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. References in these footnotes to the Central
Bank Act 1942, as amended, shall be understood as referring to the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended by
the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Acts 2003 and 2004.
22 Section 19A(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
23 ESCB Statute, Article 10.1.
24 Sections 33A through 33AF of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. 
25 Sections 33E(1), 33E(2), 33F(1), 33F(4), 33H(1), 33I(1), 33Q(1), 33Q(4) and 33S(1) of the Central Bank Act
1942, as amended.
26 Sections 33(B)(1), 33B(3) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
27 Section 33(B)(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
28 Section 5(1) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
29 Section 5(4) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
board, the CBFSAI’s Director General, the Secretary General of the Department
of Finance, the IFSRA Chairperson, the IFSRA Chief Executive and seven other
directors appointed by the Minister for Finance, four of whom are members of
the IFSRA.30 It is important to emphasise that the CBFSAI board does not have
primary responsibility for the performance of the CBFSAI’s main central
banking or supervisory activities since the ESCB-related functions are
exclusively vested in the Governor and the functions relating to the supervision
of credit and f inancial institutions are primarily vested in the IFSRA. The
residual functions of the CBFSAI which remain under the responsibility of the
CBFSAI’s board of directors include carrying out the eff icient and effective co-
ordination of the activities of the constituent parts of the CBFSAI and the
exchange of information among those parts.31
4 LIABILITY OF CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 
OF IRELAND FOR SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES OF IRISH FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Ireland has thus established a legal structure for the supervision of credit and
f inancial institutions and insurance undertakings by a statutory body enjoying
independent functions, but located within the legal personality of its NCB. The
NCB is endowed with legal personality as a corporate body, while the IFSRA
is a statutory body within and forming a constituent part of the NCB that does
not enjoy any separate legal personality as a corporate body. While this
construction is quite unique in that Irish statutory bodies are normally endowed
with legal personality, as a matter of Irish administrative law the legal form and
personality of a state-sponsored body is entirely dependent on the statute under
which it is established.32
Consistent with its legal personality, the CBFSAI may take legal proceedings
and be proceeded against in its corporate name.33 The IFSRA may, in relation
to the functions of the CBFSAI that the IFSRA is to perform, bring and defend
legal proceedings, and do any other thing, in the name of the CBFSAI,34 and any
act done in the name of, or on behalf of, the CBFSAI by the IFSRA in the
performance of the IFSRA’s functions is taken to have been done by the
CBFSAI.35 Under this construction the CBFSAI bears, in legal terms, sole
liability and responsibility for the supervisory acts of the IFSRA. It is therefore
of critical importance to understand the precise scope of the CBFSAI’s liability
for the supervisory activities of the IFSRA under Irish law. This paper will
therefore outline in some depth the relevant case law in Ireland, the United
Kingdom and the European Court of Justice shedding light on the scope of the
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30 Sections 18B(1), 18B(2) and 18B(5) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
31 Section 5A(1) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
32 See Hogan and Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland (3rd ed. Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell), pp. 114, 134-37.
33 Section 5(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
34 Section 33C(6) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. (The powers given to the IFSRA Chief Executive
in the second sentence of this sub-section derive from his or her position as a statutory office-holder exercising
functions of the CBFSAI vested in the IFSRA.) 
35 Section 33C(12) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
CBFSAI’s liability for the IFSRA under Irish and EC law, as well as the statutory
immunities enjoyed by the CBFSAI under applicable Irish legislation.
4.1 LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISOR FOR NEGLIGENCE AT COMMON LAW
The leading Irish precedent on the liability of a financial supervisor is McMahon
v. Ireland, the Attorney General and the Registrar of Friendly Societies.36 This
case concerned an action brought by a depositor who lost money as a result of
the liquidation of the Private Motorists’ Protection Society (PMPS). The
aggrieved depositor brought an action against the Registrar of Friendly Societies,
the body responsible for the supervision of industrial and provident societies.
The depositor argued that the Registrar had failed in his duty of care to
prospective depositors with the PMPS by not taking action sooner, for example
by exercising his statutory power to direct the PMPS to suspend the acceptance
of deposits.37
The High Court per Blayney J. held that the Registrar was not liable in
negligence as there was insuff icient proximity between the Registrar and the
depositors to give rise to a duty of care on the part of the Registrar in these
circumstances.38 Blayney J. held that the Registrar was entitled to the protection
of the principle referred to by Finlay C. J. in the Supreme Court decision in Pine
Valley Developments Ltd. v. The Minister for the Environment39 that “[i]f a man
is required in the discharge of a public duty to make a decision which affects,
by its legal consequences, the … property of others, and he performs that duty
and makes that decision honestly and in good faith, it is … a fundamental
principle of our law that he is to be protected. It is not consonant with the
principles of our law to require a man to make such a decision in the discharge
of his duty to the public, and then leave him in peril by reason of the
consequences to others of that decision, provided that he acted honestly in
making that decision.”40 Blayney J. concluded from this that the Registrar was
“entitled to immunity from the type of claim being made by the [depositor].”41
In McMahon, Blayney J.42 cited at length and explicitly followed the advice of
the UK Privy Council in Yuen-Kun-Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong Kong.43 That
case concerned a negligence action brought by Hong Kong residents who had
deposited money with a company authorised to accept deposits by the Hong
Kong Commissioner of Deposit-Taking Companies. After the company went into
liquidation the depositors argued that the Commissioner knew or ought to have
known that the company’s affairs were being conducted fraudulently,
speculatively and to the detriment of its depositors, and that the Commissioner
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36 [1988] I.L.R.M. 610.
37 Ibid. at 611-13.
38 Ibid. at 615.
39 [1987] I.L.R.M. 747 at 758 (quoting Moulten L.J. in Everitt v. Griffiths [1921] 1 A.C. 631 at 695).
40 [1988] I.L.R.M. 610 at 616-17.
41 Ibid. at 613-16.
42 Ibid. at 617.
43 [1988] A.C. 175, P.C. Another case following Yuen is Davis v. Radcliffe [1990] 1 W.L.R. 821, P.C., where the
Privy Council dismissed an action brought by depositors of a failed bank on the Isle of Man seeking damages
against the Manx authorities responsible for the supervision of the banking system.
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should never have registered the company as a deposit-taking company, or should
have revoked its registration so as to save the depositors from losing their money. 
The Privy Council per Lord Keith advised that the Commissioner did not owe
members of the public who might be minded to deposit their money with a
deposit-taking company in Hong Kong a duty, in the discharge of his supervisory
powers, to exercise reasonable care to see that such members of the public did
not suffer a loss through the fraudulent or improvident management of the
company.44 The fact that the Commissioner had “cogent reason to suspect that
the company’s business was being carried on fraudulently and improvidently”,
based on information not available to the public raising serious doubts about
the company’s stability, did not create a special relationship so as to give rise
to a duty on the part of the Commissioner to take reasonable care to prevent the
company from causing f inancial loss to subsequent depositors.45
In considering the Commissioner’s discretion to remove the company from the
register, Lord Keith noted that “[i]t might be a very delicate choice whether the
best course was to deregister a company forthwith or to allow it to continue in
business with some hope that, after appropriate measures by the management,
its f inancial position would improve.” Lord Keith also noted that “[t]he
Commissioner did not have any power to control the day-to-day management
of any company, and such a task would require immense resources. His power
was limited to putting it out of business or allowing it to continue.”46 Lord Keith
further noted that the class to whom the Commissioner’s duty is alleged to have
been owed must include the many inhabitants of Hong Kong who might choose
to deposit their money with any deposit-taking company.47
In Yuen the depositors made a related argument that they had relied on the
registration of the company when they deposited their money with it, and that by
registering the company and allowing the registration to stand the Commissioner
had negligently made a continuing representation that the company was
creditworthy. The Privy Council rejected this argument, holding that “reliance on
the fact of registration as a guarantee of the soundness of a particular company
would be neither reasonable or justif iable”. In this regard, Lord Keith stated the
registration system “was designed to give added protection to the public against
unscrupulous or improvident managers of deposit-taking companies, but it cannot
reasonably be regarded, nor should it have been by any investor, as having instituted
such a far-reaching and stringent system of supervision as to warrant an assumption
that all deposit-taking companies are sound and fully creditworthy.”48
Finally, from a public policy perspective, Lord Keith noted obiter that, even if
the Commissioner were to be held to owe actual or potential depositors a duty
of care in negligence, “the prospect of claims would have a seriously inhibiting
44 Ibid. at 190-98.
45 Ibid. at 196.
46 Ibid. at 195.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. at 197.
effect on the work of his department” and “[a] sound judgment would be less
likely to be exercised if the Commissioner were to be constantly looking over
his shoulder at the prospect of claims”.49
To sum up, the McMahon case, taken together with the Yuen case, establish that
the CBFSAI is insulated under common law from liability for negligent decisions
of the IFSRA.
4.2 STATUTORY IMMUNITIES OF CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF IRELAND
This insulation at common law of the CBFSAI from liability for negligent supervisory
decisions has been confirmed by Irish legislation conferring a series of elaborate
statutory immunities on the CBFSAI.50 Thus, the CBFSAI, the members of its board,
the members of the IFSRA and employees and agents of the CBFSAI or any of its
constituent parts are not liable for damages for anything done or omitted in the
performance or purported performance of their functions, unless it is proved that the
act or omission was in bad faith.51 Without limiting the effect of this general
immunity,52 it is also provided that the fact that the CBFSAI has authorised or revoked
an authorisation, or regulated the activities, of a person, under any of its functions
is not a warranty by the CBFSAI as to the person’s solvency or performance.53 It is
also provided that neither the CBFSAI nor the Irish State is liable for losses incurred
because of the insolvency, default or performance of any such person or body.54
Finally, it is provided that neither the CBFSAI, the members of its board, the members
of the IFSRA and employees and agents of the CBFSAI or any of its constituent parts
are liable to pay damages arising out of a failure to comply with the IFSRA’s
responsibility to increase awareness among the public of available financial services,
the costs to consumers and associated risks and benefits.55
These detailed provisions put beyond any doubt that the CBFSAI enjoys
immunity from liability to depositors and other creditors of a failed bank or
f inancial institution where the IFSRA is negligent in the way it carries out its
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49 Ibid. at 198. 
50 These immunities are of some interest on account of their elaborate drafting, and have attracted some
international academic attention in the context of comparative law studies regarding the liability of bank
supervisors. See Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe,
the United States and Canada (Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 137, n.73; Smits and Luberti, Supervisory
Liability: An Introduction to Several Legal Systems and a Case Study, in International Bank Insolvencies: 
A Central Bank Perspective (Giovanoli and Heinrich eds., Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 363, at p. 366.
51 Sections 33AJ(1) and 33AJ(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
52 Sections 33AJ(6) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
53 Sections 33AJ(3) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. Section 9(5) of the Central Bank Act 1971 provides
in similar terms that the grant of a licence to a bank shall not constitute a warranty as to the solvency of the
bank to whom it is granted. Sections 33AJ(4) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended, also provides in similar
terms that the fact that the CBFSAI in performing any of its functions has approved or revoked the approval, or
regulated the affairs or activities, of a stock exchange or a financial futures or options exchange, or has approved,
amended, revoked or imposed rules, or has consented or refused to consent to amendments of rules, is not a
warranty by the CBFSAI as to the solvency or performance of the exchange or any member of the exchange.
54 Sections 33AJ(5) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended. Section 9(5) of the Central Bank Act 1971 provides
in similar terms that the CBFSAI shall not be liable in respect of any losses incurred through the insolvency
or default of a bank to whom a licence is granted.
55 Section 33C(4) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
supervisory functions.56 These immunities also confirm the CBFSAI’s common
law immunity from any liability for negligent misrepresentation.57
4.3 LIABILITY OF BANK SUPERVISORS UNDER EC LAW
The question of whether bank supervisors can be held liable for losses resulting
from defective supervision under Community law has recently been resolved by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the Peter Paul case58 depositors in a
bankrupt German bank sought compensation in respect of the loss of their
deposits beyond the amount recoverable under the Deposit-Guarantee Schemes
Directive59 on the grounds of allegedly defective supervision by the former
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (Federal Off ice for the Supervision of
Credit Institutions). As a matter of German law, the liability of the
Bundesaufsichtsamt to compensate third parties for any damage arising from
a wilful or negligent breach of off icial duty under the German Civil Code is
statutorily precluded.60 However, the depositors challenged this statutory
immunity on the ground that it was contrary to Community law, and in particular
the three banking directives subsequently codif ied in the Consolidated Banking
Directive.61
The ECJ, on a preliminary reference from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court
of Justice), held that the directives in question do not preclude a national rule
preventing individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from
defective supervision on the part of the national authority responsible for
supervising credit institutions.62 The ECJ took note of the supervisory obligations
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56 See Breslin, Banking Law in the Republic of Ireland (Gill & McMillan 1998), p. 47; Donnelly, The Law of
Banks and Credit Institutions (Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 17-18.
57 While there is much discussion regarding whether it is competent for the Irish Oireachtas (National Parliament)
to establish special statutory rules of immunity for State-sponsored bodies under the provisions of the Irish
Constitution, this issue would appear to be moot where, as here, the relevant immunities are simply declaratory
of the underlying position at common law. See generally Hogan and Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland
(3d. ed., Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), pp. 809-10 (citing Byrne v. Ireland [1972] I.R. 241; Ryan v.
Ireland [1989] I.R. 177; W. v. Ireland (No. 2) [1997] 2 I.R. 142).
58 Case-222/02, Peter Paul, Cornelia Sonnen-Lütte and Christel Mörkens v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Judgment
of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 12 October 2004, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof
– Germany, published on the website of the Court of Justice at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/
index_rep.htm. See Roeges, L’Affaire Peter Paul, une affaire à suivre, Euredia 2003/1, p. 5. 
59 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee
schemes, OJ 1994 L 135, p. 5.
60 The legal basis of this immunity was Article 6(4) of the KWG or Banking Law, which provided that the
Bundesaufsichtsamt exercised the supervisory functions assigned to it only in the public interest. This provision
was adopted in response to two decisions by the German Supreme Court during the 1970s where it was held
that the objective of banking supervision as set out in the Banking Law was not only to protect the stability
and soundness of the German banking system in general, but also to protect individual creditors against risks
arising from hazardous banking activities, with the result that the banking supervisory authority could be liable
for breach of off icial duty under the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB or German Civil Code). See Wetterstein,
15 February 1979, BGHZ 74, 144 (148) (= NJW 1979, 1354, 1355); see also the decision of the Supreme Court
in Herstatt, 12 July 1979, BGHZ 75, 120 (= NJW 1979, 1354). Paragraph 6(4) of KWG or Banking Law was
designed to conf irm that banking supervision is exercised solely in the public interest and not in the interest
of third parties, such as depositors or other creditors of the f inancial institution, thereby barring suits on the
ground that the banking supervisory authority violated an “off icial duty owed to a third person”. See Hüpkes,
The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the United States and Canada
(Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 132-34.
61 Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking
up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ 2000 L 126, p. 1.
62 It is noted that the conclusions of the ECJ are similar to those reached earlier by the British House of Lords
in the BCCI case, Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220, 1236-58, 1270-
73 (per Lords Hope and Millett). 
imposed on national authorities vis-à-vis credit institutions under those
directives, and of the fact that the objectives pursued by those directives also
include the protection of depositors.63 However, the ECJ considered that it does
not follow from this that those directives confer on individual depositors rights
capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the State on the basis of
Community law in the event that the deposits are unavailable as a result of
defective supervision on the part of the competent national authorities.64 Rather,
the ECJ took the view that those directives are restricted to the harmonisation
of that which is essential, necessary and suff icient to secure the mutual
recognition of authorisations and of prudential supervision systems, making
possible the granting of a single licence recognised throughout the Community
and the application of the principle of home Member State prudential
supervision.65 The ECJ concluded that the coordination of the national rules on
the liability of national authorities in respect of depositors in the event of
defective supervision does not appear to be necessary to secure these results.66
The ECJ also noted that, as under German law, it is not possible in a number
of Member States for the national authorities responsible for supervising credit
institutions to be liable in respect of individuals in the event of defective
supervision. In this regard the ECJ noted that those rules are based on
considerations related to the complexity of banking supervision, in the context
of which the authorities are under an obligation to protect a plurality of interests,
including more specif ically the stability of the f inancial system.67
Thus, the statutory and common law immunities enjoyed by the CBFSAI under
Irish law would appear to be beyond challenge as a matter of current Community
law.68
4.4 TORTIOUS LIABILITY FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE
Thus far, it would appear that the CBFSAI enjoys a robust immunity from
liability for the decisions of the IFSRA under Irish law. However, the CBFSAI’s
immunities are not absolute, and liability still lies for acts or omissions that are
proved to have been in “bad faith”.69 In the context of a f inancial supervisor’s
activities, this is understood to include liability in cases of intentional
wrongdoing by that authority’s off icials, where damages may be recovered for
the tort of misfeasance in public off ice and a range of other intentional torts.70
While the tort of misfeasance in public off ice has a long history, its precise
contours remain a matter of much debate.71 Liability for misfeasance in public
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63 Paragraphs 35-39 of the judgement.
64 Paragraph 40 of the judgement.
65 Paragraph 42 of the judgement.
66 Paragraph 43 of the judgement.
67 Paragraph 44 of the judgement.
68 For a critical review of the Advocate General’s opinion in the Peter Paul case, see Tison, Who’s Afraid of Peter
Paul? The Financial Regulator, Vol. 9, No. 1, p.1, at pp. 7-8.
69 Sections 33AJ(1) and 33AJ(2) of the Central Bank Act 1942, as amended.
70 Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England (LLP 1996), pp. 339-40, 366.
71 McMahon and Binchy, Law of Torts (Butterworths, 3d. ed., 2000), p. 548; Hogan and Morgan, Administrative
Law in Ireland (3d. ed., Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p. 813.
off ice has been successfully established against public bodies in some modern
Irish cases.72 The most scientif ic judicial def inition of the tort would appear to
be that of Keane J. in McDonnell v. Ireland, who approved a formulation that
“misfeasance in public office is committed where an act is performed by a public
official, either maliciously or with actual knowledge that it is committed without
jurisdiction, and is so done with the known consequence that it would injure the
plaintiff.”73 In Corliss v. Ireland Hamilton J. suggested that the necessary degree
of malice “may be inferred from recklessness”.74 The judgement of Finlay C. J.
in Pine Valley suggests that misfeasance arises where a public off icial’s actions
“constitute such a gross abuse of power or wholly unreasonable exercise of power
as to lead to an inference that he was aware that he was exercising a power which
he did not possess”.75 A broader view was taken by the Supreme Court in Deane
v. Voluntary Health Insurance, where the Court indicated that a public body
might be liable for misfeasance in public off ice if its statutory powers were
merely exercised “unreasonably and unfairly” in a manner which caused loss
and damage.76 Commentators have noted that the decisions in other common law
jurisdictions do not set the boundaries of liability for misfeasance of public
off ice so widely insofar as they require that the public authority was knowingly
reckless outside the scope of its legal powers or, if professedly acting within
them, was doing so “maliciously” in the sense of being activated by an ulterior
predominant purpose, such as to hurt the plaintiff for conduct unconnected with
the exercise of the power.77
4.5 LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISOR FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE:
BCCI CASE
In 1991 the Bank for Credit and Commerce International, S.A. (BCCI), a
Luxembourg-incorporated entity, went into insolvent liquidation as a result of
“fraud on a vast scale perpetrated at a senior level in BCCI.”78 UK depositors
sought to circumvent the diff iculties presented by common law precedents on
the question of supervisory negligence by bank supervisors, and the associated
statutory immunities, by bringing proceedings against the Bank of England for
the tort of misfeasance in public off ice.79 In very general terms, the BCCI
depositors alleged that from the time that the Bank of England granted BCCI
a full licence as a deposit-taker in 1980 until shortly before its collapse in 1991
the Bank was not legally entitled under applicable UK banking laws to rely on
the supervision of the Luxembourg bank regulators because BCCI’s principal
place of business was in London rather than Luxembourg. The depositors further
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72 See Callinan v. Voluntary Health Insurance Board, unreported, Supreme Court, July 28, 1994; Re “The La
Lavia”, unreported, High Court, July 26, 1994 (cited in Hogan and Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland
(3d. ed., Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p. 815).
73 Unreported, Supreme Court, July 23, 1997 (cited in Hogan and Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland 
(3d. ed., Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p. 812).
74 Unreported, High Court, July 23, 1984 (cited in Hogan and Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland (3d. ed.,
Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), pp. 813-14).
75 [1987] I.R. 23 at 36.
76 Unreported, Supreme Court, July 28, 1994, p. 29 (per Blayney J.), discussed in McMahon and Binchy, Law
of Torts (Butterworths, 3d. ed., 2000), pp. 552-53.
77 McMahon and Binchy, Law of Torts (Butterworths, 3d. ed., 2000), p. 553; see also Hogan and Morgan,
Administrative Law in Ireland (3d. ed., Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p. 813, n. 73.
78 Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220, 1227h (per Lord Steyn).
79 See Proctor, BCCI: Suing the Supervisor, The Financial Regulator, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 35 at p. 37.
alleged that the Bank knew or was reckless that losses to depositors would result
both from its granting BCCI a licence and then failing to revoke BCCI’s licence
in the years preceding its collapse. 
In its f irst decision in this case, Three Rivers District Council v. The Governor
and Company of the Bank of England,80 the House of Lords outlined the main
elements (or, in the words of Lord Steyn, “matrix”) of the tort of misfeasance
in public off ice that would have to be established for the Bank of England to be
held liable to the BCCI depositors. First, the defendant must be a holder of public
off ice, a broad concept covering the Bank of England, which may be vicariously
liable for the acts of its public off icials.81 Second, there must be an exercise of
power in the exercise of public functions, a requirement satisf ied by the exercise
of public functions by named senior off icials of the Bank of England’s Banking
Supervision Department.82 Third, the public off icer must have a required state
of mind comprising (i) targeted malice (i.e., conduct specif ically intended to
injure a person) and/or (ii) knowledge, foresight, or a lack of an honest or good
faith belief that the public off icer has no power to do the act complained of and
that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. An act performed in a state of mind
of reckless indifference (i.e., subjective recklessness) as to the illegality or
outcome of the act is suff icient to ground liability for the tort.83 Fourth, any
plaintiff must have a suff icient interest to found a legal standing to sue. There
is no reason why such an action cannot be brought by a particular class of persons
such as depositors at a bank, even if their precise identities were not known to
the Bank of England.84 Fifth, the public off icer’s act must, as a factual matter,
have caused the plaintiffs damage.85 Sixth, regarding damages recoverable, the
public off icer must know that his act would probably injure the plaintiff, or a
person of a class of which the plaintiff was a member (e.g., depositors). Foresight
or subjective recklessness about the consequences, in the sense of not caring
whether the consequences happen or not, is suff icient.86
In Three Rivers it was noted that imposing liability for acts which although
wrongful were not committed with foresight or injury to the plaintiff “may have
a stultifying effect on governance without commensurate public benef it”87 by
“not allowing public off icers, who must always act for the public good, to be
assailed by unmeritorious actions”.88
In its second decision, the House of Lords, by a slender 3-2 majority, held that
the depositors pleaded a reasonable cause of action against the Bank.89 This
decision merely established that the depositors were entitled to a full trial on
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81 Ibid. at 1230h (per Lord Steyn) and 1268h-1269a (per Lord Hobhouse).
82 Ibid. at 1231a (per Lord Steyn) and 1267a (per Lord Hutton).
83 Ibid. at 1231b-1232d (per Lord Steyn) and 1269d-e (per Lord Hobhouse).
84 Ibid. at 1233d-e (per Lord Steyn).
85 Ibid. at 1233g (per Lord Steyn).
86 Ibid. at 1234a-1235h (per Lord Steyn) and 1261h-1262c, 1265f-h (per Lord Hutton).
87 Ibid. at 1265d (per Lord Hutton).
88 Ibid. at 1235h (per Lord Steyn).
89 Three Rivers District Council v. The Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No. 3) [2001] 2 All E.R.
513 (per Lords Steyn, Hope and Hutton, Lords Hobhouse and Millett dissenting).
the merits of their case, and not that the Bank of England was in any way liable
for its supervisory actions. Indeed, two of the f ive members of the House of
Lords would have barred the depositors’ claim outright on the basis that it had
no realistic prospect of success.90
Three Rivers establishes the important legal precedent that a bank supervisor
may potentially incur liability to a depositor for misfeasance in public off ice.
In view of the high prof ile of the BCCI litigation, the case has been a source
of concern to supervisors in other common law jurisdictions, such as Ireland,
which apply the tort of misfeasance in public off ice.91 In this respect, it is clear
that Three Rivers would be treated as a highly persuasive precedent by any Irish
court considering the potential liability of a f inancial supervisor for misfeasance
in public off ice.
4.6 LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISOR FOR OTHER INTENTIONAL TORTS
Misfeasance in public off ice is not the only intentional tort for which a
supervisor may be liable under Irish law. Potentially, a number of other torts may
provide a basis of liability in certain cases, including the torts of interference
with contractual relations,92 intimidation93 and malicious prosecution.94 It has
been suggested that the tort of intimidation may be relevant to bank supervision
where the threat of taking ultra vires supervisory action is used to coerce a
supervised institution to conform to the supervisor’s wishes by behaving in a
way involving loss to themselves (e.g., by abstaining from entering into
transactions of a particular description or by participating in the costly rescue
of another institution) or to a third party (e.g., by “blackballing” that third party
and abstaining from any contractual relationship with it).95 Inducement to breach
of contract could also be relevant in situations involving the application by a
f inancial supervisor of informal pressure on a regulated institution.96 An action
was, for example, commenced on this ground against the Bank of England by
a merchant banker accused of fraud, but ultimately acquitted of criminal charges,
in connection with the Guinness insider-dealing affair, who allegedly lost his
job as a result of pressure exercised by the Bank on his employer in pursuance
of the Bank’s responsibility to ensure the prudent management of banks.97
Liability for malicious prosecution could potentially arise where a f inancial
supervisor or its off icers are activated by improper motives in the prosecution
of criminal offences.98
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90 Ibid., [2001] 2 All E.R. 513 (per Lords Hobhouse and Millett dissenting). See Proctor, BCCI: Suing the
Supervisor, The Financial Regulator, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 35.
91 See generally Proctor, BCCI: Suing the Supervisor, The Financial Regulator, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 36, 41; see
also Dharmananda and Dzakpasu, Central Bank Liability to Depositors: Three Rivers May Not Open Floodgates
[2002] J.I.B.L. p. 40, p. 43.
92 McMahon and Binchy, Law of Torts (Butterworths, 3d. ed., 2000), pp. 821-30.
93 Ibid., at pp. 830-34.
94 Ibid., at pp. 981-86.
95 Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England (LLP 1996), p. 369.
96 Ibid., at p. 369.
97 Ibid., at pp. 369-70.
98 Ibid., at p. 368.
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4.7 CONCLUSIONS RE CBFSAI’S LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY DECISIONS UNDER
IRISH AND EC LAW
To sum up, in the McMahon case the Irish High Court held that a f inancial
supervisor is not liable to depositors of a failed deposit-taking institution for
negligence in the exercise of its supervisory functions. In reaching this
conclusion the High Court followed the advice of the UK Privy Council in the
Yuen-Kung-Yeu case, where similar conclusion was reached that a Hong Kong
supervisory authority was not liable to depositors of a failed deposit-taking
institution for negligence. This insulation at common law from liability for
negligent supervisory decisions has been conf irmed by Irish legislation
conferring a series of statutory immunities on the CBFSAI. The recent decision
of the European Court of Justice in the Peter Paul case has confirmed that bank
supervisors may not be liable for losses resulting from defective supervision
under Community law, meaning that the statutory and common law immunities
enjoyed by the CBFSAI under Irish law would appear to be beyond challenge
as a matter of current Community law.
However, the CBFSAI’s immunities are not absolute, and liability still lies for
acts or omissions that are proved to have been in “bad faith”. This would include
liability for cases of intentional wrongdoing by the f inancial supervisor’s
off icials, where damages may be recovered for the tort of misfeasance in public
off ice and a range of other intentional torts. The potential scope of a f inancial
supervisor’s liability for misfeasance in public off ice has become a more live
topic in recent years as a result of modern developments in Irish and English
case law. Liability for misfeasance in public off ice has been successfully
established against public bodies in some modern Irish cases. The judgement
of Finlay C. J. in the Pine Valley case suggests that misfeasance may arise where
a public off icial’s actions constitute such a gross abuse of power or wholly
unreasonable exercise of power as to lead to an inference that he was aware that
he was exercising a power which he did not possess. A broader view was taken
by the Supreme Court in the Deane case, where the Court indicated that a public
body might be liable for misfeasance if its statutory powers were merely
exercised unreasonably and unfairly in a manner which caused loss and damage.
The decision of the British House of Lords in the BCCI case would be treated
as a highly persuasive precedent by any Irish court considering the potential
liability of a f inancial supervisor for misfeasance in public off ice. At the risk
of generalisation, the BCCI case establishes the precedent that a bank supervisor
may potentially incur liability to a depositor for misfeasance where a public
off icer has the required state of mind comprising targeted malice (i.e., conduct
specif ically intended to injure a person) and/or knowledge, foresight or a lack
of an honest or good faith belief that the public off icer has no power to do the
act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. An act
performed in a state of mind of reckless indifference (i.e., subjective
recklessness) as to the illegality or outcome of the act is suff icient to ground
liability.
Misfeasance in public office is not the only intentional tort for which a f inancial
supervisor may be liable under Irish law. Potentially, a number of other torts may
provide a basis for liability in certain cases, including the torts of interference
with contractual relations, intimidation and malicious prosecution.
5 COMPATIBILITY OF CBFSAI’S LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISOR WITH
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS UNDER TREATY
The ECB was consulted by the Irish Department of Finance on the draft Central
Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Bill, 2002, and delivered its
opinion on the draft legislation on 5 June 2002.99 The central concern in the ECB
opinion was whether the CBFSAI’s liability for the new supervisory authority
was compatible with central bank independence requirements under the Treaty. 
The ECB opinion highlighted the fact that the legislation would establish a
structure for the supervision of f inancial institutions which involved setting up
a statutory body enjoying independent functions (the IFSRA), but located within
the legal personality of a NCB. Having particular regard to the unique structure
of the IFSRA as a constituent part of the CBFSAI, the ECB noted that Ireland’s
NCB would be accountable or liable for acts performed by a constituent part (the
IFSRA) which would be outside the control of the CBFSAI’s key decision-
making body responsible for its ESCB-related tasks (the Governor). The ECB
considered that such a structure could pose a risk to a NCB’s integrity,
threatening its overall institutional independence. In this regard, the ECB noted
that under Article 108 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying
out the tasks and duties conferred upon it by the Treaty and the ESCB Statute,
neither a NCB nor any member of its decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member State ‘or from any
other body’, which would include a statutory body such as the IFSRA.100
The f inal legislation restructuring the Central Bank of Ireland addressed the
ECB’s concern by ensuring that the Governor has a signif icant role with respect
to f inancial stability matters. While the Governor does not serve as the
Chairperson, Chief Executive or a member of the IFSRA, the Governor has been
given a number of specif ic f inancial stability powers. First, the IFSRA is
required to consult the Governor, and may act only with the agreement of the
Governor, on any matter relating to the f inancial stability of the Irish State’s
f inancial system, including (but not limited to) the issue, revocation and
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99 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 June 2002 at the request of the Irish Department of Finance on
a draft Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Bill, 2002 (CON/2002/16), published on
the ECB website at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1341/1345/html/index.en.html. The ECB is required to be
consulted by national authorities on draft legislative provisions within its f ields of competence, including
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of the Treaty; Article 2, third and sixth indents, of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the
consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, 
OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.
100 Ibid., paragraph 6.
suspension of a licence or other authority.101 Second, the Governor has been given
powers to authorise a CBFSAI employee to investigate the business and carry
out on-site inspections of licensed credit institutions, building societies, trustee
savings banks, approved stock exchanges, authorised investment business f irms
and authorised collective investment schemes.102 Third, the Governor may, with
respect to his functions, issue guidelines to the IFSRA as to the policies and
principles that the IFSRA is required to implement in performing the CBFSAI’s
functions.103 Fourth, whenever requested, the IFSRA is required to provide the
Governor with advice, information and assistance with respect to the
performance of the Governor’s functions.104
The ECB opinion expressed the view that all these provisions are fundamental
– and should be made the most of in practice – to allow for the continued close
involvement of the central banking functions in supervision matters. Indeed, the
ECB opinion noted that this involvement is a necessary condition to allow the
Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the risks to financial stability
in the euro area, and that, in addition, it also safeguards a smooth co-ordination
between the central banking functions exercised at the Eurosystem’s level and
the supervisory functions carried out at national level.105
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The prudential supervision of credit and f inancial institutions is not among the
tasks attributed to the ESCB under the Treaty. In practice, the supervision of
credit and f inancial institutions is organised under a wide variety of legal
structures in the 25 EU Member States, with varying degrees of central bank
responsibility. At one end of the spectrum, in nine Member States NCBs are
directly and fully responsible for the supervision of credit institutions. At the
other end of the spectrum, in eight Member States an independent public
authority that is legally and operationally separated from the NCB is responsible
for the supervision of practically the entire f inancial sector. The remaining
Member States have adopted nuanced variations on these two contrasting
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published on the ECB website at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1341/1345/html/index.en.html.
structures, laying down mechanisms allowing for varying degrees of central bank
involvement in the conduct of supervision. For example, in Belgium, France,
Germany and Poland NCBs make a substantial contribution to the performance
of supervisory tasks, but are not as such responsible for supervision. 
A somewhat novel legal structure is deployed in Ireland whereby the supervision
of practically the entire f inancial sector is carried out by an autonomous body
forming part of the legal personality of the NCB. Under this construction the
NCB bears, in legal terms, sole liability and responsibility for the acts of the
f inancial supervisor. This raises the important question as to the extent of the
NCB’s liability for the f inancial supervisor under Irish law.
Under Irish law the CBFSAI is immune from liability for negligence on the part
of the f inancial supervisor. However, the CBFSAI’s immunities are not absolute,
and liability still lies for acts or omissions of the supervisor that are proved to
have been in “bad faith”. This would include liability for cases of intentional
wrongdoing by the supervisor’s off icials, where damages may be recovered for
the tort of misfeasance in public off ice and a range of other intentional torts,
including the torts of interference with contractual relations, intimidation and
malicious prosecution. The potential scope of liability for misfeasance in public
office has become a live topic in recent years. Liability for misfeasance in public
off ice has been successfully established against public bodies in some modern
Irish cases, and a broad view regarding the scope of liability for misfeasance
has been taken by the Irish Supreme Court in one case. The decision of the
British House of Lords in the BCCI case, which establishes that a bank
supervisor may potentially incur liability to a depositor for misfeasance in public
off ice, would also be treated as a highly persuasive precedent by any Irish court
considering the CBFSAI’s potential liability for misfeasance on the part of the
supervisor. 
The extent of the NCB’s liability for the f inancial supervisor was a critical issue
in the opinion delivered by the ECB to the Irish authorities on the draft
legislation restructuring the Central Bank of Ireland and establishing the
autonomous f inancial supervisor as a constituent part of the newly restructured
central bank. The ECB opinion highlighted that, by setting up a statutory body
enjoying independent functions, but located within the legal personality of a
NCB, the NCB would be accountable or liable for acts performed by a constituent
part of the central bank (the f inancial supervisor), but which would be outside
the control of the central bank’s decision-making body responsible for its ESCB-
related tasks (the CBFSAI Governor). The ECB considered that such a structure
could pose a risk to a NCB’s integrity, threatening its overall institutional
independence, contrary to the independence required of an ESCB central bank
under Article 108 of the Treaty. 
The f inal legislation restructuring the Central Bank of Ireland addressed the
ECB’s concern by ensuring that the Governor has a signif icant role with respect
to f inancial stability issues. In particular, the f inancial supervisor is required
to consult the Governor and to act with the Governor’s agreement with respect
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to any matters relating to the stability of the Irish State’s f inancial system,
including the supervisor’s decisions relating to the issue, revocation and
suspension of licences. The Governor has independent powers to investigate the
business and carry out on-site inspections of credit and f inancial institutions.
The Governor may issue binding guidelines as to the policies and principles that
the supervisor is required to implement. Finally, the supervisor is required to
provide the Governor with all necessary advice, information and assistance with
respect to the performance of the Governor’s functions.
To sum up, the ECB has a strong policy in favour of the attribution of extensive
supervisory responsibilities to NCBs. Such an attribution fulf ils the Eurosystem
task under Article 105(5) of the Treaty to contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the f inancial system.
However, by locating an autonomous f inancial supervisory authority within the
legal personality of a NCB, the restructuring of the Central Bank of Ireland posed
a risk to a NCB’s institutional independence by making the NCB accountable
or liable for acts performed by a constituent part of the central bank, but outside
the control of the central bank’s decision-making body responsible for the
discharge of its ESCB-related tasks. The fundamental philosophical premise
underpinning the ECB opinion is that to saddle an ESCB NCB with liability and
accountability for a financial supervisor, without endowing the central bank with
a corresponding role with respect to the systemically signif icant decisions of
the supervisor, would infringe the independence required of an ESCB NCB under
the Treaty. In its opinion on the restructuring of the Central Bank of Ireland the
ECB clearly set the limits of the proposed reorganisation by warning against the
risk of the f inancial supervisor’s functions encroaching upon the central bank’s
independence. As a result, important safeguards were introduced to protect the
independence required of a national central bank member of the ESCB under
the Treaty by ensuring that the Governor has a signif icant role with respect to
f inancial stability issues. 
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MONETARY LAW

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EURO
Patrice de Lapasse †
ABSTRACT
La legge monetaria europea ha dovuto risolvere molti problemi fra i quali, la
definizione della moneta (l’euro),  dell’unità monetaria (un euro diviso in cento
cents), la determinazione del valore di questa moneta ed anche della moneta
di pagamento. Oltre a queste questioni, la legge incontrò due altri problemi di
fondamentale importanza : (i) definire un’equivalenza fra l’euro e le monete
nazionali preesistenti che fosse giuridicamente impegnativa e (ii) preservare la
continuità dei contratti alla quale il mondo anglosassone era particolarmente
legato. 
Per iniziativa dell’Istituto Monetario Europeo, un gruppo  composto dai giuristi
delle Banche centrali sul quale Paolo Zamboni esercitò la propria influenza,
si riunì e fu incaricato di trovare delle soluzioni. 
Benché non fosse necessario dal punto di vista giuridico, l’inserimento d’un
provvedimento specifico nel regolamento comunitario sull’euro  del 17 Giugno
1997 riuscì ad acquietare le preoccupazioni  che la continuità dei contratti aveva
fatto nascere. Per quanto riguarda l’equivalenza fra l’euro e le moneti
preesistenti, fu il concetto di fungibilità importato dal diritto romano e presente
nel codice civile di parecchi paesi, a risolvere questa questione. Paolo Zamboni
era, a buon diritto, molto fiero di vedere così ripresa una nozione di diritto
romano tra i fondamenti dell’euro.
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“À l’éminent juriste italien ami de la France, 
Paolo Zamboni Garavelli, que soit dédiée cette brève étude 
de droit monétaire, où se trouve entrelacé comme 
un souvenir de l’Union latine et de l’Union européenne,
lesquelles furent aussi, entre les deux peuples, à leur 
manière, une amitié.”1
1 PREAMBLE
Defining the legal status of the new currency played a large part in the
preparations for the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. The question
was taken up by the entire legal community in both the European Union and the
English-speaking world.
I shall stick to what I know best, namely the work carried out by the European
Monetary Institute working group of legal experts, in which Paolo Zamboni
represented the Bank of Italy and played a leading role in def ining the legal
status of the euro.
It is customary in monetary law to draw a distinction between those matters in
which States have sovereignty, monetary law (lex monetae), and those which
remain in the realm of the independent will (lex contractus). Monetary law has
never been supposed to govern everything. 
That is why one of the f irst concerns of the Community authorities, including
the European Monetary Institute (EMI), was to organise the coexistence of
monetary law with contract law (I). Paolo Zamboni played a leading role in the
EMI’s work on the subject (II), which enabled the Community authorities to
def ine Europe’s monetary law (III).
2 THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE AND EUROPEAN MONETARY LAW
A. Monetary law
It is generally accepted that monetary law contains at least three key provisions,
whether or not they are included in a single text or dispersed throughout the
legislation, as was long the case in France. These provisions are:
– def inition of the currency and the currency unit,
– determination of the value of the currency,
– determination of the currency of payment.
The State that issues the currency in question has exclusive competence, within
the meaning of public international law, to determine each of these three
elements.
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1 Note of the author.
Consequently the State – in this case the European Community – has a
discretionary right to change its monetary law without the parties to a contract
being able to assert such a change as grounds for refusing to perform their
obligations under it.
If the parties have expressed their obligations in the currency that is affected
by the change of monetary law, that change is binding on them. There is no need,
under any circumstances, to presume their acceptance of that competence
because the matter is not governed by contract law. As the Permanent Court of
International Justice found in 1929, in a famous case involving Serbian and
Brazilian loans, “it is a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to
regulate its own currency.”
The second principle found in all monetary laws is the payment value that the
State bestows on its currency. This prerogative is merely the application of the
principle of monetary nominalism; its consequence is that a debtor discharges
a debt by paying the nominal amount of the debt. As Professor Jean Carbonnier
says, nominalism means “that there is never any cause to take account of the
currency’s intrinsic value and that the conversion rate asserted by the sovereign
authority between two successive currencies raises an irrebuttable presumption
of the ratio of their values” (Droit Civil, Vol. 3, Les Biens, 18th edition, no. 16).
That is the rule enshrined in Article 1895 of the French Civil Code on loans of
money: “The obligation which results from a loan of money is always for the
numerical sum stated in the contract.”
The third principle found in all monetary laws is the determination of the
currency of payment. In general, the common rule is that a payment made in the
national currency is valid and must be accepted by the creditor.
B. Continuity of contracts
The general idea is that a change of monetary system, which is a matter of public
law, should not under any circumstances prejudice pecuniary obligations
contained in contracts between private individuals. If the name of the currency
remains exactly the same from one system to another, the continuity of contracts
is ensured automatically by the mere application of the nominalist principle: the
subject of the obligation does not require any adaptive measure (thus, in 1928
and after, Germinal francs found themselves transformed, unwittingly, into
Poincaré francs).
If, on the other hand, the successive names of the currency differ, the sovereign
authority must intervene to set a ratio between the new currency that will be sole
legal tender at the payment date and the previous currency that will no longer
be valid (Carbonnier, Droit Civil, Vol. 3, Les Biens, 18th edition, no. 17).
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3 THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE’S WORK ON THE LEGAL STATUS 
OF THE EURO
From its establishment in late 1995, the European Monetary Institute created various
working group made up of experts appointed by the fifteen national central banks.
The Working Group of Legal Experts (WGLE) – in which Paolo Zamboni
represented the Bank of Italy –, was asked at its first meeting on 
13 December 1995 to prepare the European regulations required for introduction
of the euro and propose them to the Council of the European Monetary Institute.
The European Monetary Institute was responsible for preparing the basic framework
and preliminary draft regulations that the European Commission would subsequently
submit to the Council of the European Union for final discussion and approval. 
Two problems took a long time to solve, and it was partly thanks to Paolo
Zamboni that the matter was f inally settled. The f irst step was to establish the
legal link between the euro and the national currencies during the transitional
period so as to ensure – as the Treaty required – a legally binding equivalence
between the euro and national monetary units2 and then to give market operators
a guarantee that the introduction of the euro would not adversely affect the
continuity of contracts in any way.
A. The legally binding link between the euro and national currencies
One of the tasks of the Council regulation def ining the legal framework for use
of the euro was to establish “a legally binding equivalence between the euro and
national monetary units” (Madrid Summit, December 1994).
The experts feared that the sheer statement of existence of a fixed and irrevocable
conversion rate between the euro and national currencies would not be sufficient
to achieve this. They thought that, in the absence of a legally binding mechanism
that would independently ensure the immutability of the result of the conversion
of national currencies into euros and vice versa, the risk of substantial
fluctuations, varying from one currency to another, should not be ruled out.
The outcome would have been to disorganise markets, whose assessment of
national currencies would have differed from that which would have resulted
from the straightforward application of the conversion rates set on the
changeover to the euro. One of the effects would have been the appearance of
interest-rate differentials, the negation of a single money market.
It was a legal line of reasoning, in which Paolo Zamboni played an important
part, which overcame this diff iculty. It started from the idea that one of the chief
characteristics of a currency is its fungibility, or even its “absolute fungibility”,
which goes much further than the fungibility of other goods (Carbonnier, Droit
Civil, Vol. 3, Les Biens, 18th edition, no. 53). Fungibility needed being construed
in the monetary regulation, and so it was when legally stating that payments in
one unit would discharge debts in another unit. Thus, if the euro is fungible with
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2 “Adopt the conversion rates at which their [the national] currencies shall be irrevocably f ixed” (Art. 123(4)).
each national currency, the payment of 1 euro is equivalent to the payment of
6.55957 FRF or 1.95583 DEM, and monetary debts could be redeemed at such
rates if the law so declared.
The insistence on fungibility undoubtedly reassured the markets. Moreover, the
concept was easily incorporated into monetary law. Present in Roman law,
fungibility is not peculiar to French law. It may be found at Article 337 of the
Spanish Civil Code, Article 91 of the German Civil Code (BGB), Article 1243
of the Italian Civil Code and Article 561 of the Dutch Civil Code. It also
provided a means for expressing in legal terms the principle according to which
the national currencies and the euro, for as long as they had to coexist (i.e. until
2002), became different expressions of an identical currency in economic terms.
B. The continuity of contracts
Another concern that the legal experts had to address during the groundwork for
the introduction of the euro was the problem of the continuity of contracts. Of all
the legal issues surrounding the changeover to the single currency, it was its effects
on the continuity of current contracts that most immediately attracted attention.
If substitution of the euro for national currencies had empowered the parties to
a contract to change its terms, or even to terminate it unilaterally, legal certainty
would undoubtedly have been destroyed and the fate of millions of contracts
called into question.
English-speaking legal experts were the f irst to point out the danger, which was
taken very seriously because of its inevitable effect on the smooth operation of
f inancial markets. Studies of the subject by Community institutions (the
Commission, the Monetary Committee and the European Monetary Institute)
came to the same conclusion: replacing national currencies with the euro would
have no effect on the continuity of contracts. However, it was necessary to
reassure the markets, whose occasionally irrational reactions are well-known.
That is why Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) 1103-97 of 17 June 1997 on
certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro, taken by the Council
of the European Union on the basis of Article 235 of the European Union Treaty,
contains the following provision, which is sufficiently important to quote in full:
“The introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of
a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal
instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an
instrument. This provision is subject to anything which parties may have agreed.”
The markets welcomed this as the measure that f inally lifted all the uncertainties
mentioned earlier about the possible effect of the introduction of the euro on the
continuity of current contracts. Even the English-speaking experts who had studied
the question extensively and had proved the most alarmist let the issue drop.
Let us now see how all these principles were incorporated into European
monetary law.
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4 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
In Council Regulation 974-98 of 3 May 1998 concerning the introduction of the
euro, the chief principles that underlie any monetary law, mentioned earlier, are
treated as follows.
A. Definition of the currency and the currency unit
As from 1 January 1999, the currency of the participating Member States shall
be the euro. The currency unit shall be one euro. One euro shall be divided into
one hundred cent. (Article 2, Regulation 974-98 of 3 May 1998).
B. Determination of the payment value of the currency
The euro shall be substituted for the currency of each participating Member State
at the conversion rate. (Article 3).
All contracts denominated in ECU without any other details are presumed to
continue in euros at the rate of 1 for 1 unless the parties have provided otherwise
in the contract. (Article 2, Council Regulation (EC) 1103-97 of 17 June 1997).
C. Determination of the currency of payment
On expiry of the transition period (31 December 2001), only banknotes issued
by the European Central Bank and coins issued by the Member States shall have
the status of legal tender. (Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation 974-98).
During the transition period, banknotes and coins denominated in a national
currency unit that is a non-decimal subdivision of the euro shall retain their legal
tender status within their territorial limits. (Article 9 of Regulation 974-98).
All these provisions, which may be considered to form part of Community public
policy, apply ipso facto to current contracts, without of course posing any threat
to their continuity.
Another reason for having complete confidence in the normal pursuit of current
contracts on the changeover to the euro was the fact that the monetary law of
the European Community ensured continuity between the ECU and national
currency units on the one hand and the euro on the other.
This monetary continuity between different monetary units helped to guarantee
the continuity of contracts in accordance with the nominalist principle. It was
expressed as follows: the basket ECU was replaced by the euro at the rate of 
1 for 1 and the private ECU, except where otherwise provided, was presumed
to refer to the ECU as def ined by Community legislation.
During the transition period, which lasted from 1 January 1999 to the
disappearance of national currencies in 2002: 
– the euro was divided into national currency units at the conversion rate and
the Member States’ monetary law continued to apply;
– amounts denominated in national currency units were payable with amounts
denominated in euro units at the conversion rate;
– any sum denominated in euro units or in national currency units could be
credited to a creditor’s account in the currency unit of the account.
5 EPILOGUE
This brief study shows that thanks to the work in which Paolo Zamboni played
an active part, the European Union was able to endow itself with a monetary
law and ensure that the changeover to the single currency happened so naturally
that none of the predicted disasters occurred. It was an achievement that we owe
to people who, like Paolo Zamboni, were able to reason calmly, drawing on age-
old principles already enshrined in Roman law. At a time when there is much
discussion of the merits of the common law and civil law systems, it was a civil
law notion advanced by Latin legal experts that f irmly secured the “legally
binding equivalence between the euro and national currency units” sought by
the Member States at the Madrid Summit of December 1994. And in a last nod
to history, it is Roman law that provided the def initive foundation for the euro.
Paolo Zamboni was rightly very proud.
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HOW EURO BANKNOTES ACQUIRE THE PROPERTIES 
OF MONEY
Bernd Krauskopf
ABSTRACT
Lo studio considera dove e  come le banconote denominate in euro sono divenute
moneta dal punto di vista della legge monetaria ed esamina, sulla base della
legislazione comunitaria relativa alle banconote denominate in euro, il
significato giuridico dell’emissione delle banconote e della loro messa in
circolazione.  Viene analizzata la storia giuridica delle banconote, considerate
le diverse valutazioni legali sulla loro origine e si giunge alla conclusione che
le banconote denominate in euro acquisiscono le caratteristiche di moneta nel
corso delle seguenti fasi: nelle pubblicazioni (ufficiali) sono rese note le
caratteristiche peculiari delle banconote; l’emissione delle banconote è
autorizzata dal Consiglio direttivo della Banca Centrale Europea e, da ultimo,
l’atto effettivo della loro messa in circolazione deve essere posto in essere dalle
Banche Centrali Nazionali. Per contro, la demonetizzazione avviene attraverso
il rientro di una banconota alla Banca Centrale Nazionale oppure tramite il
ritiro delle banconote di una specifica serie o denominazione.
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1 COMMUNITY LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF EURO BANKNOTES
The starting point of our deliberations on how euro banknotes acquire the
properties of money is Community monetary legislation, specifically Article 106
(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”). This
provision gives the European Central Bank (ECB) the exclusive right to authorise
the issue of banknotes within the Community. The ECB and the national central
banks have the right to issue banknotes. Article 16 of the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (“the Statute”)
reiterates these rules and adds that the ECB should respect as far as possible
existing practices regarding the issue and design of banknotes. The Council of
the European Union set 1 January 2002 as the date for the introduction of euro
banknotes and coins in Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on
the introduction of the euro.2 Through its decision of 7 July 1998 the Governing
Council of the ECB determined the denominations and specifications of the euro
banknotes and adopted (in addition to rules governing the reproduction 
of banknotes) provisions on the exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes3,
which were supplemented by a Guideline addressed to the national central
banks4. With the decision of 6 December 2001 on the issue of euro banknotes
the Governing Council of the ECB laid down a detailed division of
responsibilities with regard to the issue of banknotes within the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB).5
2 ISSUERS OF THE EURO BANKNOTES
It is not immediately clear from the Treaty just what “issuing banknotes” means.
It is therefore reasonable to resort to the traditional interpretation of the term,
which distinguishes between the issue of banknotes and the act of putting them
into circulation.6 In the case of the euro banknotes, this is an important
distinction, because these functions may be carried out by different parties. The
act of issuing the banknotes implies that the issuer, by virtue of the issuance,
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1 This is true despite the signif icant role played by book money, whose volume is many times greater than that
of cash. For example, the value of banknotes issued by central banks of the Eurosystem in September 2004
amounted to approximately €440 billion, whereas the value of overnight deposits was more than f ive times
greater at €2,428 billion. See ECB Monthly Bulletin (December 2004), p. 13.
2  OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.
3  Decision of the ECB of 7 July 1998 on the denominations, specif ications, reproduction, exchange and
withdrawal of euro banknotes (ECB/1998/6), OJ L 8, 14.1.1999, p. 36; now replaced by Decision of the ECB
of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specif ications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro
banknotes (ECB/2003/4), OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16. 
4 Guideline of the ECB of 26 August 1998 on certain provisions regarding euro banknotes, as amended on 
26 August 1999 (ECB/1999/3), OJ L 258, 5.10.1999, p. 32. After the repeal of Article 1 (4) of this Guideline
by the Decision of the ECB of 30 August 2001 on the denominations, specif ications, reproduction, exchange
and withdrawal of euro banknotes (ECB/2001/7), OJ L 233, 31.8.2001, p. 55, Articles 1,2, and 4 of the same
Guideline were repealed and replaced by Guideline of the ECB of 20 March 2003 on the enforcement of
measures to counter non-compliant reproductions of euro banknotes and on the exchange and withdrawal of
euro banknotes (ECB/2003/5), OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 20.
5  Decision of the ECB of 6 December 2001 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2001/15), OJ L 337, 20.12.2001,
p. 52, as last amended by Decision of the ECB of 22 April 2004, amending Decision ECB/2001/15 of 
6 December 2001 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2004/9), OJ L 205, 9.6.2004, p. 17.
6  For the difference between the two terms, see also R. Smits (1997), The European Central Bank: Institutional
Aspects (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), p. 206.
is incurring a liability because the banknotes have a value.7 This liability is also
listed on the balance sheet of the central banks. By contrast, putting banknotes
into circulation indicates that a banknote has physically left the premises of a
central bank with the purpose of constituting a means of payment in the market.8
However, it would be wrong to deny the act of putting banknotes into circulation
any legal signif icance and to see in it nothing more than a description of actual
procedures. Issuing and putting into circulation are not entirely unconnected but,
instead, are mutually complementary.
Pursuant to Article 106 (1), second sentence, of the Treaty, the ECB and the
national central banks may issue banknotes. Pursuant to Article 106 (1), third
sentence, of the Treaty, only these banknotes have the status of legal tender
within the Community. These provisions in primary Community law stipulate
that, as a matter of principle, only the ECB, the national central banks, or the
ECB and the national central banks together may issue banknotes.9
Paramount importance is attached to the principle of decentralisation with
respect to decisions that the Governing Council of the ECB, as its supreme
decision-making body, has to take on the performance of ESCB tasks. In
accordance with Article 12 (1), paragraph 3, of the Statute, the ECB, to the extent
deemed possible and appropriate, is to have recourse to the national central banks
to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB. 
During the period between the launch of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) and the introduction of euro banknotes and coins the national
central banks alone were empowered by the Governing Council of the ECB to
issue national banknotes in accordance with their national practices.10 The
background to this decision was that, pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation
(EC) No 974/9811, banknotes denominated in a national currency unit retained
their status as legal tender within their territorial limits as of the day (i.e. 
31 December 1998) before the entry into force of this Regulation. 
The Governing Council of the ECB decided on 6 December 2001 that, with the
introduction of euro banknotes and coins, both the ECB and the national central
banks would issue banknotes in the legal sense.12 In the same Decision the
Governing Council of the ECB laid down the distribution of responsibilities for
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7  See C. Zilioli and L. Di Preso, in H. von der Groeben and J. Schwarze (eds) (2003), Vertrag über die
Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Vol. 3, Articles 98-188 of the
Treaty; 6th ed. (Baden-Baden; Nomos), Article 106 of the Treaty, margin number 11; see also H. Weenink
(2003), “The Legal Nature of Euro Banknotes”, in Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 18,
p. 433. 
8  See Zilioli and Di Preso, op. cit. footnote 7, Article 106 of the Treaty, margin number 11.
9  In order to take account of the special situation in the United Kingdom, where banknotes are issued not only
by the Bank of England but also by commercial banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland although these
banknotes do not have the status of legal tender, the possibility of other (private) issuers issuing banknotes
with the authorisation of the ECB is not actually ruled out under primary Community law. However, these
banknotes would not be deemed legal tender in the Community.
10 See Guideline of the ECB of 22 April 1999 on the authorisation to issue national banknotes during the
transitional period (ECB/1999/NP11), published under Decision of the ECB of 10 November 2000 on the
publication of certain legal acts and instruments of the ECB (ECB/2000/12), OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 68.
11 Cited in footnote 2.
12 Article 2 of Decision ECB/2001/15, cited in footnote 5. 
the banknote cycle within the Eurosystem. The ECB is not involved in the
physical issue of banknotes. These are put into circulation and withdrawn from
circulation solely by the national central banks, pursuant to Article 3 of Decision
ECB/2001/15 on the issue of euro banknotes.13 Procurement for the production
of banknotes is also undertaken on the level of the national central banks, which
purchase them on the open market, use their own banknote printing works or
resort to public security printers.14
Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 stipulates that the ECB and
the national central banks are to put euro-denominated banknotes into circulation
as from 1 January 2002. The purpose of this was simply to f ix the date for
introducing cash. Rules governing the issuer of banknotes in the legal sense or
the extent to which the ECB and the national central banks were to be involved
in the physical issuance of banknotes were not intended to be affected by it.
There was no intention to interfere with the competence of the Governing
Council of the ECB.
These rules enshrined in Community monetary legislation on the euro provide
no def initive answer to the question we posed at the beginning: how and when
do euro banknotes acquire the properties of money. It therefore seems
appropriate to examine our understanding of the subject in the German context.
3 DEVELOPMENT OF PAPER MONEY
Let us start by taking a look at the historical development of paper money and
at the legal environment in which the various stages of this development
occurred. This will make it easier to understand the legal implications of paper
money today. In its present form, paper money is a recent phenomenon. Money
in the Europe of antiquity, the Middle Ages and early modern times took the form
of coins. Initially, these were made mostly from gold or silver and thereby
transformed these precious metals, which were used as a measure of exchange,
into manageable monetary units. The actual value of the metal was the deciding
factor. One therefore speaks of commodity money. Later, coins were minted
whose intrinsic value was less than their face value. These mark the transition
to money which has only a nominal monetary value but no intrinsic value
(f iduciary money).15 Banknotes developed from deposit certif icates for gold or
silver, which were issued by bankers or goldsmiths who promised in these
certif icates to pay out a certain quantity of gold or silver on presentation of the
certif icates.16 Soon the issue of notes began to take place independently of the
actual amount of precious metal deposited, with the result that the promise of
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13 This takes account of the principle of decentralisation cited in Articles 9 (2) and 12 (1) of the Statute. See
Recital 8 of Decision ECB/2001/15.
14 For future procurement, see Guideline of the ECB of 16 September 2004 on the procurement of euro banknotes
(ECB/2004/18), OJ L 320, 21.10.2004, p. 21.
15 See P. Badura (1963), Das Verwaltungsmonopol (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot), p. 99, which contains further
references.
16 See K. Olivecrona (1957), The Problem of the Monetary Unit (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell), p. 49.
an exchange came to the fore. However, these notes did not lose their properties
as a security at f irst but continued to represent a claim under private law.17 This
means that they were bearer debt securities with which a redemption commitment
on the part of the issuer was securitised and which were treated under the law
of negotiable instruments (representative money).
Historically, various bodies were engaged in the issue of (covered) notes. In
Germany, for example, not only state central banks had the right to issue their
own notes; in the past private banks also enjoyed this prerogative. It was not until
a unif ied Nation State had been founded in Germany in 1871 that this right was
restricted to one (state-owned) central bank, the Reichsbank, which was
established in 1876.18
The promise to pay the bearer in gold was also abolished eventually.19 This finally
brought about a development which had long been advocated in political debate.
As far back as the 18th century Sir John Sinclair saw the freeing of paper money
from the redemption commitment as a prerequisite for any economic growth.20
Yet, a promise to redeem these notes in gold remained on the banknotes of many
countries for quite some time.21 However, the practical value of the redemption
commitment was always marginal as it would probably have functioned only as
long as it was not really required.22 With the abolition of the redemption
guarantee the development of the banknote from being a security to being a
monetary23 token or a public monetary token24 (f iat money) was complete.25
The previously securitised right to fulf ilment is having an effect on the legal
treatment of banknotes to this day. Duden has arguably provided the most apt
explanation of how we should understand the terms “redemption” or “cover” in
the case of today’s money which is non-convertible, i.e. cannot be exchanged
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17 See H. H. Schaelchlin, Das Geld als ökonomische und juristische Kategorie (dissertation, Freiburg/Schweiz,
1948), p. 71. The right to the exchange or replacement of (damaged) banknotes (which still exists today) has
its origins in public law, at least in Germany; see L. Gramlich (1988), Bundesbankgesetz (Köln et al.: Heymann),
section 14, margin number 10.
18 For the history of the central banks in Germany up to 1936, see B. Sprenger (1986), “Banknotenprivileg in
Deutschland”, in Die Bank, p. 533 et seq.
19 See H. Beck (1959), Gesetz über die Deutsche Bundesbank (Mainz-Gonsenheim and Düsseldorf: Braun), section
14 K 349.
20 “It was a great discovery when a metallic medium was substituted for barter; it was also a great discovery
when paper was made convertible into gold and silver; but a third discovery was reserved for our own times,
namely that with an inconvertible paper currency, agriculture, commerce and manufactures might advance in
a career of unexampled prosperity.” Sir John Sinclair, as quoted by J. Harvey (1877), Paper Money, the Money
of Civilization. An Issue by the State, and Legal Tender in Payment of Taxes (London: Provost & Co.), p. 16.
21 See Olivecrona, op. cit. footnote 16, p. 49 et seq., who refers to the promise to pay which still appeared on
US and UK banknotes at that time but which, he claims, is meaningless. However, this promise may have
remained in use not only for reasons of tradition and to increase conf idence in the currency but also for legal
considerations because in the UK, for example, the guarantee to pay in gold was only suspended initially and
was not abolished completely until later.
22 See A. Nussbaum (1925), Das Geld in Theorie und Praxis des deutschen und ausländischen Rechts (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck), p. 31 et seq., who refers to Ludwig Bamberg’s description of the redemption guarantee as a
“fur for dog days”.
23 For the development of paper money, the partial gold cover and the (false) wording “I promise to pay”, see
Harvey, op. cit. footnote 20, p. 8.
24 See G. Grenz (1955), Geldregal und Währungsverwaltung (legal dissertation, Hamburg), p. 169.
25 See also Bundesverwaltungsgericht (the German Supreme Administrative Court), judgement of 23 November
1993, BVerwGE 94, 294 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1994), p. 954. The court explicitly rejected the
qualif ication of banknotes as bearer debt securities.
for precious metals or precious metal coins. Duden points out that today money
is neither covered contractually nor legally by certain assets which would be
linked to its security but, instead, that solely “appropriate banking operations”
guarantee the cover of bank money.26
Closely associated with the question of cover or redeemability is the government
order which stipulates that the acceptance of banknotes is mandatory and which
is encapsulated in the term “legal tender”.27 The question is whether it is essential
for money to be subject to unrestricted mandatory acceptance before one can
speak of “money”.28 The property of money as “legal tender” emphasises f irst
and foremost its exclusive claim to be the money of a given currency area and
renders legal actions easier. However, it would be equally conceivable to leave
its acceptance to the discretion of the marketplace. It has been rightly pointed
out that, although the general mandatory acceptance implied by the term “legal
tender” is customary nowadays for monetary tokens, it is not essential for a
certain object to be a monetary token.29 In contrast to coins, banknotes were not
recognised as legal tender for a long time. It was even maintained that paper
money can be regarded as money in the legal sense only if it is at one and the
same time legal tender as only coins were real money.30 In Germany, for example,
even the banknotes issued by the Reichsbank were not legal tender until declared
so by the Coinage Act of 1 June 1909.31
If the State refrains from granting any monetary token the status of legal tender,
problems will arise, if at all, only in the case of weak currencies. However, events
in the 1930s in Switzerland, where there was no legal tender in circulation
between 1930 and 1936, show that, even when none of the monetary tokens
issued has the property of legal tender, the tokens in circulation, such as
banknotes denominated in Swiss francs, can be accepted in transactions without
diff iculty. They are therefore also to be treated as money in the legal sense.32
Nowadays, it is sensible and consistent with tradition to grant banknotes the
status of legal tender. However, it does not appear to be absolutely essential. By
contrast, the value of the material or the redemption commitment are
meaningless. Distinguishing between coins and paper money within the same
monetary legislation is no longer appropriate.33 In the case of the euro the
European legislators decided to grant euro banknotes the status of (sole)
unrestricted legal tender.34
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26 See K. Duden (1968), Der Gestaltwandel des Geldes und seine rechtlichen Folgen (Karlsruhe: CF Müller),
p. 10.
27 See Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 32.
28 Again, see Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 32; for a critical appreciation of  the term “legal tender” see
also Duden, op. cit. footnote 26, p. 15.
29 See U. Häde (1994), “Die rechtlichen Grundlagen der Bargeldausgabe“, in Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung,
p. 90.
30 See C. Knies (1931), Das Geld, reprint of the 2nd edition of 1885 (Leipzig: Buske), p. 348.
31 In Article 3 of this Act, RGBl. 1909, p. 507; see also Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 30.
32 See Schaelchlin, op. cit. footnote 17, p. 73.
33 Regarding the legal division of responsibilities, it must be remembered that in many countries the right to mint
coins and the right to issue banknotes are not held by the same institutions. The central bank is frequently
responsible for issuing the banknotes while the “coin prerogative”, as it is called, belongs to the government.
34 Article 106 (1) of the Treaty and Article 16 of the Statute, reiterated by Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 974/98.
4 MONETISING EURO BANKNOTES
With respect to the euro banknotes any legal notif ication of the origin of paper
money must state not only that banknotes which are stored in the vaults of the
central banks (either because the central banks have not yet put them into
circulation or because the banknotes have flowed back to them) are not shown
on the liabilities side of these central banks’ balance sheets but also that the ECB,
which does not put banknotes into circulation itself, nevertheless lists, as the
issuer of banknotes, such banknotes as liabilities on its own balance sheet and
receives from the Eurosystem prof its arising from the banknote issue.35
No standard legal def inition (or one agreed at the international level) of money
exists at present.36 Civil law and criminal law each have their own way of looking
at money as a phenomenon. The def inition of money in civil law has remained
(almost) unaffected by the changes in the term “money” in the economy as a result
of the increase in book money and is still largely determined by a physical notion
of money.37 Owing to the principle of nulla poena sine lege, criminal law requires
precise definitions. It is therefore not surprising that an early definition of money
in German law introduced in a united Germany after 1871 is to be found in a
decision delivered in a criminal case on counterfeiting. The Supreme Court
def ined money as “any means of payment certif ied as a medium of value by the
State or by any body authorised by it and destined for public circulation”.38 In
monetary legislation, money is defined as what  is proclaimed by the State to have
valor impositus and which must be, or at least is, accepted to repay debts.39
It is clear from these def initions that the emergence of the property of “money”
is not a purely factual matter but rather a legal matter. Given the necessary
technical know-how, anyone can produce printed paper with colourful designs
and special security features.40 If such a product is to become (paper) money
which will be accepted by third parties as a universal means of exchange, a legal
act to that effect is required. There is a broad consensus within the f ield of
jurisprudence in Germany that the legal act denoting the “birth” of a banknote
belongs to the sphere of public law41 for the mere reason that the issuance of
banknotes in Germany was, and is, a task reserved exclusively for public bodies,
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35 See Annex II of the Decision of the ECB of 5 December 2002 on the annual accounts of the ECB
(ECB/2002/11), OJ L 58, 3.3.2003, p. 38, and Article 10 and Annex IV of the Guideline of the ECB of 
5 December 2002 on the legal framework for accounting and f inancial reporting in the ESCB (ECB/2002/10),
OJ L 58, 3.3.2001, p. 1.
36 Nothing has changed with respect to the f inding of S. Simitis (1960), “Bemerkungen zur rechtlichen
Sonderstellung des Geldes”, in Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, Bd 159, p. 406 and p. 465, to the effect that
there is no such international def inition of money.
37 See H. U. Franzke (1964), Geldhoheit und Währungssteuerung (Frankfurt am Main: Knapp), p. 106.
38 Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the German Reich), judgement of 11 July 1924, RGSt 58, 255, 256. This
def inition which was derived from the court decision, was generally taken over by the legal literature; see W.
Ruß, in H.-H. Jescheck, W. Rus and G. Wilms (eds) (2000), Leipziger Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch, 11th edition
(Berlin and New York: de Gruyter) section 146, margin number 4; W. Stree and D. Sternberg-Lieben, in A.
Schönke and H. Schroeder (2001), Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, 26th edition (Munich: Beck), section 146,
margin number 2; H. Tröndle and T. Fischer (2001), Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 50th edition (Munich:
Beck), section 146, margin number 2; K. Kühl in K. Lackner and K. Kühl (2001), Strafgesetzbuch mit
Erläuterungen, 24th edition (Munich: Beck), section 146, margin number 2; Häde, op. cit. footnote 29, p. 90.
39 See Schaelchlin, op. cit. footnote 17, pp. 70 et seq., who describes this money as “money par excellence”.
40 However, certain materials used in the manufacture of banknotes are given special protection against unauthorised
use, section 127 of the Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (Act on Breaches of Administrative Regulations).
41 See H. J. Hahn (1990), Währungsrecht (Munich: Beck:), p. 65.
both prior to entry into Stage Three of EMU and after the introduction of the
euro.42 Consequently, the unauthorised issue of monetary tokens is a punishable
offence, pursuant to section 35 of the Bundesbank Act.43
The act of monetisation, through which a moveable object is accorded the
function of a general means of exchange, or, in other words, the function of
money, is supposed to be identif iable by an outwardly recognisable mode of
behaviour.44 However, owing to the undeniable diff iculties, some commentators
avoid specifying by what outwardly recognisable act the transformation from
printed paper to banknote is manifest. They restrict themselves to the statement
that this act is an administrative act with no particular addressee and bring it
close to the status of dedication. Many even see a similarity between dedicating
a banknote and dedicating any object to be a public entity.45 In German law this
is understood to be a measure by which the government or other national bodies
with sovereign powers acquire specif ic physical control, which leaves private
property untouched but burdens it with public servitude.46 Accordingly, the issue
of banknotes is said to be the dedication of banknotes to the public entity of
money in the form of unrestricted legal tender.47 As a counter to this legal
construction, however, it has been argued that the jurisdiction of the holder of
the paper money is not restricted but, instead, is extended because the paper
acquires a value in addition to its purely material value.48 Furthermore, neither
public use nor public ownership coupled with the transfer of money to private
use is associated with money.49 These weaknesses are recognised by others, and
the act of dedication is deemed to be sui generis.50 
However, this does not bring us much further in answering the questions posed
at the beginning because that depends crucially on what outwardly visible act
the monetisation act51 is associated with from a legal point of view. There are
three possible options:
(a) Manufacturing banknotes;
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42 See J. von Spindler, W. Becker and O.-E. Starke (1973), Die Deutsche Bundesbank, 4th edition (Stuttgart et al.:
W. Kohlhammer), section 27, note IV in conjunction with Beck, op. cit. footnote 19, section 14, footnote I 2.
43 The same applies to non-interest-bearing bearer debt securities. In the history of law, this again illustrates
the origin of the modern uncovered banknote, which arose from the bearer debt security of a central bank.
44 For a def inition of the monetising act, see U. Häde (1991), Geldzeichen im Recht der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos), p. 50.
45 For example, Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 179, although she does not deal with the preconditions and
consequences of this act of dedication in more depth; also, more recently, D. von Stebut (1982), “Geld als
Zahlungsmittel und Rechtsbegriff ”, in Jura, p. 561 and p. 563.
46 See G. Pfennig (1971), Die Notenausgabe der Deutschen Bundesbank (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot), p. 28
et seq.; H. Dilcher, in J. von Staudinger (1995), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einführungsgesetzen und Nebengesetzen, sections 21-103, 13th revision (Berlin: de Gruyter), section 91, margin
number 13; with regard to its dedication to be a public entity, see also L. Gramlich (1987), “Die Begebung
von Geldzeichen”, in Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen, p. 548 and p. 552, although he assumes the
existence of an “inherent power” arising from the actual process of putting the monetary tokens into circulation,
a phenomenon which he detects in the issuance by the Bundesbank.
47 See Pfennig, op. cit. footnote 46, p. 47.
48 See Häde, op. cit. footnote 44, p. 183.
49 See Dilcher, op. cit. footnote 46, section 91, margin number 13.
50 See, for example, K. Schmidt, in: Staudinger (1997), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einführungsgesetzen und Nebengesetzen, sections 244-248 (monetary legislation), 13th revision (Berlin: de
Gruyter), before section 244, margin number B 2; see also Häde, op. cit. footnote 44, p. 183; see also Hahn,
op. cit. footnote 41, p. 65.
51 For terminology, see Häde, op. cit. footnote 44, p. 51 et seq.
(b) Announcing the distinguishing features on a particular banknote
denomination or banknote series;
(c) Putting an individual banknote into circulation. 
The f irst thing that has to be emphasised is that the production of banknotes,
just like the minting of coins, cannot be said to have direct legal effects as they
are both purely technical processes. Money does not come into being simply as
the result of the production of “banknotes”.52 Even if one wanted to regard this
juncture as the moment when a banknote is “born”, the transformation of printed
paper into a banknote would occur, if at all, at the time this technical process
took place and not as a result of that process in itself. Grenz believes that the
characteristics of money are bestowed on printed banknote paper at the point
of manufacture itself by virtue of that very process and, moreover, that the act
of manufacture undergoes an act of dedication which gives it monetary value.53
Here, she follows older German authors who developed this explanation for the
minting of coins. She classif ies the act of dedication as an administrative act
with no particular addressee. According to Grenz, the customary signatures
depicted on banknotes are to be seen as a “certif ication of banknotes” just as
the government stamp is on coins.54 These thoughts evidently stem from the
similarity between seals and coin motifs but are hardly valid now that the ability
to reproduce these processes is so simple. Hahn, by contrast, maintains that, once
a particular banknote denomination has been announced55 or, in the absence of
such an announcement, has been put into circulation, every other banknote of
this type acquires the characteristics of money on completion.56 A related idea
is linked to the creation theory held in some quarters with respect to the German
law on securities. According to this theory, a security becomes such as soon as
it is issued and does not depend, for its properties of being a security, on the
subsequent act of issuance by the issuer.57 That does not explain why banknotes
which are not in circulation but, instead, are stored in the vaults of a central bank
are not banknotes in the legal sense and do not appear on the central bank’s
balance sheet. These opinions are therefore widely rejected.58
Another point of reference for monetisation could be the (official) announcement
of a banknote series. The Governing Council of the ECB laid down the
denominations and features of the euro banknotes by virtue of a decision which
was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.59 At the same time
this decision is an expression of the ECB’s intention that euro banknotes should
be issued with certain features.60 Pursuant to section 14 (1), sentence 3, of the
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52 See Hahn, op. cit. footnote 41, p. 65; and Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 173, who makes a distinction between
the printing of banknotes and the creation of their monetary properties.
53 See Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 179. However, she sees monetary value as a subjective public right.
54 See, for example, Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 175 et seq.
55 See below.
56 Hahn, op. cit. footnote 41, p. 69; and Schmidt, op. cit. footnote 50, before section 244 margin number B 3; Nussbaum,
op. cit. footnote 22, p. 35; von Spindler, Becker and Starke, op. cit. footnote 42, section 14, footnote 2.
57 Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 35; for a similar line of argument, see also Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 171.
58 See Dilcher, op. cit. footnote 46, section 91, margin number 13.
59 For the f irst euro banknote series, reference may therefore be made to Decision ECB/1998/6. This decision
has since been replaced by Decision ECB/2003/4 (both Decisions cited in footnote 3).
60 This expression of willingness was demanded by H. Fögen (1969), Geld- und Währungsrecht (Munich: Beck),
p. 21.
Bundesbank Act, the Bundesbank is also required to announce publicly the
denominations and distinguishing features of the banknotes which it issues. Prior
to the introduction of the euro it published these features in the Federal Gazette.
It has retained this practice for the euro banknotes. 
The essential purpose of these announcements is to inform the general public
about the distinguishing features of the banknotes. However, illustrations of the
euro banknotes appear neither in the off icial announcements of the ECB nor in
those of, for example, the Bundesbank. The announcement in the relevant legal
provisions is therefore legally necessary but in practice hardly suff icient. Large
sections of the general public are probably informed about the issue of new
banknotes not through off icial publications but, instead, through media
campaigns commissioned by the central banks. A crucial role is therefore
attached to the supplementary publicity work carried out by the central banks.
Prior to the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins this work focused on
the visual appearance of the euro banknotes and on how to recognise the security
features incorporated into the euro banknotes. 
It might actually be worth ascertaining whether announcement in this context
would not mean more than publication in off icial journals, and whether it
requires the central banks to undertake publicity work rather than just allowing
this work.
Voigt regards the announcement of denominations and distinguishing features
in the Federal Gazette as a legal norm (i.e. a statutory regulation) because, he
says, by its very nature it ascribes the characteristics of money to all the relevant
monetary tokens and consequently regulates the rights and obligations of every
individual participating in the economy as a whole.61 He rejects any further act
of creation or dedication that may be associated with the issue of the tokens.62
Others do not see the announcement of a new banknote series as a condition for
the bestowing of the function of money on it.63 Even the publication of the
distinguishing features is seen by some as unnecessary for transforming a note
into money. Accordingly, a banknote issued without prior announcement is also
to be ascribed a monetary value. The announcement of the denominations and
the distinguishing features has no normative value, it is claimed; nor does it have
any direct legal effect. This can be seen in the fact that the security of the payment
system would be endangered unless each banknote put into circulation by the
authorised bodies were given the characteristics of money.64 However, some add
the qualification that banknotes which were not put into circulation by the central
bank but were lost by it prior to issue can be acquired honestly only if such an
announcement were made.65 This argument is not convincing. The security of the
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61 See H.-U. Voigt (1969), Die Währungsverwaltung der Deutschen Bundesbank (legal dissertation, Göttingen),
p. 197.
62 See Voigt, op. cit. footnote 61, p. 198.
63 See Hahn, op. cit. footnote 41, p. 66; see also Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 177.
64 See Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 175 et seq.
65 See Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 171 et seq.
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paper-based payment system is based precisely on the fact that authorised
banknotes are distinguishable from other banknotes. This attaches paramount
importance to their outward appearance. The general public uses both the graphic
elements and the special security features (special printing techniques,
watermarks, security threads and the embossed “ECB” acronym) to ascertain
whether a particular piece of printed paper is a genuine banknote or not.
Häde66 sees in the announcement of the new issue of a banknote series the crucial
and publicly discernible declaration of intent on the part of the issuer which gives
the printed paper the characteristics of banknotes. Even so, he qualif ies this by
adding that this declaration can refer only to the banknotes already produced
at the time of the announcement. By contrast, he sees the manufacturing order
as the deciding act for subsequently produced banknotes of a series already
introduced. This view is not convincing because it creates an artif icial split in
a process that cannot be detected from outside the bank. Furthermore, the
contract to produce the banknotes is awarded before the actual production of
the notes begins. Evidently Häde uses this construct simply to avoid attributing
legal signif icance to the act of production itself. 
It is therefore clear that the decision to issue a banknote series and to announce
this decision is a necessary but not a suff icient condition for monetising euro
banknotes. The actual “transfer of banknotes to the public” as the decisive act
in their transformation into money is carried out by the national central banks,
which also put into circulation the banknotes issued by the ECB. 
In our opinion, putting the banknotes into circulation with the authorisation of
the Governing Council of the ECB is an essential element of their transformation
into money and fulf ils the decision to issue banknotes manifest in the
announcement.67 The transfer of ownership is to be seen as the moment when
the banknotes take on a monetary value.68 The transfer, which is to be viewed
as an act under civil law, simultaneously has an impact under public law because
the granting of the characteristics of money is a sovereign act. In principle, the
act of putting the banknotes into circulation is carried out by bodies endowed
with sovereign authority. In this way, the national central banks implement the
decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB.69
66 See Häde, op. cit. footnote 44, p. 73. However, Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 177, rejects the announcement
as the point of transformation into money, asserting that the announcement has no direct temporal connection
with the act of creation.
67 See Fögen, op. cit. footnote 60, p. 21; P. Probst, “Straf- und währungsrechtliche Aspekte des Geldwesens”,
in G. Warda et al. (eds) (1976), Festschrift für Richard Lange zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin and New York: de
Gruyter) describes this act as the point of issue; W. Fröhlich (1983) agrees in Die währungspolitischen
Instrumente der Deutschen Bundesbank und ihre Einordnung in die Regelungskategorien des öffentlichen Rechts
(legal dissertation, Würzburg), p. 110; Gramlich, op. cit. footnote 46, concurs (p. 548 and p. 550); for the
creation of coins as legal tender, see also Gramlich, op. cit. footnote 17, section 8 of the Coinage Act, margin
number 4.
68 See Fögen, op. cit. footnote 60, p. 22, for the importance of the transfer of the ownership of money in line
with the provisions for movable property; the characteristics were highlighted earlier by Schaelchlin, op. cit.
footnote 17, p. 74.
69 For a similar situation where Community law is implemented by national authorities without procedural rules
laid down by treaty or secondary legislation, see C. Koenig and A. Haratsch (2000), Europarecht, 3rd edition
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck), p. 50, margin number 129.
In the Eurosystem the task of putting the banknotes ascribed to the ECB into
circulation was also transferred to the national central banks.70 In Germany the
banknotes are put into circulation through the branches of the Bundesbank which
in turn pass them on to the holders of current accounts at these branches (as a
rule, these account holders are credit institutions or cash-in-transit companies).
Accordingly, it can also be conclusively stated that banknotes do not acquire the
characteristics of money until they are put into circulation by being transferred
to a third party and that banknotes which flow back to the central bank (or to
one of the other national central banks within the Eurosystem) again lose their
characteristics of money as a result and, further, that these banknotes which are
now out of circulation are not shown as a liability item on the central bank’s
balance sheet. Only when it is retransferred to the public does a banknote regain
the characteristics of money.
At least according to German legal interpretation, the acquisition of monetary
value can also be ascribed to “banknotes” which become lost at the issuing
central bank. The question here is whether and, if so, when these lost “banknotes”
become money in the legal sense. These notes are def initely not money in the
legal sense when held by parties in bad faith. The solution here is therefore likely
to be found in a bona fide approach.71 German law on the acquisition of property
in good faith stipulates that ownership of lost property cannot be acquired in
good faith (see section 935 (1) of the Civil Code.) However, section 935 (2) of
the Civil Code makes an exception in the case of money. It is widely held that,
pursuant to section 935 (2) of the Civil Code, at least by analogy, ownership of
this printed paper can be acquired as in the case of money.72 The characteristics
of money would arise with the acquisition of the property through a bona f ide
third party as the central bank does not lose ownership until this point and the
situation is therefore comparable with the deliberate transfer of ownership in
the case of putting banknotes into circulation. In support of this argument
reference has sometimes been made to the historical origin of the banknote as
a physical bearer debt security: banknotes could not be subject to less protective
provisions for the general public than physical bearer debt securities and
therefore the transformation into money accompanies in any event the bona f ide
acquisition.73
Putting banknotes into circulation through a body specif ically authorised for the
purpose, i.e. the national central banks in the case of the Eurosystem, is therefore
the last step in the process of printed paper acquiring the characteristics of money.
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70 See Article 3 (1) of Decision ECB/2001/15, cited in footnote 5.
71 It is only if every moveable object is regarded as money, assuming the nature of its production and appearance
is consistent with the general conception of money, that such a case does not pose problems. See, for example,
Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 35. For the reasons given above, however, this production-related approach
should be rejected.
72 See Fögen, op. cit. footnote 60, p. 22; Probst, op. cit. footnote 67 p. 422 et seq.; and D. Coburger (1988), Die
währungspolitischen Befugnisse der Deutschen Bundesbank (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot), p. 66 et seq.
73 See Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 170; F.A. Mann (1970), for example, in Juristenzeitung, p. 212 and p. 409,
emphasises more strongly the analogy with section 794 of the Civil Code concerning the obligation on the
part of the issuer arising from a debt security that he or she has lost or that has been put into circulation against
his or her will; Pfennig, op. cit. footnote 46, p. 69; and (for coins) Gramlich, op. cit. footnote 17, section 8,
margin number 4, of the Coinage Act.
5 DEMONETISATION
A banknote can lose the characteristics of money in two ways. First, a
(temporary) demonetisation can occur in the cash cycle if the banknote flows
back to the cash off ice of the central bank and its value is credited to an account
or if it is exchanged for another banknote. Second, a banknote can lose its
monetary properties if banknotes are recalled or withdrawn from circulation. 
Recall and withdrawal are used to replace one banknote series with another or
to introduce individual banknote designs with a new design. Recalled banknotes
have to be exchanged. This stems from an obligation under public law to grant
replacements; it arises from the nature of monetary sovereignty and concerns
the nominal value of the banknotes. An expiry period for the exchange is
customarily def ined. Once this exchange period has expired, the banknotes
become invalid and lose their monetary properties.74 Under German law the recall
of a banknote is tantamount to an administrative expropriation which divests the
holder of the note of his/her subjective public right75 to the monetary value of
the banknote, but leaves him/her in ownership of the banknote paper. However,
this expropriation is lawful76 as long as such government action serves the
common weal and as long as the length of the exchange period is adequate.77
The ECB’s rules governing the recall of a banknote series, an event which has
so far not taken place since the start of Monetary Union, are still rudimentary
and provide for the adoption of a Decision by the Governing Council of the ECB,
which will be published in the Off icial Journal of the European Union (and in
other media).78 Furthermore, the national central banks are required to announce
this decision in the national media at their own expense.79
Some people have also seen a termination of a banknote’s monetary properties
in the wear and tear or other physical mutation which results in a banknote being
deemed no longer f it for circulation.80 However, this is countered by the fact that
central banks are also required to exchange these banknotes.81 Moreover, cash
payments would be fraught with considerable risks as it would be unclear at what
point of deterioration the banknotes would lose their monetary properties.
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74 That, however, does not rule out the fact that such a period of exchange will be waived, at least for the time
being, as it happened, for example, at the Bundesbank with respect to Deutsche Mark banknotes when the euro
banknotes were introduced.
75 To understand monetary value as a subjective public right, see Grenz, op. cit. footnote 24, p. 38 et seq. and p. 170.
76 See Voigt, op. cit. footnote 61, p. 200. For an analysis of demonetising from the point of view of expropriation
under French law, see E. Alfandari, “Le droit et la monnaie: de l’instrument à la politique”, in P. Kahn (ed.)
(1988), Droit et Monnaie. Etats et espace monétaire transnational (Paris: Litec), p. 135 and p. 146 et seq.
77 See Gramlich, op. cit. footnote 46, p. 548 and p. 553.
78 Article 5 of  Decision ECB/2003/4, cited in footnote 3.
79 Article 5 of  Decision ECB/2003/5, cited in footnote 4.
80 See Nussbaum, op. cit. footnote 22, p. 38, for whom it was also immaterial whether this could be supported
by statutory provisions or not.
81 Regarding Deutsche Mark banknotes, see Bundesverwaltungsgericht, judgement of 23 November 1993, cited
in footnote 25.
6 SUMMARY
According to the Treaty and secondary EC legislation, both the ECB and the
national central banks have the right to issue banknotes. The Governing Council
of the ECB has decided to allow the ECB and the national central banks to issue
banknotes and has published the distinguishing features of the euro banknotes
in a Decision. 
As we understand it, printed paper becomes a euro banknote as a result of its
being put into circulation through its transfer by a national central to a third party
following the announcement of the Decision by the Governing Council of the
ECB to issue and the said Council’s authorisation to issue.
Conversely, demonetisation occurs either through the return of a banknote to a
national central bank or through the recall of a banknote series or a specif ic
denomination.
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THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE EURO AS A MEANS 
OF PAYMENT
Giuseppe Napoletano
ABSTRACT
Concentrandosi sulla protezione dell’euro quale moneta a corso legale, il cui
utilizzo ha efficacia liberatoria nell’adempimento delle obbligazioni
pecuniarie, il contributo delinea il modo in cui gli Stati membri dell’Eurosistema
hanno messo in comune la loro sovranità monetaria per creare un nuovo “bene
europeo”, l’euro, protetto legalmente a livello europeo.
Esponendo gli elementi essenziali del quadro istituzionale per l’emissione
dell’euro, lo studio evidenzia il fondamento a doppio strato della lex monetae
dell’euro: gli atti legali degli organi europei e quelli della Banca Centrale
Europea.
Il contributo descrive quindi gli sforzi effettuati per garantire protezione penale
all’euro nei confronti delle contraffazioni. In questo senso, molti sforzi sono stati
compiuti al fine di armonizzare, nei limiti del possibile, le previsioni di legge
nazionali in materia penale.
Un altro aspetto della protezione dell’euro è la progressiva integrazione, a
livello sia europeo che nazionale, tra le strutture organizzative, per prevenire
e reprimere le falsificazioni.
Infine, le regole fondamentali sulla riproduzione delle banconote in euro
dimostrano come la protezione dell’euro si estenda oltre i limiti della tutela
penale, coinvolgendo anche aspetti di tutela della proprietà intellettuale.
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1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
With the adoption of the European single currency, euro area Member States’
sovereignty and monetary sovereignty were separated. Although traditionally
considered as an inseparable part of a state’s sovereignty1, monetary sovereignty
was actually shared between the Member States that adopted the euro2, within
the institutional framework of the European Union (EU), where the issue of the
euro is governed by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), consisting
of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs).3
The ECB and the NCBs of the Member States that have adopted the euro are
known as the “Eurosystem”, and together they conduct the monetary policy of
the Union.4
As the institution where the decision-making bodies of the ESCB operate5, the
ECB alone may authorise the issue of euro banknotes and coins.6 The ECB and
the NCBs may issue banknotes, and these are the only legal tender in the Union.7
Member States may issue coins subject to the approval of the ECB as far as the
volume of issue is concerned.8
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1 See F. A. Mann (1992), The Legal Aspects of Money, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 416 et seq. There have been
some derogations to the principle, such as the “Latin Monetary Union” or “Latin League”, in the second half
of the nineteenth century; the so-called currency board, consisting of creating a link between the national money
and a foreign currency that is taken as a benchmark; or the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, which bind national monetary policies. On these topics, see M. Perassi, “Il cammino dell’Euro: da moneta
virtuale a moneta effettiva” (Messina, 20 December 2001), mimeo. The Latin League was created by an
International Convention on 23 December 1865, whereby Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland created a
common monetary area, in which golden and silver national coins had to be accepted in the other Member
States. Greece joined the League in 1875. The International Agreement was dissolved on 24 December 1925.
On this last topic, see P. Pecorari (1999), La lira debole. L’Italia, l’Unione monetaria latina e il “bimetallismo
zoppo” (Padua: Cedam).
2 On this process, see C. Santini and P. Zamboni Garavelli, “La Banca d’Italia nel Sistema Europeo delle Banche
Centrali”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.) (1999), Scritti in memoria di Pietro de Vecchis (Rome: Banca d’Italia), II,
pp. 904-05.
3 On the structure and the tasks of the ECB and of the NCBs, see S. Baroncelli (2000), La Banca Centrale
Europea: profili giuridici e istituzionali (Fucecchio: European Press Academic Publishing); C. Zilioli and 
M. Selmayr (2001), The Law of the European Central Bank (Oxford, Portland). See also R. Smits (2003), The
Position of the European Central Bank in the European Constitutional Order (Utrecht: Eleven International
Publishing), p. 23 et seq.
4 The conduct of the monetary policy implies the def inition and the implementation of the monetary policy of
the Union: Article 105 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”). See also Articles
I-30 (1) and  III-185 (2a) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (“the European Constitution”),
OJ C 310, 16.12.2004, p. 1. The references in this article to the European Constitution are based on the
assumption that the respective Treaty will actually enter into force, in accordance with Article IV-447.
5 Article 107 (3) of the Treaty. See also Articles I-30 (2) and III-187 (1) of the European Constitution.
6 Article 106 of the Treaty. See also Article I.30 (3) and III-186 of the European Constitution. 
7 Article 106 (1) of the Treaty. See also Article III-186(1) of the European Constitution. The issue of banknotes
is legally referred to the ECB and to NCBs (Decision of the ECB of 6 December 2001 (ECB/2001/15), OJ L
337, 20.12.2001, p. 52, amended by the Decision of the ECB of 18 December 2003 (ECB/2003/23), OJ L 9,
15.1.2004, p. 40, and by the Decision of the ECB of 22 April 2004 (ECB/2004/9), OJ L 205, 9.6.2004, p. 17).
8 Article 106 (2) of the Treaty. See also Article III-186 (2) of the European Constitution.
The European political bodies – the Parliament, the Council and the
Commission9 – play an important role in def ining the law of the euro, and there
are many ways for such bodies and the ESCB to exchange views.10
All these bodies, together with the Member States, concurred in def ining the
rules for the introduction of the euro, so as to ensure a smooth use of the
currency afterwards. This is based on awareness of the interaction between legal
certainty and monetary stability, since a well-def ined body of law is one of the
elements that, in combination, may provide stability to a currency.11
As a result, the introduction of the euro was accompanied by a close grid of rules,
which vary in nature between civil, administrative and penal. In this way, the
institutional rules for the governing of the euro, the lex monetae; the operational
criteria that citizens and f irms had to observe during the transition to the euro;
and the common rules for the protection of the euro, either as the object of
intellectual property or, most of all, as a means of payment, were all def ined.12
2 THE LEX MONETAE
Sharing monetary sovereignty implies an immediate effect on the legal sources
that def ine the money and control its use. In actual fact, if, as a rule, each
currency is def ined by the State that issues it13, then the def inition of the lex
monetae of the euro is basically a competence of the political bodies of the
European Union. The Parliament, the Council and the Commission may thus
issue European laws and framework laws14 to establish “the measures necessary
for use of the euro as the single currency”, upon consultation and without
prejudice to the competences of the ECB.15
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9 With reference to the European Constitution, see Articles I-34 and III-191.
10 The President of the EU Council and a member of the Commission may participate, without voting rights, in
the meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB. The President of the EU Council may submit a motion for
deliberation by the Governing Council of the ECB. The President of the ECB is invited to the meetings of the
EU Council when it discusses issues related to the objectives and the tasks of the ESCB. The ECB submits an
annual report to the European Parliament, the EU Council, the Commission and the European Council, while
the President of the ECB presents the report to the EU Council and the European Parliament, which can also
proceed on this basis to a general debate. The President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive Board
of the ECB may be heard by the competent committees of the European Parliament (Article 113 of the Treaty).
The ECB will also be invited to participate in the informal meetings of the Euro Group, provided for by a Protocol
to the European Constitution, whose members are the ministers of the Member States that adopted the euro plus
the Commission (Article 1 of the Protocol on the Euro Group, annexed to the European Constitution).
11 Article 105 (1) of the Treaty. See also Article I-30 (2) of the European Constitution. The stability of the currency
is essential to the welfare of society, as the recent Argentinian experience has shown. The stability of money
as a reserve of value protects f irst of all the weakest parts of the population, who live from their jobs, provides
f irms with certainty in their investment plans and in their business, and strengthens the function of means of
payment. For these reasons, the euro was created with price stability in mind; in its Preamble, the Treaty on
European Union underlines the willingness of the Member States to create “a single and stable currency”.
This is a key element in ensuring the stability of prices, which the European Constitution assumes is a basis
for the “sustainable development” of Europe (Articles I-3 (3), III-177, second and third periods and III-185
(1) of the European Constitution) and which it assigns to the ESCB as the “primary objective”. See ECB (ed.)
(2001), Why Price Stability? (Frankfurt am Main: ECB).
12 Major diff iculties were faced with reference to the penal protection of the euro, because Member States share
monetary sovereignty regarding the euro, but retain their legislative powers in the penal f ield; still, it is
necessary to punish any counterfeiting of the euro and, in general, any unauthorised reproduction.
13 M. Perassi (2003), “Armonizzazione e contratti bancari”, in F. Cafaggi (ed.) Quale armonizzazione per il diritto
europeo dei contratti? (Padova: CEDAM), p. 153 ff; T. Treves, “Pagamenti internazionali”, in Enciclopedia
Giuridica, (Rome: Isitituto della Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani), p. 2.
14 Articles I-33 and I-34 of the European Constitution.
15 Article III-191 of the European Constitution.
The EU Council def ined some aspects of the lex monetae of the euro through
Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to
the introduction of the euro16, and through Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May
1998 on the introduction of the euro.17 Besides scheduling the times and the
modalities for the changeover to the euro18 and introducing some contractual
rules19, these Regulations provide that the banknotes denominated in euro are
the only general means of discharging pecuniary obligations, while no person
or business is bound to accept more than 50 euro coins in a single payment.20
National provisions that limit cash payments for reasons of public interest are
expressly declared compatible with European rules, “provided that other lawful
means for the settlement of monetary debts are available”.21
In fact, the lex monetae of the euro is not only established in Council
Regulations. As mentioned above, the power of other European bodies in this
f ield does not prejudge the competencies of the ECB, according to which view
its exclusive power to authorise the issue of banknotes encompasses that of
adopting “all necessary legal measures to protect the integrity of the euro
banknotes as a means of payment”, including the adoption of a regime, common
to central banks, to exchange mutilated or damaged banknotes22 and to “withdraw
euro banknotes and to establish a common regime under which the ECB and the
NCBs can perform this withdrawal”.23
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16 OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1.
17 OJ L 139, 11.5.98, p. 1. Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 was amended by Regulation (EC) No 2595/2000 of 
27 November 2000, OJ L 300, 29.11.2000, p. 1, and Regulation (EC) No 974/98 was amended by Regulation
(EC) No 2596/2000 of 29 November 2000, OJ L 300, 29.11.2000, p. 2. Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 
28 June 2001 lays down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting, OJ L 181,
4.7.2001, p. 6, whose effects have been extended to the Member States that did not adopt the euro as their
single currency by Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001, OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11.
18 As from 1 January 1999 the euro is the currency of the Member States of the European Union that adopted
the single currency, with the exception of Greece, which joined the single currency as from 1.1.2001 (Article
2 of Regulation (EC) No 974/98, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2596/2000). From 1 January 2002, the
euro, formerly a “virtual” money, became money under any effect, since it circulates and is legal tender in
all the States that adopted the single currency. The conversion rates between the euro and national currencies
were established by EU Council Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 of 31.12.1998, OJ L 359, 31.12.1998, p. 1. During
the transitional period (1 January 1999-31 December 2001), the national currencies had to be considered as
subdivisions of the euro according to the irrevocable conversion rates, and could still circulate in each respective
Member State as legal tender according to the respective national rules (Article 6.1 of Regulation (EC) 
No 974/98). In any case, on the basis of Article 52 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank (“the Statute”), it was possible until 31 March 2002 to exchange national
currencies among themselves according to the respective conversion rates with the euro (Guideline of the ECB
of 20 July 2000 on the implementation of Article 52 of the Statute after the end of the transitional period
(ECB/2000/6), OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 66, amended by Guideline of the ECB of 25 October 2001
(ECB/2001/10), OJ L 304, 21.11.2001, p. 281. The “virtual” character of the euro during the transitional period
meant that the euro could be used only on a voluntary basis – according to the principle of “no prohibition
no compulsion” – for non-cash payments.
19 The provision that the introduction of the euro is without prejudice to the continuity of the contracts and of
the other legal instruments belongs more to the lex contractus than to the monetary law (Article 3 of Regulation
1103/97), unless the parties agree in a different way or, of course, the parties sign a contract to cover exchange
rate risk, in which case the introduction of the euro directly affects the contractual consideration. On this 
and other aspects related to the introduction of the euro, see A. Giardina (1999), “L’euro: Aspetti
Internazionalprivatistici”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, 4, pp. 789-800.
20 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 974/1998.
21 See “whereas” clause (19) of Regulation (EC) No 974/ 1998.
22 See “whereas” clauses (4) and (7) of the Decision of the ECB of 20 March 2003 on the denominations, specifications,
reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (ECB/2003/4), OJ L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16.
23 See “whereas” clause (12) of Decision ECB/2003/4.
As a rule, genuine euro banknotes which have legal tender and that are mutilated
or damaged can be exchanged at the NCBs if more than 50% of the banknote
is presented to the counter or if the bearer can demonstrate that the missing parts
were destroyed.24 Such an exchange is refused if the NCBs are certain or if they
have suff icient reason to believe that a crime was committed in relation to the
presented banknote; in this case, the NCBs shall seize the banknote and transmit
it to the judicial authorities.25
The ECB has not yet established a general regime for withdrawing euro
banknotes from circulation; nonetheless, it has established, on the one hand, that
such a regime shall include as a minimum the indication of the type or of the
series of the banknote that has to be withdrawn, “the duration of the exchange
period”, the date on which the banknote will lose its legal tender status, and “the
treatment of the euro banknotes presented once the withdrawal period is over
and/or they have lost their legal tender status” and, on the other hand, that the
rules on the withdrawal have to be published for purposes of general information
in the Off icial Journal of the European Union and in other means of
communication.26
3 CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
Ever since the Geneva Convention of 20 April 1929 on the Suppression of
Counterfeit Currency, counterfeiting has been a matter of special attention at
international level.27 This is probably one of the reasons why Regulation (EC)
No 974/98, which established the legal principles for the euro, briefly states that
“participating Member States shall ensure adequate sanctions against
counterfeiting and falsif ication of euro banknotes and coins”.28
Nonetheless, a more profound awareness about the risks of counterfeiting
regarding the euro was slowly developing, taking into account the introduction
of a completely new monetary sign at European level, the treacherousness of
counterfeits, especially during the f irst period of circulation of the euro, when
European citizens were not yet fully accustomed to the basic features of euro
banknotes, and the greater potential that new digital techniques offer for
reproduction, which are now more diffused than ever before.
Thus, the ECB, in the middle of 1998, issued a Recommendation for the
European bodies and the Member States to review their policies in the f ight
against counterfeiting, to provide a new evaluation of the possibilities of
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24 Article 3.1 of  Decision ECB/2003/4.
25 Article 3.3 (b) of Decision ECB/2003/4. 
26 Article 5 of  Decision ECB/2003/4.
27 Under the Convention, the signing States shall: a) punish the forgery of counterfeited banknotes and coins,
the counterfeiting of genuine banknotes and coins, their putting into circulation, the procurement of such values
and of the instruments necessary for the forgery or the counterfeiting; and b) punish those facts even if they
concern foreign money or were committed abroad. The only requirement is that the forgeries must have been
committed on banknotes or coins with legal tender.
28 Article 12. In fact, all Member States already had national criminal provisions in place against counterfeiting,
in some cases also entailing very severe sanctions.
harmonising national criminal laws in this f ield, and to improve cooperation at
institutional, judiciary and police level, also by analysing the new techniques
which are available for banknote counterfeiting.29 The ECB stated that all
Member States should make it mandatory for banks and other professional
handlers of cash to seize suspected counterfeit banknotes and to send them to
the competent law enforcement authorities, as already provided for in Germany.30
In a short time31, the modalities to prevent and punish counterfeiting were
reconsidered, specif ically to protect the euro. Major steps towards the
harmonisation of criminal provisions on counterfeiting were taken, and
administrative structures were created to study counterfeiting techniques both
at a technical (with reference to comparisons between counterfeit and genuine
banknotes) and at an intelligence level, with specific reference to methodologies
and resources dedicated to investigations.32
The harmonisation of penal elements regarding the crime of counterfeiting was
obtained on the basis of the Council Framework Decision of 29 May 2000 on
increasing the protection provided by criminal penalties and other sanctions
against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro33 and
Council Regulation No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001, which laid down measures
necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting.34 These acts
def ined the common elements of the crime of counterfeiting in the EU Member
States and created an administrative structure for European cooperation, with
the aim of preventing and studying the phenomena related to counterfeiting.
Under Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 200035, Member States
shall ensure adequate protection of the euro against counterfeiting, with criminal 
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29 Point 4 of the Recommendation of the ECB of 7 July 1998, regarding the adoption of certain measures to
enhance the legal protection of euro banknotes and coins (ECB/1998/7), OJ C 11, 15.1.1999, p. 13.
30 Point 6 of Recommendation ECB/1998/7.
31 On 28 May 1999, the EU Council adopted Resolution 1999/C 171/01, OJ C 171, 18.6.1999, p. 1, which urged
Member States and the European bodies to cooperate more closely to protect the euro against counterfeiting.
In November 1999, the ECB published a Report on the legal protection of euro banknotes in the EU Member
States, which identif ied distinct areas of intervention and revealed the measures that the ECB considered as
necessary. On the basis of a comparative analysis, the Report ascertained that four kinds of counterfeiting were
punishable in the Member States: the duplication without legitimacy of genuine banknotes or the alteration
of their value; putting into circulation money which was counterfeited as indicated above; holding, acquiring
or transporting false money; and producing or distributing instruments to produce false money. The ECB
immediately underlined the need for close cooperation among the European police forces.
32 From a legal point of view, the interventions of the European bodies are founded on different legal bases: some
acts have been adopted on the basis of Title VII of the Treaty on economic and monetary policy. Other measures
are founded on the so-called third pillar of the EU, which means the provisions of the Treaty regarding the
cooperation of the police and the judiciary in the penal f ield (JHA). 
33 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 140, 14.6.2000,
p. 1. The content of the Framework Decisions may be similar under some aspects to that of a Directive, since
they, in order to harmonise the legal systems of the Member States (Article 34.2 (b) of the Treaty on European
Union), introduce some obligations for Member States. Regarding the differences between the Framework
Decisions and the Directives, see C. Koenig, A. Haratsch and M. Bonini (2000), Diritto Europeo (Milan:
Giuffrè), p. 357.
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001, OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6. The territorial application
of this Regulation was extended to the Member States that did not adopt the euro as their single currency by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001, OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 11.
35 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA aims to complete and facilitate the application of the Geneva Convention
of 20 April 1929 in the field of punishment of counterfeiting; several provisions similar to those of the Framework
Decision 2000/383/JHA are contained in the Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001, on
combating fraud and the counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 149.
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provisions.36 “Currency” means “paper money (including banknotes) and
metallic money, the circulation of which is legally authorised including euro
banknotes and euro coins, the circulation of which is legally authorised pursuant
to Regulation (EC) 974/98” (Article 1, second indent). Criminal penalties shall
be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” and they shall include “penalties
involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition”; “the offences
of fraudulent making or altering of currency [...] shall be punishable by terms
of imprisonment, the maximum being not less than eight years” (Article 6).37
Moreover, Member States shall also provide for “the necessary measures to
ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the offences […] committed for
their benef it by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of
the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person” (Article
8.1).38
In order to create a common space of freedom, security and justice, the European
Union simplif ied the procedures for judicial cooperation, introducing a
“European arrest warrant”39, which consists of the application (which also applies
to forgery and counterfeiting of the euro and to the counterfeiting of means of
payment (Article 2.2, 10th and 24th indents)) of the principle of mutual
recognition of a series of judicial penal measures, such as def initive sentences
(therefore going beyond the formal procedure for extradition), the provisional
measures of sequestration and conf iscation of goods, and arrest.
Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 created an administrative structure to prevent
counterfeiting of the euro, which is characterised by the integration between
European and national administrations. It is provided that each State shall
designate national competent authorities that are enabled to identify
counterfeited banknotes and coins, to collect and to analyse technical and
statistical data and to perform intelligence activities on counterfeits as well.40
36 To achieve this, it is provided that Member States shall punish as a crime the following: the fraudulent making
or the alteration of currency, whatever means are employed; the fraudulent uttering of counterfeit currency;
the importation, exportation, transport, receiving or obtaining of counterfeit currency with a view to uttering
the same and with knowledge that it is counterfeit; the fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining or possession
of instruments, articles, computer programs or other means peculiarly adapted for the counterfeiting or altering
of currency, or of holograms or other components of currency that serve to protect against counterfeiting
(Article 3.1).
37 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA was amended by Council Framework Decision 2001/888/JHA of the
Council, of 6 December 2001, OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 3, which introduced a “European recidivism”, consisting
of the duty to recognise as a cause of recidivism the f inal judgements of conviction issued in other Member
States for the crimes of counterfeiting, whatever the counterfeited money is.
38 The liability of the legal entity shall imply the imposition of “effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions”,
comprising criminal or non-criminal f ines and possibly other sanctions, including: a) the exclusion from
entitlement to public benefit or aid; b) the temporary or permanent prohibition to exercise commercial activities;
c) the placing under judicial surveillance; and d) a judicial winding-up order (Article 9.1).
39 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1. According to the Framework Decision, a French
judicial authority, for instance, can order the arrest of someone who has counterfeited banknotes in France
and, if the author of the crime has returned to, say, Italy, the Italian judicial authority shall execute the French
arrest warrant and shall surrender the person after verifying that the crime falls within the categories provided
for in Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision. There is no need for a corresponding crime to exist in Italy. As
far as counterfeit banknotes are concerned, in this example, the Italian judicial authority shall transmit them
to France, unless another trial is pending in Italy regarding the same banknotes, in which case the Italian
authority may decide that the banknotes shall temporarily stay in Italy or that they should be delivered to the
French authorities upon the condition that they shall be returned.
40 Article 2 (b) of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001.
Under Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001, banks and other professional handlers
of banknotes and coins shall seize counterfeits and remove them from circulation
each time they “know or have suff icient reason to believe [them] to be
counterfeit”, in order to ship them “immediately” to the national competent
authorities (Article 6 (1)). These authorities shall convey the banknotes and coins
which are suspected to be false to the National Analysis Centres (NACs) or to
the Coin National Analysis Centres (CNACs), respectively, so as to allow them
to conduct the f irst analysis and classif ication of the technical and statistical
data concerning the counterfeit; the f inal evaluation shall then be performed by
the ECB or by the European Technical and Scientif ic Centre (Articles 4 and 5).
The technical data concerning the counterfeits are then communicated to the
ECB so that they can be included in the Counterfeit Monitoring System (CMS),
a database created within the ESCB that permits users to analyse and manage
technical and statistical data related to euro counterfeits.41
Forms of cooperation concerning intelligence activities are also provided:
Member States, the Commission, the ECB and Europol shall cooperate by
exchanging information and by mutually assisting each other by means of
scientif ic support, training and logistical support (as per Article 7 of Regulation
(EC) No 1338/2001).
With reference to collaboration between polices, the European authorities chose
to strengthen the role of Europol, which performs intelligence activities by
collecting, storing, elaborating and analysing information42, by extending its
mandate to f ight against the counterfeiting of money and other means of
payment.43 To help in the performance of the tasks assigned to Europol, the
Member States shall ensure that Europol is informed about the result of the
analyses carried out by the national analysis centres on banknotes and coins
denominated in euro that are suspected to be false, within the criminal
procedures against counterfeiting.44
The extension of the Europol mandate to counterfeiting of money and other
means of payment automatically implies that Eurojust is also competent for the
same issues.45 Eurojust is a European office with a decentralised structure which
is entrusted with the tasks of stimulating, coordinating and supporting both
criminal investigations and judicial procedures, when at least two Member States
are involved. In the exercise of its tasks, Eurojust closely cooperates with
Europol and may exchange information with national, European and other
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41 Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 and Decision of the ECB of 8 November 2001 (ECB/2001/11),
OJ L 337, 20.12.2001, p. 49.
42 The tasks of Europol are to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States; to acquire, collect
and analyse information; to inform promptly the competent authorities of Member States about crimes that
can be of interest to them, also because these may be connected to other crimes, to assist the investigations
in the Member States, and to manage a database of relevant information.
43 Council Decision 1999/C 149/02, of 29 April 1999, extending Europol’s mandate to deal with forgery of money
and other means of payment, OJ C 149, 28.5.1999, p. 16; in this Decision, the concept of forgery of money
and other means of payment is def ined in relation to Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 20 April 1929.
44 Article 3 of Decision 2001/887/JHA.
45 Article 4.1(a) of Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002, setting up Eurojust with a view to
reinforcing the f ight against serious crime, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1. This Decision was also taken under the
third pillar of the EU Treaty.
international bodies and organisations (for instance, the ECB and the NCBs
which have been designated as NACs), as well as with authorities of third
countries which have competence in criminal investigations and judicial
procedures.46
4 UNAUTHORISED REPRODUCTION
Copyright on euro banknotes belongs to the ECB47; the copyright on the design
of the common face of euro coins belongs to the European Union, represented
by the Commission.48 Therefore, the protection of copyright on the designs of
euro banknotes and coins is left to the initiative of the central banks of the ESCB,
as far as banknotes are concerned, and to the Member States with reference to
coins; such a solution is in keeping with the civil and pecuniary nature of the
protection mainly offered by copyright law.
It should be mentioned that criminal sanctions against the breach of copyright
also exist, and that overall protection of copyright permits the completion of the
protection that is ensured in punishing counterfeiting by extending the control
of the police and the courts to cases that, although not strictly falling under the
criminal provisions, create unauthorised reproductions of banknotes and coins
that can confuse the public with regard to the exact individuation of genuine
monetary signs with legal tender, or that can damage the image of the issuing
institutions.
The purposes of reproductions of the euro may vary, but they can be classif ied
into two categories. The f irst refers to the creation and circulation of banknotes
or metallic pieces that, by reproducing more or less faithfully the legal tender
or by making reference to some elements that identify them (e.g. the name
“euro”, possibly with a pref ix or a suff ix), are intended to be means of payment
in a more or less wide context (e.g. displays, fairs). In the second category, the
object of reproduction is the design of the banknotes or of the coins, and its
purpose is cultural or educational (e.g. photos in specialised magazines,
inclusions in pieces of art) or commercial (e.g. on t-shirts, chocolates, etc.). This
therefore creates a grey zone, where reproductions – according to their nature
– may on the one hand be irrelevant from a legal point of view, but could on the
other hand imply a breach of copyright and/or damage to the image of the
issuer.49
The rules on reproduction, although based in copyright in a f irst moment50, later
found a wider legal basis. In actual fact, the legal basis to regulate reproduction
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46 The Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts (Nice Treaty) modif ied Article 29, second paragraph, second indent, of
the Treaty on European Union to mention explicitly Eurojust among the instruments of judicial cooperation
(Article 1.7 of the Nice Treaty). 
47 See “whereas” clause (3) and Article 1.2 of Decision ECB/2003/4.
48 Communication from the Commission on copyright protection of the common face design of the euro coins,
22 January 2001, paragraph 1.
49 For example, reproductions with pornographic elements.
50 Commission , op. cit. footnote 48, paragraph 2, “Reproduction regime”.
of the euro was found in the power of issuing the banknotes that are legal tender;
it can be assumed that such power, as a rule and without prejudice to different
provisions, includes the competence to adopt the legal measures which are
necessary to protect the integrity, as a means of payment, of banknotes and coins
that are expressed with the relevant monetary sign.51
Since the integrity of the means of payment is at stake if there is any confusion
on the part of the public with regard to the exact individuation of the values that
are legal tender, the criterion which was chosen to distinguish lawful
reproductions from those that are illicit was the existence of a danger of
confusion among the general public.52
Therefore, while the Commission adopted reproduction rules for the common
face of euro coins on the basis of its power as the representative of the European
Union, which is the holder of the copyright on the common face of euro coins53,
the ECB distinguished between “unlawful” reproductions (of banknotes
denominated in euro), in that they do not fulf il the criteria established by the
ECB to avoid the risk of confusing the public, and reproductions that infringe
the ECB’s copyright on the design of euro banknotes.54 Both typologies are
def ined as “non-compliant” and, in connection with this, mechanisms of
activation of central banks are provided.55
The ECB indicated either those elements that, in se, do not exclude the illicit
character of the reproduction (e.g. the reproduction technique, the addition of
elements that do not belong to the original design of the genuine banknote), as
well as the criteria designed to eliminate the danger of confusion; the ECB also
provided for an instrument of legal certainty, such as the safe harbour represented
by the possibility given to citizens to ask central banks in written form to provide
an evaluation as to whether or not a specif ic reproduction that is not in line with
the above-mentioned conformity criteria could confuse the general public.56
5 INFORMATION FOR CITIZENS
Any rule on the use of the euro, any criminal provision against counterfeiting,
and any criterion issued to discourage unauthorised reproduction of the euro
would risk being insuff icient if citizens did not possess adequate knowledge of
the basic features of banknotes and coins denominated in euro.
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51 See “whereas” clause (4) of Decision ECB/2003/4.
52 Article 2 of Decision ECB/2003/4; Commission, op. cit in footnote 48, paragraph 2, third period; and (4) and
Article 2 of the Commission Recommendation of 19 August 2002 concerning medals and tokens similar to
euro coins, OJ L 225, 22.8.2002, p. 34.
53 Commission, op. cit footnote 48, paragraph 2, “Reproduction regime”.
54 As far as violations of copyright on the design of banknotes are concerned, the ECB recommended to the
Member States to ensure that designs on banknotes may benef it, under the law, from the protection provided
for the registered marks (Point 3 of Recommendation ECB/1998/7).
55 Guideline of the ECB of 20 March 2003 on the enforcement of measures to counter non-compliant reproductions
of euro banknotes and on the exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes (ECB/2003/5), OJ L 78, 25.3.2003,
p. 20.
56 Article 2.1, 3 and 4 of Decision ECB/2003/4.
For this reason, European bodies and central banks placed great importance on
the provision of adequate information, to be furnished especially to the most
vulnerable parts of society, such as elderly people, persons in economic or social
diff iculties, persons with inabilities of a physical, sensorial or mental nature57,
or young people outside the educational system.58
Initiatives in European schools were set up by the European Parliament with a
view to the introduction of the euro59, when information campaigns were
designed by EU bodies, central banks and national governments and local
authorities.
6 THE EURO AS A “EUROPEAN GOOD”
The European interventions aimed at def ining the legal regime of the euro
characterise the euro as a “European good”.
The development of the euro into a good of a European nature is currently under
way following a track that started from the adoption of the single currency,
passed through the creation of the ESCB as a European structure to govern the
money, to come to the explicit provision, in the European Constitution, of the
Euro Group.
Although most attention is generally paid to the dialogue between the EU
representative bodies and the ESCB and to the f inancial instruments used to
conduct the monetary policy, the stability of the euro cannot be obtained without
adequate measures of legal protection; such measures are another important
element in ensuring that European citizens can trust in the euro as a means of
payment with legal tender and, thus, to contribute to its stability.
With this in mind, the legislative and monetary authorities in Europe have
def ined a system to protect the euro, which now can genuinely be qualif ied as
a “European good”, not only in a political and economic sense, but also in a legal
sense.
The protection of the euro is the object of European interest for a variety of
reasons, including the social welfare of European citizens, which is closely
linked to their trust in the euro as a means of payment with legal tender; and
the pecuniary interest of the issuers operating at the European level. The
European rules therefore protect the euro sometimes directly, and sometimes
through the Member States or the NCBs of the Eurosystem.
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57 Article 1.1 of the Recommendation of the Commission 2000/C 303/05 of 11 October 2000, on the measures
to facilitate the preparation of economic operators to the changeover to the euro, OJ C 303, 24.10.2000, p.
6, which is addressed on this point to the Member States.
58 Article 3.3, last period, of the Recommendation of the Commission of 23 April 1998, concerning the dialogue,
monitoring and information provided to facilitate the transition to the euro, OJ L 130, 1.5.1998, p. 29.
59 Point 10 of the Resolution of the European Parliament of 21 June 2001, A5-0222/2001, 2000/2278 (INI) on
the measures to assist economic operators in the changeover to the euro, approved by the European Parliament
at its meeting of 4 July 2001, OJ C 65 E, 14.3.2003, pp. 24 and 61.
The protection is pursued by convergent actions, also of an informational nature,
that are performed by the central banks and by the European and national
authorities. A signif icant level of co-ordination of the actions of police forces
and courts in the Member States was provided on the basis of the harmonisation
of criminal provisions. A strong impulse was given towards the harmonisation
of the rules on the use of the euro among citizens.60
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CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE UNDER EUROPEAN UNION
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Robert Sparve
ABSTRACT
Il contributo fornisce un breve resoconto del contesto in cui si è svolto il lavoro
sulla legislazione relativa alle banche centrali condotto dall’Istituto Monetario
Europeo (IME) e delinea i requisiti indicati dall’IME e, successivamente, dalla
Banca Centrale Europea (BCE). Lo studio ne esamina anche l’influenza in alcuni
paesi esterni all’Unione Europea (UE).
Il Gruppo di lavoro di esperti legali (Working Group of Legal Experts – WGLE)
dell’IME fu istituito nel 1995 per svolgere attività di ricerca ed elaborare
proposte su questioni giuridiche connesse con l’istituzione della BCE e con
l’introduzione della moneta unica, l’euro. Uno dei suoi compiti principali è stato
quello di elaborare proposte per garantire che gli statuti delle Banche Centrali
Nazionali (BCN) fossero compatibili con il Trattato e garantissero
l’indipendenza di ciascuna BCN, requisito, quest’ultimo, da applicare anche alle
banche centrali dei paesi che non avevano ancora adottato l’euro. Il WGLE ha
esaminato l’ammissibilità delle cosiddette “peculiarità nazionali”, valutandone
il grado e concludendo che erano ammissibili in misura limitata. I requisiti che
l’IME, come precursore della BCE, avrebbe stabilito dovevano essere, in linea
di principio, rigidamente applicati.
In retrospettiva, la BCE e i requisiti di indipendenza stabiliti dal WGLE hanno
avuto una influenza significativa sulla legislazione relativa alla banca centrale
in molti paesi. Gli standard UE sono considerati lo “stato dell’arte” e
rappresentano a livello internazionale la migliore prassi in materia di
legislazione per la banca centrale. L’adozione di questi standard da parte della
UE ha anche chiaramente dimostrato agli altri paesi che la politica monetaria
può e dovrebbe essere delegata a banche centrali indipendenti.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides a brief account of the background behind the work on central
bank legislation conducted by the European Monetary Institute (EMI), and
outlines the requirements set out by the EMI and, later on, by the European
Central Bank (ECB). The paper also examines their influence on some countries
outside the European Union (EU).
As several studies have demonstrated, for example those by Finn Kydland and
Edward Prescott1, governments in democratic countries may have a time
consistency problem. If economic policymakers lack the ability to commit in
advance to a specif ic decision rule, they will often not implement the most
desirable policy later on. What Kydland and Prescott offer is a common
explanation for events that, until then, had been interpreted as separate policy
failures. Their award-winning work on how economies become trapped in high
inflation even though price stability is the stated objective of monetary policy
established the foundations for an extensive research programme on the
credibility and political feasibility of economic policy. This research shifted the
practical discussion of economic policy away from isolated policy measures and
towards the institutions of policymaking, a shift that has largely influenced the
reforms undertaken by central banks and the design of monetary policy in many
countries. 
The importance of adequate institutional arrangements for conducting monetary
policy had been periodically highlighted by some economists from the 1940s
onwards, but it was not until the end of the 1970s that this topic came to the
fore and was more broadly studied and discussed. The reaction to the oil crisis
was an expansionary fiscal policy, partially financed by the printing press, which
ultimately resulted in inflation and stagnation – dubbed “stagflation” – because
fiscal policies were solely focused on creating demand instead of addressing the
underlying structural def iciencies caused by the new relative prices that OPEC
had imposed on the industrialised economies. The immediate effect of this was
the introduction in many countries during the 1980s of an explicit statutory price
stability objective for the monetary policy, and the limiting of direct central bank
credit to the government. However, such provisions rarely qualif ied the concept
of price stability, and central bank laws seldom contained statutory provisions
stating the independence of the central bank to def ine and execute its monetary
policy to attain this objective. In some small open economies, the political
authorities chose to peg the national currency to a foreign currency, which
implied the need to adjust the economic policy, in particular the inflation rate,
to that other currency. By contrast, the political authorities in some other
countries were hesitant or unwilling to delegate such powers to the central bank.
This may partly be attributed to an unwillingness to relinquish important
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F. E. Kydland and E. C. Prescott (1977), “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”,
Journal of Political Economy 85, pp. 473-90.
economic powers to technocrats, and additionally by the fact that under
Keynesianism, which emerged during the depression of the 1930s, the cost of
inflation was not fully appreciated. However, in all fairness, it must be
recognised that politicians in control of government are understandably reluctant
to relinquish monetary policy, since they would still be perceived by the
electorate as being responsible for the economic policy of the country as a whole. 
The Working Group of Legal Experts (WGLE)2 at the EMI was established in
1995 to conduct research and make proposals on legal issues related to the
establishment of the ECB and the introduction of the single currency, the euro.
One of its main tasks was to make proposals on the criteria according to which
the so-called legal convergence requirements3 should be applied by Member
States, with the aim of ensuring that the national central bank (NCB) statutes
should be compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB)4 and of the European Central Bank (henceforth “the
Statute”), as well as contain provisions securing the independence of each NCB,
with the latter requirement also applying to central banks that had not yet
adopted the single currency.5
At one of the f irst meetings of the WGLE, at which the extent to which the EMI
should accept, if at all, so-called national peculiarities in NCB laws was
discussed, some members6 argued that the EMI should allow for some flexibility.
In retrospect, those members were probably all eventually extremely content with
the majority decision to stand f irm. National peculiarities were accepted to a
very limited extent, and the requirements to be set up by the EMI, as the
forerunner to the ECB, were, in principle, to be strictly applied.7
The ECB and the independence requirements set out by the WGLE have had a
remarkable influence on central bank legislation in many countries. In particular,
with regard to the target of autonomy, the EU standards are considered to be state
of the art and constitute international best practice for central bank legislation.
The EU’s adoption of these standards has also clearly demonstrated to other
countries that monetary policy can and should be delegated to independent
central banks.
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2 The WGLE was composed of lawyers of the EMI and of each national central bank of the EU Member States
under the chairmanship of Jean Guill, Director of the Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois (Luxembourg
Monetary Institute). Upon the establishment of the ECB, the WGLE was transformed into the Legal Committee
of the ECB. Paolo Zamboni was one of the most influential and, it must be said, most charismatic members
of the WGLE and the Legal Committee. 
3 Article 121 (ex Article 109j) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”).
4 The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) consists of the ECB and the NCBs of the EU Member States.
Most members of the WGLE, including Paolo Zamboni, had been directly involved in the drafting of parts
of the Maastricht Treaty, including the drafting of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB.
5 These provisions do not apply to the United Kingdom according to the Protocol annexed to the Treaty.
6 Including, among other members, the author of this paper and Paulo Zamboni.
7 While the Treaty required “compatibility” of NCB legislation with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB
and the ECB, the EMI abstained from requiring harmonisation and still left some room for national peculiarities.
See The EMI Convergence Report 2000, p. 73. 
2 THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
Although important restrictions on German f iscal policy admittedly played a
fundamental role in the building up of the strength of the Deutsche Mark, the
Deutsche Bundesbank had for many years been internationally admired as one
of the best, if not the best, models for central banks and, naturally, had a great
impact on the legal framework for the ECB as the Maastricht Treaty was being
drafted. Central bankers worldwide had long appreciated the Bundesbank’s focus
on price stability; its independent status in its relations with the political
establishment; and, not least, the remarkable price stability that the Bundesbank
had delivered for several decades. To the founding fathers of the Maastricht
Treaty, the Bundesbank clearly deserved to serve as the model for the ECB and
the NCBs of the ESCB. 
Central bank independence had already been on the agenda at several
international meetings of central bankers. The Deutsche Bundesbank Act was
not the only model that was being studied and discussed; the importance of
removing monetary policy issues from the political scene had been discussed
in some other countries and, in various forms, implemented in the legal
framework of several central banks, for example in New Zealand and Chile.
However, when it came to designing the independence of the ESCB, the
Bundesbank model was the natural choice on which to build the fundamental
legal framework for the future central banking system that would administer the
single currency of the European Union.
3 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ESCB
The EU legal framework regulating the ECB is to be found in the Maastricht
Treaty and in the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB (which is part of the
consolidated version of the Treaty). On the national level, all NCB laws and,
in some countries, the Constitution as well (for example in Germany and
Sweden) had to be amended to ensure the independence of the ESCB.
A. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
The independence of the ESCB is founded on certain provisions in both the
Maastricht Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. Most of the
Treaty provisions are copied (or almost copied) and transferred into the Statute.
The most interesting provisions in this context are listed below:
NATIONAL LEGAL COMPATIBILITY 
Article 109 (ex Article 108) is crucially important as it prescribes that each
Member State shall ensure, no later than at the date of the establishment of the
ESCB, that its national legislation, including the statutes of its NCB, is
compatible with the Treaty and the Statute. Consequently, limitations on the
independence of NCBs would be incompatible, and provisions in national
legislation which would prevent the execution of ESCB-related tasks, or
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compliance with decisions of the ECB, would be incompatible with the effective
operation of the ESCB. With regard to the timing for removing
incompatibilities, independence needed to be enforced at the date of the
establishment of the ESCB, while provisions relating to the legal integration of
NCBs into the ESCB only needed to enter into force when the euro was
introduced as the single currency.
PROHIBITION AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS
Article 108 (ex Article 107) is one of the principal Articles of the Treaty on central
bank independence and includes the prohibition of instructions. The ECB, each NCB
and any member of their decision-making bodies are prohibited from seeking or
taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies or from any government
of a Member State or from any other body. This principle must be respected by
Community institutions and bodies and by the governments of Member States. They
must all undertake not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making
bodies of the ECB and of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks.
OTHER FEATURES
Although the objectives and functions of each central bank are not, strictly
speaking, elements of its independence, the maintenance of price stability is of
fundamental importance, and is enshrined as the central bank’s primary objective
(Article 105 of the Treaty and Articles 2 of the Statute). National legislation
should, accordingly, be compatible with these stipulations. Another such issue
is the prohibition against the central bank providing credits to the respective
governments, which is explicitly regulated in the Treaty (Article 101, ex Article
104) and also reiterated in the Statute (Article 21), which had applied since the
start of Stage Two of EMU, i.e. from 1 January 1994. 
This had wide implications for the functioning of not only the ECB but also of
the NCBs which, up to that point, had operated as government agencies under
direct control by the government or by the Ministry of Finance in theory, and by
the Minister of Finance in person in practice, in most Member States. European
politicians, and politicians in most other countries too, had for a long time tended
to consider their respective central banks to be basically the bank of the
government. This meant that the central bank should not only support the economic
policy of the government and provide additional funds for the government’s budget,
if required, but also, if necessary, do so whenever this was politically desirable,
even if economically unwise or inappropriate at a particular juncture. It may in
many cases have been tempting (and perfectly understandable) for any government
or Minister of Finance to order the central bank to conduct a lenient monetary
policy to boost employment when general elections were approaching, for
example. Notwithstanding this fact, this practice had in many countries repeatedly
proven to be disastrous to the economy and to its long-run economic growth
potential. It was believed that including an explicit price stability objective and
a prohibition against providing credit to the government, in conjunction with a
statutory prohibition against instructions, would provide an appropriate legal
framework that could foster central bank independence in conducting monetary
policy in accordance with the central bank’s statutory monetary policy objective.
B. THE STATUTE OF THE ESCB AND OF THE ECB
Article 7 of the Statute refers to Article 108 of the Treaty on the prohibition of
instructions, and Article 14 of the Statute prescribes specif ic provisions for the
NCBs, in this context in particular on:
– The compatibility of the national legislation of each Member State, including
the statutes of its central bank, with the Treaty and the Statute (Article 14.1).
– The statutes of the NCBs shall provide that the term of off ice of the governor
are no less than f ive years (Article 14.2, f irst paragraph).
– The governor of each NCB may be relieved of off ice only if he or she no
longer fulf ils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties
or if he or she has been guilty of serious misconduct; any decision to this
effect may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(Article 14.2, second paragraph).
4 THE 1998 EMI CONVERGENCE REPORT
Evidently, the rather fragmented provisions on central bank independence in the
Treaty and in the Statute had to be complemented and specif ied to provide a
useful pattern of requirements against which the compatibility of the national
legislation of the Member States, including the statutes of the NCBs, could be
effectively compared. Some gaps had to be f illed in, and the WGLE was
entrusted with conducting an investigation into this and working out an
appropriate proposal. This resulted in three progress reports in which the
assessment methodology was successively developed.8
The conclusions of the WGLE were largely adopted by the Council of the EMI
and published in the 1998 EMI Convergence Report, in which the EMI
established a list of features of central bank independence, distinguishing
between features of an institutional, personal, functional and f inancial nature,
and identifying remaining incompatibilities in national legislation. The EMI
concluded that neither the supremacy of the Treaty and the Statute over national
legislation nor the nature of a specif ic instance of incompatibility affects the
obligation to remove such incompatibilities.9
In addition to the statutory provisions in the Treaty and the Statute, the EMI
specif ied the following, related to:
INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
– The right of third parties to approve, suspend, annul or defer decisions by the
NCBs is incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as far as ESCB-related
issues are concerned.
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and Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union, EMI, October 1997. 
9 EMI Convergence Report, March 1998, p. 289. Reference is also made to the ECB Convergence Reports of
2000, 2002 and 2004.
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– The right to censor decisions on legal grounds and subsequently submit them
to political authorities for f inal decision would be equivalent to seeking
instructions and is considered incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute.
– The right of representatives of external political authorities to participate in
the decision-making bodies of an NCB with a right to vote is, even if not
decisive, incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute; no voting rights for
such representatives at board meetings may be acceptable.
– The right to be consulted (ex ante) on an NCB’s decisions is incompatible with the
Treaty and the Statute. However, this does not prevent there being a dialogue between
NCBs and the respective political authorities to provide information and exchange
views, which is not considered incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute, provided
that it does not result in interference with the decisions by the decision-making bodies
of the NCBs, that the ECB’s competences and the special status of the governor as
member of the ECB’s decision-making bodies are respected, and that any
infringement of the confidentiality requirements in the Statute provisions is avoided.
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE
– The minimum term of off ice for governors is f ive years, which does not
preclude however a compulsory retirement age that is compatible with the
Treaty and the Statute.
– The grounds for dismissal of governors must contain, in addition to the
requirements set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute, provisions ensuring that
governors are not dismissed for reasons other than those stated in Article 14.2.
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
– The NCBs should be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate means
to ensure that their ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulf illed.
– Safeguards shall be in place to ensure that any ex post reviews by the government
or parliament do not infringe upon the independence of the NCBs. In countries
where the government or parliament are in a position, directly or indirectly, to
influence the determination of the budget or the distribution of profits, the
relevant statutory provisions should contain a safeguard clause to ensure that
this does not impede the proper performance of the NCBs’ ESCB-related tasks.
FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
As the NCBs shall be integrated into the ESCB, their functional independence
is secured if the degree of legal integration into the ESCB is deemed appropriate,
in particular in the following areas:
– The statutory objectives (primary and secondary as stipulated in the Treaty).
– The tasks (compatibility with ESCB-related tasks).
– The instruments (any incompatibility with the Treaty and the Statute needs
to be removed).
– The organisation (there should be no rule binding the governor in his or her
voting at the ECB level or preventing any decision-making body from
complying with the rules at the level of the ECB).
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5 INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE FOR CENTRAL BANK LEGISLATION
The repeated f inancial disasters during the 1990s, in particular in parts of
Europe, Asia and Latin America, made it necessary for the international
organisations responsible for fostering international f inancial stability, such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to study what went
wrong and why, and to identify effective means of preventing similar f inancial
disasters from happening in the future. The legal institutional framework was
one of the areas identif ied as being critical to improving f inancial stability.
Monetary policy would be best conducted if policy decisions were removed from
the political arena. Governments in democratic countries are naturally and
understandably reluctant to take unpopular decisions before general elections,
although these decisions may be the most desirable or necessary ones. 
The IMF and the World Bank have endorsed internationally-recognised standards
and codes in 12 areas as being important for their work and for which Reports
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) are prepared. Standards in
the areas of data, f iscal transparency and monetary and f inancial policy
transparency have been developed by the IMF, while others have been developed
by other standard-setting bodies including the World Bank, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The work
on standards and codes has been termed a “critical pillar” in the effort to
strengthen the international financial system. There is now broad acceptance that
standards can serve as a framework to focus policy decisions more effectively
and to strengthen the functioning of markets not just in emerging market
economies, but also in advanced economies. 
Member countries have been encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank since
the late 1990s to adopt and implement such standards and codes. This is deemed
vital to the prevention of f inancial crises, which have proven to be particularly
devastating to the poor and most vulnerable parts of the population in affected
countries.
Notwithstanding the fact that no internationally recognised standards or codes
exist on the principles of central bank legislation, except on monetary policy
transparency (the IMF) and on the independent status of banking supervisors
(the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), the IMF provides guidance to
member countries on central bank legislation based on international best
practice. The latter is based, in accordance with principles accepted by the vast
majority of economists, on the maintenance of domestic price stability as the
primary monetary policy objective of a central bank, and its independence10 in
formulating and executing monetary policy. These principles were formulated
10 In the literature, autonomy is sometimes preferred to the frequently used term independence, as autonomy entails
operational freedom while independence indicates a lack of institutional constraints. Even “independent” central
banks typically have a strong commitment to pursuing price stability, follow a specif ic exchange rate policy,
or comply with a target explicitly stipulated by the government. Although the term autonomy is often preferred
by the Fund, the term independence is used in this context as it is viewed from the EU perspective, and
additionally because it is the term used in the Treaty and the Statute and by the EMI/ECB.
in February 1998 in an Operational Paper of the IMF Monetary and Exchange
Affairs Department (MAE) entitled “Elements of Central Bank Autonomy and
Accountability”.11
When compared the IMF’s Operational Paper with the 1998 EMI Convergence
Report, it becomes clear that several items are identical or almost identical. This
is particularly the case for items included in the IMF recommendations, such as:
– Price stability is the primary objective. A specific target (e.g. a direct inflation
target, the maintenance of a f ixed exchange rate, or monetary aggregate
targets) should be established and published.
– The central bank should determine and implement monetary policy to achieve
its target without interference from the government.
– There should be a statutory prohibition for central bank board members
against seeking advice, and for anyone else against giving them instructions.
– The term of off ice of the governor should be longer than the election cycle
of the body which has the main responsibility for selecting the governor.
– A governor should only be dismissed for breaches of qualif ication
requirements or misconduct. 
– Direct government representatives should be eliminated from the policy board
and probably also from the monitoring board, if either of these exist. If a
government representative is a member of a policy board, this should at a
minimum exclude the right to vote.
– Basic consistency needs to be ensured between the exchange rate policy and
the monetary policy. If the former is not solely the responsibility of the central
bank, the bank shall nevertheless have suff icient authority to implement
monetary policy within the constraint of exchange rate policy, and should be
the principal advisor on exchange rate policy issues.
– The law should ensure that the central bank has sufficient f inancial autonomy
to support policy autonomy, but within matching f inancial accountability. 
– Policy and f inancial accountability should be clearly published. The central
bank should prepare formal statements on monetary policy performance
without the prior approval of the government. The statements should be
forwarded to both the executive and the legislature and also published. Annual
f inancial statements audited by external auditors should also be disclosed. 
It should perhaps also be noted that, notwithstanding the obvious similarities
with the EU requirements, some differences do exist. This is particularly the case
with respect to certain items, such as:
– A conflict resolution process should be in place to resolve any policy conflicts
between the central bank and the government by, for example, allowing the
government to overrule the central bank. It should be absolutely clear to the
executive, the legislature and the general public that responsibility for the
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11 MAE Operational Paper, MAE OP/98/1. It should be mentioned that the views expressed in this paper are those
of the MAE staff and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Executive Directors of the IMF or other
IMF staff.
results lies with the government, not the central bank, if the latter is overruled,
its advice ignored or its effectiveness signif icantly limited by government
policies.12
– Lack of performance could constitute grounds for dismissal of the governor
if required performance is clearly def ined in terms of the primary objective
and specif ic targets.13
– If credits to the government are not strictly prohibited, they should be
carefully limited to what is consistent with monetary policy objectives and
targets.
– The statutory requirement for the central bank to obtain approval from the
government should be in place in case the central bank needs to act as lender
of last resort to insolvent institutions, if suff icient collateral is not available,
in order to prevent a f inancial crisis affecting the f inancial sector as a whole.
– The central bank law should contain a procedure to be followed to provide,
if necessary, additional funds to the central bank out of the government’s
budget. Quasi-f iscal activities should be explicitly prohibited, although
temporary and clearly limited central bank credit to the government is
permissible, but with the sole aim of addressing seasonality of revenues and
expenditures. 
Since most member countries of the IMF that require technical assistance on
central bank and banking legislation are at an earlier stage of economic and
institutional development than the EU Member States, the IMF needs to
recognise that identical requirements cannot be def ined for all countries. There
is no “one size fits all” approach, and any recommendation to upgrade the central
bank law to the state of the art in one single step is clearly unrealistic in some
countries. Accordingly, the IMF has not endorsed a model law but has instead
formulated a toolbox of provisions designed to reflect the type of autonomy
chosen, the functions of the central bank (in most countries that require IMF
technical assistance, the central bank is also the supervisor of banks and other
f inancial institutions), and country-specif ic conditions, including culture, legal
traditions and political systems. The IMF recommendations must, in such cases,
allow for a degree of leniency and flexibility that is not acceptable for EU
Member States. 
The 1998 IMF/MAE recommendations have subsequently been f ine-tuned in
practice and in light of experience gained, including the development of the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, while these
recommendations have been periodically modified since 1998, their main content
is still valid. 
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12 In most countries, the central bank law is not entrenched in the Constitution to the same extent as in the EU.
Accordingly, the legislature can ultimately amend the central bank law and thus make a good central bank law
worse. However, as a safety valve in emergencies, it may be preferable if the government temporarily takes
over responsibility for monetary policy by overruling the central bank, say in the case of war or natural disasters.
Provided this is done in a transparent way, this could result in a smaller loss of credibility in monetary policy.
Even some EU countries (such as the Netherlands) formerly had such provisions in their central bank law. 
13 Central bank autonomy presumes professional central bankers. However, while central bankers should be
protected from discretionary removal, they must also be made clearly accountable. The most clear-cut example
of this practice is New Zealand, where the governor can be dismissed.
The EU standards have played a role in this process, not least by providing
practical examples of independent central banks in the EU Member States. The
recent EU enlargement, which added ten new Member States, many of these in
former socialist-ruled countries, has shown that central bank laws ensuring the
highest standard of independence are also possible in countries in transition to
market economies.
The standards adopted in the Maastricht Treaty and further developed by the EMI
and, later, by the ECB and the EU Commission have played, and continue to play,
a pivotal role. The amendments that have had to be made in the NCB laws in
Member States to make them compatible with the Treaty and the Statute provide
useful approaches for independent central banks in other countries. 
6 SOME EXAMPLES OF NON-EU CENTRAL BANK LAWS 
Central bank laws in some countries outside the EU were studied and compared
with international best practices for central banks for the purpose of this survey.14
This yielded the following key observations:
PRICE STABILITY
The insertion of the maintenance of price stability as an objective in central bank
law may now broadly be considered as the internationally-accepted standard
monetary policy objective in many, if not in most, countries, including some
developing countries and countries in transition to a market economy. In some
countries, this objective is even stated in the Constitution of the country15, which
may further strengthen public confidence that the political authorities are committed
to price stability as the principal monetary policy objective of the central bank.
INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Central bank independence also appears, if this is evaluated based only on
statutory provisions in the central bank laws, to be internationally a widely
accepted standard. It may be found in a number of countries, and not only in
industrialised ones.16 Its signif icance varies from country to country, however;
unless central bank independence from outside pressure (political or non-
political) is clearly specif ied, its autonomy in practice must be individually
analysed for each country. The mere insertion of any of the words
“independence”, “independently” or “autonomous” into the central bank law
does not necessarily mean that the central bank takes its monetary policy
decisions independently of political or other bodies. In countries where an
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14 The countries in question are Albania, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Egypt, Georgia, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan,
Lesotho, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, the Philippines, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela.
15 As in, for example, South Africa and the Ukraine.
16 For instance, in Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Moldova, the Philippines,
Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine (“economic independence”) and Venezuela.
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authoritarian regime has recently been replaced by a democratic one, the
desirable and even necessary coordination of monetary policy with the
government’s f inancial policy may be perceived as a tool for conducting
discussions with the central bank management, which, in practice, is tantamount
to unlawful political interference in the decision-making of the central bank.
As is the case with price stability, the independence of the central bank is
stipulated in the Constitution in some countries.17
PROHIBITION AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS
Explicit statutory prohibition for members of central bank decision-making
bodies against seeking or taking instructions from outside parties, and a
reciprocal prohibition of outside parties giving such instructions, is widely
recommended, as it def ines in a clear manner the meaning of independence. If
such a provision is not in place, the authorities might make their own definitions
that could be misused. What remains to be explained, however, is that the
prohibition against instructions should not prevent desired and even necessary
discussions among the central bank, the government, the parliament, the
f inancial community, academia, the media and the general public.
Coordination with the government is for example needed on public debt policy.
Moreover, all EU citizens should be entitled to express their views on monetary
policy issues. The central bank should correspondingly make a great effort to
explain its decisions publicly. It may also need to explain what types of monetary
policy can and cannot be achieved, and should agree not to take any blame for
what rightfully belongs to the government, for example.
Statutory prohibitions against instructions in central bank laws can be found in
number of countries.18
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE
The EU standards on personal independence of the members of the central bank
board (or of any equivalent decision-making body) have been partly implemented
in many countries. They often apply, however, only to the governor of the central
bank and only partly, or even not at all, to other members of the board.
The minimum term of off ice of the governor is often prescribed to be several
years and sometimes f ive years or even more19, which in most countries is a
longer period than the terms for members of parliament.
17 For instance, in South Africa. Among the EU countries, this is so in Sweden’s case.
18 For example, Albania, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Romania, Serbia and Switzerland.
19 This is the case in, for example, Albania (7 years), Azerbaijan (5 years), Georgia (7 years), Iceland (7 years),
Indonesia (5 years), Jordan (5 years), Lesotho (5 years), Mexico (5-8 years), Moldova (7 years), Mongolia
(6 years), the Philippines (6 years), Serbia (5 years), South Africa (5 years), Sweden (6 years), Switzerland
(6 years), Ukraine (7 years) and Venezuela (7 years). For a survey of terms for governors and other non-ex
off icio members specif ied in more than 100 central bank laws, see Lybek and Morris (2004).  
On the issue of dismissal of the governor and other board members, provisions
fully satisfying international best practice can only be found in a few countries.
There are, however, provisions in several central bank laws prohibiting a
discretionary dismissal of the governor.20
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
The power to determine the central bank’s budget is, in fact, assigned to the board
of the central bank in some of the countries studied.21 However, in most of these
countries, the political authorities appear reluctant to give the central bank board
the full authority to avail itself of the resources it considers necessary to fulf il
its duties in a proper manner. They are particularly reluctant to allow the central
bank to offer salaries that differ from those customary in the public sector, even
though this is necessary to attract candidates best suited for the positions. The
salaries offered may, at best, be above customary salary levels in the public
sector, but still substantially below those in the private sector. As the public
sector may to some people be more attractive for other reasons, some difference
may be justif ied, but central bank salaries should not be substantially lower than
those in the private sector. Monetary policy and f inancial sector stability are
challenging tasks and responsibilities, and should be assigned to professionals
capable of and dedicated to carrying out those tasks. 
In most countries, this reality is reflected in the somewhat higher level of salaries
of employees of the central bank compared with employees in the public sector.22
FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Functional independence mainly entails central bank independence with regard
to political authorities in determining and executing monetary and banking
supervision policies. The central bank board (or the equivalent body) should have
sole authority to determine:
– The def inition of price stability;
– The def inition of f inancial stability;
– The means by which the central bank’s objectives shall be achieved;
– The authority to decide on its own and to issue binding monetary regulations
and, provided the central bank is also responsible for banking supervision,
banking supervisory regulations; and
– The sole power, within its authority set out in the central bank law, if any, to
approve any credit to the government.
The observance and practical implementation of functional independence is
diff icult to measure simply by analysing the central bank law. The law may
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20 Among the countries studied in this survey, there are provisions against discretionary removals of the governor
and, in some cases, of other members of the board of the central bank in Albania, Botswana, Georgia, Lesotho,
Russia, Switzerland and Venezuela.
21 For example, in Egypt, Indonesia and Moldova.
22 However, this is not the case in the Banca d’Italia, where the central bank seeks to recruit, at attractive terms,
the most qualif ied people in the banking and f inancial sector.
provide what is required but, in some countries, the implementation of adopted
laws may not be satisfactoryfor a number of reasons, such as:
– Corruption in both the private and the public sectors, including within the judiciary; 
– Insuff icient and/or inadequate resources within the legal system; and 
– A lack of tradition in respecting and upholding the rule of law.
This paper does not attempt to evaluate the practical implementation of the
adopted central bank laws; this task remains to be carried out at some later stage.
7 FINAL REMARKS
What is next on the agenda? There are still many countries with central bank
laws that need to be thoroughly revised to become compatible with international
standards, provided the political authorities recognise that this is desirable or
even necessary to make their monetary policy as effective as possible in
contributing to long-term economic growth. The focus of the international debate
has been moving from autonomy to accountability and transparency and, most
recently, towards good governance and eff iciency.
A major problem in some countries is the misuse of public funds by the central
bank. Most central bank buildings are of a considerably higher standard than most
other public buildings, and even in some low-income countries, central bank
buildings are best described as luxurious. Poor governance is a problem in some
countries. If the board does not truly function as an overseer of the central bank,
the Minister of Finance has valid reasons for interference. Proper procedures to
elect appropriate board members, clear objectives and responsibilities, and proper
evaluation and accountability procedures should be in place in order to set up a
central bank board that fulf ils its duties in as effectively as possible. 
Ineff icient judicial systems and widespread corruption also cause severe
problems in a number of countries and often present a major obstacle to the
effective implementation of legal frameworks of standards, even in industrialised
countries. Corruption is diff icult to combat, particularly in countries where it
is also widespread within the political establishment. If lawmakers are reluctant
to combat corruption within the legal system and elsewhere in the society, it
becomes difficult to set up organisations and other systems which can effectively
govern any country to the benef it of the majority of its population. For this
reason, governance issues are being increasingly focused upon in international
efforts to combat poverty and improve conditions in many countries that are
heavily burdened by corruption. 
In many newly democratic countries, tradition still plays an important role.
Substantial parts of the population are used to politicians not respecting the rule
of law; and, in some countries which have recently become democratic on paper,
politicians at times tend to act, even though they are lawmakers, as if they were
not bound by the rule of law. The legal situation in some countries affected by
such traditions is sometimes described as “unpredictable”, to use IMF jargon. 
284
The importance of the rule of law and the importance of respecting and
upholding it are concepts that are still unfamiliar in some countries that are
currently or were previously ruled by authoritarian governments. In such
countries, resources to ensure the rule of law are still scarce. This affects the
transparency of the law, so that amendments are rarely if ever incorporated into
published laws. Where the court system is under-dimensioned, the outcome of
court proceedings may be severely delayed, which is particularly damaging in
court proceedings involving banking or f inancial issues. Evidently, the outcome
of court proceedings can be predetermined if even the judges are inclined to
accept favours of some sort. In many countries, there is also a clear need to assist
judges by informing them about how the banking system functions (including
the central bank), how legal and accountancy principles can be applied, and how
the market economy functions as a whole. Improvements in such areas would,
obviously, represent a great step forward toward making the legal system a useful
part of the public sector. This would support democracy and the market economy,
which has proven, over the years, to be the most effective economic model for
most people in the majority of countries. Simultaneously, it must be recognised
that current salaries in the public sector (including the judiciary) are often
substantially lower than in the private sector, and that governments in most
developing countries have severe budget constraints that do not permit them to
raise substantially the salaries of civil servants. Indeed, the low level of current
salary levels in some countries even appears to suggest tacitly that some civil
servants should raise extra funds on the side. 
The effective implementation of legal provisions is a challenging task and an
issue that needs to be carefully considered in a number of countries. To a varying
degree this is also true for EU Member States: possible legal reforms must be
thoroughly evaluated in, for example, upcoming EU assessments of the
implementation of the legal convergence criteria in applicant countries.
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NATIONAL EXPERIENCES IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE 
OF INDEPENDENCE IN CENTRAL BANK STATUTES
LITHUANIA Gintautas Pošiūnas and Liutauras Žygas
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SLOVAKIA Milan Gašparík
ABSTRACT
Il contributo  evidenzia i principali cambiamenti negli statuti delle Banche
Centrali Lituana, Maltese e Slovacca relativamente alla questione
dell’indipendenza nel rispetto dei requisiti del Trattato UE e in particolare dello
Statuto del SEBC. Particolare enfasi viene posta sulla maniera in cui gli aspetti
personali, istituzionali, funzionali e finanziari di indipendenza sono stati
riportati nei recenti emendamenti a tali statuti.
Lo studio si divide in tre parti principali, ciascuna delle quali esamina i
principali emendamenti che hanno avuto ripercussioni rispettivamente sulla Law
on Lietuvos bankas (N. I-678 del 1 dicembre 1994), sulla Central Bank of Malta
Act 1967 (Cap. 204 delle Leggi di Malta) e sulla National Bank of Slovakia Act
(N. 566/1992 coll. del 18 novembre 1992).
Mentre alcuni emendamenti sono comuni a tutti gli statuti (quali il mantenimento
della stabilità dei prezzi come obiettivo primario, il termine di cinque anni della
carica di Governatore, il divieto di chiedere istruzioni ex art. 108 del Trattato
CE), altri sono tipici di uno o più statuti, per poter adeguatamente trattare 
a fondo la questione dell’indipendenza conformemente alla situazione
contingente.
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LITHUANIA
Gintautas Pošiūnas and 
Liutauras Žygas
1 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE – INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Lietuvos bankas is the central bank of the Republic of Lithuania, and belongs
to the State by the right of ownership. The State is therefore the sole owner of
Lietuvos bankas. The principle of independence of Lietuvos bankas is established
in Articles 125 and 126 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. The
Republic of Lithuania Law on Lietuvos bankas (hereafter “the Law”)1 and other
laws of the Republic of Lithuania are designed to ensure the implementation of
the principle of independence of Lietuvos bankas in all constitutive parts of the
legal system of the Republic of Lithuania.  
The principle of central bank independence vis-à-vis Community institutions
and bodies, governments of the Member States of the European Union (EU)
and/or any other body is laid down, in particular, in Article 108 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community (hereafter “the Treaty”) and Article 7 of
the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank (hereafter “the Statute”). The criteria of central bank
independence are laid down in detail in the statutory requirements to be fulfilled
by the national central banks (NCBs) of the Member States in order to become
an integral part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). These
requirements were approved by the European Monetary Institute (EMI)2, and
further ref ined by the European Central Bank (ECB).
Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute prohibit Community
institutions or bodies and the governments of the Member States from seeking
to exert influence on the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB
and the NCBs in the performance of their duties. It establishes the independence
of the ECB and the NCBs, and prohibits them from seeking or taking instructions
from Community and/or national institutions of legislative and/or executive
power. The provisions of the Treaty and the Statute do not oblige the ECB and
the NCBs to implement these decisions. 
The Treaty and the Statute distinguish between four basic criteria of central bank
independence: functional independence, institutional independence, personal
independence and f inancial independence. 
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1 The old version of the Law (No I-678 of 1 December 1994) has been amended and supplemented on several
occasions. Two basic revisions of the Law were made in 2001 (No IX-205 of 13 March 2001) and 2004 (No
IX-1998 of 5 February 2004) with a view to incorporating the provisions of the Treaty and of the Statute. These
revisions dealt, in particular, with the establishment of statutory provisions designed to safeguard the
independence of Lietuvos bankas. Other amendments and supplements of the Law in the areas of supervisory
competences, provisions on settlement f inality, powers to impose sanctions on reporting agents as well as
provisions relating to financial collateral arrangements have since been added by other amendments. The ECB’s
comments have been observed while making these revisions.
2 Progress towards Convergence 1996, Chapter II: “Statutory Requirements to Be Fulfilled for NCBs to Become
an Integral Part of the ESCB”, EMI (1996), pp. 98–107.
2 FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
The ESCB unif ies the primary objective, tasks and functions of the constituent
parts of the ESCB, i.e. the ECB and the NCBs, as laid down in Article 105 of
the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute. The 11 Member States of the European
Community as of 1 January 1999, and 12 as of 1 January 2001, became the
participating Member States and members of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), adopting the euro as the single European currency. Having adopted the
euro, the ECB and the NCBs participating in Stage Three of EMU now share
the primary objective of maintaining price stability.3 In addition to implementing
this objective, the ECB and the NCBs of the participating Member States
(hereafter “the Eurosystem”) are also responsible for def ining and
implementing the single monetary policy for all Member States of the
Community; for conducting foreign exchange operations consistent with the
Treaty; for holding and managing the foreign reserves of the Member States;
and for ensuring the reliable operation of credit and settlement systems. To the
maximum extent possible, these provisions have been reflected in the 2001 and
2004 revisions of the Law, which amended the following: 
– Lietuvos bankas’ primary objective (Article 7) 
– f inances (Chapter 3) 
– instruments of monetary policy (Chapter 4) 
– foreign reserves held by Lietuvos bankas and operations with foreign financial
and credit institutions (Chapter 5) 
– functions of the State Treasury agent (Chapter 6) 
– f inancial accounting and reporting (Chapter 8). 
Finally, some amendments were also incorporated into the Law with a view to
safeguarding against possible conflicts of interest (Articles 3 and 15), along with
provisions anticipating grounds for dismissal and ensuring the right of judicial
review (Article 12), as well as the obligation of professional secrecy (Article 19).
Following the provisions of Article 14.4 of the Statute, NCBs may perform
functions other than those specified in this Statute assuming that these functions
do not interfere with the primary objective, tasks and functions of the ESCB.
The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
and the stability of the f inancial system as provided in Article 105(5) of the
Treaty and Article 3.3 of the Statute. Hence, the provisions of the Law
establishing the functions of Lietuvos bankas on the licensing and supervision
of credit institutions (Chapter 7 of the Law) are fully in line with the tasks of
the ECB and of the ESCB, and do not contravene the primary objective of the
ESCB.
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3 As of the date of accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, the Republic of Lithuania and the other nine new Member
States participate in EMU as Member States with a derogation within the meaning of Article 122 of the Treaty.  
The ECB has noted that it would be more consistent with one of the guiding principles of the Community,
namely, price stability, as well as with the spirit of the Treaty, to adapt the statutes of the NCBs of the Member
States with a derogation at the moment of joining the ESCB, as this would more accurately reflect the ultimate
objective of monetary policy to maintain price stability. This would comply with the principle of functional
independence, as Article 4 (3) of the Treaty also applies to Member States with a derogation.
3 INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute establish the principle of
institutional independence of the national central banks.
The above-mentioned articles prohibit Community institutions and bodies as well
as the governments of the Member States from giving instructions to and/or
exerting influence on the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB
and the NCBs in the performance of their duties. The provisions of the Treaty
and the Statute do not oblige the ECB and the NCBs to implement the decisions
of legislative and/or executive power at a Community and/or national level if
these decisions fall within the scope of regulation by the ECB and/or the NCBs,
or if they interfere with the primary objective and/or key tasks of the ESCB. 
The principle of institutional independence of each NCB is embodied in the f ive
basic prohibitions that apply to the state institutions of legislative and/or
executive power, preventing them from influencing in any way the activities of
the central bank:
1. Prohibition on giving instructions – the state institutions of legislative and/or
executive power are prohibited from giving instructions to the central bank;
2. Prohibition on approving, suspending, annulling or deferring decisions – any
rights of state institutions of legislative and/or executive power to approve,
suspend, annul or defer decision of the central bank are prohibited;
3. Prohibition on censoring decisions on legal grounds – state institutions of
legislative and/or executive power are prohibited from censoring, on legal
grounds established by the law or any other legal act, the decision of the
central bank, presuming, as a consequence, coordination of this decision with
the institutions of political or state power;
4. Prohibition on participating in the decision-making bodies of an NCB with
a right to vote – participation of representatives of state legislative and/or
executive power in the decision-making bodies of the central bank with the
right to vote is prohibited;
5. Prohibition on ex ante consulting on an NCB’s decision – explicit statutory
provisions obligating the central bank to coordinate its decisions with state
institutions of legislative and/or executive power are prohibited.
The 2001 revision of the Law took into account the above prohibitions. Thus
the provision of Article 1, Paragraph 5 of the Law on the accountability of
Lietuvos bankas to the Seimas (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) has been
abolished. As the central bank was formerly accountable to the state institutions
of legislative and/or executive power, legal grounds for these institutions to
interfere in the activities of the central bank had already been established; this
was naturally incompatible with the prohibition on giving instructions to the
central bank. 
Before Lietuvos bankas joins the Eurosystem, this prohibition will be made more
stringent. The uniform governance of the euro will require members of the
decision-making body of Lietuvos bankas, when taking part in the activities of
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the ECB’s Governing Council, to be independent and not bound by the
instructions of the decision-making body (Board) of Lietuvos bankas or indeed
any other instructions. This means a certain exemption from the application of
national and/or any other norms of law.
4 PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE
Article 109 of the Treaty and Article 14.1 of the Statute state that the statutes
of NCBs that are part of the ESCB must be compatible with the provisions of
the Treaty and the Statute. Compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty
and the Statute is to be ensured at the latest at the date of the establishment of
the ESCB.4 Article 14.2 of the Statute contains the requirement that the minimum
term of office of the Governor of an NCB is five years, which should be reflected
in each NCB’s statute.5 Along with the requirement on the minimum term of
office for governors, Article 14.2 of the Statute establishes a requirement to unify
the grounds for the dismissal of governors from off ice prior to the expiration
of their term of off ice. Governors may be relieved from off ice only if they no
longer fulf il the conditions required for the performance of their duties, if they
have been found guilty of serious professional misconduct or misconduct in
office, or if they have been found guilty of a serious deed, i.e. an act or omission
that is against the law. However, the concept of “serious misconduct” is not
limited to any list of acts or omissions.
The provisions of Article 14.2 of the Statute require that the grounds for
dismissal of governors of the NCBs are uniform in the NCBs’ statutes. Article
108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute, while referring to “the
independence of the members of decision-making bodies” of the ECB and of
the NCBs in the performance of their duties vis-à-vis state institutions of
legislative and/or executive power at a Community and/or national level, do not
restrict the security of tenure of off ice with regard to governors of the NCBs
exceptionally. The Governor of an NCB is deemed to be one of the members of
the board appointed to govern it and has one voting right without privileges, i.e.
he or she is f irst among equals (primus inter pares). Following this approach,
it is presumed that the provision of Article 14.2 of the Statute implying the
uniformity of grounds for dismissal of governors applies not only to governors
of the NCBs, but also to other members of decision-making bodies of the NCBs
involved in the performance of the tasks and functions of the ESCB and ECB.
This applies in particular where a Governor is f irst among equals among
colleagues with equivalent voting rights, or where other members may have to
deputise for the Governor.
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4 According to the EMI, the NCBs had to be independent at the date of the establishment of the ESCB and entry
into force of the ECB (1 June 1998). See “Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union
as at August 1997”, EMI (1997), p. 2.
5 The indefinite term of office does not require the statutes of the NCBs to be adapted if the grounds for dismissal
of a governor are in line with those of Article 14.2 of the Statute, as stated in Progress towards Convergence
1996, Chapter II: “Statutory Requirements to Be Fulf illed for NCBs to Become an Integral Part of the ESCB”,
EMI (1996), p. 101.
Along with the requirement to unify the grounds for dismissal of governors and
other members of decision-making bodies of the NCBs involved in the
performance of the tasks and functions of the ESCB and ECB, Article 14.2 of
the Statute establishes the right for persons who have held such off ice to apply
to the court with regard to a decision on their dismissal. Members of a decision-
making body may deputise for the Governor, and are equal vis-à-vis the law.
Following Article 230 (4) of the Treaty, they, as EU citizens6, retain the right
to apply to the European Court of Justice as far as their ESCB-related tasks are
concerned, and assuming that the decision to dismiss them from off ice falls
within the meaning of Article 230 (4) of the Treaty. 
Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute establish the independence
of the members of decision-making bodies of the NCBs involved in the
performance of the tasks and functions of the ESCB and ECB from the
instructions of the state institutions of legislative and/or executive power at the
European Community and/or national level. Article 11.1 of the Statute refers
to the right of ECB Executive Board members to work only in this institution;
the Article further states that the Governing Council may grant in exceptional
cases an exemption from the application of this rule. Generally, any activities
of the members of decision-making bodies of the ECB and of the NCBs may
be deemed unacceptable if they result in a conflict of interest between the
members of decision-making bodies and the NCBs. With regard to the governors
of the NCBs, the conflicts between the interests of the Governor of every NCB
and the interests of the ECB should also be taken into account.
Along with the features of personal independence mentioned above, the former
provisions of Article 10, Paragraph 4 of the Law, which granted discretion to
the national parliament to f ix and/or change the salary of the Chairperson of
the Board of Lietuvos bankas, have been identif ied by the ECB7 as being
incompatible with the criterion of personal independence of governors and other
members of decision-making bodies of the central bank from the state
institutions of legislative and executive power established by European
Community law. This provision was abolished by the 2001 revision of the Law.
Article 17, Paragraph 4 of the Law establishes the procedure for f ixing the
Chairperson’s salary, which is independent from the Republic of Lithuania’s state
institutions of legislative and/or executive power.
The same revision of the Law took into account the ECB’s proposal to admit only
those grounds for dismissal which are listed in Article 14.2 of the Statute. Thus
the grounds referred to in Article 14.2 of the Statute were inserted into Article
12, Paragraph 1 of the Law, and now constitute the grounds for dismissal of the
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6 Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the European Union, as provided in
Article 17 (1) of the Treaty. Only nationals of these Member States may be appointed to the Executive Board of
the ECB. Article 11.2, third indent, of the Statute stipulates this provision. Article 10, Paragraph 2 of the Law
makes this provision effective in case of Lietuvos bankas. As from 1 May 2004, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania
enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty and are subject to the duties imposed thereby (Article 17 (2) of the Treaty).
7 Article 10, Paragraph 4 previously provided that the salary of the Chairperson of the Board was f ixed by the
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania.
Governor and other members of the Board of Lietuvos bankas, i.e. Deputy
Chairpersons and members of the Board. The revision abolished an explicit list
of grounds for dismissal, as the listed grounds were not incompatible with those
mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute. However, the revision did not prescribe
all possible cases of application of the grounds for dismissal referred to in Article
14.2 of the Statute. From the point of view of European Community law, only
those grounds for dismissal referred to in Article 14.2 of the Statute are
admissible in the law (statute) of an NCB which is a constituent part of the ESCB.
European Community law does not restrict the enumeration in national legal acts
of the cases of application of these grounds in the national legal system. 
This doctrine might be appropriate in interpreting the provisions of Article 75
of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which grant certain discretion
to the national parliament with regard to removing the Chairperson of the Board
of Lietuvos bankas through a vote of non-confidence. Such grounds for dismissal
must be abolished prior to joining the Eurosystem. 
The 2004 revision of the Law took into account the ECB’s proposal. As a result,
Article 16, Paragraph 1 of the Law now restricts employment of all the members
of the Board of Lietuvos bankas to only this institution. This provision applies
to the Chairperson, Deputy Chairpersons and members of the Board. 
5 FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The f inancial independence of an NCB is to be evaluated in the context of ex
ante influence on it as well as in the context of ex post influence on an NCB.
State institutions of legislative and/or executive power are assumed to influence
ex ante an NCB when these institutions and/or third parties may take part in the
composition of the NCB’s budget and/or allocation of its net prof it (loss). The
central bank will be influenced ex post when the state institutions of legislative
and/or executive power and/or other third parties are permitted to review and
evaluate the NCB’s accounts, and such a review and/or evaluation takes the form
of accountability of the central bank to the state institutions of legislative and/or
executive power and/or any other third parties. 
The 2001 revision of the Law abolished the former provision of Article 11,
paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 15, which could have had an adverse effect on the
allocation of the annual estimate of Lietuvos bankas’ budget. The new version
of Article 11, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 15 of the Law, last revised in 2004,
entrusts the Board of Lietuvos bankas with the right to approve Lietuvos bankas’
budget. The abolition of the provisions of the Law on the accountability of
Lietuvos bankas to the Seimas took place alongside the abolition of ex ante
coordination of Lietuvos bankas’ budget with the Seimas, the highest state
institution of legislative power in Lithuania. 
The prof it (loss) of Lietuvos bankas is calculated by deducting expenses from
income, as provided in the updated 2004 version of Article 22 of the Law. Article
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23 of the Law establishes a revised order for the allocation of prof it (loss) of
Lietuvos bankas. Under this Article, the loss of a f inancial year may be covered
from the reserve capital, the latter being accumulated by allocating on a regular
basis the prof it remaining from the accumulation of the authorised capital
(Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Law, in conjunction with Article 23, paragraph
3, sub-paragraph 3). The possibility of covering the losses of a f inancial year
from the authorised capital of the central bank was abolished by introducing a
statutory norm which ensures that any unsecured loss in a f inancial year should
be covered from the reserve capital. This provision does not restrict the allocation
of unsecured claims to the next f inancial year.
A certain safeguard clause granting the central bank the right to draw on the state
budget in an emergency might be appropriate in this context. To the same extent,
it is inappropriate for the central bank to favour the public sector in the form
of regular donations and/or any other form of regular f inancing, as this
contravenes the prohibition of monetary f inancing8 and/or the prohibition of
privileged access by the public sector to central bank ref inancing.9 These
provisions were enshrined in the 2004 revision of Article 37 of the Law with
respect to Lietuvos bankas. 
Lietuvos bankas will manage its f inancial accounts following the ECB’s
recommendations concerning the NCBs of the ESCB (Article 49 of the Law).
An independent audit f irm will carry out the statutory audit of Lietuvos bankas
(Article 50 of the Law)10, in view of the fact that Article 27 of the Statute will
take effect when Lietuvos bankas joins the Eurosystem.
6 APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE TO
LIETUVOS BANKAS AND THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS, IN VIEW OF
THE FUTURE ADOPTION OF THE EURO 
The Republic of Lithuania f inally became an EU Member State on 1 May 2004.
Following the provisions of Article 4 of the Act on the Conditions of Accession
to the EU11, the Republic of Lithuania, along with the other nine new Member
States, now participate in EMU as Member States with a derogation within the
meaning of Article 122 of the Treaty.
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8 Article 101 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993, which specif ies
def initions for the application of Article 104 and Article 104b (1) of the Treaty (in Official Journal of the
European Communities, 31 December 1993, OJ L 332 31.12.1993, p. 1).
9 Article 102 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 of 13 December 1993, which specif ies
definitions for the application of the prohibition of privileged access as referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty
(in Official Journal of the European Communities, 31 December 1993, OJ L 332 31.12.1993, p. 4).
10 The 2004 revision of the Law took into account the ECB’s proposal, and therefore abolished the second sentence
of Article 50 of the Law, which had formerly prescribed coordination with the parliament of the terms of
purchase of services from an audit company. 
11 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of
Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta,
the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic, together with the adjustments to
the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (in Official Journal of the European Union, 23 September
2003, No L 236, p. 34).
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Article 124 (2) of the Treaty requires Member States with a derogation to treat
their exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest. As new Member States
of the EU, the Republic of Lithuania and the other nine new Member States are
committed to eventually adopting the euro, with no opt-out clause possible. 
The main instrument of exchange rate policy with regard to the currencies of
the non-euro area Member States is the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II).
As expected, the Republic of Lithuania joined ERM II in June 2004 as a
precondition for the adoption of the euro.
However, the ECB (and before it, the EMI) has on a number of occasions stated
that the most important element of the legal integration of the NCBs into the
ESCB and hence into the Eurosystem was to remove any incompatibilities
between national provisions and the Treaty and the Statute. National provisions
should thus either be in line with the Treaty and the Statute, or should omit those
statutory provisions that are already present in the Treaty and the Statute, as the
provisions of the Treaty and the Statute take precedence over national provisions.
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MALTA
Bernadette Muscat
The Central Bank of Malta, a statutory body the capital of which is wholly owned
by the government and which has a distinct legal personality, was established
in 1968 subsequent to the enactment of the Central Bank of Malta Act of 1967.1
The Central Bank of Malta Act (“the CBM Act”) may be divided into six main
parts dealing with the establishment and principal business of the Central Bank
of Malta2; the conduct of monetary policy; f inancial provisions3; the collection
of information; relations with government, with credit and financial institutions4,
with the f inancial services regulator, and with international and other
organisations; and with the issue of currency and protection against
counterfeiting.
The CBM Act has been amended on a number of occasions. However, for the
purposes of this paper, the more relevant amendments incorporating the principle
of the independence of the Central Bank of Malta are those promulgated by Act
No XVII of 2002 which entered into force on 1 October 2002. It was the Central
Bank of Malta itself which, after extensive discussions with the Directorate-
General Legal Services of the European Central Bank (ECB), took the initiative
to draft these amendments way back in 1999 and to ensure their passage through
Parliament in time for Malta’s accession to the European Union.
These amendments were intended to mirror the requirements of independence
of a central bank as laid down in the EC Treaty and the Protocol on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank
annexed to the EC Treaty. Consequent to these amendments, the CBM Act now
provides that the primary objective of the Central Bank of Malta is to maintain
price stability.5 The CBM Act further provides that the Bank forms an integral
part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and that it shall
participate in carrying out the tasks and complying with the objectives conferred
upon it by the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank (“the Statute”), and that it shall further assume all rights
and obligations consequential to such a status.6
The aspects of central bank independence have been classif ied by the ECB itself
(and previously by the European Monetary Institute) in its various Convergence
Reports and by learned authors in this f ield in a number of categories.7 For ease
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1 Chapter 204 of the Laws of Malta.
2 This part, Part II of the CBM Act, includes provisions on the setting up of the Board of Directors.
3 This part, Part III, mainly deals with the capital and reserves of the Bank and f inancial reporting.
4 This part, Part V, includes provisions on the regulation and oversight of payment systems.
5 Article 4 of the CBM Act.
6 Article 38D of the CBM Act, as amended by Act No III of 2004, which entered into force on 1 May 2004.
7 See in particular R. Smits (1997), The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International) pp. 155-58.
of reference, the amendments affected to the CBM Act shall be grouped into the
following two main categories: the personal aspect of independence, concerning
mainly the autonomy bestowed by law upon the Board of Directors; and the
operational aspect, which broadly refers to the Bank’s independence in
determining and selecting monetary policy instruments and its f inancial
autonomy.
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE
The Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Malta is composed of a Governor,
a Deputy Governor and three other directors. In terms of the CBM Act8, the
Board of Directors is responsible for the policy and general administration of
the affairs and business of the Bank, except in relation to matters of monetary
policy, where decisions are taken solely by the Governor. The Governor presides
as chairperson at Board meetings. Decisions are adopted by a simple majority
of the votes of the directors present and voting. The Governor as chairman has
a normal vote and, in the event of a tie, exercises a casting vote.
Prior to the 2002 amendments, the Governor and Deputy Governor were
appointed for a period not exceeding f ive years, while the other three directors
were appointed for a period not exceeding three years. The Governor and Deputy
Governor were required to occupy an executive role within the Bank, and were
authorised by law to act as chairmen or members of domestic or international
boards or committees. In the event of the temporary absence of or in the case
of a vacancy in the post of the Governor, the law empowered the Deputy
Governor to assume the duties of the Governor. In addition, in the event of the
temporary absence of both the Governor and Deputy Governor, the President
of Malta, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, could designate any other
director or a senior off icial of the Bank to act as Governor during such a period
of absence. On the other hand, in the case of a vacancy in the post of a director
before the expiry of the term for which he or she was appointed, another person
could be appointed to f ill the vacancy for the unexpired term of off ice.
Evidently, this state of affairs did not augur well for the personal independence
of the members of the Board of Directors. The 2002 amendments established
that all members of the Board are appointed for a f ive-year period and are
eligible for reappointment.9 The Governor and Deputy Governor are still required
by law to occupy an executive role; however, they may only occupy roles as
chairmen or members of other boards in their capacity of Governor and Deputy
Governor respectively and provided that this activity is not, in the opinion of
the Board, in conflict with the performance of their duties under the CBM Act.
The other three directors are as before not required to occupy executive roles
within the Bank. However, the law now prohibits them from holding other
positions which may be in conflict with their duties as directors.
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8 Article 7 of the CBM Act.
9 Article 8 of the CBM Act in respect of the Governor and Deputy Governor, and article 9 in respect of the other
three directors.
In the case of the temporary absence of or in the event of a vacancy in the post
of the Governor, it is solely the Deputy Governor who may be appointed to
perform the duties of the Governor. Alternatively, if a director dies or resigns
or otherwise vacates his or her off ice before the expiry of his or her term of
off ice, another person will be appointed in his or her stead for a whole term of
f ive years.
Before the 2002 amendments, it was possible to dismiss any member of the
Board on the grounds that he or she was incapable of carrying on his or her
duties; was guilty of serious misconduct in relation to his or her duties; or was
absent from the meetings of the Board without reasonable cause for a period
deemed excessive by the Minister responsible for f inance. In order to avoid any
doubts as to whether this provision went beyond the grounds for dismissal as
laid down in the Statute, the 2002 amendments changed this provision in the
sense that any member of the Board may only be dismissed if he or she no longer
fulf ils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or if he
or she has been guilty of serious misconduct.10
OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
The CBM Act provides in two instances that neither the Bank nor any member
of the Board  when exercising their functions, duties and powers under the law
are to seek or take instructions from the Government or from any other body.11
This is in stark contrast to the situation that prevailed before the 2002
amendments, when the law contained various requirements to obtain the consent,
or to act upon the recommendation, of the Minister responsible for f inance. The
classic case of ministerial intervention prior to the 2002 amendments regarded
the empowerment of the Minister, in cases when he or she deemed it necessary
in the national interest, and after consultation with the Governor of the Bank,
to give the Bank written directions as he or she deemed appropriate in the light
of the objectives of the Bank, with which the Bank was obliged to comply.12
The requirement to obtain the Minister’s approval or consent was pervasive
throughout the CBM Act. Even in the case of the prerogative traditionally given
to central banks to act as lenders of last resort, the CBM Act obliged the Bank
prior to the 2002 amendments to obtain the prior approval of the Minister before
advancing any loan to a bank incorporated in Malta (against security), whenever
this was deemed necessary to safeguard monetary stability or in other
exceptional circumstances.13
There are now no traces of the requirement to obtain the Minister’s approval,
save in the case regarding the auditing of the Bank’s accounts, where the law
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10 Article 11 of the CBM Act.
11 The relevant provisions are contained in article 7 of the Act in so far as concerns the Bank and members of
the Board. On the advice of the Legal Services of the ECB, the provision was repeated in article 17A, which
specif ically refers to the Bank and members of the Monetary Policy Advisory Council.
12 Former article 32 of the CBM Act, substituted by the 2002 amendments.
13 Former article 15 (m) of the CBM Act, substituted by article 15 (1) (g) after the 2002 amendments.
provides that the accounts of the Bank are to be audited by independent external
auditors appointed annually by the Board with the approval of the Minister. Since
the government is the sole shareholder of the Bank, it was deemed appropriate
that on the basis of company law principles, the government should retain the
right to approve the Bank’s external auditors, which are required by law to be
independent.
A number of new provisions were introduced in 2002 to set up a new legal
framework on monetary policy. Prior to these amendments, monetary policy
matters were discussed by the Monetary Policy Council, a body set up by
management and composed of a number of senior off icers of the Bank and
members of the Board of Directors. Decision-taking was however reserved to
the Board of Directors who were (and still are) responsible for policy and general
administration of the business of the Bank.
Following the 2002 amendments, the set-up of the Council was enshrined in
law.14 It has become an advisory body and is now known as the Monetary Policy
Advisory Council. It is composed of the Governor, Deputy Governor, the other
three directors and three members appointed by the Governor, after consultation
with the Board, from among the senior off icials within the Bank or from among
suitably qualif ied individuals from outside the Bank.
The 2002 amendments mentioned so far simply transferred into written law the
practice that obtained prior to that date. The one novelty in this area – and a
radical one at that – regarded a change in decision-taking in monetary policy
matters, which is now reserved solely to the Governor, and in his or her absence
the Deputy Governor, after taking into account the advice of the Council. This
role was removed from the remit of the Board of Directors since the Board is
partly composed of three (possibly) non-executive directors and, in the light of
the stringent requirements of the autonomy of decision-taking in monetary policy
matters, it was deemed advisable to vest the Governor with sole authority and
responsibility to take decisions on monetary policy.15
Ministerial intervention was perhaps most conspicuous in the f inancial
provisions of the CBM Act.16 In terms of the law, the Central Bank of Malta is
obliged to maintain a General Reserve Fund and a Special Reserve Fund. Prior
to the 2002 amendments, the law provided that the Special Reserve Fund was
available for the purposes of investing in the shares, bonds or debentures of any
public body approved by the Minister for the purpose of promoting or f inancing
development in Malta, or for any similar purpose approved by the Minister.
Moreover, allocations could only be made to either of these funds with
ministerial approval.
The law prior to 2002 further provided that the prof its and losses attributable
to any revaluation of the Bank’s net assets or liabilities made as a result of any
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14 Part IIA of the CBM Act.
15 The 2002 amendments took on board the Irish model in this respect.
16 Part III of the CBM Act.
adjustment of the external value of the Maltese lira were to be credited or debited
(as the case may be) to a special Revaluation Account. The Minister was, in such
instances, required to make proposals as to how any debit or credit balance in
this account at the end of the previous year was to be dealt with.
Clearly, this state of affairs was untenable in view of EU accession, and the law
was amended to iron out these requirements for ministerial interventions. The
law now provides that the General Reserve Fund is available for any purpose
as may be determined by the Board of Directors17, while the Special Reserve
Fund is available for the purposes of crediting or debiting any prof its or losses
attributable to any revaluation of the Bank’s net external assets or liabilities made
as a result of the adjustment of the external value of the Maltese lira. The balance
in this fund is then dealt with as determined by the Board.18
OTHER ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE
The autonomy of the Central Bank of Malta stems from other equally relevant
provisions of the law. The Bank is now prohibited from granting credit to the
government or to a public undertaking, or to purchase government or public debt
instruments from the primary market.19 This replaced a number of provisions
obliging the Bank to invest in government or public instruments in various
instances20, and in particular it replaced a former provision stating that any
balance of a temporary advance made by the Bank to the government and still
outstanding on 1 January 2000 was to be repaid in full by 31 December 2000.21
This provision was intended as a temporary measure prior to the full enforcement
of the provision on the prohibition of government f inancing.
An equally important provision evidencing the autonomy bestowed upon the
Bank is that the Bank is now endowed with full responsibility to regulate and
oversee domestic payment systems, including securities settlement systems, and
has been delegated legislative powers to carry out this task.22
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17 Article 18 of the CBM Act.
18 Ibid., article 24.
19 Ibid., article 27.
20 For instance, prior to the 2002 amendments, article 15 (f) of the CBM Act provided that the Bank could
purchase, sell, discount or rediscount government Treasury bills that form part of a public issue; article 15 (h)
provided that the Bank could purchase and sell publicly issued securities of or guaranteed by the government
maturing in not more than twenty years; article 15 (i) provided that the Bank could subscribe to, purchase and
sell shares, bonds or debentures of any body corporate in Malta established by law or sponsored by, or set up
under the authority of, the government, or of any other corporate body as approved by the Minister, for the
purpose of promoting or f inancing development in Malta or for the purpose of promoting the development
of a money or a securities market in Malta; article 15 (j) provided that the Bank could invest its staff and pension
funds and other internal funds of the Bank in government securities or other f irst-class securities approved
by the Board; and article 29 provided that the Bank could be entrusted with the issue and management of
Treasury bills and government loans publicly issued in Malta upon such terms and conditions as could be agreed
between the Minister and the Bank.
21 Former article 27 of the CBM Act, substituted by the 2002 amendments.
22 Article 36 of the CBM Act.
INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY
The autonomy granted to the Central Bank of Malta and the persons entrusted
with decision-taking within the Bank brought with it a strengthening of the
reporting requirements incumbent upon the Bank.
The general reporting provisions were already contained in the CBM Act prior
to the 2002 amendments and concern the obligation of the Bank to keep the
Minister informed of the Bank’s policy.23
The f inancial reporting mechanism has been strengthened in the sense that prior
to the 2002 amendments, the Bank was only obliged to transmit to the Minister
a copy of the audited annual accounts and a report on its operations to be
presented before Parliament and eventually published. Since 2002 the Bank has
also been obliged to transmit a statement of the Bank’s investments to the
Minister.24 This is meant to counterbalance the full autonomy given to the Bank
to manage its external reserves.
New reporting procedures have been created with respect to monetary policy
matters. As reiterated earlier, the Governor is now vested with sole responsibility
for monetary policy decisions. The Governor is obliged to keep the Monetary
Policy Advisory Council informed of the discharge of the powers vested in him
in this respect.25 The Governor may also be requested by the House of
Representatives to report on the conduct by the Bank of its monetary policy
functions before a committee of the House appointed for this purpose, and 
to furnish the committee with any information deemed necessary. This
parliamentary committee is empowered to question the Governor on any
activities or decisions taken in the f ield of monetary policy, but it has no powers
to order the Governor to change any decisions or to undertake a certain course
of action. However, to ensure that such reporting does not constitute undue
pressure, the Governor may not be requested to appear before the committee
more often than once every six months.26 Finally, after each meeting of the
Monetary Policy Advisory Council, the Bank is obliged to publish a statement
of the monetary policy decisions taken by the Governor.27
Of course, the implementation of the concept of independence of the Central
Bank of Malta within the CBM Act is not an end in itself but a necessary measure
to allow the Bank to conduct its monetary policy and to participate in the ESCB.
With the eventual adoption of the euro it is envisaged that the Bank will again
have to shed its operational autonomy, in part to recognise the competence of
the ECB in ESCB-related tasks. At this time it will have to be assessed whether
this actually means handing over autonomy to the ECB, or rather sharing
autonomy with other central banks and the ECB acting together within the
Eurosystem.
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24 Ibid., article 23.
25 Ibid., article 17A.
26 Ibid., article 17B.
27 Ibid., article 17D.
SLOVAKIA
Milan Gašparík
Národná banka Slovenska (the National Bank of Slovakia) is the independent
central bank of the Slovak Republic as established by the National Bank of
Slovakia Act No 566/1992 Coll., as amended (henceforth “the NBS Act”).
The principle of the independence of Národná banka Slovenska is also declared
in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.1
As far as central bank independence is concerned, national legislation in the
Member States has to be adapted to comply with the relevant provisions of the
Treaty establishing the European Community (“the Treaty”) and the Protocol
on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European
Central Bank  (“the Statute”).
The Treaty in Article 108 and the Statute in Articles 7 and 14.2 identify central
bank independence and require the compatibility of national legislation with
these provisions, which has to be ensured at the latest upon joining the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB).2
In 1997 the European Monetary Institute established a list of features that
embody the concept of central bank independence. These form the basis for
assessing the national legislation of the Member States, in particular of the
statutes of the national central banks (NCBs).
The concept of central bank independence includes various types of
independence that must be assessed separately; namely personal, institutional,
f inancial and functional independence.
Over the past few years, these aspects of central bank independence have been
further ref ined by the European Central Bank (ECB) and subsequently
incorporated step by step into the statutes of the NCBs of the new Member
States.
This is also the case for Národná banka Slovenska. The NBS Act has been
amended several times since 1997, and the principle of central bank
independence has been incorporated into Slovak legislation.
The following brief review is designed to cast some light on the way in which
some of the key aspects of central bank independence are reflected in the current
NBS Act. 
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1 Article 56 of Act No 460/1992 Coll., as amended (Constitution of the Slovak Republic).
2 Article 109 of the Treaty and Article 14.1 of the Statute.
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE
MINIMUM TERM OF OFFICE FOR GOVERNORS
The statutes of the NCBs must, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute,
contain a minimum term of office for a governor of five years, although this does
not preclude a longer term of off ice. 
The NBS Act lays down that the members of the Bank Board shall be appointed
for a term of off ice of f ive years, and that the membership of the Bank Board
shall be limited to a maximum of two consecutive terms of off ice.3
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF GOVERNORS AND SECURITY OF TENURE OF
MEMBERS OF THE DECISION-MAKING BODIES OF NCBs INVOLVED IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF ESCB-RELATED TASKS OTHER THAN GOVERNORS  
NCBs’ statutes must ensure that their governors may not be dismissed for reasons
other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute (i.e. that they no longer
fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or that they have
been guilty of serious misconduct).
Personal independence would be jeopardised if the same rules for the security
of tenure of governors were not also applied to other members of the decision-
making bodies of NCBs who are involved in the performance of ESCB-related
tasks. This applies in particular where the governor is primus inter pares between
colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where other members may deputise
for the governor.
To prevent the dismissal of a governor being at the discretion of the authorities
involved in his or her nomination and appointment, in this case the Government
of the Slovak Republic and the Parliament of the Slovak Republic, and to declare
the security of tenure of other members of the decision-making bodies, the NBS
Act provides for the following, in line with the Statute:
Article 7 (9)
A member of the Bank Board may only be recalled from his function in the event
that:
a) he has been legally sentenced by court for an intentional criminal offence,
b) he no longer fulf ils the preconditions for the performance by him of the
function of a member of the Bank Board pursuant to paragraph 4,
c) he has taken up a function, occupation, employment or activity that is
incompatible with membership of the Bank Board or has otherwise violated
the provisions of paragraph 6.
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3 Article 7 (4) and (5) of the NBS Act.
RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The limitation of political discretion in the evaluation of grounds for dismissal
justif ies the fact that members of decision-making bodies have the right to have
any dismissal decision reviewed by an independent judicial court. Article 14.2
of the Statute stipulates that an NCB governor who has been dismissed from his
or her position may refer the decision to the Court of Justice. Moreover, national
legislation should also grant national courts the right to review a decision to
dismiss any other member of the decision-making body of the NCB who is
involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks.
The NBS Act declares that any disputes relating to the dismissal of a member
of the Bank Board from his or her off ice shall be decided by a court in
proceedings pursuant to a separate law. This shall however not apply in cases
where, under an international treaty which is binding upon the Slovak Republic
and which takes precedence over the law of the Slovak Republic, such a decision
falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.4
SAFEGUARD AGAINST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Personal independence also entails ensuring that no conflicts of interest arise
between the duties of members of decision-making bodies of NCBs vis-à-vis
their respective NCB (and additionally of governors  vis-à-vis the ECB) on the
one hand, and any other functions which such members of decision-making
bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks may have and which
may jeopardise their personal independence on the other.
The problem of conflict of interest has been eliminated in the wording of the
NBS Act, as follows: 
Membership of the Bank Board shall be incompatible with the post of President
of the Slovak Republic, Member of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic, Member
of the Government of the Slovak Republic, judge, public prosecutor, and any other
function, office of employment in state authorities, self-government bodies or any
other public bodies, position in the management or supervisory body of a legal
person doing business, performing entrepreneurial or other economic or income-
earning activities which may create conflict of interest. A member of the Bank
Board may not perform any other function or non-income-earning activity which
may create a conflict of interest between duties of the member of the Bank Board
and that function or activity. If, at the time of his/her appointment, a member of
the Bank Board holds a position or pursues an occupation, employment or activity
that is incompatible with membership of the Bank Board, he/she shall be obligated
to take without delay a demonstrable legal action aimed at terminating such office,
profession, employment or activity and shall be obligated without delay to give
up such office, profession, employment or activity.
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4 Article 7 (10) of the NBS Act.
INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
Institutional independence is a feature of central bank independence that is
expressly referred to in Article 108 of the Treaty as reproduced in Article 7 of
the Statute. These Articles prohibit Member State NCBs and members of their
decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community
institutions or bodies, from any Member State government, or from any other
body. Some of the following rights of third parties were identif ied by the ECB
as being incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute, and therefore needed to
be amended in preparation for joining the ESCB:
– the right to issue instructions;
– the right to approve, suspend, annul or defer decisions;
– the right to participate in decision-making bodies of an NCB with a right
to vote;
– the right to be consulted on an ex ante basis on an NCB’s decision; 
– the right to censor decisions on legal grounds.
Taking into account the rights of third parties mentioned above, several more
or less signif icant inconsistencies have been identif ied and subsequently dealt
with in the NBS Act, with the following outcome:
– extension of the prohibition for the members of the decision-making bodies
of Národná banka Slovenska of seeking or taking instructions not only from
the Government of the Slovak Republic, but also from any other bodies,
– elimination of the advisory role of the representatives of the Government of
the Slovak Republic in the decision-making process,
– elimination of the NBS reporting obligations towards the Government of the
Slovak Republic and the Parliament of the Slovak Republic, which obligations
could be understood as ex ante consultations on the NBS’s decisions,
– participation of the governor in the meetings of the Government of the Slovak
Republic to be based on invitation rather than obligatory. 
To cope with these issues, new provisions have been incorporated into the NBS
Act. For example:
Article 7 (7)
In connection with the performance of their functions or with activities of the
National Bank of Slovakia, members of the Bank Board may not seek or take
instructions from state authorities, self-government bodies, any other public
bodies, or any legal persons or natural persons. State authorities, self-government
bodies, any other public bodies, or any legal persons or natural persons may not
influence the National Bank of Slovakia or members of the Bank Board in
connection with the performance of their function and the operations of the
National Bank of Slovakia. The Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia may
not seek or take instructions from the Bank Board in connection with the
performance of his function in bodies of the European System of Central Banks
and the European Central Bank. The same shall apply to a person acting for the
Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia in these bodies.
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Article 12 (2)
The National Bank of Slovakia shall fulf il its tasks pursuant to Article 2 hereof
independently of instructions from state authorities, self-government bodies, any
other public bodies and from legal persons and natural persons.
Article 8 (4)
Apart from its members, Bank Board meetings may be attended by a member
of the Government of the Slovak Republic authorised by the Government of the
Slovak Republic, persons designated in the Bank Board’s rules of procedure, and
other persons invited by the Bank Board. 
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
In some countries third parties, particularly the government or parliament, were
formerly in a position, either directly or indirectly, to influence the determination
of an NCB’s budget or the distribution of profit. The submission of a draft NCB
budget to the government or parliament either for approval or an opinion would
clearly exceed the boundaries of f inancial independence. This was also the case
for Národná banka Slovenska, albeit only to a limited extent. 
The former NBS Act stated that Národná banka Slovenska should submit an
Annual Statement on the results of its activities for approval to the Parliament
of the Slovak Republic. There was some doubt as to whether the Parliament could
be in a position to have either a direct or indirect influence on the determination
of Národná banka Slovenska’s budget or the distribution of prof it. 
To avoid any confusion, the new NBS Act states that the competence of the
Parliament of the Slovak Republic shall be purely limited to an ex post review which
should be regarded as a reflection of the accountability of Národná banka Slovenska,
without infringing its independence in any shape or form. Article 38.3 states that: 
Within three months of the end of a calendar year, the National Bank of Slovakia
shall submit to the Parliament of the Slovak Republic an annual report on the
results of its operations; in addition to balance sheet data of the National Bank
of Slovakia and an auditor’s opinion verifying it, this report shall specif ically
state the data concerning the costs of the National Bank of Slovakia.  
FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Article 2 of the former NBS Act stated that the primary task of Národná banka
Slovenska should be to ensure the stability of the Slovak currency. In light of
the ESCB Statute’s distinction between objectives and tasks, and in order to
reflect more accurately the primacy of price stability, the wording was changed
to “primary objective”, as follows:
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Article 2.1
The primary objective of the National Bank of Slovakia shall be to maintain price
stability.
In addition, the former Article 12 stipulated that Národná banka Slovenska
should support the economic policy of the Government of the Slovak Republic.
Because the ESCB’s secondary objective is to support the general economic
policies of the Community, the NBS Act has been amended accordingly. Article
12 (1) states that:
While respecting its primary objective and tasks, the National Bank of Slovakia
shall support the economic policy of the Government of the Slovak Republic.
Article 2 (2) additionally states that:
With a view to accomplishing its primary objective pursuant to paragraph 1, the
National Bank of Slovakia shall also perform the authority, activities, tasks,
rights and obligations following from its participation in the European System
of Central Banks.
In becoming an independent central bank, Národná banka Slovenska has
embarked on the process of becoming a member of the ESCB, with the aim of
f inally joining the Eurosystem as planned in 2009. 
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NATIONAL EXPERIENCES IN PREPARING FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS INTO THE
EUROSYSTEM: THE ORGANIC LAW OF BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Jorge Santos and 
Maria Amélia Saraiva 
ABSTRACT
La legge organica (Organic Law – OL) del Banco de Portugal (BP) è stata
adeguata al Trattato CE in due fasi: la prima nel 1995, la seconda nel 1998.
Gli emendamenti del 1995 miravano, sostanzialmente, a proibire il
finanziamento monetario dello Stato e l’accesso privilegiato alle istituzioni
finanziarie. Successivamente furono approvati altri emendamenti per
avvicinare maggiormente l’obiettivo prioritario della BP al mantenimento della
stabilità dei prezzi, per attribuire alla BP la responsabilità della conduzione
della politica monetaria e rafforzarne l’indipendenza finanziaria.
Gli emendamenti del 1998 si basavano sul fatto che, mentre gli adeguamenti
giuridici da introdurre in materia di indipendenza delle banche centrali
nazionali (BCN) dovevano essere pienamente efficaci al più tardi entro la data
di istituzione del SEBC, gli adeguamenti finalizzati a integrare le Banche
Centrali Nazionali nel SEBC, benché preferibilmente adottati prima di tale data,
dovevano divenire efficaci soltanto o all’inizio della Terza fase (per gli Stati
membri senza deroga) o all’inizio della loro piena partecipazione alla UEM (per
gli Stati membri con deroga). Senza conoscere, al momento di legiferare,
l’inserimento o meno del Portogallo tra gli Stati membri rispondenti alle
condizioni necessarie per adottare l’euro il 1° gennaio 1999, il legislatore
portoghese ha considerato due ipotesi: la prima, che il Portogallo non avrebbe
adottato la moneta unica il 1° gennaio 1999, e l’altra che l’avrebbe fatto. Nella
prima ipotesi, gli emendamenti all’OL sarebbero stati quelli, a completamento
dell’indipendenza della BP, introdotti con l’articolo 1 della Legge 5/98 (in vigore
dal 1° febbraio 1998) oltre a quelli relativi all’integrazione (mitigata), introdotta
dall’articolo 3 della stessa legge (in vigore dal 1° gennaio 1999). Nella seconda
ipotesi, gli emendamenti alla OL sarebbero stati quelli relativi all’indipendenza,
introdotti con l’articolo 1 e in vigore dal 1° febbraio 1998, e quelli che
rafforzavano tale indipendenza e che riguardavano anche l’integrazione (piena),
introdotta dall’articolo 2 della stessa legge e in vigore dal giorno in cui il
Portogallo avesse adottato l’euro come propria valuta.
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PREFACE
This paper has been written bearing particularly in mind the Member States that
have not yet adopted the euro as their currency but that, should this be envisaged
in the future, will face similar problems with regard to achieving legal
convergence as Portugal did. In this context, its main purpose is to describe the
“two in one” approach followed by the Portuguese legislative bodies when
deciding to foresee, in one single legal act, the two possibilities of Portugal either
adopting or not adopting the euro on 1 January 1999. This article is not intended
to establish a model that should be followed by other Member States: obviously,
each national legislator is free to choose its own approach. However, the
European Monetary Institute (EMI) singled out the Portuguese approach for
particular praise in its Opinion of 15 August 1997, noting “with particular
satisfaction the comprehensive fashion in which the adaptation of the Bank’s
statute is foreseen in the draft law, whilst at the same time the different situations
are accommodated which may occur dependent on the moment at which Portugal
adopts the single currency”. 
INTRODUCTION
When the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force on 1 November 1993,
rewording the provisions dedicated to Economic and Monetary Policy1 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty), the statutes of the Banco
de Portugal (henceforth “the Bank”) were contained in an Organic Law (OL)
which had been approved by Decree-Law 337/90 of 30 October 1990 (OL-90).
The new requirements of the Treaty conflicted with several provisions of OL-
90, and the Portuguese authorities therefore decided to adapt the OL in two steps,
the f irst in 1995 and the second in 1998.
1 THE 1995 AMENDMENTS 
1.1 
Some of the provisions of OL-90 were clearly inconsistent with Articles 101 and
102.1 of the Treaty (the prohibition of monetary f inancing and of privileged
access to f inancial institutions, respectively), and attention had to be paid to the
fact that these Articles would be applicable as from the beginning of the second
stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. from 1 January 1994.2
More specif ically, the Bank was allowed to “grant to the State, through the
appropriate credit operations, the funds required by the latter to subscribe capital
stock of international organisations operating chiefly in the monetary, f inancial
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1 Currently Articles 98 to 124, after the renumbering made by the Treaty of Amsterdam. This paper uses the
numeration introduced by this Treaty.
2 Article 116.3, in conjunction with Article 116.1 of the Treaty.
and foreign exchange f ields” (Article 25); the Autonomous Regions of Azores
and Madeira were permitted to resort to an “account, free of charge” opened with
the Bank (Article 26)3; and the Bank was allowed “to buy and sell securities
issued by the Portuguese State” (Article 35.1.b).
It seems obvious that Articles 25 and 35.1.b were contrary to Article 101.1 of
the Treaty4, while Article 26 contradicted Article 102.1 of the same Treaty.5
Therefore, OL-90 was amended by Decree-Law 231/95 of 12 September 1995
with the main purpose of adapting it (although almost two years later…) to the
said Articles of the Treaty.
1.2
Article 25 was reworded as follows: “(1) Overdraft facilities or any other type
of credit facility with the Bank in favour of the State or other State-dependent
services or bodies, other public-law legal persons and public undertakings, or
any other bodies on which the State, the Autonomous Regions or local authorities
may, directly or indirectly, have a dominant influence, shall be prohibited. 
(2) The Bank shall not guarantee any commitments of the State or any other body
mentioned in the foregoing number, and shall not directly purchase debt
instruments issued by the State or by the same bodies.”6
The mechanism foreseen in Article 26 of OL-90 on the resort to a free-of-charge
account by the Autonomous Regions was replaced in Decree-Law 231/95 by a
transitional provision stating that “the Autonomous Regions may temporarily
benef it from an interest-free credit facility with the Banco de Portugal”. This
exception was in accordance with the Protocol on Portugal annexed to the
Treaty.7 Later on, Article 48 of Law 13/98 of 24 February 1998 laid down that
the Autonomous Regions’ interest-free accounts would be def initively closed
no later than 31 December 2000 and that the respective debit balances would
be paid on that date.
Finally, Article 35.1.b has been reworded to allow the Bank to buy and sell
securities issued by the Portuguese State “on the secondary market” only.
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3 Under the original wording of Article 26 of OL-90, the State itself was also entitled to resort to a free-of-charge
account opened with the Bank. However, such an account had already been closed in accordance with Article
58 of Law 2/92 of 9 March 1992 (the State budget for 1992). Therefore, at the entering into force of the Treaty
of Maastricht, the part of Article 26 referring to the State’s account had been implicitly repealed.
4 “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the central banks of the Member
States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or
national central banks of debt instruments.”
5 “Any measure, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Community institutions
or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public
law, or public undertakings of Member States to f inancial institutions, shall be prohibited.”
6 The prohibition of guaranteeing commitments of the State or other public bodies was linked to Article 103
of the Treaty.
7 “(1) Portugal is hereby authorised to maintain the facility afforded to the autonomous regions of Azores and
Madeira to benefit from an interest-free credit facility with the Banco de Portugal under the terms established
by existing Portuguese law. (2) Portugal commits itself to pursue its best endeavours in order to put an end
to the above-mentioned facility as soon as possible.”
At the same time, the opportunity was taken to introduce, on a voluntary basis,
other amendments with the aim of facilitating the path to EMU. In this context,
the amendments to Articles 3, 18.1 and 63.2 deserve special mention.
According to Article 3 of OL-90, the objective of the Bank was, in its capacity
as the central bank of Portugal, to “ensure the internal monetary equilibrium
and the external solvency of the currency”; this provision came closer to the first
and second sentences of Article 105.1, of the Treaty8, insofar as it was rephrased
as follows: “The primary objective of the Banco de Portugal, as the central bank
of the Portuguese Republic, shall be to maintain price stability, taking into
account the overall economic policy of the Government.”
Article 18.1 of OL-90 stated that only “taking into account the Government’s
guidelines” was it incumbent on the Bank “to cooperate in the formulation of
the monetary and foreign exchange policies and to execute such policies”;
Decree-Law 231/95 eliminated the reference to the government’s guidelines and
entrusted the Bank with the responsibility for conducting monetary policy, and
no longer just cooperating in the formulation of this policy: “As [the] central
bank, besides the conduct of monetary policy, under the terms of Article 3, it
shall be particularly incumbent on the Bank [...] to cooperate in the formulation
and to implement the foreign exchange policy”.
Finally, while Article 63.2 of OL-90 on the distribution of prof it for the f iscal
year laid down that, after a deduction of 20% for legal and other reserves, 80%
of such prof it should be distributed to the State9, the 1995 version reinforced
the f inancial autonomy of the Bank since, after deducting 20% for reserves, the
remainder would be distributed to the State as dividends, “or to other reserves
proposed by the Board of Directors and approved by the Minister of Finance”.
2 REQUIREMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS (NCBs)
AND OF THEIR INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL
BANKS (ESCB)
2.1
According to Article 108 of the Treaty, applicable as from the beginning of the third
stage of EMU10, “when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB,
nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall
seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any
government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions
and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this
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8 “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective
of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2.”
9 The Banco de Portugal has been totally owned by the State since 15 September 1974 (Decree-Law 452/74 of
13 September 1974).
10 Article 116.3 of the Treaty. 
principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies
of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.”
By virtue of Article 109 of the Treaty, “each Member State shall ensure, at the
latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB, that its national legislation
including the statutes of its national central bank is compatible with this Treaty
and the Statute of the ESCB.”
It was known that the Commission and the EMI would report to the ECOFIN
Council on the progress made by the Member States in the fulf ilment of their
obligations regarding the achievement of EMU, and moreover that such reports
would not only analyse the degree of sustainable economic convergence among
Member States, but would also “include an examination of the compatibility
between each Member State’s national legislation, including the statutes of its
national central bank, and Articles 108 and 109 of this Treaty and the Statute
of the ESCB”.11 Moreover, the Council of Heads of State or Government, taking
into account the above-mentioned reports, would conf irm before 1 July 1998
which Member States fulf illed the necessary conditions for the adoption of the
single currency.12
It derives from the above that, to be included in the group of those fulf illing the
conditions for adopting the single currency, Member States should previously
respect not only the economic convergence criteria, but also the legal
convergence criteria.
In its essence, legal convergence means that (i) NCBs must be independent,
either from the political authorities or from any other entities outside the ESCB13;
and (ii) not only the statutes of NCBs but all national legislation that has an
impact on the NCBs’ performance of their ESCB-related tasks has to be
compatible with the Treaty and with the Statute of the ESCB/ECB (the Statute),
keeping namely in mind the integration of NCBs into the ESCB.14
2.2
The independence of NCBs, to which Article 108 of the Treaty and Articles 7
and 14.2 of the Statute refer, is necessary for the performance of ESCB-related
tasks and may be conceived as institutional, personal, functional and f inancial
independence.
Institutional independence means that neither the NCBs nor any member of the
respective decision-making bodies may seek or take instructions from any entity
outside the ESCB.
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11 Article 121.1 of the Treaty.
12 Article 121.4 of the Treaty. In fact, this would take place during the f irst quarter of 1998 because, according
to Council Decision 96/736/EC of 13 December 1996, on entry into the third stage of Economic and Monetary
Union (OJ L 335, 24.12.96, p. 48), the procedure foreseen in Article 121.4 of the Treaty would be applied
“as soon as possible in 1998.”
13 With the natural exception of the judicial authorities.
14 Due to the limited scope of the present paper, reference shall only be made to aspects related to the statutes
of NCBs.
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Personal independence means that the term of off ice of a governor of an NCB
shall be no less than f ive years, and that a governor may not be relieved from
off ice unless he or she no longer fulf ils the conditions required for the
performance of his or her duties, or if he or she has been guilty of serious
misconduct. Taking into account the spirit of the Treaty, the same rules for the
security of tenure of off ice should also apply to the other members of decision-
making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks.
Functional independence means that NCBs’ statutes must clearly reflect that in
the third stage of EMU, they will perform their duties in an operational
framework whose objectives are laid down in Article 105 of the Treaty, and no
longer at national level.
Financial independence implies that NCBs must be in a position that allows them
to avail themselves of the f inancial resources that are necessary to perform their
functions.
2.3
As stated above, legal convergence also has the meaning of integration of NCBs
into the ESCB. Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute are particularly devoted to
this integration, which means that it has to be taken into account that NCBs are
an integral part of the ESCB and must act in accordance with the guidelines and
instructions of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ESCB is an independent
and self-regulated system whose components are the NCBs and the ECB15, and
where the NCBs must be able to comply with decisions taken by the ECB. Hence,
national legislative provisions, including the statutes of NCBs, that create
obstacles to compliance with such decisions or that do not respect the
prerogatives of the ECB are incompatible with the full operation of the system.
To sum up, the full integration of NCBs into the ESCB implies the adoption of
other measures beyond those aiming to ensure independence, particularly taking
into account the need to allow NCBs to perform their functions in their capacity
as members of the ESCB and in accordance with the decisions of the ECB.
3 THE 1998 AMENDMENTS
3.1
As mentioned before, each Member State had to ensure the compatibility of its
national legislation, including the statutes of its NCB, with the Treaty and the
Statute of the ESCB “at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB”.16
Since the ESCB would be established “as soon as the Executive Board (of the
ECB) is appointed”, this appointment being made “immediately after 1 July
15 Article 107.1 of the Treaty.
16 Article 109 of the Treaty.
1998”17, the date of establishment of the ESCB would precede the beginning of
the third stage of EMU. It should be noted that, regarding the application of
Articles 108 and 109, the Treaty does not distinguish between Member States
with a derogation and Member States without a derogation. Therefore, these
Articles were binding for all Member States (with the sole exceptions of the
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Denmark)18, since a derogation, in the
sense of Article 122 of the Treaty, only means that the respective NCB
participates in the ESCB with reduced rights and obligations. Consequently, the
time limit for all the necessary legislative adaptations would be the date of
establishment of the ESCB, i.e. 1 July 1998.
Besides this, the Report on Progress towards Convergence, published by the EMI
in November 1996, had highlighted19 that the adaptations to be introduced in the
f ield of independence of the NCBs needed to be fully effective, at the latest, by
the date of the establishment of the ESCB, while adaptations aiming to integrate
NCBs into the ESCB, although possibly adopted before that date, only needed
to become effective either at the start of the third stage (for Member States
without a derogation) or at the start of their full participation in EMU (for
Member States with a derogation).
This timing created a problem of legislative technique for the Portuguese
legislative bodies. Considering that the compatibility of the statutes of the NCBs
with the Treaty was one of the eligibility requirements for a Member State to
adopt the single currency at the start of the third stage of EMU20, the amendments
to the OL of the Banco de Portugal would need to be adopted before knowing
whether or not Portugal would participate in that group of countries. Therefore,
the problem was, in addition to the provisions on independence, how to determine
which norms relative to integration into the ESCB needed to be adopted, before
knowing what kind of integration (full or mitigated) would be required of the
Bank.
It appeared that the easiest way to proceed would be to divide the law amending
the OL into two main parts. The f irst was chiefly aimed at amending some
Articles of the OL then in force, so as to guarantee the independence of the Bank,
and should become effective immediately; the second would fully replace the
OL with a new text containing both independence and full integration
requirements, and would become effective at the start of the third stage or, should
Portugal not be confirmed as fulfilling the necessary conditions for the adoption
of the single currency on 1 January 1999, at a later date on which Portugal would
adopt the single currency.
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17 Article 123.1 of the Treaty.
18 The United Kingdom, having notified the Council that it did not intend to move to the third stage, was exempted
from the application of Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Protocol on
certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, annexed to the Treaty.
Denmark, which had also notified that it would not participate in the third stage, was considered to be a Member
State with a derogation and, as such, Danmarks Nationalbank had to fulf il the requirements of central bank
independence, in accordance with Article 108 of the Treaty and with Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute.
19 See p. 99.
20 Articles 121.1 and 121.4.
It was however taken into account that even if Portugal were not to be in the f irst
group of countries participating in the single currency, some mitigated
integration requirements would nevertheless apply to all NCBs as from the start
of the third stage21, regardless of the full participation of the respective country
at that stage. Consequently, it was also considered advisable to lay down
forthwith the provisions amending the OL which – should Portugal fail to
participate in the single currency from the start – were designed to reconcile
the OL with these mitigated integration requirements and would become
effective at the start of the third stage.
Law 5/98 of 31 January thus contained simultaneously and successively the
following: some changes to be introduced immediately in the OL with regard
to the Bank’s independence (Article 1)22; a new integral version of the OL, which
envisaged not only the independence of the Bank but also its full integration into
the ESCB, whose version would entirely replace the OL then in force as of the
date of Portugal’s full participation in the third stage of EMU (Article 2)23; and
other amendments to the OL in the f ield of integration, which would only
become effective at the start of the third stage if Portugal’s full participation were
to occur only subsequently, and whose validity would be confined to the interim
period between the start of the third stage and the day on which Portugal adopts
the euro (Article 3).24
In other words, without knowing, at the moment of legislating, whether or not
Portugal would be confirmed as fulfilling the necessary conditions to be included
in the group of Member States that would adopt the single currency on 1 January
1999, the Portuguese legislator considered two hypotheses, one being that
Portugal would not adopt the single currency on 1 January 1999, and the other
that it would. In the f irst hypothesis, the amendments to the OL would be those
completing such independence, introduced by Article 1 of Law 5/98 (in force
since 1 February 1998) plus those regarding (mitigated) integration, introduced
by Article 3 of the same Law (in force as from 1 January 1999). In the second
hypothesis, the amendments to the OL would be those regarding independence,
introduced by Article 1 and in force since 1 February 1998, plus those reinforcing
such independence and regarding also (full) integration, introduced by Article
2 of the same Law and in force as of the day of Portugal’s adoption of the euro
as its currency.
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21 With the possible exception of the Bank of England, pursuant to the Protocol on certain provisions relating
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
22 Article 1: “(1) As of the date of publication of this Law, Articles 1, 3, 16, 43, 44, 47, 51, 57, 58, 64, 66, 67,
69, 71 and 72 of the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal, approved by Decree-Law No 337/90 of 30 October,
as amended by Decree-Law No 231/95 of 12 September and by Law No 3/96 of 5 February, shall be reworded
as follows: [...] (2) As of the date mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, Articles 71-A and 71-B shall be added
to the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal in question, worded as follows: […]”
23 Article 2: “As of the day on which Portugal adopts the euro as its currency, the Organic Law of the Banco de
Portugal shall have the wording contained in the annex to the present Law, of which it forms an integral part.
Simultaneously, the Organic Law approved by Decree-Law No 337/90 of 30 October, as amended by Decree-
Law No 231/95, of 12 September, by Law No 3/96 of 5 February, and by Articles 1.1 and 1.2 and, should it
come into force, by Article 3 as well of the present Law, shall be revoked”.
24 Article 3: “Should Portugal fail to adopt the euro as its currency on the day on which the third stage of Economic
and Monetary Union will start, as of that date Articles 3, 19, 39 and 65 of the Organic Law of the Banco de
Portugal, approved by Decree-Law No 337/90, of 30 October, as amended by Decree-Law No 231/95, of 
12 September, by Law No 3/96, of 5 February and by Article 1.1 and 1.2 of the present Law, shall be reworded
as follows: […]”
Among other advantages, this legislative technique provided a full picture of
Portugal’s intentions in this f ield, which was all the more important as both the
EMI and the European Commission would have to produce reports containing
studies on the compatibility of the national legislation of each Member State
with the Treaty provisions, which would in turn be taken into account by the
European Council when conf irming which Member States had fulf illed the
necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.25 Besides this, such
a legislative technique would avoid a second consultation with the ECB on a
future draft OL.
As Portugal was conf irmed as one of the Member States that would adopt the
euro as a single currency on 1 January 1999, the amendments on independence
introduced in the OL by Article 1 of Law 5/98 were in force between 1 February
and 31 December 1998; the amendments on independence and full integration
introduced by Article 2 of Law 5/98 entered into force on 1 January 199926;
whereas the amendments on independence and mitigated integration foreseen
in Article 3 of the same Law never entered into force.
3.2 IT IS ILLUSTRATIVE TO COMPARE THE LEGAL REGIMES ON INDEPENDENCE
AND ON INTEGRATION ENVISAGED FOR THE TWO IDENTIFIED HYPOTHESES27
3.2.1 PROVISIONS FOR THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PORTUGAL WOULD NOT ADOPT
THE SINGLE CURRENCY ON 1 JANUARY 1999: ARTICLES 1 AND 3
We will start with the amendments laid down by Article 1 of Law 5/98 aiming
to ensure the independence of the Bank.
3.2.1.1
Article 43 of OL-90 stated that the Governor could “suspend the effectiveness
of the decisions taken by the Board of Directors” on the grounds that, in his
judgement, they were “contrary to the law, to the interests of the country or of
the Bank”; the suspension should be reported to the Minister of Finance and
would be considered waived if the government did not confirm it within 15 days.
This power to suspend the effectiveness of the decisions, insofar as it depended
on conf irmation by the Cabinet, was not compatible with the institutional
independence of the Bank and, therefore, Law 5/98 changed it into the equivalent
of a right of veto, although restricted to the issues concerning the participation
of the Bank in the ESCB as well as the independence of the Governor as a
member of the decision-making bodies of the ECB, to which he would inherently
belong.28
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25 Articles 121.1 and 121.4 of the Treaty.
26 The amendments on independence introduced by Article 1 of Law 5/98 had by then been subsumed within
the more signif icant amendments brought about by Article 2.
27 Comparison is naturally limited to the essential features of these regimes.
28 Article 43.2, as amended by Article 1 of Law 5/98: “The vote in the affirmative of the Governor shall be required
for all the decisions taken by the Board of Directors or by Executive Committees, which, in his motivated
judgement, may affect either his decision-making autonomy in his position as member of the decision-making
bodies of the European Central Bank, or the compliance with the obligations of the Bank as an integral part
of the European System of Central Banks”.
3.2.1.2
There was general consensus that the independence of NCBs could be jeopardised
if the same rules for the security of tenure of office – which Article 14.2 of the
Statute only expressly provides for central bank governors – were not also applied
to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the
performance of ESCB-related tasks.29 The Portuguese legislator therefore added two
new paragraphs, 4 and 5, to Article 44 of OL-9030 to ensure the implementation of
this principle. Paragraph 4 is self-explanatory, while paragraph 5 seeks to highlight
the fact that, according to the Statute, only the Governor has the right to institute
proceedings at the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the vice-
governors and other members of the Board shall only have the right to institute
proceedings at Portuguese courts, under general terms).
3.2.1.3
Three new paragraphs, 5, 6 and 7, were added by Law 5/98 to Article 64 of 
OL-90.31 Paragraphs 5 and 6 were justif ied because, in their absence, the Bank
would be subject on the one hand to the f inancial system governing public
administration services and bodies, like any other public body, and, on the other
hand, to the control of the Portuguese Court of Auditors. This would hamper its
management and, consequently, the successful performance of the Bank’s tasks
as an integral part of the ESCB. 
3.2.1.4
A new paragraph, number 2, was also added by Law 5/98 to Article 69 of the
OL-9032 with the aim of putting an end to an old practice which required the
Minister of Finance to sign the Notices of the Bank, since such a practice, 
in terms of the ESCB-related tasks, was not consistent with the Bank’s
independence.33
3.2.1.5
Turning now to the amendments foreseen by Article 3 of Law 5/98 aiming at
the integration of the Bank into the ESCB, the f irst one worth noting is the
rewording of Article 3 of the OL.
In contrast to the text then in force, as amended in 199534, Law 5/98 redrafted
Article 3 of the OL as follows: “(1) The Bank, in its capacity as central bank
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29 Cf. EMI, Report on Progress towards Convergence (1996), p. 102.
30 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 44, as amended by Law 5/98: “(4) The Governor and the other members of the
Board of Directors may only be relieved from off ice should any of the circumstances envisaged in Article 14.2
of the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank occur. (5) The
Governor may institute proceedings against such a decision, pursuant to the provisions laid down in Article
14.2 of the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.”
31 Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Article 64, as amended by Law 5/98: “(5) The Bank shall not be subject to the financial
system governing the autonomous funds and services of the public sector. (6) The Bank shall not be subject to the
prior control of the Court of Auditors, nor to its successive control in the issues relating to its participation in the
performance of the tasks entrusted to the European System of Central Banks. (7) The provisions of the foregoing
paragraph shall be applicable to all Funds operating at the Bank or in whose management the Bank participates.”
32 “(2) The Notices of the Bank shall be signed by the Governor and published in Series I, B of the Off icial
Gazette”.
33 In broad terms, the “notices” of the Bank are mainly the expression of its regulatory power (pouvoir
règlementaire) to produce rules detailing the principles established by the law.
34 See supra, 1.2.
of the Portuguese Republic, shall be an integral part of the European System
of Central Banks. (2) The Bank shall pursue the objectives and shall participate
in the fulf ilment of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, pursuant to the provisions
laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community and in the statutes
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.”
The reasons behind this amendment are certainly worth elucidating. The
Portuguese legislative bodies were confronted with an apparent contradiction
between the Treaty provisions and the provisions of the Statute as regards the
degree of involvement in the objectives and tasks of the ESCB by the NCBs of
the Member States that would not adopt the single currency from the start of
the third stage (non-participating NCBs).
Resorting to a virtually identical wording, the objectives of the ESCB are defined
in Article 105.1 of the Treaty and in Article 2 of the Statute, while its basic tasks
are def ined in Article 105.2 of the Treaty and in Article 3 of the Statute.
Article 122.3 of the Treaty states that Articles 105.1 and 105.2 would not apply
to any Member States not joining the single currency from the start of the third
stage, which leads to the assumption that the non-participating NCBs would
neither be involved in the objectives nor in the tasks of the ESCB.
However, Article 43 of the Statute, which develops Article 122.3 of the Treaty,
conf irms the non-applicability of Article 3 (tasks) of this Statute, although not
of Article 2 (objectives) of the same Statute. This indicates that, after all, the
non-participating NCBs share the pursuance of the ESCB’s objectives, although
they do not take part in the fulf ilment of its tasks.
This contradiction, which resulted from the literal meaning conveyed by the
texts, had to be solved by resorting to established techniques for interpreting
the law. Along this line, the interpreter verif ied that the ESCB would be
composed of all the NCBs, with no exception (Articles 107.1 of the Treaty and
Article 1.2 of the Statute). For this reason, non-participating NCBs assist the
ECB in the collection of statistical information in order to undertake the tasks
of the ESCB (Article 5 of the Statute); they may be prevented from performing
functions that interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB (Article 14.4
of the Statute); they are prohibited from granting credit to public sector entities
(Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 21 of the Statute); their assets and
liabilities that fall within the ESCB are included in the consolidated balance
sheet of the ESCB (Article 26.3 of the Statute); they subscribe their part to the
capital of the ECB (Articles 28 and 29 of the Statute) and may be forced to pay
up a minimal percentage as a contribution to the operational costs of the ECB,
even though in principle the need to pay up their subscribed capital is waived
as long as their country has a derogation (Article 48 of the Statute)35; and the
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35 This in fact happened through Decision ECB/1998/14 of 1 December 1998, which laid down the measures necessary
for the paying-up of the capital of the ECB by the non-participating NCBs (OJ L 110, 28.4.99, p. 33). This Decision
was replaced by Decision ECB/2003/19 of 18 December 2003 (OJ L 9, 15.1.2004, p. 31), which, in turn, has itself
been repealed and replaced by Decision ECB/2004/10 of 23 April 2004 (OJ L 205, 9.6.2004, p. 19).
respective governors are members (Article 45.2 of the Statute) of the General
Council of the ECB, which is one of its decision-making bodies (Article 45.1
of the same Statute).
However, the non-participating NCBs retain their powers in the field of monetary
policy according to national law (Article 43.2 of the Statute) and, namely, are
not subject to the guidelines and instructions of the ECB (Articles 12.1 and 14.3
of the Statute of the ESCB, which do not apply to them pursuant to Article 43.1
of the Statute).
Based on the above, and also taking into account the fact that the provisions of
the Statute as laid down in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty have the same legal
force as this one, the Portuguese legislator concluded that Article 122.3 of the
Treaty should be interpreted in light of the provisions of Article 43 of the Statute,
which means that the non-participating NCBs also pursue the objectives of the
ESCB and, albeit on a more limited basis, also take part in the performance of
its tasks.
It may appear somewhat surprising that the enforcement of this new wording
of Article 3 of the OL was proposed to become effective on 1 January 1999,
although the ESCB and the ECB were to be established earlier, in accordance
with Article 123.1 of the Treaty. This was on the one hand due to the fact that
a different solution would have lead to a higher degree of complexity, in terms
of transitory law. On the other hand, it was also felt that during such an interim
period, the direct applicability of the relevant Articles of the Treaty and of the
Statute would suff ice to remove any doubts not only with regard to the
participation of the Bank in the composition of the ESCB, but also as to the terms
and conditions under which such participation should take place.
3.2.1.6
According to Article 19.1 of the OL, the Bank should “ensure the centralisation
and compilation of the monetary, f inancial, foreign exchange and balance-of-
payments statistics”. In order to reinforce the integration of the Bank into the
ESCB, Article 19.1 was reworded by Law 5/98 as follows: “(1) The Bank shall
ensure the collection and compilation of the monetary, f inancial, foreign
exchange and balance of payments statistics, particularly within the scope of
its cooperation with the European Central Bank”.
3.2.1.7
A new sub-paragraph a) was added to Article 39.1 of the OL, stating that it would
be incumbent upon the Governor “to carry out the tasks of member of the
General Council of the European Central Bank, pursuant to the provisions laid
down in the Treaty establishing the European Community and in the Statute of
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank”.
The reason for this amendment was that the function of member of the General
Council of the ECB would not be performed on behalf of the Bank, in
contradiction to what was prescribed in the subsequent two sub-paragraphs b)
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and c) of the same Article.36 In fact, while the governors that compose the
Council of the EMI were considered as “representatives of their institutions”,
and the prohibition of instructions only covered “the Council of the EMI”
(Article 8 of the EMI Statute), the situation is completely different in the third
stage of EMU, as regards both the decision-making bodies of the ECB (one of
which is the General Council, as laid down in Article 45.1 of the Statute) and
the decision-making bodies of the NCBs: in the ECB, the aforementioned
representation ceases and the prohibition of instructions include the “ECB, the
NCBs or any member of their decision-making bodies” (Article 108 of the Treaty
and Article 7 of the Statute).
3.2.2 PROVISIONS FOR THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PORTUGAL WOULD ADOPT THE
SINGLE CURRENCY ON 1 JANUARY 1999: ARTICLE 2
For the hypothesis whereby Portugal would not adopt the single currency on 
1 January 1999, Articles 1 and 3 of Law 5/98 merely introduced some
adjustments in OL-90. But for the hypothesis that Portugal would adopt the
single currency on 1 January 1999, the entirely reformed OL foreseen in Article
2 of Law 5/98 incorporated fundamental amendments to the same OL-90. Some
examples that illustrate these amendments are provided below.
3.2.2.1
While, in the f irst hypothesis described above, Article 3.2 of the OL stated that
“the Bank shall pursue the objectives and shall participate in the fulf ilment of
the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, pursuant to the provisions laid down in the
Treaty establishing the European Community and in the statutes of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank”, for the second
hypothesis it was added that, besides the above, the Bank “shall be subject to
the provisions of the Statute of the ESCB and of the European Central Bank,
acting in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the European
Central Bank pursuant to the same Statute.”
3.2.2.2
While, in the f irst hypothesis, Article 43.2 referred to the Governor as a member
of “the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank”37, the equivalent
Article 32.2 of the reformed OL mentions, more precisely, the Governor as a
member of “the Governing Council and of the General Council of the ECB”.
3.2.2.3
The same applies to the competence of the Governor: while in the f irst
hypothesis the new sub-paragraph a) added to Article 39.1 mentioned the
Governor as a member of “the General Council” of the ECB38, the corresponding
Article 28.1 (a) mentions him/her as a member of “the Governing Council and
of the General Council”.
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36 Article 39.1 (b) of the OL: “To represent the Bank”; Article 39.1 (c) of the OL: “To act on behalf of the Bank
with foreign or international institutions”.
37 See supra, 3.2.1.1, 2nd paragraph.
38 See supra, 3.2.1.7.
3.2.2.4
In the same vein, only on the assumption that Portugal would adopt the single
currency was it possible to introduce in the OL, via Article 2 of Law 5/98, some
other fundamental changes, namely the deletion of the provisions related to
banknotes denominated in escudo; the deletion of references to the “currency
issue of the bank and other sight escudo liabilities”; the deletion of the reference
to the powers of the Bank to conduct monetary policy (which contradicted the
provisions of Article 105.2 of the Treaty and of Articles 3.1, 12.1, 14.3, 18.2,
19.1 and 20 of the Statute)39; the deletion of the reference to the powers of the
Bank not only to “cooperate in the formulation of the foreign exchange policy”
but also to “implement such policy” (since, according to Article 4.2 of the Treaty,
the Community has a single exchange rate policy whose types of def inition and
implementation as well as the sharing of responsibilities between the ECOFIN
Council and the ECB are set forth in Article 111); the deletion of the reference
to the powers of the Bank to determine the composition and the requirements
of minimum reserves imposed on credit institutions (which was inconsistent with
Article 19 of the Statute); and, f inally, the specif ication, in the indicative list
of operations available for monetary policy and foreign exchange purposes, that
such operations are carried out “in order to meet the objectives and to perform
the tasks of the ESCB”.
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39 The participation of the Banco de Portugal in this area is at any rate subject to the general provisions of the
new Article 3.2 (see supra, 3.2.1.1).
BREAK WITH THE PAST
THE ORGANIC ACT OF DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK N.V.
Jan Barend Jansen
ABSTRACT
L’Articolo 109 del Trattato costitutivo della Comunità Europea richiede che, al
più tardi entro la data di costituzione del SEBC, la legislazione degli Stati
Membri venga adeguata al fine di eliminare le incoerenze con il Trattato e lo
Statuto del SEBC/BCE e di assicurare il necessario grado di integrazione delle
Banche Centrali Nazionali degli Stati Membri del SEBC. Tale norma implicava
che la legislazione e gli statuti delle Banche centrali nazionali di questi Stati
Membri dovevano essere modificati al fine di limitare le incoerenze con il
Trattato e lo Statuto del SEBC/BCE ed assicurare il necessario livello di
integrazione delle Banche Centrali Nazionali degli Stati Membri del SEBC.
Per quanto riguarda i Paesi Bassi, ciò ha significato che il Bank Act del 1948,
la legge organica della Nederlandsche Bank, dovesse essere modificato. Lo
studio esamina le principali differenze tra il Bank Act del 1948 e il successivo,
il Bank Act del 1998. Inquadrati nel rispettivo contesto storico, viene rilevato
che il Bank Act del 1998 differisce sotto molti aspetti dal precedente testo
normativo e che pertanto le differenze con il passato sono considerevoli.
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INTRODUCTION
Under Article 109 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty)1
each Member State of the European Community has a duty to ensure that its
national legislation, including the articles of association of its national central
bank, is, by the date of establishment of the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) at the latest, compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (Statute of the
ESCB). This was a direct instruction to revise the Bankwet (Bank Act) of 1948,
the organic Act which laid down the duties, objectives, instruments and
institutional provisions governing De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. before it was
replaced by the current act, the 1998 Bank Act.2 This article examines, against
a historical background, in what ways the organic Act governing De
Nederlandsche Bank N.V. (the Bank) differs, in its current form, from its
predecessors.
The requirement that national legislation be compatible with the Treaty is one
of the provisions ensuring that the ESCB is able to conduct a uniform monetary
policy. Were the laws, rules and regulations in force in the Member States to
differ, implementation of the policy set by the European Central Bank (ECB)
would be impossible or, at any rate, inadequate. Bringing national legislation
into line with the Treaty requirements relating to Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) – in particular with the laws governing the powers of the national central
banks – was thus of considerable importance. This is also evident from the fact
that upon transition to Stage Three of EMU it was necessary to ascertain to what
extent the Member States satisf ied this legal criterion.3
The establishment of EMU was agreed upon in the Treaty on European Union4,
also known as the Treaty of Maastricht, the place where the Treaty was signed
at the end of 1991.5 The Treaty of Maastricht amended the Treaty and provided
that EMU should take place in three stages. The f irst stage, lasting from 1989
to 1994, was geared towards further coordination of economic and monetary
policy. The second stage began with the establishment of the European Monetary
Institute (EMI) on 1 January 1994 and was marked by further convergence of
the economic and monetary policies of the Member States and preparations for
the introduction of the euro. Stage Three, which began on 1 January 1999, is
marked by the advent of Monetary Union among the participating Member
States.6
324
1 Upon entry into effect of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999 the articles were renumbered; this was
previously Article 108 of the Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ, 1997, C 340) was approved for the whole
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands by way of the Goedkeuringswet (Act of Ratif ication) of 14 December 1998;
(Staatsblad (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees) 1998, 737).
2 The Bankwet 1998 (1998 Bank Act), the Statuten van De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. (Articles of Association
of De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.), and the Statute of the ESCB can be found on the Bank’s website at
www.dnb.nl. The ECB’s website contains, inter alia, the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB’s legal instruments.
3 This obligation is laid down in Article 121 (1), (2) and (3) of the Treaty. It also applies to Member States which
join at a later stage (see Article 122 (2) of the Treaty).
4 OJ 1992, C 191.
5 Ratif ied by way of Rijkswet (Kingdom Act) of 17 December 1992 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders, and Decrees 1992,
692).
6 11 Member States acceded to Monetary Union on 1 January 1999. Greece joined on 1 January 2001.
The transition to Stage Three of EMU was about implementing the monetary
provisions of the Treaty; the economic leg of EMU had largely been implemented
at the beginning of the second stage. The monetary provisions are geared towards
the needs of the Community as a whole and not specif ically to those of an
individual Member State. The requirement of compatibility between national
legislation and the Treaty was one of the reasons for completely revising the 1948
Bank Act. In the process of modifying the 1948 Bank Act, the starting point was
to identify which of its provisions were in conflict with the Treaty and the Statute
of the ESCB. Such provisions had to be either amended or repealed. Thereafter
it was ascertained which provisions would have to be introduced as a
consequence of the fact that the Bank was to be an integral part of the ESCB
and would have to operate in line with the guidelines and instructions of the
ECB.7 This not only meant having to introduce a number of new provisions; it
was also decided that the Act’s provisions, structure and terminology should, as
far as possible, be brought into line with those of the Treaty and the Statute of
the ESCB, in order to ensure that there would be as few differences as possible
with the agreed Community provisions. In addition, the revision of the 1948
Bank Act was used as an opportunity to adapt the Bank’s non-monetary duties
to the requirements of the times, with the consequence that some of the
provisions of the Bank Act disappeared altogether, while others were re-written.
The break with history is considerable – much greater than in the case of
previous revisions of the Bank Act.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A large number of articles contained in the 1948 Bank Act have their origin in
other bank acts, i.e. those of 1937, 1918, 1903, 1888 and 1863; some even go
back to the Bank’s first Octrooi (Letter Patent) of 1814. This Letter Patent relates
to the Koninklijk Besluit (Royal Decree) of 25 March 1814 whereby the Bank
was established and, for a period of 25 years, licensed to carry out “only those
activities conferred upon it”. Thus the Letter Patent of 1814 encapsulates three
principles which can also be found in the 1948 Bank Act:
– the Bank was to limit itself to banking activities; trading in goods was
forbidden, with the exception of trading in coin material;
– the Bank could perform only those banking activities detailed in the Letter
Patent;
– the issuing of unsecured credit was expressly forbidden.
The f irst and the third of these principles can also be found in the 1998 Bank
Act (Section 8); they stem not so much from the Dutch tradition, but rather from
the fact that the Statute of the ESCB contains corresponding provisions.8 The
principle that the Bank can perform only those banking activities expressly
stipulated in the Bank Act – such as those transactions described in Section 15
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7 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.
8 Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB.
of the 1948 Bank Act – was, in conformity with Article 18 of the Statute of the
ECSCB, abandoned.9 These amendments are already an indication of the extent
of the break with the past. The break is also evident from the absence of
provisions which are contained in the 1948 Bank Act and can be traced back to
the 1863 Bank Act, such as the provision of cashier services to the State free
of charge10, the power to invest its capital and reserves11, the publication of a
summary balance sheet12 and the dropping of the function of Secretary on the
Bank’s Governing Board. Section 10 of the 1948 Bank Act provides that the Bank
is authorised, to the exclusion of any other party, to issue banknotes. This article,
too, has its origin in the 1863 Bank Act, Section 1 of which provides that:
No bank of issue can be established and no foreign bank of issue can put its
banknotes into circulation in this country other than by virtue of a special
law and on the basis, and pursuant to the provisions, of such a law. 
The article likewise provides that “Bank of issue refers to any institution whose
purpose is to issue banknotes or put them into circulation”. In addition, Section
2 of the 1863 Bank Act grants the Bank the right to act as a bank of issue for
a period of 25 years after the expiration of the existing Letter Patent. As a result,
in successive Bank Acts up to that of 1948 the Bank was continually granted a
licence to act as a bank of issue for a specif ic period of time. This Letter Patent
was not granted to other f inancial institutions, meaning, de facto, that up to the
entry into effect of the 1948 Bank Act the Bank had the exclusive right to issue
banknotes. The licence construct was abandoned  in the 1948 Bank Act, by way
of which the Bank was granted the sole right to issue banknotes for an unlimited
period. Under Section 6 of the 1998 Bank Act the Bank is also authorised to issue
banknotes. However, the Bank’s right to do so is no longer exclusive; under
Article 106 (1) of the Treaty and Article 16 of the Statute of the ESCB both the
ECB and the national central banks have the right to issue banknotes as from
the beginning of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union.13 This means,
on the one hand, that alongside the banknotes issued by the Bank, banknotes
issued by other central banks can circulate in the Netherlands, and, on the other,
that the banknotes issued by the Bank can enter circulation throughout the euro
area. Thus, the break with tradition is evident here too. On the other hand, an
old tradition is maintained: the legal form of the Bank remains that of a naamloze
vennootschap (public limited liability company), and the Governing Board and
the Supervisory Board remain the Bank’s most important bodies.
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9 However, the activities which the bank may carry out are clearly demarcated: only such activities as are
necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it (Section 5) or those conferred upon it by Royal
Decree (Section 9 c).
10 Section 19 (2), 1948 Bank Act.
11 Section 18, 1948 Bank Act.
12 Section 35, 1948 Bank Act.
13 Article 106 should be read in conjunction with Article 116 (3) and Article 122 (3) of the Treaty and Protocol
No. 11 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. From this
it emerges that the Treaty article relating to the issuing of banknotes is not applicable to Member States which
have not yet adopted the euro, to Member States with a derogation and to the United Kingdom for as long as
it makes use of its opt-out right. Thus, in the context of EMU, the term “Community” refers to the Member
States belonging to the euro area.
The substantial nature of the revision of the Bank Act is evident from the new
form of the “Gemeenschapselement” (public welfare component)14 in the 
Bank Act of 1998.  From time immemorial there had always been a Royal
Commissioner who was responsible for supervising the Bank’s activities.15
During discussions on the draft 1937 Bank Act in the Tweede Kamer (Lower
House), various Members expressed the view that the relationship between the
Government and the bank of issue was in need of revision. While not wishing
to turn the Bank into a state bank, they were keen to ensure that its policies be
geared towards promoting the public welfare. In their view the Bank should not
only direct its own activities towards this objective, but also ensure that functions
of the private banking sector be performed in a manner which best served the
welfare of Dutch society. The State was to ensure that the Bank performed these
duties properly and, if necessary, should issue an instruction to the Bank to act
accordingly. Within the same framework the issue was raised of whether it would
be appropriate and desirable for the Bank to conduct an active economic policy
under the influence and supervision of the Government.16 Ultimately, however,
this line of thinking did not f ind expression in the 1937 Bank Act. Only after
World War Two was a process embarked upon of strengthening the Bank’s public
welfare component alongside the function of the Royal Commissioner who
supervised the Bank’s activities on behalf of government. An important reason
for this was that the Bank’s monetary policy under the gold standard was more
or less automatic in nature. Following the abandonment of the gold parity in
1936, it was repeatedly necessary to give substance to monetary policy, as the
Bank’s room for manoeuvre had increased. The then Dutch Minster of Finance,
Pieter Lieftinck, remarked that:
Before the war, under the system of the international gold standard, the Bank’s
policy was to a large extent mechanical in character. The maintenance of the
existing gold parity of the currency unit was the guiding objective, and
monetary policy was subordinate to this objective, irrespective of the
economic consequences. In the thirties we had learned what the consequences
of such a policy can be. When the gold standard was abandoned the era of
managed currencies began. The central bank faced a new task. I was of the
opinion that its position and powers had to be brought into line therewith.17
This occurred, in the f irst instance, by way of the Royal Decree of 1 October
194518, which not only stated that the 1937 Bank Act, which had been abrogated
by the occupying powers, was once again declared effective, but also that, inter
alia, the appointment of members of the Governing Board by the shareholders
was to be subject to the approval of the government, that a Bankraad (Bank
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14 This is the term used historically in the Netherlands as a way of referring to the public element in the workings
of the Bank. It should be distinguished from the term “Community element” (capital “C”), a concept referring
to the European Community.
15 First introduced in the 1863 Bank Act, Section 20.
16 A.M. de Jong, De wetgeving nopens De Nederlandsche Bank: 1814-1958: een historische studie, Nijhoff, 
’s-Gravenhage 1960, p. 259.
17 A. Bakker and M. M. P. van Lent, Pieter Lieftinck 1902-1989: een leven in vogelvlucht, Utrecht, 1989, p. 163.
18 Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees F204.
Council) – an advisory body for the Minister of Finance and for the Bank’s
Governing Board – was to be established, and that the Minister of Finance could
issue instructions to the Governing Board. 
These public welfare components ultimately appeared, in somewhat modif ied
form, in the 1948 Bank Act. In addition, in order to strengthen the Bank’s public
welfare component, all shares were transferred to state ownership by way of the
Naastingswet (Nationalisation Act) of 23 April 194819, which entered into effect
on 15 May 1948.20 Private shareholders affected by the nationalisation process
were compensated. Such compensation took the form of issuing those
shareholders who surrendered their shares to the Bank with a declaration on the
basis of which they could, per share of 1,000 guilders in the Bank, receive an
entry of a nominal amount of 2,000 guilders in the national debt register, yielding
interest at a rate of 2.5%.21 The last private shares were surrendered to the Bank
in 1958. The Bank remained a vennootschap (public limited liability company),
as this legal form guarantees independence and because there are a number of
administrative advantages associated with such a form as compared with that
of a public institution. For example, in the case of a public institution, by contrast
with a public limited liability company, business is conducted solely through
the budget.22 Moreover, Finance Minister Lieftinck considered it necessary to
deviate from previous Bank Acts by incorporating a general description of an
issuing bank’s duties in Section 9. Under Section 9 (1) of the 1948 Bank Act
the Bank had: 
… the duty to regulate the value of the Netherlands’ monetary unit in such
a manner as will be most conducive to the nation’s prosperity and welfare,
and in so doing to keep the value as stable as possible.
Thus it was established that the Bank’s (monetary) policy was to be geared to
the public interest, i.e. to promoting the welfare of the Dutch state. In the
Memorie van Toelichting (Explanatory Memorandum) to the Bill the Minister
of Finance made it clear that the direction of monetary policy was to be
determined by the Government.23 Accordingly, under Section 26 the Minister of
Finance was granted the power to issue binding instructions with regard to the
Bank’s monetary policy, where necessary. The f inal part of Section 9 (1), added
during the reading in the Lower House by way of an amendment proposed by
Member E. Sassen, provides that the country’s welfare is served by stabilising
the value of the guilder to the greatest extent possible. This addition was striking
in that it gave the Bank’s monetary policy a direction at a time when views on
the issue still differed widely. Some expressed a preference for price stability,
others for smoothing cyclical fluctuations, for pursuing a neutral monetary policy
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or for supporting an employment policy.24 Ultimately the addition proved to be
a very propitious one; in the 1970s and 80s the pursuit of price stability became
the prevailing doctrine for central banks. In the case of the ESCB this objective
is laid down in the Treaty.25
The public welfare elements laid down in the 1948 Bank Act were in part revised
in the 1998 Bank. All shares remain – in conformity with the Nationalisation
Act – in the hands of the State, and the President and Executive Directors of
the Governing Board are appointed by the Government.26 The Bank Council also
remains as an advisory body under the 1998 Bank Act, albeit in a modif ied
composition and size.27 On account of the independence required by the Treaty,
the Minister of Finance’s right to issue instructions, as laid down in Section 26
of the 1948 Bank Act, has expired, as has government supervision of the Bank’s
activities by a Royal Commissioner. There is a weak allusion to the Royal
Commissioner in Section 13 (2), in conjunction with Section 14, in the form of
a Government-appointed Supervisor who is to provide the Minister of Finance
with all information deemed necessary. In addition, the 1998 Bank Act also
makes reference to a public welfare element. However, this no longer relates to
the welfare of the country, but rather – as a result of the transfer of monetary
policy to the European level – to that of the European Community; the Bank
supports, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the general
economic policies in the European Community.28 In this context, the President
of the ECB regularly appears before the European Parliament’s Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs, where he accounts for the policy pursued by
the ECB. 
MOST IMPORTANT REVISIONS
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
From the beginning of Stage Three of EMU, monetary policy (together with the
other ESCB tasks) was conducted at the Community, and no longer national,
level. For the Netherlands this means that responsibility for monetary policy no
longer lies with the Dutch Minister of Finance and, accordingly, that the Minister
is no longer accountable to the Dutch Parliament for such policy. Accountability
now lies at the European level. The ECB compiles an Annual Report on the
activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy for the previous and current
year for the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, as well as
for the European Council. The President of the ECB presents this report to the
Council and the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on the
basis of thereof.29
329
24 De Jong, p. 411.
25 Article 105; Article 2 Statute of the ESCB.
26 Section 12 (2), 1998 Bank Act.
27 Section 15, 1998 Bank Act.
28 Article 2 (2), 1998 Bank Act.
29 Article 113 Treaty; Article 15 Statute of the ESCB.
LAPSING OF THE RIGHT TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS
The principle that it is the Government of the Netherlands that has the last word
on monetary policy in the Netherlands was already incorporated into the Royal
Decree of 1 October 1945. Its inclusion in the 1948 Bank Act was justif ied as
follows in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill:
In view of the fact that the direction of monetary policy should be determined
by the Government, the Minister of Finance must be able to issue binding
instructions to the Governing Board of the Bank on matters of principle
regarding which the Bank’s policies might conflict with the monetary and
financial policies of the Government.30
It is ultimately the Dutch Government’s responsibility to safeguard the general
welfare of the country. However, when the draft Act was being read in
Parliament, Minister of Finance Lieftinck stated that in normal circumstances
the coordination of the policies of the Bank and the Government should take
place through regular consultation. The issuing of instructions should be
considered an ultimum remedium.31 No Minister of Finance has made use of the
right to issue instructions laid down in Section 26 (1) of the 1948 Bank Act. This
was partly due to the inclusion by Lieftinck of a second sub-section in Section
26, which granted the Bank the right to appeal to the Government against
instructions and the option, included in the fourth subs-section of Section 26,
of making the instructions public. It is also worth noting here that the third sub-
section determined that, contrary to the normal procedure, the Council of State,
the highest advisory Government body, had no role to play in such appeals to
the Government, the rationale being that the interests of the country would be
best served by swift decision-making procedures in such matters. These
provisions strengthened the Bank’s position to conduct an independent policy
and forced the Minister and the Bank to f ind an internal solution to possible
differences of opinion regarding the monetary policy to be conducted. De facto,
therefore, the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bank under the 1948 Bank
Act was high. 
At the time when the 1948 Bank Act was being drafted, there was no unequivocal
view on the monetary policy to be conducted by a central bank. As stated above,
there were differing views on whether the aim should be to strive for price
stability, to conduct a cyclical or employment policy, or to adopt a neutral policy
stance. This was also one of the reasons behind granting the Minister of Finance
the right to issue instructions to the Bank; however, charging the Bank with the
task, in accordance with the wishes of Parliament, of keeping the value of the
monetary unit as stable as possible gave a clear direction to the policy to be
conducted by the Bank, thereby reducing the need to issue instructions. Since
that period, the views on the monetary policy to be conducted by a central bank
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have, however, evolved. Today the prevailing view is that a central bank’s
monetary policy should be based on one primary objective. This is the view,
developed by monetarists in the 1960s, that central banks must follow a f ixed
monetary growth rule based on trend growth of real national income.32 Monetary
policy must be based on combating inflation, not on regulating the real economy
by means of discreetly dampening cyclical fluctuations. According to these
monetarists, the latter, in which the money supply is geared to the economic
cycle, will in the longer term lead to greater cyclical fluctuations, as lag factors
will cause monetary actions to have procyclical effects. In the mid-1970s several
central banks, including the Deutsche Bundesbank, adopted a more or less f ixed
growth rate for the money supply, which was made public in advance. Through
the pegging of the Dutch guilder to the Deutsche Mark in March 1983, Dutch
monetary policy was indirectly (i.e. via German monetary policy) geared to a
policy of f ixed monetary growth up to the third stage of EMU.
Related to this is the preference for a central bank which is independent of the
world of politics. When a central bank is in a position to conduct an independent
monetary policy, this will ensure that monetary policy is protected from the
(short-term) policies of Government. Thus, paradoxically, the responsibility for
the common interest, which should, in the f irst instance, be that of Government,
is partly withdrawn from the political domain. The primacy of politics in this
area (and thus part of the democratic control exercised by Parliament) makes
way for the advantages of an independent central bank. The solid reputation of
a number of independent central banks (in particular the Deutsche Bundesbank)
in the area of combating inflation has strongly contributed to acceptance of this
view – a view which has had a great influence on the formulation of the Statute
of the ECB and the national central banks participating in the ESCB.
As a result of the requirement for monetary policy to be independent, as laid
down in the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, the Minister of Finance’s right
to issue instructions under the Bank Act 1948 was not incorporated into the 1998
Bank Act. In this respect, the legal situation is thus the same as that prevailing
at the time of the 1937 Bank Act.33 However, the actual situation has always, even
under the 1948 Bank Act, been one in which the Bank has had a high degree of
independence. As noted above, the Minister of Finance never made use of the
right to issue instructions and the Bank has been able to conduct a completely
independent monetary policy on the basis of its authority, in good cooperation
with the Minister of Finance and within the broad frameworks established by
the political domain. Even under the 1948 Bank Act the Bank enjoyed the
reputation of being an independent central bank. Thus, the amendment
introduced by the 1998 Bank Act is, in fact, smaller than it may seem in legal
terms. The amendment is smaller than the above suggests in another respect too:
although the Bank’s independence vis-à-vis the Minister of Finance may indeed
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have increased, this is balanced by the fact that the Bank is now obliged to follow
the instructions issued by the ECB.34
EXPIRATION OF THE OFFICE OF ROYAL COMMISSIONER
When extending the Letter Patent of 1838 the Government intended to institute
a Royal Commissioner, but in the end it refrained from doing so as a result of
the Bank’s resistance. Under the 1863 Bank Act, however, this wish on the part
of Government was f inally fulf illed. The institution of a Royal Commissioner
was based on the rationale that the interests of the State and its citizens were
greatly affected by the actions of the Bank and that the State had also entrusted
the Bank with considerable f inancial interests.35 Article 30 (1) of the 1948 Bank
Act stated that the Royal Commissioner should supervise the Bank’s actions on
behalf of Government. In addition, the article stipulated that the Royal
Commissioner could attend the meetings of the Bank’s governing bodies and that
he would be provided, by the Governing Board, with all information which he
deemed necessary in order to adequately conduct his supervision. This extension
of the powers of the Royal Commissioner was laid down by Royal Decree.36 In
addition to supervision of the Bank’s actions, Section 31 of the 1948 Bank Act
also provided for the Royal Commissioner to supervise the Bank’s f inancial
management. 
The Royal Commissioner was no longer included in the 1998 Bank Act. A
continuation of the Royal Commissioner’s right to supervise the Bank’s actions
and f inancial management would have been incompatible with the requirement
of independence laid down in Article 108 of the Treaty (Article 7 of the Statute
of the ESCB). Government supervision of the Bank’s actions has been
abandoned, while supervision of the Bank’s f inancial management under the
1998 Bank Act is, in accordance with company law, conducted by the
Supervisory Board. Instead of the Royal Commissioner, there is now a
Government-appointed member of the Supervisory Board.37 In addition to the
duties ensuing from his membership of the Supervisory Board, this Supervisor
has a trait d’union function between Government and the Bank.38 As can be seen
from the extended powers of the Royal Commissioner, the latter’s duties also
consisted largely of a trait d’union function: he acted as the “eyes and ears” of
the Minister of Finance by informing the latter of the Bank’s actions and policies.
Within the conf ines set by the Treaty, this function has been taken over by the
Government-appointed member of the Supervisory Board. 
INTEGRATION INTO THE ESCB
One of the most important changes compared with the 1948 Bank Act is that in
the 1998 Bank Act the Bank’s objectives, tasks and activities are completely
332
34 See Section 3 (3) of the 1998 Bank Act.
35 Appendix of Proceedings II, 1862-1863, No. CXIX, 3, pp. 1477-78.
36 Royal Decree of 27 October 1972, No. 82.
37 Section 13 (2) of the 1998 Bank Act.
38 Section 14 of the 1998 Bank Act.
modelled in accordance with the objectives, tasks and activities of the ESCB, and
that the Bank’s rights and duties are formulated in such a way that the Bank is
fully integrated into the European System of Central Banks. The Bank’s tasks are
no longer exclusively national, but also European, insofar as they coincide with
those of the ESCB. The European dimension is evident from several sections of
the 1998 Bank Act. Section 1 (2) provides for the Bank to be an integral part of
the European System of Central Banks as regards the tasks and duties conferred
upon the ESCB under the Treaty. Section 2 (2) subsequently makes clear that the
Bank, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, supports the general
economic policies in the European Community. The European dimension is also
apparent from the tasks assigned to the Bank in Section 3, which reflect the tasks
of the ESCB, and from the provision included in this Section that, in
implementing the Treaty, the Bank may seek and take instructions exclusively
from the ECB. Finally, this European dimension is also clear from Section 12 (4),
which states that, with a view to achieving the objective of maintaining price
stability, the Governing Board shall respect the President’s position as a member
of both the Governing Council and General Council of the ECB.  
MODERNISATION
The revision of the 1948 Bank Act, which had become necessary in order to bring
the Act into line with the Treaty, was used to adapt the Bank’s non-monetary
tasks to the new requirements of the time. First, it was ascertained which
provisions on the tasks and powers were still appropriate; outdated provisions
were taken out. Subsequently, it was decided which provisions belonged in the
Act and which provisions should be more appropriately included in either the
Bank’s corporate Articles of Association or a ministerial regulation. 
The Explanatory Memorandum39 provides two examples to illustrate the
modernisation of the Bank Act. Articles 11 to 14 of the 1948 Bank Act dealt with
the exchange, form, compensation and recall for exchange of banknotes issued
by the Bank. In the 1998 Bank Act it was decided, on the basis of Section 27 (3),
that these provisions should be laid down in a general administrative order.40 This
decision was made because this concerned operational activities in respect of
which it was important that the relevant rules may, if necessary, be amended
through a simplif ied procedure. The rules issued applied to banknotes
denominated in guilders. Upon the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins,
this Royal Decree was amended, as was Section 27 of the 1998 Bank Act.41
The second example refers to the activities that the Bank was allowed to conduct
to implement its tasks. Section 15 of the 1948 Bank Act included an exhaustive
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list of the activities which the Bank was allowed to conduct. Under the 1948
Bank Act, the greatly outdated provisions were interpreted as broadly as possible
in order to allow the Bank to conduct those activities that were expected of a
central bank at the time in question. Thus, it was concluded in the past that the
Bank would be allowed to participate in bridging loans provided to countries
by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), in anticipation of a promised
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.42 In
addition, in the mid-1980s it was judged that the Bank would be allowed to
accept “certificates of deposit” (CDs) en “commercial paper” (CP) as collateral.43
In the 1998 Bank Act  this provision was replaced by one which granted the Bank
broad powers to conduct transactions in the f inancial markets.44 This provision,
stripped of outdated concepts, was formulated in an open (non-exhaustive) way
and was derived from Article 18 of the Statute of the ESCB. 
A f inal example refers to activities, not specif ied in the Bank Act itself,
conducted by the Bank pursuant to Royal Decrees issued on the basis of Section
21 of the 1948 Bank Act. It was ascertained for which of these activities under
the 1998 Bank Act a separate Royal Decree was still necessary. A number of
these decrees were repealed because they were outdated or because the activities
in question were carried out in accordance with the 1998 Bank Act or the Treaty.
The activities assigned to the Bank by Royal Decree under the 1998 Bank Act
have a dual legal basis. This is due to the strict distinction between tasks and
activities under the new Act. Thus, under Section 4 (4), it is permitted, by Royal
Decree, to conduct other tasks and, under Section 9, sub-section c, to perform
other activities.
STRUCTURE OF THE 1998 BANK ACT 
CONTENTS OF THE ACT
The 1998 Bank Act consists of various chapters dealing with the following
subjects: Chapter I: Def initions; Chapter II: Objectives, tasks and activities of
the Bank; Chapter III: Provisions on the management of the company; Chapter
IV: Information and conf identiality; Chapter V: Amendment of other acts; and
Chapter VI: Transitional and f inal provisions.45
TERMINOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
The 1998 Bank Act  refers to objectives, tasks and activities, in accordance with
the subdivision in the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The 1948 Bank Act
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referred only to activities and tasks, where the concept of activities was broadly
defined and comprised both tasks and activities that the Bank was legally entitled
to undertake. The 1948 Bank Act did not contain the concept of objective. The
objectives of the Bank under this Act and also under earlier Bank Acts were
implicit in the tasks assigned to the Bank. In line with the Treaty and the Statute
of the ESCB, the interrelationship between the three above-mentioned concepts
is as follows in the 1998 Bank Act: the Bank uses the activities which it is
entitled to undertake to perform a task aimed at achieving an objective.46
As indicated above, the Bank is integrated in the ESCB under the 1998 Bank
Act. Accordingly, it contributes to a number of tasks and activities assigned to
the ESCB. When reference is made to ESCB activities, this is indicated in the
text of the Act with the words: “In implementation of the Treaty”. However, in
addition to the tasks and activities that arise from its integration into the ESCB,
the Bank also performs activities that ensue from the national tasks assigned
to it. A clear distinction is made in the Bank Act between ESCB and non-ESCB
activities. This distinction comes to the fore in Sections 2, 3 and 4. As with ESCB
activities, the 1998 Bank Act subdivides non-ESCB activities into objectives,
tasks and activities. In Section 2, the f irst two sub-sections set out the ESCB
objectives, while sub-section 4 sets out the non-ESCB objective. Section 3
specif ies the ESCB tasks and Section 4 the non-ESCB tasks. From the structure
of the Act it follows that the objectives aimed at achieving ESCB tasks and
objectives (the monetary objectives) and the non-ESCB objectives (the non-
monetary objectives) are on a par: the f irst objectives are of the same order as
the last objective, which ensures that when the Bank performs a task related to
a particular objective, this task is not subordinate to a task performed under
another objective. This is also reflected in Section 1 (2), which stipulates that,
in implementation of the Treaty, the Bank’s objective is to maintain price
stability, whereas in the Treaty (Article 105(1)) reference is made to primary
objective. The Treaty thus indicates that maintaining price stability is the main
objective of the ESCB. Were this terminology to have been adopted in the 1998
Bank Act, however, this would have meant subordinating the non-ESCB objective
to the maintenance of price stability. It should be borne in mind, however, that
the national central banks of the euro area can only perform other functions if
these do not interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB (including the
primary objective of price stability).47 Thus, despite the fact that in the 1998 Bank
Act the ESCB and non-ESCB activities are on a par, the latter activities must
never interfere with the objective of price stability. 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Until the start of Stage Three of EMU, monetary policy was a national
prerogative. Pursuant to Article 109 of the Treaty, however, each Member State
had to ensure that, at the latest by the date of the establishment of the ESCB,
its national legislation, including the statute of its national central bank, was
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compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. This Treaty obligation
aimed to ensure that all central banks would be independent by the time the
ESCB was established.48 Its purpose was to create the necessary distance between
the ESCB and the political domain in the important preparatory phase leading
up to the transfer of monetary policy authority to the European level. That is
why the 1998 Bank Act had to contain at least two transitional regimes: a regime
applicable as from the establishment of the ESCB until the Netherlands’
accession to Monetary Union (the Bank is independent and monetary policy is
a Dutch prerogative) and a regime applicable as from the moment of the
Netherlands’ accession to Monetary Union (the Bank is independent and
monetary policy is a prerogative of the ESCB). In addition, the 1998 Bank Act
provides for a third regime, whereby the possibility is taken into account that
the 1998 Bank Act  would come into force prior to the establishment of the
ESCB (the Minister of Finance can give the Bank instructions and monetary
policy is a Dutch prerogative). The latter regime has never applied, because the
1998 Bank Act came into force simultaneously with the establishment of the
ESCB.
CONCLUSION
The organic Act of the Nederlandsche Bank has been amended many times in
the past two centuries, albeit that such amendments to the Act always followed
in the footsteps of earlier Acts. The 1998 Bank Act, however, follows a
completely new pattern: this time not a Dutch, but a European one. It is for this
reason that the 1998 Bank Act in many ways constitutes a signif icant break with
the past.
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TAX BARRIERS ON THE WAY TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED
EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET: THE EU SAVINGS DIRECTIVE
AS A CHALLENGE FOR CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
SYSTEMS
Joseph De Wolf
ABSTRACT
La creazione di un mercato finanziario europeo integrato, efficiente, liquido e
sicuro è uno dei programmi più ambiziosi della UE. Tuttavia, i trasferimenti
internazionali di titoli incontrano una così ampia divergenza di trattamento
fiscale in seno alla UE, e in pratica le questioni di tipo fiscale rimangono un
ostacolo reale alle transazioni internazionali ed allo sviluppo di un mercato
finanziario europeo. Il Rapporto Giovannini ha già evidenziato le principali
barriere fiscali esistenti.
Il  contributo riflette sull’impatto della Direttiva UE sul Risparmio sulle barriere
fiscali esistenti. Se, da un lato, la procedura adottata di scambio di informazioni
può considerarsi un approccio positivo per il reddito riveniente dai conti di
deposito presso gli istituti di credito, dall’altro, l’autore si chiede se non sia
più adeguato un approccio diverso per i proventi da titoli a reddito fisso,
negoziabili sui mercati mobiliari.
In particolare, l’organizzazione di un meccanismo di ritenuta fiscale a livello
delle infrastrutture di compensazione e regolamento tramite meccanismi come
quello belga X/N potrebbe aver incrementato i proventi fiscali degli Stati
membri, dirottato l’importante onere amministrativo della raccolta dei dati su
operatori più adeguati, affidato le responsabilità per la raccolta e lo scambio
delle informazioni alle autorità competenti e infine essere riuscito pienamente
a rispettare la sovranità fiscale degli Stati membri.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL DEBATE
The Commission’s Communication on clearing and settlement1 to the Council
and the European Parliament calls the creation of an integrated and eff icient
European capital market the most important and ambitious economic project
currently under way in the European Union (EU). 
Such a European capital market should be safe, liquid and offer facilities for
the cross-border issuing, trading and holding of EU securities. The project is
supported by a multitude of players, such as the European institutions, the
European Central Bank (ECB); regulators and supervisors from the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB)/the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR); the specialised committees, in particular the Giovannini
Group; and, last but not least, the public and private sector, the clearing and
settlement systems, national capital markets and the banking sector. All have
a proper interest in the project and jointly contribute in their respective f ields
of competence.
The European capital market is to be the f inal link in a long chain of
developments, starting with the liberalisation of capital movements, the single
passport for f inancial institutions (e.g. credit institutions, investment f irms,
insurance companies, etc.), the creation of the ESCB, the single currency and
a safe environment for f inancial transactions through EU projects such as
Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 1998
on settlement f inality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166,
11.6.98, p. 45) and Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council of 6 June 2002 on f inancial collateral arrangements (OJ L 168,
27.6.2002, p. 43). 
The clearing and settlement systems clearly play a significant role in this project.
Their role is currently the subject of intensive debate2, as a process of integration
and consolidation is underway, and it is not certain that the political debate about
their role can keep up with the pace of change in the industry. The debate is about
the optimal degree of regulation that may enhance private initiative and
competition, while meeting the need for a secure, balanced and institutional level
playing-f ield for all operators. Clearing and settlement has a natural tendency
to improve efficiency via economies of scale and to seek to consolidate markets.
Member States, on the contrary, have a tendency to segment markets and to
maintain boundaries, monopolies and sets of local rules in order to respond
eff iciently to their overall responsibility for the proper functioning of their own
markets. 
The Commission has given indications as to the way forward to improve the
Community environment for cross-border securities clearing and settlement.
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The Report’s call for contributions received a large response.
Priority points on the agenda will be the elimination of existing barriers and of
possible restrictive market practices, as well as the adoption of a common regulatory
and supervisory framework, accompanied by appropriate governance structures.
The Commission also made it clear that it will respect the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality and the diversity of approaches in the different
Member States with regard to market structures. Any further consolidation
should be mainly market-driven, but only to the extent that this meets legitimate
public policy concerns. The Commission adopts the approach suggested by the
Giovannini group to remove existing barriers through a combined effort by the
private and public sectors, and according to an appropriate sequence of actions.
The Commission therefore envisages the creation of advisory and monitoring
groups, the drafting of a Directive on clearing and settlement, and the organising
of expert groups to tackle legal and tax issues. 
The f iscal treatment of transactions in securities still diverges widely within the
EU. As a consequence, tax issues remain in practice a fundamental obstacle for
cross-border transactions. While legal insecurity regarding the settlement of
f inancial transactions has to a considerable extent been removed through the
implementation of relevant Community directives in all EU Member States, no
such progress has yet been realised in the f ield of direct taxation.
The Giovannini Report3 identifies these tax barriers. It suggests that one solution
might be to allow investors to choose the preferred location of the holding of
their securities. Such a solution, which would imply that exclusivity of taxation
is given to the Member State where the security is located, would make sound
competition possible between Member States in order to attract investors.
However, it would also be contrary to the EU principle of f iscal sovereignty,
which allows Member States to tax the income of securities held by their tax
residents, irrespective of the location of the asset, as well as to levy a
withholding tax upon the streams of income from securities passing through or
originating in their jurisdiction. The Giovannini Report correctly observes that
even such a solution would not solve all potential problems, as some investors
might prefer to hold their securities in the local market so that national
differences in the relevant tax regime would remain.
National differences in withholding taxes, capital gain taxation and transaction
taxes are of a general nature, and are not specific to the securities and settlement
systems environment. The Giovannini Report also stresses the negative impact
of tax barriers resulting from disadvantageous domestic withholding tax
regulations for foreign intermediaries, or from functionalities integrated into
local settlement systems that reduce the possible recourse to alternative
settlement systems and therefore reduce competition and weaken the optimal
allocation of resources.
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Fiscal barriers fully appear in the processing of cross-border transactions. There
are numerous causes of inconsistencies4, such as:
– the differences in the tax treatment of income derived from equity or f ixed-
income securities, such as domestic withholding taxes, taxation of capital
gains, permanent establishment exemptions, etc.;
– the f iscal treatment of securities lending, swaps or repurchase transactions;
– the def inition of “benef icial ownership”; 
– the formalities and documentation duties to obtain tax exemptions, tax
vouchers or tax relief via other forms (e.g. aff idavits, certif icates);
– the scope of the tax reporting by the SSSs (securities settlement system) or
(I)CSDs ((international) central securities depositary);
– the f iscal status of intermediaries (e.g. US qualif ied intermediary status); 
– the particular clauses of the bilateral treaties to avoid double taxation.
The position of the Commission towards the taxation of interests from f ixed-
income securities and dividends may for this reason have an important impact
upon the further progress towards a European capital market. 
THE FUNCTIONALITIES OF CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
We shall f irst briefly describe the functionalities of clearing and settlement. 
Transactions in securities generally go through four phases: trade,
conf irmation, clearing and settlement. As there is no common legal def inition
for these operations, concepts are often used rather interchangeably, which does
not simplify matters. 
The f irst two parts of these transactions, trade and conf irmation, allow the
securities transaction to be legally constituted (which means the creation of a
valid legal agreement for the securities transaction, whatever its type) and,
preferably, also confirmed, in order to avoid errors or later disputes. These parts
are handled by the traders’ front and back off ices. 
The third phase of the execution of a securities transaction is neither obligatory
nor absolutely necessary, but is extremely useful. In the clearing phase, parties
to securities transactions set off all mutual transactions through a process of
compensation. The intention is to arrive at a single claim of securities and cash
which must be settled by the respective debtors. The transactions are generally
cleared through a so-called clearing house. The clearing of securities transactions
may moreover be accompanied by legal novation of the obligations: the seller’s
obligation to deliver the securities is taken over by a central counterparty (in
principle the same as the clearing house), and the same is true for the buyer’s
obligation to pay the price. 
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Finally, the securities transaction is settled: the securities are delivered and the
price is paid. This can be performed on a gross settlement basis, in which case
the obligations of the parties are executed individually and separately for each
transaction, often in a so-called real time gross settlement process. If the
securities transactions are cleared prior to settlement, then only the net balances
are settled. The advantage of clearing is precisely that it drastically reduces the
settlement process, and more particularly the need for settlement assets.
However, even if the securities transactions are not cleared beforehand, the
securities settlement systems can still net the settlement transactions (i.e. the
so-called payment netting) rather than settling all instructions individually on
a gross basis. The settlement can be arranged either by delivery versus payment
(DVP) or by delivery free of payment.
In practice, the settlement, and more particularly the delivery, of securities is
arranged through bookings on securities accounts. No physical security is
handled or transferred between parties, unless this is expressly demanded, as
may be the case in some jurisdictions where investors still prefer to receive
physical bearer securities. In such cases, physical delivery will only appear in
the last phase of the chain. Normally the transfer of property is organised through
the debiting and crediting of book entries of fungible or dematerialised securities
on securities accounts. Physical securities in bearer form are gradually
disappearing in the Member States as they are costly, contain a high risk of loss,
and may facilitate tax fraud and money laundering. 
In a cross-border environment investors have a variety of possibilities to settle
a transaction, depending on the market organisation, their position and the
possibilities of access to the different market structures. They may address
themselves directly to a local agent abroad, which will arrange the transaction
with the foreign central security depositary (CSD). If the investors are
professional ones, they will normally operate through an ICSD, a custodian bank
or global custodian specialised in custody of securities, or through a local CSD,
if a link exists with the foreign CSD. The settlement of such cross-border
transactions is more expensive than local transactions for a number of reasons,
mainly because all markets are still functioning in a national environment as far
as operational, regulatory, supervision and tax features are concerned, which
makes the cost structure multi-layered.
As the Giovannini Report points out, the fragmentation of the markets with their
integrated local tax functionalities might constitute an obstacle to the
development of a functioning European capital market. However, one must also
take into account the fact that most ordinary investors need to be able to address
their local intermediaries, and expect simple, safe and transparent treatment. For
this reason, it is also necessary to maintain local infrastructures at the lowest
possible cost.
Fragmentation as such should therefore not necessarily be seen as a threat. The
threat consists rather in the absence of low-cost, eff icient links, that allow
smooth interactions between the local infrastructures, which overrides the local
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functionalities. The problem should not be the independence or proper
functionality of the local infrastructure, but rather the absence or ineff iciency
of links or suprastructures interconnecting the local infrastructures.5 And then
again, tax obstacles may be at the heart of connection problems. 
THE BREAKTHROUGH REPRESENTED BY THE EU SAVINGS DIRECTIVE
Direct taxation is not subject to the European harmonisation process but remains
a sovereign Member State competence. It is clear that taxation issues have an
immediate and far-reaching impact on the architecture of the European capital
market and on the functioning of clearing and settlement systems in the EU.
The EU Savings Directive6 (“the Directive”) seems to mark a signif icant
breakthrough and may accelerate the development of an integrated market. 
Therefore, we should examine some aspects of the Directive and its possible
impact on the European clearing and settlement systems in more detail.
Although the principle of the exclusive sovereignty of Member States in the area
of direct taxation is in principle not questioned, the Directive indicates the need
for further action at the EU level. 
Some major achievements have already been made. In the f ield of company
taxation, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive7 stopped the cumulative taxation of
company gains within a group structure, while the Code of Conduct, presented
by the Tax Harmonisation Group chaired by Dawn Primarollo, was aimed at
avoiding harmful tax competition between Member States. Today, the
Commission is following a two-track strategy, addressing specif ic tax obstacles
on the one hand, and working on a more long-term solution for a single EU-wide
company tax base for EU cross-border activities on the other. The adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) shall boost this process.
The Directive originates in the adoption of the Council Directive of 24 June
19888, which liberalised the free movement of savings. On this occasion a
political agreement was reached between Member States to adopt in parallel
another directive that would counter the tax avoidance that the liberalisation of
the cross-border opening of savings accounts had made possible. While the f irst
directive passed, however, the second failed and was quietly abandoned.
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6 Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on the taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments
(OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 38).
7 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ L 225, 20.8.1990, p. 6).
8 Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (OJ L 178,
8.7.1988, p. 5).
Tentative measures to impose a common EU withholding tax9 also failed, among
other reasons because of the objections of the United Kingdom due to concerns
about the impact on the Eurobond market. 
Finally, consensus was reached upon an EU legislative instrument at the Santa
Maria da Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000. The ultimate aim of
the EU Savings Directive is to enable the effective taxation of interest payments
in the beneficial owner’s home Member State.10 The exchange of information
between Member States is accepted as a substitute for a common withholding
tax. The entry into force of this Directive was made dependant on the
simultaneous introduction of equivalent measures in the major competitive
financial centres.11 Three Member States negotiated a transitory regime, whereby
they will not share information, but will instead levy a withholding tax, starting
at 15% and progressively reaching 35% in 2011. The revenue of this withholding
tax will be shared between the withholding state (25%) and the home state (75%). 
The Directive contains a signif icant implicit message, namely the recognition
of the failure of Member States to organise and coordinate an appropriate tax
information exchange.12 The EU Savings Directive admits this def iciency13 and
justif ies on the basis of the subsidiarity principle the need for action to be taken
on the Community level to adopt a minimum framework for the automatic
exchange of information.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) did consider that possible def iciencies in
the exchange of information on tax matters might not justify restriction of the
free movement of capital by Member States. In the Commission v. Kingdom of
Belgium14, the ECJ examined whether a provision in the prospectus of a
Eurobond loan issued by Belgium in the German market was compatible with
the free movement of capital. This provision prevented Belgian residents from
acquiring securities of this loan. Normally, Belgian residents would be liable
to withholding taxes on interest income from Belgian government loans issued
on the Belgian market, whereas this would not be the case with a Belgian
Eurobond loan issued on the German market.15 The Belgian government invoked
the arguments of f iscal coherence16, the effectiveness of f iscal supervision and
the need to prevent tax evasion. However, the Court tested these arguments
against the required appropriateness and proportionality of such restriction.
Taking into account the fact that nothing stops Belgian residents from acquiring
hundreds of other Eurobond loans issued by other entities, these arguments did
not pass the proportionality test. Still, a rather problematic issue remained in
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Swiss Confederation was reached. These measures have now been adopted and the term for a public call for
a Swiss referendum will expire on 31 March 2005.
12 Recital 10.
13 See Recitals 10 and 16 of the EU Saving Directive.
14 Case C-478/98 of 26 September 2000, Commission v Kingdom of Belgium.
15 While no Belgian withholding tax will apply on interest received abroad, Belgian residents will have to declare
this interest income in their yearly tax returns.
16 An argument that was accepted in case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgian State, 1992, ECR I-249.
that the Court did not take any account of the major difficulties faced by Member
States to organise an effective mutual exchange of information, which would
certainly apply to those hundreds of other Eurobond loans. 
On this point the Directive represents a clear breakthrough and answers a genuine
need of the EU. The questions that have been raised as to its compatibility with
the freedom of movement of capital and payments, as provided for by Articles
50 to 60 of the Treaty establishing the European Community17, do not seem to
undermine the legitimate motivation and grounds of the Directive concerning
the need to legislate on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. The existing
possibilities for the exchange of information among EU Member States certainly
appear less than ideal for the EU.
Although Article 26 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on the exchange of
information on tax matters was updated in July 200418 and may over the coming
years affect more than 2,000 existing bilateral tax agreements, it can no longer
satisfy the needs of the EU. After having realised the free flow of capital in the
EU, an efficient information exchange has become a necessity in order to maintain
the Member States’ taxation competences. An approach that only relies on the
framework of conventions to avoid double taxation would require the current 25
EU Member States to conclude or modify among them a total of 320 bilateral
tax agreements. Moreover, bilateral agreements are not satisfactory instruments
on the EU level, taking into account the competency of Member States to
interprete the terms of the agreements according to the def initions under the
national legislation. While the OECD Model Tax Convention may remain a useful
bilateral instrument for settling several types of taxation matters between Member
States, it seems it can no longer be regarded as a workable instrument to organise
the information on flows of interest and dividends in the EU. 
Neither has the existing Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977
concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States
in the f ield of direct taxation (OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, p. 15) been able to satisfy
the pressing need for automatic information exchange on interest and dividend
income after the liberalisation of the capital markets. 
The Directive puts all required tax data with respect to the f ixed income of
individual tax residents at the disposal of the Member States. The investment
decisions of residents with regard to f ixed-income securities or deposits in the
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the Freedom of Movement of Capital?”, Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and Financial Law,
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18 The main improvements of Article 26 are the following:
– A paragraph has been added to prevent the so-called domestic tax interest requirements from hindering the
exchange of information. The new paragraph holds that Contracting States should obtain and exchange
information irrespective of whether they also need the information for their own tax purposes.
– A paragraph has been added to ensure that ownership information and information held by banks, f inancial
institutions, nominees, agents and f iduciaries can be exchanged. This will prevent bank secrecy from being
used as a basis for refusing to exchange information.
– The conf identiality rules in Article 26 have been changed to permit disclosure of information to oversight
authorities. 
EU will no longer be adversely affected by considerations of tax evasion, but
will instead be the result of an objective comparison between the f inancial
conditions on offer. Therefore the Directive might represent the tipping point
towards the emergence an EU capital market for f ixed-income securities. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the easiest road has been chosen.
THE EU SAVINGS DIRECTIVE AND THE CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
This contribution does not enter into the details of the Directive. For the purpose
of this paper, it is suff icient to know that the EU Savings Directive puts an
obligation upon paying agents19 to inform their national tax authorities on the
payment of f ixed-income savings income in the form of interest payments to
individuals who are identif ied as the beneficial owners and residents of another
EU Member State. The information is then forwarded by the tax authority of the
involved Member State to the relevant tax-resident EU Member State. 
Some of the def initions in the Directive, such as ‘beneficial owner’, ‘interest
payment’ and ‘paying agent’, have raised many questions, and the explanatory
note of the Commission will hopefully provide the required clarif ication. It has
also already been observed that some operators may be tempted to look for
loopholes.20 The Commission has foreseen this problem and has arranged for a
three-yearly review to remedy any such def iciencies.21
However, it cannot be ignored that the banking industry, f inancial intermediaries
and any operator qualifying as a paying agent under the Directive are all
confronted with the nightmare of qualifying, interpreting, implementing and
processing complex information at their own responsibility, and must then justify
their actions towards their client base.
No distinction is made in the Directive on the basis of the nature of the right
created by the f inancial instrument, be it an intuitae personae contractual right
(e.g. cash deposit accounts) or a right in rem (e.g. bearer securities). Income
from deposit accounts held in the books of financial institutions from Eurobonds
in bearer form deposited with a financial intermediary, or from registered bonds,
all become subject to identical measures of information exchange. Unlike
deposits, where the financial institution has an overall oversight on a yearly basis
of the client’s accounts, tradable securities may be actively managed on a daily
or short-term basis, or be transferred, sold or subject to specif ic f inancial
transactions, such as securities lending, repos, swaps, etc. And all these data,
which may be dispersed over a wide variety of operators and intermediaries, will
f inally have to be collected, interpreted and classif ied. 
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21 Article 18.
This implies that the Directive not only places reporting duties on the most
obvious intermediaries, namely the f inancial institutions, which are after all
properly organised to manage the client’s data flow, but also on any operator in
the industry processing an interest payment and qualif ied as paying agent by
the Directive. The Directive does not distinguish between different types of
intermediaries and instruments, with the consequence that all sectors and types
of intermediaries will be affected by reporting duties and tax data processing,
which might eventually damage the eff iciency of the exchange of information
and boost the cost of market transactions. In a global European capital market,
investors should be able to operate directly in the different market segments
through competitive intermediaries. One might therefore fear that further market
unification will be mirrored by a further fragmentation of data over the different
market segments that may be involved in a securities transaction. This could
multiply the number of involved paying agents for securities transactions.
The Directive’s automatic exchange only addresses one type of savings income,
namely interest payments, and excludes income from pension schemes, insurance
policies or shares.22 On several occasions, when no accurate information can be
obtained, the Directive introduces legal presumptions, so that income may be
qualif ied as an interest payment for the application of the Directive.23
Information will therefore not always be accurate and will need to be treated
very carefully by the tax authorities. 
While the data exchange for income from deposit accounts is manageable, it is
less certain that the same applies to the data on securities transactions on the
EU markets. 
Remarkably, for Member States falling under the Directive’s derogation and
applying the withholding tax, the Directive acknowledges that the period of
holding of a security might not be known by the paying agent. Therefore, it
allows the withholding tax to be levied without regarding the period of holding
of the securities.24 This may seem a practical solution, but in reality it means
the end of cross-border access to such a market. This decision will make such
a market segment unworkable for cross-border transactions, as the
withholding tax burden will become extremely severe. The following example
demonstrates the consequences.
Say that an Italian resident holds a Belgian government bearer bond with a yearly
coupon of 5%. Under the Belgian tax regime, Belgian government bearer bonds
do not qualify for any exemption of withholding tax unless they are registered
and held for the whole interest period. Our Italian resident sells the bond on the
secondary market. There will be no possibility of establishing the period of
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holding of the security unless the individual serial number of each security is
registered at each transaction. This is in practice unfeasible. As a consequence,
the Italian resident will f irst have to pay the pro rata compensatory indemnity
for withholding tax, which is ordinarily applied between the seller and buyer,
and will then once again suffer the Directive withholding tax.25 However, this
will not be the pro rata withholding tax for the period of holding, as this
unfortunately cannot be established, so that the Directive’s legal f iction applies
and the withholding tax is calculated as if the Italian resident had held the
security from the beginning of the interest period. This results in double taxation
in Belgium, without the possibility of reimbursement, as this is unavailable under
Belgian tax law. The story is not even over at this point, as the taxation power
of Italy as the tax resident’s home state fully remains.26 We do not wish in this
paper to further elaborate this example, but the least that can be said is that the
Directive does not seem in this regard to improve the unif ication of the EU
capital market. 
Although the Directive does represent a breakthrough, it is also an extremely
burdensome administrative instrument that shifts an important amount of work
from the f iscal authorities to the industry, yet still entails substantial efforts on
the part of the f iscal authorities to channel, process, verify and redress all the
collected data.
Therefore, it is questionable whether the option of introducing a generalised
reporting duty for all types of interest payments, independent of the type of
instrument, is overall the most effective one. For negotiable securities, the
withholding tax mechanism would offer numerous advantages, while the tax
sovereignty of the Member States to choose between a withholding tax system
or a globalisation of income need not be affected. A possible model for such
alternative is described below.
THE BELGIAN X/N MODEL: AN INTERESTING MODEL?
There is little doubt that a common withholding tax could make life easier and
constitutes an eff icient instrument for market integration. This was the original
idea of the Commission, but no unanimous vote could be reached.
Member States have resisted the idea of a common withholding tax. Even if the
alternative of a massive information exchange system may have frightened the
Member States, a common withholding tax system on interest payments seems
to have been seen as a greater threat, creating the fear of a possible EU
withholding tax, to be redistributed among the Member States on macroeconomic
parameters. This would then have signif ied a major breach of tax sovereignty.
The system of data exchange seems to protect against such an evolution. 
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While this resistance seems reasonable for income from deposits held with
financial institutions on a contractual basis, the argument is less valid for income
from securities transactions operated on the markets.
The Belgian X/N withholding tax system27, which is applied in the so-called X/N
clearing and settlement system of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque
Nationale de Belgique (NBB), introduces a very simple system to organise a
differentiated and anonymous withholding tax that can be directly settled with
the Belgian Treasury or with any EU Member State other than Belgium, provided
that a link has been created between both national securities markets. This system
should not affect the f inal tax sovereignty of Member States in any way, but
should avoid the immense administrative burden on the paying agents.
How would such an EU withholding tax system work? Let us f irst examine the
existing Belgian X/N model.
In the Belgian X/N system, the participants, as the financial intermediaries, keep
two categories of securities accounts at the top level of the CSD/SSS, held in
the accounts of the NBB: accounts for persons or entities exempted from
withholding tax, and accounts for non-exempted persons or entities. These
accounts are global accounts28, and the individual accounts are held on the lower
levels in the books of the participants or sub-participants of the CSD/SSS. The
identif ication and administrative attestation for tax purposes remain at the level
of the immediate contractual relationship with the f inal client. 
Taxation is organised at the level of the global accounts, and then cascades to
the lower levels, without an additional need to exchange data on the individual
account holders.
Securities transactions executed on “X” accounts (“exempted accounts”) are
performed on a “gross” basis (meaning that no withholding tax applies on the
payment of interest income). On “N” accounts (“non-exempted accounts”) the
withholding tax applies and only net interest is paid or received by the account
holder (either on coupon date or when buying or selling during the interest
period). This withholding tax is calculated by the clearing system, which
disposes of all required data (type of security, interest income and period of
interest). To create a global market that allows transactions between exempted
and non-exempted persons, a transitory account needs to be held by the Belgian
Treasury, which functions as a valve to enable possible transactions between
persons of different tax categories. The Belgian Treasury immediately receives
the withholding tax pro rata temporis when an N account is debited and,
conversely, advances the pro rata temporis withholding tax each time an N
account is credited. A particular mechanism of debiting or crediting pro rata
withholding is also put into place for the holders of X accounts to allow them
to enter or withdraw securities from the common tax system environment into
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the X/N clearing system, and vice versa. In this way, transactions between X and
N accounts are made possible, one on a gross basis and the other on a net basis. 
The advantages of such a system are clear: a global securities market is created
with broad access to all types of issuers and investors, which can heighten the
degree of market liquidity and eff iciency. Withholding tax is collected and
transferred by the clearing system to the Treasury in real time on all global
transactions, without the need to identify or individualise, as all identif ication
data exist on the lower levels and are subject to tax controls. This simplif ies and
improves tax collection. However, most importantly, this system avoids placing
an administrative burden on the f inancial intermediaries, which do not have to
exchange data or calculate withholding tax, but only have to pass on to the
accountholders the withholding tax debt, which is established on the global top
accounts of the X/N system. Of course, the f inancial intermediaries remain
subject to tax controls on their correct classif ication of the security accounts
into X or N accounts. This requires identif ication of the client, and the
intermediaries bear a proper tax liability for errors. The tax authorities are in
a position to receive all global data from the X/N system so that local controls
can be eff iciently organised and information can still be transmitted to the
resident Member States according to the arrangements between the Member
States’ tax authorities. In this way Member States can rely upon a performant
information exchange and maintain a sovereign choice as to the national f iscal
regime applied to interest and dividend income29 and the methods to avoid double
taxation on this type of income.30
In this way the burden of processing the withholding tax, data handling and tax
supervision is allocated to the most suitable levels with the most competent
persons in charge. The processing of withholding tax is assigned to the clearing
system at the top of the pyramid, so that it can work on the level of the global
accounts, which allows a cost-eff icient approach and advantages of scale. The
exchange of information remains a primary task of the f iscal authorities.
This system can comply with any desired tax policy. It can provide exemptions
on withholding tax for any type of income (Eurobonds, etc.), or for any type of
tax entity or persons, depending on the tax policy. 
Such a system can be linked to local systems of other Member States and could
take into account the tax policy and withholding tax rate of these Member States.
The system will even be directly operational for the tax collection of any Member
State when its national Treasury holds an account with the system to be debited
or credited according to the mechanism, described above and adjusted to satisfy
the national tax regime’s particularities.
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If national CSD systems in the EU all had a transition account with the different
national Treasuries, withholding tax on income paid to tax residents of each
Member State would in real time31 be processed by the Treasury of the tax-
resident Member State at the common EU withholding tax rate of 15%, or even
directly at the national rate determined by each resident Member State. In
parallel, an information exchange on income from residents, resulting from local
controls on the lower level accounts held with the participants, would apply,
allowing resident Member States to receive regular and systematic data
information on their national tax residents that hold accounts abroad. This data
exchange would not be as complete as the data exchange organised by the
Directive, but it would be suff iciently systematic and thorough32 to dissuade
benef iciaries from tax evasion. Such a system would therefore entirely respect
the Member States’ sovereign taxation policies.
Could this taxation model improve the development of a European capital
market? The essential characteristics of the X/N withholding tax mechanism
certainly seem to offer some interesting perspectives, two of which stand out.
Firstly, the mechanism of levying and collecting withholding tax is situated on
the top level of the suprastructure. Withholding tax levying and collecting is
linked to the functioning of the global accounts and is disconnected from the
individual holders of the accounts on the lower level. This characteristic
minimises the administrative tax procedures while still providing permanent
access to all relevant individual information.
Secondly, on the level of the global accounts, it becomes possible to multiply
unlimitedly the number of types of X or N accounts based on the requirements
of each Member State. A common EU withholding tax would no longer be
necessary. A local SSS could easily keep 25 different global types of account,
each one designed to apply the required withholding tax for a specif ic category
as determined by each particular Member State, and connecting the global
account to the transitory account of the relevant Treasury of each Member State,
thereby enabling transactions between the holders of different types of accounts.
Such a mechanism can only be operational on the level of the suprastructures.
Progress towards achieving an EU capital market would require the creation of
certain links. In a f irst phase, links will only be required between the national
systems33 and the different Treasuries. Links with the latter would allow the
withholding tax to be immediately redistributed without any further
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administrative burden. In a subsequent phase, direct cross-border access for
issuers and investors would require further development of the links between
the SSSs, (I)CSDs and Treasuries. This would be made easier with an X/N type
taxation model, which could simplify tax administration, collection and
redistribution. 
Of course, administrative changes to the links between the SSSs and (I)CSDs
would need to be implemented. The Member States’ Treasuries and tax
administrations would have to be involved in this process, which would represent
a major European operation.
However, the burden of such an operation would rest upon the suprastructures
and national authorities, and not on the thousands of intermediaries who are
currently confronted with the encumbrances of complex data processing even
though they are not necessarily organised to accomplish this task, or capable
of perceiving whether any real progress towards a more eff icient cross-border
EU capital market has been made.
It seems that such a tax system might kill several birds with one stone. Member
States’ collection of f iscal revenues would be highly facilitated, while a
signif icant step towards a single global EU capital market would have been
taken. The competitiveness of national securities markets and clearing and
settlement systems would improve. Responsibility for data collection,
verif ication and exchange would remain essentially with the competent
authorities, while correspondingly avoiding placing an administrative burden
on the industry. All this might contribute to optimal capital allocation and to
the creation and redistribution of welfare in the EU.
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THE EUROSYSTEM’S CREDIT OPERATIONS AND LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COLLATERAL UNDER COMMUNITY LAW
Federico de Tomasi
ABSTRACT
La garanzia è diventata di recente un requisito fondamentale per il corretto
funzionamento dei mercati finanziari  e monetari nell’Unione Europea al fine
di ridurre il rischio di credito. A causa della mancanza di un quadro legale di
riferimento armonizzato ed orientato al mercato, rischi legali di varia natura
potrebbero pregiudicarne l’efficacia, specie nel contesto delle operazioni
transfrontaliere. L’Eurosistema, come ogni operatore di mercato, deve tener
conto di simili rischi nell’ambito delle proprie operazioni di rifinanziamento.
La prima parte del contributo si concentra sul quadro legale di riferimento
dell’Eurosistema in materia di garanzie. Ai sensi dello Statuto del SEBC e della
BCE, le operazioni di credito devono basarsi su garanzie adeguate, da un punto
di vista sia finanziario che giuridico. Oggetto di attenzione sono i principali
rischi legali, alla luce dei vincoli operativi derivanti dalla politica monetaria
unica. Si procede quindi ad esaminare il modo in cui l’Eurosistema ha gestito
il rischio legale attraverso la regolamentazione, tenendo conto delle legislazioni
nazionali, di aspetti quali requisiti di forma, ubicazione, uso transfrontaliero
ed escussione della garanzia, costruendo un quadro legale basato sui princìpi
di armonizzazione e decentralizzazione.
La seconda parte mira a descrivere succintamente il quadro legale dell’UE, che
è stato costituito in pochi anni, con il fine di accrescere l’efficienza e la solidità
legale della prestazione di garanzie, a beneficio del mercato finanziario
integrato e della politica monetaria unica. In particolare, vengono in
considerazione le Direttive sulla definitività degli ordini di trasferimento, sulle
procedure di risanamento e liquidazione degli enti creditizi e sulle garanzie
finanziarie. Il quadro giuridico dell’UE non è ancora definitivo, tuttavia è stato
conseguito un consistente miglioramento.
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1 THE PRINCIPLE OF ADEQUATE COLLATERAL UNDER THE STATUTE OF THE
ESCB AND THE ECB
1.1 REQUIREMENT OF COLLATERAL
Article 18.1 2nd indent of the Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) and
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) states that, in order to achieve
the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the national
central banks (NCBs) may conduct credit operations with credit institutions and
other market participants, with lending based on adequate collateral.1 To be more
precise, Article 18 applies only to the ECB and the NCBs of those Member States
that have adopted the single currency2 (the “Eurosystem”3). The Eurosystem
enters into credit operations when carrying out its tasks, i.e. the implementation
of monetary policy, the conduct of foreign exchange operations, the holding and
management of the off icial foreign reserves of the Member States, and the
promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems.4
In the course of preparatory work on the Statute, the Committee of Governors
did not reach any consensus on the requirement of adequate collateral. The
proposal to the Intergovernmental Conference which drafted the Maastricht
Treaty5 put the relevant text in square brackets. In fact, although most NCBs used
to take collateral in order to limit credit risk in the context of their transactions,
their statutes did not always expressly require it.6 The absence of an express
obligation allows more flexibility, for instance in the context of abnormal
operational situations, or the adoption of alternative risk control measures, such
as the levying of fees.7 However, the legislator f inally decided that a prudent
approach would be justif ied due to the role of the Eurosystem as manager of
the European currency and of the off icial foreign reserves, and with regard to
the responsibilities which are given to the individual NCBs and to the ESCB as
a whole concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
overall stability of the f inancial system. 
Although the f inal text of Article 18 has put a certain constraint on the
operational capacity of the Eurosystem, the same provision has conferred on the
ECB quite broad powers of def inition with regard to the notion of adequate
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1 Article 18.1 lists open market and credit operations in two separate indents, and the requirement of adequate
collateral is only mentioned in the latter. However, it goes without saying that collateral must also be taken
when the Eurosystem conducts credit operations through open market interventions. 
2 See Article 43 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB (the “Statute”). 
3 The Governing Council of the ECB has adopted the term “Eurosystem” to denote the composition in which
the ESCB performs its basic tasks (see Article 3.1 of the Statute). 
4 The Eurosystem may also enter into credit operations when the market needs f inancial assistance due to the
malfunctioning of market infrastructures or liquidity shocks affecting financial stability. Interventions in favour
of a single illiquid bank should remain within the national competences of NCBs, with regard to their links
with prudential supervision. See on this issue R. Smits, The European Central Bank (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), p. 269. 
5 See Smits, op. cit., p. 272. On Article 18, see also J. V. Louis, “L’Unione économique et monetáire”, in
Commentaire Mégret: Le Droit de la CEE, 2nd edition (Brussels: L’Université de Bruxelles, 1995), p. 81. 
6 For instance, the statutes of the Banco de España, the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland,
and Suomen Pankki did not contemplate collateral. 
7 The Federal Reserve charges fees in the context of its intraday credit operations. See H. W. Richards, “Daylight
Overdraft Fees and Federal Reserve Payment System Risk Policy”, Federal Reserve Bulletin (December 1995),
pp. 1065-77, quoted by Smits, op. cit., p. 273. 
collateral. In fact, according to Article 18.2, the ECB may establish general
principles for open market and credit operations entered into by the Eurosystem,
including principles governing the announcement of conditions under which it
stands ready to enter into such transactions. 
Therefore market-oriented instruments remain in the full domain of the Eurosystem,
which can “regulate indirectly – and without recourse to administrative control and
or restrictions – money and market conditions”.8 On the other hand, mandatory
instruments used to implement monetary policy (minimum reserve requirements
under Article 19 and other instruments of monetary control under Article 20) are
subject to the regulatory power of the Council. 
In accordance with Article 108 of the Treaty, Member States have adapted the
statutes of NCBs in order to make them compatible with the Treaty and the
Statute.9 In some cases, the principle of “adequate collateral” has been embodied
expressly in the NCBs’ statutes.10 In other cases, legislation has entrusted NCBs
with a broad range of operational capacity within the limits set out by the Statute
and by the ECB’s regulatory acts; those national provisions that restricted the
categories of eligible collateral were repealed.11
1. 2 THE ADEQUACY OF COLLATERAL FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
The Eurosystem has assessed the adequacy of collateral for its own operations
on the basis of two different perspectives. Firstly, eligible assets must be
f inancially sound and ensure operational eff iciency.12 Secondly, collateral must
be legally enforceable, i.e. it must be valid and realisable to the benef it of the
creditor under the relevant jurisdictions.
This legal analysis requires the assessment of two elements which are strictly
linked to each other: the nature of the collateral arrangements, and the legal
framework that regulates the collateral.
With regard to market-oriented instruments, the Eurosystem acts in accordance
with applicable national law. The ECB has organised the Eurosystem’s credit
operations on the basis of the principle of decentralisation (Article 9 of the
Statute): each NCB may, acting in its own name, enter into contractual
relationships with counterparties established in its own territory, on the basis
of standard terms and conditions of a contractual or regulatory nature, which
are harmonised by way of regulatory acts issued by the ECB. Therefore,
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8 See the introductory report to the Draft Statute, published in Europe, Document No 1669/1670, 8 December
1990, p. 25.
9 For more information, see the reports of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and the ECB’s Convergence
Report of 1998, available on the ECB’s website (www.ecb.int).
10 See Article 16 of the consolidated version of the Statutes of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale
de Belgique, published in Moniteur belge, 12 January 1999, No 990112-84, and 12 March 1999, No 990312-
421.
11 Italy has followed this approach: see Article 6, paragraphs 2-3 of the Legislative Decree of 10 March 1998,
No 43, published in Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 14 March 1998, No 61, and Article 41 of
the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, published in the Gazzetta, 30 April 1998, No 91. 
12 See Chapter 2.3 of this paper.
collateral is established in accordance with the relevant national law and in the
legal form adopted by each NCB, on the basis of its common practice.13
Harmonisation of the regulatory and operational regime has had a material
impact on existing NCB practices with regard to risk control measures.14 Keeping
the principle of an open market economy with free competition in mind (Article
2 of the Statute), the collateral framework takes market standards into account.15
In line with the needs of a single money market, the Eurosystem accepts
collateral located abroad.
In this context the Eurosystem has to deal, on the same footing as all market
participants, with a variety of legal risks16 in relation to its own ref inancing
operations. Risks arise from national jurisdictions which traditionally impose
formal and procedural requirements on the perfection and realisation of collateral
in order to make it valid and opposable to third parties, with the objective of
limitation of derogation to the general principle of pari passu. In addition, the
existence of a cross-border component in credit operations adds further
complexity and uncertainty due to the application of foreign law.
With regard to collateral, legal risks may be grouped into four categories17: 
a) establishment risks, b) realisation risks, c) custodian risks, and d) conflict
of law risks.
a) Establishment risks arise when the formalities for perfection of collateral are
not respected. The outcome may be that collateral is invalid, either due to an
operational failure (which is very likely if the formalities for perfection are very
burdensome) or to an incorrect interpretation of the law. One peculiar case of
establishment risk is the so-called recharacterisation risk. This risk arises in
jurisdictions where repo arrangements are not legally recognised and may be
recharacterised by courts as security interests: if the formalities for the perfection
of pledges are not carried out, the collateral may not be valid.18
b) Realisation risks occur in the event of default of the collateral provider. In such
cases, the civil law (or, in the event of insolvency, the bankruptcy law) may limit
the rights of the creditor of enforcement on assets in different ways. Waiting periods,
reduction of the claim, special procedures for sale and judicial authorisations may
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13 See Smits, op. cit., p. 263.
14 According to Article 32.4 of the Statute, the Governing Council of the ECB may decide that NCBs should be
indemnif ied for losses arising from monetary policy operations. The existence of a harmonised risk control
framework may give grounds for the application of this provision. 
15 It is worth noting that upon the entry into force of Article 102 (the former 104 A) of the Treaty on 1 January
1994 (the start of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union), Member States had to repeal any
provisions which considered only public debt instruments eligible as collateral for NCBs’ credit operations
to the detriment of private issuers. 
16 Legal risk is broadly def ined as “the risk of loss because of the unexpected application of law or regulation
or because a contract cannot be enforced” (quoted from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), “Cross-border
Securities Settlements” (1995), report prepared by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the
central banks of the Group of Ten countries (CPSS), available at www.bis.org).
17 See EMI, “Standards for the Use of EU Securities Settlement Systems in ESCB Credit Operations” (1998),
p. 31, available on the ECB’s website. 
18 On the subject of recharacterisation risk, see J. Benjamin, “Recharacterization Risk and Conflicts of Law”,
in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (1997), p. 513. 
all delay or hinder the realisation of collateral. Any such delay, however, could cause
market risks due to the loss of value of collateral on the market. Legal obstacles to
the recognition of close-out netting techniques also fall within this category of risk.
c) Custodian risks arise because f inancial instruments eligible as collateral are
issued with central securities depositories (CSDs) which are subject to
operational and, at worst, insolvency risk. This risk requires the legal features
of these depositories to be identif ied in order to assess the degree of protection
of the rights of the collateral taker, acting as the pledgee or owner of securities.
d) Conflict of law risks19 arise from the cross-border use of collateral and from
the access of a foreign entity to credit operations. In a complex but not
exceptional case, the validity of collateral may be subject to three different
jurisdictions: the lex contractus, which regulates credit operations and collateral
arrangement; the lex rei sitae, the law of the place where the collateral is located,
which determines the conditions for perfection and realisation of collateral20;
and the lex concursus, which in the event of insolvency of the collateral provider
affects the realisation of collateral. The lex contractus may be agreed by the
parties according to the Rome Convention, whereas the lex rei sitae and the lex
concursus are determined by mandatory law.
The single monetary policy brought with it the cross-border use of collateral:
banks may offer assets which are located in a foreign jurisdiction as collateral.
According to general principles of private international law, the lex rei sitae
regulates the exercise of a right in rem. However, this rule was intended for
moveable things, in particular physical securities, but was not applicable to book-
entry securities21, which have however fully replaced physical securities on
financial markets. Given that investors may maintain their interest on securities
through a constellation of accounts located in different jurisdictions, a special
international private law rule was needed to clearly determine the law applicable
to collateral established on such instruments.22
The interference of the lex concursus on the realisation of collateral was already
an element of concern before the introduction of the single currency: according
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19 See R. Potok (ed.), Cross-border Collateral: Legal Risk and the Conflict of Laws (London: Butterworths, 2002);
and A. M. Corcoran, “Cross-border Financial Transactions: 25 Questions to Consider in Making Risk
Management Decisions”, in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the
Euro (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 332.
20 In fact, the borderline between the lex contractus and the lex rei sitae is vague, and inconsistencies between
the relevant jurisdictions may cause uncertainty on the validity of collateral. See M. Perassi, “I sistemi di
pagamento internazionali”, in Banca, Borsa e Titoli di credito (2000), I, p. 507; and Benjamin, op. cit., p. 516. 
21 Book-entry securities are issued in immobilised or dematerialised form through a CSD (see R. Goode, “The
Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilised Securities”, in Journal of International
Banking and Financial Law (1996), No 4, p. 167; and C. Bernasconi, “The Law Applicable to Disposition of
Securities Held through Indirect Holding Systems”, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Preliminary Document No 1 of November 2000, available at http:/hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/sec_pd01e.pdf). In
both cases, interest on securities is identif ied and transferred by means of book entry onto an account. In some
countries the investor may keep this account directly with the issuer or its agent (direct holding system), but
in most countries the investor’s interest on securities is recorded on the books of an intermediary which, in
turn, may have its interest recorded with another intermediary, and so on until the last intermediary of the
chain which holds an account with the issuer (indirect holding system).
22 See on this aspect R. D. Guynn, “Modernising Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Law”, in Capital
Markets Forum (Section on Business Law of International Bar Association) (1996), pp. 35-41.
to European Community (EC) law23, branches of banks incorporated in another
country are subject to the monetary policy of the host country and must enter
into monetary policy operations with the host central bank. The lex concursus
tends to override the lex contractus and the lex rei sitae. However, in the absence
of a harmonised European regime for the conduct of bank insolvency
proceedings, uncertainty as to the applicable lex concursus could arise. As this
paper will show, in some countries the principle of universality was in force;
while other countries followed the principle of territoriality, with several
nuances. This implied that in the event of insolvency of a multi-branch bank,
local proceedings could open in tandem with the main proceeding, each one
subject to its own lex concursus.
2 THE EUROSYSTEM’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CREDIT OPERATIONS
2.1 THE ECB’S GUIDELINES
In most cases the legal risks examined above could only be solved through
legislative reforms, as explained below in Chapter 3. In the meantime, the
Eurosystem has managed such risks by setting out its own legal framework for
credit operations, within the limits allowed by national laws.
Article 18, as already noted, gives to the ECB the power to regulate the open
market and credit operations of the Eurosystem. On this basis, the ECB has enacted
several legal acts in the different f ield of competence of the Eurosystem24: the
“Guideline on monetary policy instruments and procedure of the Eurosystem
which regulates monetary policy credit operations”25; the “Guideline on a Trans-
European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System
(TARGET)”26, which regulates intraday credit operations; and the “Guideline on
the foreign reserve management of the ECB by NCBs and the legal documentation
for operations involving the foreign assets of the ECB”.27 Such Guidelines are
binding for the Eurosystem (Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute), but do not have
a direct effect on market participants. NCBs are obliged to implement them in their
legal frameworks in accordance with the powers conferred on them by national
statutes and to execute their operations accordingly.
The Guideline on monetary policy may be considered a sort of framework legal
act.28 It is basically composed of two annexes: the General Documentation on
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23 See Article 27 of 2000/12/EC Directive (“The Consolidated Banking Law Directive”) published in OJ, L 126
26.5.2000. 
24 The following quotations refer to the legal acts currently in force.
25 ECB/2000/7 published in OJ L 310, 11.12.2000, p. 1; ECB/2003/16 published in OJ L 69, 8.3.2004, p. 1.
26 ECB/2001/3 published in OJ L 140, 24.5.2001, pp. 72-86; ECB/2002/1 published in OJ L 67, 9.3.2002, 
pp. 31-32; ECB/2003/6 published in OJ L 113, 7.5.2003, pp. 10-13.
27 ECB/2001/1 published in OJ L 207, 17.8.2000, p. 24; ECB/2001/5 published in OJ L 190, 12.7.01, 
pp. 26-28; ECB/2001/12 published in OJ L 310, 28.11.2001, pp. 31-32.
28 With regard to the eligibility criteria for assets accepted as collateral for intraday credit operations, the
Guideline on TARGET makes reference to the same criteria that are valid for monetary policy operations
(Article 3 (f)). Foreign reserve assets transferred by the NCBs to the ECB, which the above-mentioned
Guidelines refer to, are managed by the NCBs acting as agents of the ECB on the basis of standard market
documentation. Foreign reserve assets that remain with the NCBs are managed exclusively by the NCBs within
the limits set by Article 31 of the Statute. 
Eurosystem Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures (the “General
Documentation”), and the Additional Minimum Common Features (AMCF).
The General Documentation29 describes the operational framework30 chosen by
the Eurosystem, providing accurate information on eligible counterparties31, open
market and bilateral operations, procedures, eligible assets and minimum
reserves. The AMCF aims at harmonising the contractual or regulatory
arrangements which NCBs adopt for monetary policy operations.
2.2 THE LEGAL FORM OF COLLATERAL
The General Documentation (Chapters 3.1 and 4.1) states that NCBs have the
option to execute credit transactions either in the form of repurchase
agreements32 or as collateralised loans, where the collateral has the nature of a
pledge or charge. The power of NCBs to select their preferred collateralisation
technique is a result of the principle of decentralisation33, and is also one of the
ways through which the Eurosystem may limit legal risks relating to collateral:
each NCB should adopt a safe legal technique in its own jurisdiction, on the basis
of its consolidated practice. However, this approach may not be fully effective
in a cross-border context: if assets are located in a foreign country, requirements
for the perfection and realisation of collateral are subject to the rule of that
foreign country. If the foreign country’s legislation does not provide safe
mechanisms for the collateral technique generally adopted by the financing NCB,
or if the assets provided as collateral are subject to special legal features, then
the collateral practice and contractual arrangements of the f inancing NCB are
also affected and must be adapted, with the cooperation of the NCB in which
the collateral is located.34
2.3 THE LOCATION OF COLLATERAL
Chapter 6 of the General Documentation sets out the criteria which assets must
fulf il to be eligible for monetary policy operations. These criteria aim to protect
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29 The Governing Council of the ECB has just adopted the last version of the General Documentation, which
shall enter into force on 30 May 2005 and is already available on the ECB’s website.
30 In this respect see G. Vento, “The Eurosystem Operational Framework – the Use of Collateral and Liquidity
Distribution in the Euro Area: Towards a Single Interbank Market?”, BNL Quarterly Review (2004), p. 72.
31 Supervised credit institutions are the only eligible counterparties for monetary policy operations (General
Documentation, Chapter 2.1). Banks and other entities that participate in TARGET (investment f irms, clearing
and settlement agents, and some public entities) may access the Eurosystem’s intraday credit facility; it is worth
noting that public entities may be exempted from collateral requirements, see Article 3 (f) of the Guideline
on TARGET. In the absence of any restrictions in the Guidelines of the ECB (see footnote 27), operations on
foreign assets may be conducted with banks and other market participant in accordance with Article 18 of the
Statute. 
32 On the use of repo transactions for monetary policy purposes, see BIS, “Implications of Repo Markets for
Central Banks” (1999), available on the BIS’s website.
33 Chapter 2 of the General Documentation implements such a principle, whereby it specif ies that eligible
counterparties may access the Eurosystem’s standing facilities and open market operations based on standard
tenders only through the NCB of the Member State in which they are established. The ECB may only conduct
f ine-tuning bilateral operations on its own under exceptional circumstances, subject to the decision of the
Governing Council (Chapter 1.3.1).
34 In this respect, see the legal documentation adopted by the Banca d’Italia for the acceptance of some foreign
collateral in “Strumenti di politica monetaria dell’Eurosistema: Guida per gli operatori” (2004), pp. 101-30,
available on the Banca d’Italia’s website (www.bancaditalia.it).
the Eurosystem from incurring losses, ensuring the equal treatment of
counterparties and enhancing operational eff iciency.35
It is worth examining the eligibility criteria36 concerning the location of eligible
assets, since location determines the lex rei sitae, i.e. the law applicable to the
perfection and realisation of collateral. Article 17 of the Statute allows the
Eurosystem to accept book-entry securities as collateral. Since the drafting of
the Treaty, book-entry securities have fully replaced physical securities on
financial markets: accordingly, the General Documentation requires that eligible
assets must be as a rule transferable in book-entry form. The legal uncertainties
relating to the application of the lex rei sitae rule to book-entry securities have
already been mentioned. The European legislation has agreed on the principle
– as will be seen below – that the perfection and realisation of book-entry
securities collateral are regulated by the law of the place of location of the
relevant account where the rights of the collateral taker are legally recorded. On
this basis, the General Documentation states (Chapter 6.2) that assets must be
held in the euro area37 through an account with the Eurosystem or with a
securities settlement system (SSS) which fulf ils the standards established by the
ECB, “so that perfection and realisation are subject to the law of a euro area
country”. Therefore this criterion is based not only on operational eff iciency
(i.e. the need to ensure immediate access of the Eurosystem to the settlement
accounts), but also on legal reasons, since it allows the Eurosystem to check that
formalities relating to the perfection and, if needed, realisation of collateral are
properly executed in a well-known jurisdiction.
The Eurosystem has adopted standards which SSSs must comply with to be
eligible for the settlement of monetary policy operations.38 As already mentioned,
one of the risks that the collateral taker bears is custody risk, i.e. the risk that
due to insolvency or operational failure of the custodian, the interest of the
collateral taker may be affected. One of these standards (Standard 1) concerns
the legal soundness of the SSSs. It prescribes that SSSs must have a sound legal
basis under the jurisdiction of incorporation and must provide for adequate
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35 The General Documentation distinguishes between tier one assets and tier two assets. The former consist of
marketable debt instruments fulf illing uniform euro area-wide eligibility criteria specif ied by the ECB; the
latter consist of additional marketable and non-marketable assets which are of particular importance to national
f inancial markets and banking systems and for which eligibility criteria are established by the NCBs, with
the approval of the ECB and subject to minimum eligibility criteria established by the ECB. However, there
is no distinction between the two tiers with regard to the quality of the assets and their eligibility for various
types of operations. The Eurosystem intends to replace the current two-tier system with a single list of eligible
collateral (see the last version of the General Documentation, footnote 29). In order to organise a smooth
transition to a single list, the following measures are envisaged. Firstly (as from May 2005), euro-denominated
debt instruments issued by entities established in G10 countries that are not part of the European Economic
Area (EEA) will be introduced in tier one; equities will be withdrawn from the tier two lists of those countries
that currently have them eligible. In a second stage, bank loans and non-marketable retail mortgage-backed
debt instruments will be included in the single list. 
36 The other eligibility criteria for tier one assets are that they must be debt instruments, should meet high credit
standards, must be denominated in euro and issued (or alternatively guaranteed) by entities established in the
EEA, and must be listed or quoted on a regulated market or on certain non-regulated markets as specif ied by
the ECB. 
37 However, assets may be deposited/registered (issued) in the EEA with a central bank or with a CSD that fulf ils
the minimum standards established by the ECB.
38 See EMI, “Standards for the Use of EU Securities Settlement Systems in ESCB Credit Operations”, op. cit.
protection for the rights of the NCBs and the ECB in respect of securities held
in their accounts in such systems. The legal framework which regulates the SSS
must ensure that the holder of securities is entitled with a proprietary right as
distinct from a mere contractual claim, in order to be protected in the event of
insolvency of the system operator or the depository.
2.4 CROSS-BORDER USE OF COLLATERAL
The cross-border use of collateral is an essential feature of the operational
framework of the Eurosystem. It ensures equal treatment of counterparties in
the euro area, and fosters integration of f inancial markets. Counterparties may
obtain funds from their refinancing NCB (the “home NCB”) by providing assets
issued or held in another Member State of the euro area as collateral. The
General Documentation (Chapter 6.6) states that cross-border transfer of
securities may take place in accordance with two alternative options: the
correspondent central banking model (CCBM), or the links between SSSs.39
The CCBM is based upon a correspondent agreement between the Eurosystem
members under which they act as custodians for each other in respect of assets
issued or held in their local depository or settlement system. A counterparty
which intends to obtain credit from its home NCB instructs its correspondent
in the country where its securities are held to transfer them to the central bank
of that country (the “correspondent NCB”) for the account of the home NCB.
The collateral is managed by the correspondent NCB on behalf of the home
NCB: formalities for its perfection and realisation are subject to the law of the
state of the correspondent NCB, since the account where the collateral is
registered is located there. The correspondent NCB ensures the legal soundness
of collateral on the basis of its expertise in the local jurisdiction.40
Links between SSSs allow a participant in one SSS (the “investor SSS”) to hold
securities issued in a foreign SSS (the “issuer SSS”) without being a participant
in the latter. The investor SSS enters into a depository agreement and opens an
account with the issuer SSS on which the global position of its participants is
recorded (the “omnibus account”). When a counterparty intends to transfer to
the home NCB foreign assets which have been issued in the country of the issuer
SSS, the transfer takes place on the books of the investor SSS where both the
NCB and the counterparty have their own accounts. The omnibus account held
by the investor SSS in the issuer SSS is not affected by the transaction. The
collateral is established according to the law of the state of the home NCB, since
that is where the relevant account is located. The eligibility of links for their
use in monetary policy operations is subject to assessment by the Eurosystem
according to the same standards that apply to domestic SSSs. 
363
39 See Perassi, op. cit., p. 510.
40 At the time of the launch of the single monetary policy, the CCBM model was envisaged as a transitional
arrangement, since links between SSSs were very limited at that time. The situation has now changed, as the
Eurosystem has assessed the eligibility of many links. However, the General Documentation (see footnote 25)
no longer refers to the transitional nature of the model. Counterparties may freely decide between one of the
two alternative models.
From the perspective of collateral management, the advantage of the
correspondent model is that NCBs may benef it from the expertise of their
correspondents. This could prove worthwhile, especially if the counterparty is
subject to an insolvency proceeding in a foreign state. However, transfer through
a link undeniably limits the cross-border dimension of the transactions, since
the lex rei sitae and the lex contractus coincide.
2.5 HARMONISATION OF LEGAL DOCUMENTATION
The AMCF are designed to achieve a minimum level of harmonisation with
regard to the terms and conditions adopted by the Eurosystem for monetary
policy operations. In compliance with the principle of decentralisation, NCBs
retain a certain discretion in tailoring legal documentation on the basis of their
practice and legal environment. However, harmonisation is also needed to ensure
equal treatment among all participants in the euro area as well as to manage
credit risk properly. In actual fact, most of the individual AMCF deal with the
treatment of counterparty default and the realisation of collateral. The AMCF
list the individual instances of counterparty default (AMCF I.6) and the
following remedies which should be at the disposal of NCBs. In particular, they
should be “in a legal position to realise all assets provided as collateral without
undue delay” (AMCF I.7), and “without there being prior claim over the assets
concerned” (AMCF II.23). The basic features of repurchase transactions,
including mark-to-market arrangements, substitution of assets and the mechanics
of close-out netting (II. 17-22), are also part of this minimum harmonisation. 
NCBs have implemented such principles in their legal documentation to the
extent possible given the legal constraints imposed by national legislation. As
already noted, Community legislation was needed to modernise national
legislation on collateral as well as to regulate complex cross-border issues and
to create legal certainty. 
3 EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION ON COLLATERAL
3.1 THE BACKGROUND AND THE OVERALL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Over the last f ifteen years, collateralisation41 has become an essential feature for
the proper functioning of monetary and financial markets, payments and securities
settlement systems. The increasing volume of f inancial activity generates credit
risks which may have systemic implications, as recognised by the monetary
authorities.42 Measures like collateral, netting and exposure limits (caps) all limit
such risks. The derivative markets are based upon the payment of margins to
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41 On the reasons behind the development of collateralisation, see J. Benjamin, Interests in Securities: A
Proprietary Law Analysis of the International Securities Markets (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 80. Benjamin
particularly draws attention to the “need to achieve new regulatory capital eff iciencies in an increasingly
competitive market”. 
42 See BIS, Cross-border Securities Settlement Systems, op. cit., and Core Principles for Systemically Important
Payment Systems (2001), report prepared by the CPSS, available on the BIS’s website.
clearing houses; other markets and SSSs have put in place guarantee funds to
ensure that transactions can be performed. In the secondary money market,
transactions with terms longer than one month are mostly collateralised.43 Central
banks have developed gross settlement systems in order to reduce systemic risks
in their national payment systems: intraday liquidity granted against collateral is
an essential feature that ensures the proper functioning of these systems.
A common legal framework was needed to reduce legal risks and make
collateralisation effective, in particular in a cross-border context. The legislative
initiative was spurred by the introduction of the single currency, the
establishment of the Eurosystem legal framework and the need to complete the
single f inancial market. 
In a short space of time the Community legislator has enacted a number of legal
acts which deal with collateral and insolvency issues: Directive 98/26/EC of 
19 May 1998 on settlement f inality in payment and securities settlement 
systems (the “Settlement Finality Directive”); the Regulation on insolvency
proceedings of 29 May 2000 (EC/2000/1346, the “Insolvency Regulation”)44;
Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding-up 
of credit institutions (the “Winding-up Directive”); Directive 2001/17/EC 
of 3 March 2001 on the reorganisation and winding-up of insurance
undertakings; and Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on f inancial collateral
arrangements (the “Collateral Directive”).
The Eurosystem has contributed to this process through the opinions released
by the EMI and the ECB and the participation of its representatives in the
drafting working parties, with regard to its twofold function as both a market
player and a guarantor of f inancial stability.
The Settlement Finality Directive (SFD), the Winding-up Directive (WUD) and
the Collateral Directive have a special relevance for the collateral activities of
the Eurosystem and more generally of monetary and f inancial markets, and are
accordingly individually examined in detail below in sub-sections 3.2-3.4.
3.2 THE SETTLEMENT FINALITY DIRECTIVE
The SFD45 aims at eliminating legal risks which affect payment and securities
settlement systems in the event of insolvency of their participants. Legal
protection of collateral provided to participants in the systems is one of the
measures envisaged for this purpose. The SFD also applies to collateral provided
in connection with operations of the ESCB, including monetary policy
operations, and thereby contributes to the development of the Eurosystem legal
framework (Recital No 10). Therefore, the ESCB may be subject to the rules of
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43 See the ECB report on “The Euro Money Market” (2001), available on the ECB’s website.
44 The Insolvency Regulation applies to the insolvency of institutions other than banks, insurance undertakings
and investment firms; it has special relevance since its provisions have been partially transposed in the Winding-
up Directive. See D. Devos, “The European Directive of 19 May 1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment and
Securities Settlement Systems”, in Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro, op. cit., p. 366.
45 On the SFD, see Devos, op. cit., p. 361.
this Directive as collateral taker either in intraday credit operations in TARGET,
or in other central banking operations. 
The def inition of collateral (“collateral security”, Article 2 (m)) encompasses
“all realisable assets” provided in whatever legal form, including the expressly
mentioned pledge and repurchase agreements. The SFD derogates to insolvency
law in order to ensure satisfaction of the rights of the collateral taker. Then it
sets out the rule of private international law which determines the law applicable
to book-entry securities provided as collateral. 
The rights of holders of collateral security are “insulated” from the effects of
the insolvency of the provider46 (Article 9): insolvency law is not applicable to
collateral takers in so far as it: a) imposes procedural constraints on the right
of realisation of collateral (such as waiting periods, judicial authorisation, f iling
of creditors’ claims, etc.); b) limits the right of the collateral taker to satisfy its
claim on the secured assets, by admitting the concurrence or preference of other
creditors. Therefore, the general rules applicable to collateral, i.e. the lex rei
sitae, should regulate the procedures for realisation.47 Article 9 applies
irrespective of whether one (the main proceeding in the Member State of
incorporation) or more proceedings (local proceedings in the Member States with
regard to the establishment of branches) are being opened within the European
Union (EU); it may also be relevant in the event of proceedings opened in third
countries (Article 2 (j)).48 The Collateral Directive has broadened, as shown
below, the scope of application of the principle set out by Article 9.
As already noted, the rule of lex rei sitae required adaptation to the peculiar
nature of book-entry securities. Article 10 of the Directive is based upon the
so-called place of the relevant intermediary approach (PRIMA), according to
which the rights of collateral holders on securities which are legally recorded
on a register, account or centralised deposit system located in a Member State
shall be governed by the law of that Member State. The PRIMA has been broadly
considered as a qualif ication of the lex rei sitae rule, although one distinguished
scholar has drawn attention to its peculiarity49, since in the absence of a paper
form, it is no longer possible to identify the physical location of the security.
3.3 THE WINDING-UP DIRECTIVE
The WUD50 has further contributed to legal certainty with regard to the
enforceability of collateral in the context of insolvency proceedings of banks.
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46 Devos, op. cit., p. 385, notes that this provision takes inspiration from Article 5 (1) of the Insolvency Regulation,
but goes further than it since “insulation” also takes effect when the assets provided as collateral are located in the
same Member State as the one where the insolvency proceedings have been opened, whereas Article 5 applies the
same principle only in the event that assets are located in another Member State. See also Chapter 3.2, footnote 55. 
47 See Devos, op. cit., p. 386.
48 In this case, the receiver may not challenge Article 9 on the grounds of its incompatibility with the local
insolvency law, since the Directive should be considered part of the international public policy of Member
States. See Devos, op. cit., pp. 377-78.
49 See R. Goode, “Security Entitlement as Collateral and the Conflict of Law”, in Journal of International Banking
and Financial Law (September 1998), p. 22.
50 See E. Galanti, “The New EC Law on Bank Crisis”, in International Insolvency Review (2002), p. 49; and 
A. Campbell, “Issues in Cross-border Bank Insolvency: The European Community Directive on the Reorganization
and Winding-up of Credit Institutions”, available at www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/campbpdf
It has introduced a regime of mutual recognition of measures for bank crises.
A clear legal framework is now in place with regard to the authorities entrusted
with crisis management and the national law which comes into play. The WUD
applies to the crisis (reorganisation measures or winding-up proceedings) of
banks in the European Community with at least one branch in a Member State
other than the one in which they have their headquarters, and only to the crisis
of branches of non-EC banks when such banks have branches in at least two
Member States. It is based upon the principles of unity and universality. The
principle of unity provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the home Member
State’s administrative or judicial authorities regarding the decision to implement
a crisis management measure in a specif ic bank, including in branches
established in another Member State (Articles 3.1 and 9.1). The Community
legislator does not intend to depart from the “home country control” rule in case
of diff iculties, and will grant equal treatment to all creditors in case of
liquidation. The principle of universality implies that a single insolvency
proceeding, established and regulated by the home Member State’s law, shall be
effective with the consequent prohibition of any secondary proceeding being
opened by the host authorities. The decisions taken within the proceeding shall
be recognised and capable of producing effects in all Member States, without
need of any formality or exequatur procedure.
The application of the principle of universality is mitigated by the introduction
of some exceptions51 which provide for the application of the lex rei sitae or the
lex contractus instead of the lex concursus.52 It is worth noting that a number
of these exceptions relate to f inancial transactions and collateral arrangements.
In such cases, the forum concursus shall apply foreign insolvency law to
determine the treatment of these rights and contracts.53
The derogation in favour of the lex rei sitae is justified by the fact that the location
of the assets to which the rights refer creates an objective connection with another
jurisdiction. These exceptions relate, inter alia54, to rights on dematerialised or
immobilised f inancial instruments where the register, account or centralised
deposit system is held or located in a Member State (Article 24). In this case, in
line with the PRIMA, the law of the Member State where the relevant account is
located, i.e. its insolvency law, shall regulate the enforcement of proprietary rights. 
The location of assets is also relevant regarding rights in rem in respect of
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable assets belonging to the credit
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51 This derogation is also contained in the Insolvency Regulation (Articles 5 to 15).
52 Galanti, op. cit., p. 51, explains this outcome as a compromise adopted in the course of preparatory works
between the supporters of a paramount application of the universality principles, and the advocates of a
“softened” universality which would have allowed secondary proceedings. In particular, the latter were
concerned about the treatment of local creditors, whereas the former considered the opening of secondary
proceedings inconsistent with a system based on home country control. The compromise solution gives some
protection to creditors in host Member States, while at the same time ensuring that there is no possibility of
a further set of legal proceedings being initiated (see also Campbell, op. cit., p. 11).
53 However, Recital No 17 states that the exceptions in favour of the lex loci or the lex contractus have to be
literally interpreted, while other issues, “such as the lodging, verif ication, admission and ranking of claims
concerning those contracts and rights and the rules governing the distribution of the proceeds of the realisation
of the assets […] are governed by the law of the Member States”.
54 The other derogation concerns rights in respect of immovable property, a ship or an aircraft subject to
registration (Article 20 (b) (c)).
institutions, or rights based on a reservation of title on assets which are situated
within the territory of another Member State at the time of adoption of the
insolvency proceeding (Articles 21 and 22). Such rights, according to the
provision, are not “affected by the insolvency proceedings”.55
Netting agreements, repurchase agreements and transactions carried out in the
context of regulated markets (Articles 25 to 27) remain subject to the lex
contractus56, whose application is justif ied by Recitals 23 and 24. The conflict
of the lex concursus with the rules normally applicable in the context of the
economic and f inancial activity of the credit institution and its branches must
be regulated, in particular to ensure the security of transactions and the
protection of the integrity of regulated markets. This approach follows the same
direction adopted by the SFD, whereby the law regulating the system (the lex
contractus), rather than the lex concursus, determines the rights and obligations
of a participant regarding the system. In this way, both Directives encompass
not only the settlement of transactions, but also dealing on f inancial markets
and bilateral netting agreements, on the basis of the same principle of the lex
contractus.57 It has been noted58 that these rules allow not only free choice in
terms of the law applicable to this legal relationship, but also the chance to
choose an applicable law taken from outside the EU. This may lead to a tendency
to select the most favourable legal jurisdiction (“choice of law shopping”), and
may even cause disintermediation in the European markets.
This remark leads us to some concluding considerations on the objective and
effects of the provisions set out by the WUD. This Directive dictates rules which
permit the solution of conflicts of law. This approach is of great value in terms
of legal certainty: in the banking sector, the opening of potentially conflicting
insolvency proceedings is no longer admitted; a f inancial market or a central
bank that has contractual relationships with a number of operators may establish
ex ante that only one single law, i.e. either the lex contractus or the lex rei sitae,
will apply to its transactions, irrespective of the place of incorporation of
counterparties. However, in some cases the determination of the applicable law
may indeed be unclear, especially taking into account the recalled principle of
literal interpretation of derogations to the lex concursus. 
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55 This rule repeats the content of Article 5 of the Insolvency Regulation and is also similar to Article 9 of the
SFD. However, under the Insolvency Regulation “the insulation” does not take place when secondary insolvency
proceedings are opened: in such an event, the rights of the collateral taker shall be subject to the insolvency
law of those proceedings. With regard to banks, secondary proceedings are not contemplated by the Directive.
According to Devos, op. cit., p. 373, Article 21 means that the holder of the right in rem “should be exempted
from any restrictive rules intending to avoid abuses to the detriment of other creditors”. Galanti, op. cit., 
p. 62, holds that a narrower interpretation of Article 21 may be that rights in rem “do not straightaway escape
from the proceeding but that they are not voided as a simple effect of its opening”. This latter position may
be supported by the fact that rights in rem as def ined by Article 21 cannot benef it from more favourable
treatment than rights on book-entry securities, which would be subject to the lex rei sitae as defined by Article
24. In any case, Article 21 is without prejudice to the application of the special regime regulated by the SFD
with regard to collateral given to central banks and participants, with the insulation of the rights of collateral
holders from insolvency law (Recital No 26).
56 However, even the provision on set-off (Article 23) contains a derogation to the lex concursus which is based
upon the contract law applicable to the claim of the credit institution subject to set-off.
57 See Galanti, op. cit., p. 61, who reports that the advocates of derogation put forward this argument in the course
of preparatory work.
58 Galanti, op. cit., p. 61.
The WUD did not aim at harmonising substantive rules on insolvency in the EU.
In the context of this Directive, harmonisation was not a realistic objective (see
Recital No 6). Further progress toward a reduction of legal risks called for
greater harmonisation of the European insolvency law with regard to the
treatment of collateral arrangements, taking the objective of ensuring the
competitiveness of the European f inancial market into account.  
3.4 THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE
The Collateral Directive is the last and the most ambitious piece of EU
legislation on collateral issues. It complements the other legal acts considered
above (Recital No 4), but in fact goes well beyond their limited scope in this
f ield. The Commission announced its intention to proceed further with
legislation on collateral in its Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)59 after the
adoption of the SFD. The preamble of the Collateral Directive explains its
objective: “A Community regime […] for the provision of securities and cash
as collateral […] will contribute to the integration and cost-eff iciency of the
f inancial markets as well as to the stability of the f inancial system” (Recital 
No 3). This Directive also aims at improving the eff iciency and legal soundness
of the cross-border operations of the Eurosystem, which are necessary for the
implementation of monetary policy, and at improving collateralised
transactions entered into the secondary money market (Recital No 12).
The Collateral Directive concentrates on the profile of harmonisation: only one
provision is devoted to conflict of law issues (Article 9, on the law applicable
to book-entry securities collateral). It touches upon aspects regulated by the lex
contractus (the recognition of title transfer arrangements and right of use), the
lex rei sitae (perfection and enforcement) and the lex concursus (close-out
netting and avoidance rules). Harmonisation has requested material
amendments to the basic rules of civil law, which are all extremely ancient.
However, the Council adopted the Collateral Directive in a very short time-
frame, one year after the proposal of the Commission. This apparent
contradiction may be explained by the fact that this Directive takes its inspiration
from consolidated market practice, as embodied in the master agreements
adopted by the f inancial market associations. Moreover, past case laws have
often recognised legal arrangements such as repo contracts, close-out netting
and marking to market, even though they were not expressly regulated by
national civil law. Finally, the previous Directives paved the way for this
comprehensive legislative intervention. 
3.4.1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND PERFECTION REQUIREMENTS
The Collateral Directive60 applies to public authorities, central banks, f inancial
institutions subject to prudential supervision and central counterparties,
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59 COM (1999) 32.
60 On the Collateral Directive, see J. Coiley, “New Protections for Cross-border Collateral Arrangements: Summary
and Analysis of Draft EU Directive on Financial Collateral”, in Journal of International Banking Law (2001),
p. 119; G. Morton, “Modernization of EU Financial Law: The Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements”,
Euredia (2003), pp. 11-40; and F. T’Kint and W. Derijcke, “La Directive 2002/47/CE concernant les contrats
de garantie f inancière au regard des principes généraux du droit des sûrétes”, Euredia (2003), pp. 41-57. 
settlement agents and clearing houses; it also applies to non-f inancial entities
other than natural persons, provided that the other party of the collateral
arrangement is a public or f inancial institution as listed above (Article 1.2). The
issue of its subjective scope proved very controversial in the course of
preparatory work. The Commission had originally submitted that only large-sized
legal persons other than f inancial institutions would be encompassed by the
Directive61, as the proposed legislation was addressed to the needs of the
monetary and f inancial markets. Some delegations, by contrast, were in favour
of extending the subjective scope to all undertakings, or even to natural persons,
in order to avoid any disparity of treatment or segmentation of the credit market.
Others supported instead a restrictive approach, since the Collateral Directive
sets out a derogation to the insolvency law.62 Final agreement was reached with
the inclusion of an opt-out clause: Member States may decide to exclude non-
f inancial entities from the scope of the Directive. To our knowledge, only a few
countries have exercised this opt-out clause.63
Regarding its objective scope, the Directive applies to f inancial collateral, i.e.
cash and f inancial instruments, taken for the purpose of securing f inancial
obligations, namely obligations which give right to cash settlement and/or
delivery of securities (Article 2.1 (d-f)). The ECB64 suggested extending the
notion of f inancial collateral in order to cover all types of assets that are eligible
for Eurosystem credit operations, including credit claims in the form of bank
loans. However, this proposal was not accepted, probably for procedural reasons.
The def inition of collateral arrangements (Article 2.1 (a-c)) encompasses title
transfer arrangements (i.e. arrangements, including repurchase agreements,
under which a collateral provider transfers full ownership of the collateral to
the collateral taker); and security arrangements (i.e. arrangements under which
a collateral provider provides collateral by way of security to, or in favour of,
a collateral taker, and under which the full ownership of the collateral remains
with the collateral provider).
The Collateral Directive takes its inspiration from the “functional approach”
typical of common law, which is based upon the underlying economic function
of the collateral arrangements. Continental civil law, on the other hand, is based
on the “formal approach”, i.e. the provision of a specific form devoted to security
(pledges).65 The ECB has welcomed the functional approach, since it
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61 See the proposal of the Commission, in OJ C 180 E, 26.6.2001, p. 312.
62 The ECB (in its Opinion of 13 June 2001, OJ C 48, 12.7.2001, p. 10, paragraphs 7-8) expressed concern that
the application of thresholds would create uncertainty and as a compromise proposed that the provisions that
do not deal with protection against insolvency, but with substantive law or the conflict of law rule, could be
made generally applicable.
63 Namely Austria, Malta, Slovakia, Sweden, France and Germany (in the latter three cases to a very limited
extent). This implies that most states have solved the trade-off between a broader derogation to the civil and
insolvency law regime and the risk of segmentation of the credit market and of choice of law shopping in favour
of the f irst option.
64 Opinion of the ECB, op. cit., paragraph 10.
65 See G. Ferrarini, “Changes to Personal Property Security in Italy: A Comparative and Functional Approach”,
in R. Cranston (ed.), Making Commercial Law – Essays in Honour of Roy Goode (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), p. 477. Ferrarini here recalls that the American Uniform Commercial Code was the f irst to adopt the
functional approach. See also R. C. C. Cuming, “The Internationalization of Secured Financing Law: The
Spreading Influence of the Concepts UCC, Article 9 and Its Progeny”, in Making Commercial Law, op. cit.,
p. 499; and Coiley, op. cit., p. 119. 
encompasses and protects all the collateral techniques adopted by the
Eurosystem.66 The functional approach implies the legal recognition of security
based on title transfer arrangements (see Article 6) and, in particular, of
repurchase agreements, which some jurisdictions did not consider valid yet or
did not expressly regulate. In fact, the Collateral Directive goes even further than
this by extending rights of use67, of appropriation and close-out netting, which
are normally linked to title transfer arrangements, to security collateral. It
follows that the differences between the two legal forms of collateral are
becoming increasingly indistinct.  
For the purpose of its application, the Collateral Directive requires that f inancial
collateral “has been provided” and that “provision can be evidenced in writing”
(Article 1.5).68 Provision is defined (Article 2.2) as collateral “being delivered,
transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession
or under the control of the collateral taker”. Evidencing the provision requires the
identif ication of the f inancial collateral.69 Recital No 9 explains that “provision”
not only defines the scope of application of the Collateral Directive, but also sets
out the “only perfection requirement that national law may impose in respect of
collateral” (see also Article 3). The objective is to limit the “administrative burden
for parties using financial collateral”. The perfection or enforceability of collateral
may not be subject to any other formal acts, such as those listed by Recital No 10.
The Collateral Directive considers that this solution provides a balance between
market eff iciency and the safety of parties to the arrangement and third parties,
thereby avoiding inter alia the risk of fraud. However, a distinguished scholar has
criticised70 the dismissal of any system of publication, since even the functional
approach broadly recognises the need for publicity, which would also be easy to
implement with modern technology, in order to protect the interests of third parties
to obtain information on the assets of their debtors.
3.4.2 ENFORCEMENT
The Collateral Directive extends the privileged treatment on the enforcement
of collateral recognised by the SFD for the benefit of central banks and systems
to collateral arrangements entered into by the other parties covered by the
Collateral Directive. Moreover, the derogation is not limited to disapplication
of the lex concursus, as set out by the SFD, but also impinges on the lex rei sitae,
since the special enforcement rules are also relevant upon the occurrence of
events of default not related to insolvency. 
The Collateral Directive is designed to introduce rapid and non-formalistic
enforcement procedures with the aim of safeguarding f inancial stability and
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66 See the Opinion of the ECB, op. cit., paragraph 6.
67 The recognition of the right of use is somewhat anomalous since it goes against the general principle of nemo
plus ius transferre potest quam ipse habet, although the right is subject to the agreement of the collateral
provider. On the right of use, see Morton, op. cit., p. 18. The Collateral Directive holds that the right of use
will increase liquidity in f inancial markets (Recital No 19). 
68 The collateral arrangements under which collateral has been provided must be also evidenced in writing or
in an equivalent manner (Article 1.5, 3rd sub-paragraph).
69 For the purpose of book-entry securities collateral and cash, it is suff icient to prove that provision has been
registered in the proper account (Article 1.5, 2nd sub-paragraph).
70 G. Ferrarini, “Le garanzie su strumenti f inanziari nel diritto comunitario: orientamenti e prospettive”, in Il
Fallimento, 9 (2002), p. 1003.
limiting contagion effects in case of a default of a party (Recital No 17). For
this purpose, it leaves parties considerable freedom in the def inition of
enforcement mechanisms. However, discretion creates risks of abuse that may
have a material impact on f inancial stability as well. The Collateral Directive
only partially contrasts these side-effect risks, as this paper demonstrates below.
Collateral may take effect in accordance with the terms agreed in the f inancial
arrangements, notwithstanding the commencement of winding-up or
reorganisation measures (Article 4.4). The definition of reorganisation measures
also includes cases in which authorities decide to suspend payments (Article 2.1
(k)). In such cases, rapid realisation may conflict with the interest of prudential
supervisors in effective reorganisation measures and the stability of the financial
system, as the ECB has also pointed out.71 The same risk exists with regard to
the def inition of “enforcement events”, i.e. events of default or similar events
agreed between parties which may trigger the right of enforcement (Article 2.1
(l)). The provision seems to leave full discretion to the parties on the def inition
of what is “similar” to an event of default72: courts can hardly control the material
relevance of such events on this basis.
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 def ine the enforcement procedures for security collateral
arrangements. Financial instruments may be realised by sale or appropriation73
(the latter only if parties have agreed and have determined the valuation of the
f inancial instruments). Cash collateral may be realised by set-off. Article 4.4
specif ies the principle of the rapid and non-formalistic enforcement procedure
by clarifying that, subject to the terms agreed by the parties, realisation of
collateral should not be subject to formal procedures as listed in the article (prior
notice, approval of courts, public sale and waiting periods).
Article 7 provides for the full recognition of close-out netting clauses: these may
take effect in accordance with their terms, and prevail on mandatory insolvency
rules and on legal set-off mechanisms.74 It is worth noting that the def inition
of close-out netting (Article 2.1 (n)) aims to include all the possible variants
which the practice elaborates. Close-out netting provisions of derivative
arrangements, such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) master agreement or the European Master Agreement (EMA), should
also be included in the scope of the def inition to the extent that a f inancial
collateral arrangement should form part of the derivative arrangement.75
The provisions briefly examined above (Articles 4 to 7) are subject, according
to Article 4.6, to any requirement under national law to the effect that the
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71 See the Opinion of the ECB, op. cit., paragraph 13. 
72 The approach of the Directive reflects the current market practice embodied in the standard contractual
documentation, which usually contains a detailed list of events of default or termination events.
73 Member States that did not allow appropriation on 27 June 2002 are not obliged to recognise it. To our
knowledge, no state has yet exercised its right to opt out.
74 For more on netting, see P. R. Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-off and Netting (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
75 According to Article 6.2 (on the recognition of title transfer collateral) and Article 5.5 (on the right of use),
the obligation of the collateral taker to transfer equivalent collateral may also be subject to a close-out netting
provision.
realisation or valuation of f inancial collateral and the calculation of the relevant
f inancial obligations must be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.
The Community legislator has therefore left it up to Member States to decide
whether the collateral provider or third parties, including receivers or liquidators,
should have any right to challenge the realisation procedure or the relevant
clauses agreed by parties. This approach can be criticised76, since a principle of
harmonisation on this very sensitive issue would have been appropriate in order
to avoid the risk of competing legal jurisdictions. However, it is acknowledged
that the risk of abuse is substantially reduced when parties adhere to standard
market documentation which sets out criteria for the realisation and valuation
of f inancial collateral and the calculation of f inancial obligations.77
3.4.3 DISAPPLICATION OF INSOLVENCY LAW
Article 8 of the Collateral Directive provides for a minimum harmonisation of
national insolvency rules which, in order to ensure compliance with the pari
passu principle, regulates the validity of collateral arrangements entered into
a prescribed period prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceeding
or on the same day of commencement. These rules are peculiar in every
jurisdiction: in some cases, automatic avoidance rules based only on the timing
of transactions are in place, whereas in other cases the voidness of an act is
subject to further or different circumstances, such as the detrimental nature of
the act to the estate and the creditors or the bad faith of the counterparty. The
Directive is intended to repeal just the national provisions that belong to the first
category.78
Article 8.1 states that f inancial collateral arrangements and the provision of
collateral under such arrangements cannot be declared void on the sole basis
that they have come into existence or have been provided on the day of the
commencement of the proceeding, but prior to the issuance of the decree (the
“zero hour rule”), or in a prescribed period prior to the commencement of the
proceeding (“the suspect period”). Article 8.2 ensures the validity of any
collateral activity arising79 on the same day of the proceeding but after its
commencement, if the collateral taker proves its good faith. 
The Collateral Directive further repeals the “zero-hour rule” with regard to
collateral arrangements that lie outside the scope of the SFD. The protection of
collateral provided after the commencement of proceedings is entirely new, as
the SFD contains a similar provision to be used only “exceptionally” in the case
of transfer orders (Article 3.1, 2nd paragraph). 
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76 See also the Opinion of the ECB, op. cit., paragraph 13.
77 In the wake of this, the Italian legislator (Article 8.1 of the Legislative Decree of 21 May 2004, No 170, in
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, No 164, 15 July 2004, p. 11), has stated that contractual clauses
on realisation and valuation are presumed to be commercially reasonable if they are in line with contractual
arrangements determined by the Banca d’Italia, in agreement with the Commissione Nazionale per la Societa’
e per la Borsa (the Italian supervisor for the stock exchange and financial markets), taking into account market
practices on collateral arrangements. 
78 Subject to the contents of Article 8, the Directive leaves the general rules of national law unchanged in relation
to the avoidance of transactions (Article 8.4).
79 The provision applies where on such a day and after the commencement of the proceeding, a f inancial collateral
arrangement or a relevant financial obligation has come into existence, or financial collateral has been provided. 
Article 8.3 provides for special regulation of top-up collateral and substitution
clauses.80 These clauses regulate very common market practices in the f inancial
markets, and are normally included in the standard market documentation. They
are considered by regulators and supervisory authorities as a sound system for
managing credit risk.81 It is worth noting that the def inition of top-up collateral
does not cover collateral provided as a consequence of a deterioration in the
f inancial soundness of the debtor: this is not accidental, as national insolvency
law does not generally recognise protection to disposition of assets in favour
of creditors that are aware of a deterioration in the f inancial position of their
debtors.82
The Collateral Directive requires the repeal of national rules which provide for
invalidity of provision of top-up or substitute collateral on the sole basis of the
timing of the provision, as def ined by Article 8.1, and/or on the basis that
relevant f inancial obligations were incurred prior to the date of the provision
of the top-up or substitute collateral.83 As for Article 8.1, the wording “on the
sole basis” implies that whenever national legislation makes the avoidance rule
subject to requirements other than those set by Article 8.3, such as bad faith on
the part of the collateral taker, there is no need for implementation in national
legislation.84
3.4.4 THE EXTENSION OF THE PRIMA APPROACH
The Collateral Directive has extended the scope of application of the PRIMA
to cases where the relevant account is located outside the EU. Article 9 of the
Collateral Directive lists those matters that are regulated by the law of the
location of the relevant account in relation to book-entry securities collateral
(legal nature and proprietary effects, perfection and realisation, competing titles,
etc.).
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The establishment of a EU legal framework on collateral has clearly substantially
reduced the legal risks encountered by the Eurosystem and f inancial operators
in f inancing operations. However, there are three main reasons why this process
is far from complete.
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80 Article 8.3 (a) def ines top-up collateral as an obligation to provide f inancial collateral or additional f inancial
collateral in order to take account of changes in the value of the f inancial collateral or in the amount of the
relevant f inancial obligations. A substitution clause (Article 8.3 (b)) entrusts the collateral provider with a
right to withdraw f inancial collateral upon providing, by way of substitution or exchange, f inancial collateral
with substantially the same value.
81 In this respect, the Opinion of the ECB (op. cit., paragraphs 17 and 18) supports the protection of such clauses
as a way of fostering the effectiveness of risk control management systems, including the risk control framework
of the Eurosystem. In particular, the recognition of substitution of assets would allow f inancial operators to
increase the effectiveness of collateral management, as well as to contribute to the smooth functioning of
securities settlement systems by reducing settlement failures and thus enhancing f inancial stability.
82 See Recital No 11 of the Commission’s proposal.
83 In fact, the existence of a time-lag between the existence of the f inancial obligation and the provision of
collateral is often considered by insolvency law as evidence of an absence of consideration or of the existence
of fraud.
84 See Morton, op. cit., p. 35.
Firstly, the WUD and the Collateral Directive have not yet been implemented
by all Member States, notwithstanding the expiry of the envisaged deadlines.
The assessment of consistent implementation among Member States will be
crucial in order to ensure a level playing-f ield in the markets and the proper
functioning of the adopted rules in a cross-border context.
Secondly, the Eurosystem’s legal framework on collateral is subject to adaptation
prompted by the process of consolidation of the regulatory and operational
framework. A notable example is the recent decision85 to include credit claims
in the form of bank loans in the prospective single list of eligible collateral.
Credit claims have not been regulated by the examined EU Directives. Some
harmonisation of national legislation concerning this kind of collateral might
be warranted, as recalled by the ECB in its Opinion on the Collateral Directive.
Thirdly, regulation on book-entry securities remains at the top of the agenda of
the Community legislator in the f ield of f inancial law. As far as international
private law is concerned, the possible ratification of the recent Hague Convention
would require amendments to the Directives at hand.86 In the meantime, the
Commission has announced that it intends to propose harmonising substantive
law on interest in securities with an intermediary, as the absence of such a law
is now considered to be the most important source of legal risk in cross-border
transactions.87
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85 See the last version of the General Documentation, footnote 29.
86 Reference is made to the Hague Convention “on the law applicable to certain rights related to securities held
with an intermediary”. The Convention has adopted a different approach based on the agreement between the
intermediary and the account holder. See D. Devos, “The New Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Securities Held with an Intermediary and Its Relevance for the ESCB’s Cross-border Use of Collateral”,
collected in this book. 
87 On this project, see the Communication of the Commission of 28 April 2004 on “Clearing and Settlement in
the European Union – The Way Forward” (COM (2004) 312). The International Institute for the Unif ication
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has been working on the same project and has already produced a preliminary
draft convention (available at www.unidroit.org).

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE 
TO BOOK-ENTRY SECURITIES – THE RELEVANCE FOR THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS
Diego Devos
ABSTRACT
Finora si è osservato un considerevole grado di incertezza giuridica a livello
internazionale, in relazione alla determinazione di una precisa legislazione
nazionale relativa ai titoli accreditati su un conto presso un intermediario in
una dimensione internazionale, dovuta alla varietà dei possibili sistemi
legislativi (legge dell’emittente, legge del luogo in cui i certificati sottostanti
- certificati cartacei del tipo al portatore - possono essere fisicamente depositati
o detenuti, legge di registro, legge dell’emittente CSD - Central Security
Depository, legge di un altro intermediario a livello superiore o inferiore, etc.).
Tale  incertezza genera a sua volta rischi giuridici per l’industria dei valori
mobiliari e gli investiori nella misura in cui la legge che regola i titoli
smaterializzati determinerà la protezione offerta al possessore in caso di
insolvenza dell’intermediario, nonché le formalità da adempiere per creare,
perfezionare e attuare i contratti di garanzia finanziaria su tali titoli.
L’applicazione di un’altra legge, diversa da quella attesa dalle parti, al rapporto
di custodia potrebbe in realtà compromettere i diritti di proprietà
dell’investitore, o invalidare le sue operazioni di garanzia finanziaria qualora
i requisiti di quest’altra legge non fossero stati soddisfatti.
A livello UE, le Direttive sulla Definitività del Regolamento, la
Riorganizzazione e la Liquidazione degli istituti di credito e il Collaterale hanno
notevolmente elevato il livello di certezza giuridica, ma rimangono limitate alla
UE, senza rivolgersi al resto del mondo e tener conto di tutti gli aspetti rilevanti
per i possessori di titoli e tutti gli operatori di mercato. E’ proprio questo che
la Convenzione dell’Aia sta ora realizzando, determinando la legge applicabile
ai titoli smaterializzati con particolare riferimento alla legge scelta  per regolare
l’accordo relativo al conto titoli. Lo studio commenta la Convenzione dell’Aia
incentrandosi sui suoi principali risultati in vista delle suddette incertezze
giuridiche. E in conclusione spiega anche perché tale Convenzione dovrebbe
essere particolarmente rilevante in una prospettiva SEBC.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1. The need for legal certainty when dealing with securities held through
intermediaries on a cross-border basis is undisputed among market players,
law practitioners and public authorities. This need is at the heart of multiple
law reforms introduced at national level over the last 20 years as well as at
international or at European level, with the adoption by the European Union
(EU) of the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD)1, the Directive on the
Reorganisation and Winding-up of Credit Institutions2 (WUD) and, more
recently, the Collateral Directive.3 These legal reforms were aimed at
improving the substantive legal regimes of collateral transactions and of
transfer of securities (and cash) in general, particularly against insolvency
risk of the counterpart, the intermediary holding the securities itself, or of
any third party (creditors, etc.) interested in the securities transaction.
2. It is however pointless to achieve the best possible legal protection of
securities transactions in a national environment if, on the other hand,
uncertainties remain about the determination of the applicable national law
governing a particular securities transaction in a cross-border dimension. Of
course, this question is less of an issue when for example two domestic banks
exchange domestic securities on behalf of domestic clients in a domestic
central securities depository (CSD), which will naturally take place under 
the law of the domestic jurisdiction in question. However, f inancial
transactions nowadays are often substantially more complicated with many
international aspects to consider, such as the involvement of foreign market
players conducting transactions from abroad on a remote basis with a domestic
player or through a domestic branch. Domestic players also deal with foreign
securities, either in the domestic CSD that holds such foreign securities via
a link with another CSD, or with a custodian in the jurisdiction where these
securities were issued and are primarily deposited, or even directly in the local
market. Additionally, they may themselves hold securities on behalf of
domestic or foreign customers, and so on. Central banks that are members
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) have since 1998 adopted
rules on the eligibility of assets for monetary policy purposes and on the
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1 Directive 98/26/EC of 19 May 1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems,
OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, pp. 45 ff; on this Directive, see D. Devos, “La directive européenne 98/26/CE concernant
le caractère déf initif du règlement dans les systèmes de paiement et de règlement des opérations sur titres”
(1999), Euredia, pp. 149 ff; D. Devos, “Collateral transactions in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems:
The EU Framework”, Revue (belge) de Droit bancaire et financier (2002), pp. 10-27; and D. Devos, “The
European Directive of 19 May 1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems”,
in G. Ferrarini, K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2002), pp. 361-88. 
2 Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001 on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of Credit Institutions, OJ L
125, 5.5.2001, p. 15; on this Directive, see in particular J.-P. Deguée, “La directive 2001/24/CE sur
l’assainissement et la liquidation des établissements de crédit: une solution aux défaillances bancaires
internationales?” (2002), Euredia, p. 241.
3 Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral Arrangements, OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43; on this Directive,
see D. Devos,  “The Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral Arrangements of June 6, 2002”, in Mélanges
en Hommage à Jean-Victor Louis (Brussels: ULB, 2003), Vol. II, p. 259; see also S. Economou, “La proposition
de directive européenne sur les contrats de garantie f inancière”, Bull. Joly Bourse, 2002, chron., 1; Clifford
Chance, Securities Newsletter (May/June 2002); and D. Turing, “The EU Collateral Directive”, Journal of
International Banking and Financial Law (2002), p. 187.
cross-border use of collateral (correspondent central banking model (CCBM)
arrangements and the use of eligible links between eligible securities
settlement systems (SSSs)). This represents a departure from long-standing
monetary policy traditions, which classically limited the range of securities
eligible as collateral for ref inancing purposes to domestic assets.
3. In the above context, the specif ic need for legal certainty with respect to
determining which law will govern the holding of securities has been stressed
many times in the legal literature4, as well as in the preparatory Report
prepared by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law5, which seeks to justify the adoption of what has become
the “Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities
held with an intermediary” (“the Hague Convention”), adopted by the
Nineteenth Session of the Hague Conference on 13 December 2002. The
Hague Convention is the subject of this paper. The reader is referred to the
rationale explained in this preparatory report as well as in the Explanatory
Report of the Hague Convention prepared by three professors of law (Roy
Goode, Hideki Kanda and Karl Kreuzer) with the assistance of Christophe
Bernasconi (henceforth “the Report”), which can be found on the website of
the Hague Conference.6
2 THE ISSUES
4. In seeking to assess the important and complex issues addressed by the Hague
Convention, it is necessary to revisit the overall situation as a whole, since it
is probably in this f ield that some misunderstandings may have arisen in the
past – misunderstandings which are currently influencing the debate about the
need to have the Hague Convention adopted at EU level. This is why it is worth
recalling some basic principles of conflict of laws in relation to securities. This
paper will subsequently address the issues at stake in the context of indirect
holding of securities and the correlative criteria that have to be taken into
account as part of the commentary on the Hague Convention itself.
The key principles to take into account when looking at the determination of
the law governing indirectly held securities are as follows:
a) It is generally admitted that the law applicable to securities in the direct
relationship between the end-investor and the issuer is the domestic law under
which these securities were issued. This is the domestic company law, or lex
societatis, of the domestic issuer for domestic issues in the form of equities
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4 See “The Oxford Colloquium on Collateral and Conflict of Laws” held at St John’s College, Oxford University,
in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, special supplement September 1998.
5 “The Law Applicable to Dispositions of Securities Held through Indirect Holding Systems”, preparatory report
prepared by C. Bernasconi, First Secretary at the Hague Conference’s Permanent Bureau, available on the
website of the Hague Conference (www.hcch.net).
6 http://www.hcch.net; see also the rationale indicated in the Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the
signing of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an
intermediary, presented by the EU Commission on 15 December 2003 (COM (2003), 783 f inal).
or bonds, which is in common law countries determined by reference to the
place of incorporation of the company; and in continental law systems, by
reference to the place of the main seat of the company.7 Alternatively, for
international bonds, the applicable law is determined by reference to the lex
contractus, the law governing the issue of such international bonds (as selected
in applicable contractual issuing documentation, e.g. the prospectus, etc.).8
b) It is also generally recognised that the law applicable to the listing and trading
of securities listed on a particular stock exchange is indeed the law of that
stock exchange9; the law applicable to the netting process in case of
intervention by a central counterpart (clearing) is the law chosen to govern
such contractual netting (generally by way of novation).10 
c) Again, it is not disputed that the law applicable to over-the-counter (OTC)
securities transactions between the two relevant counterparts is the law
governing the particular OTC transaction (forward sale, repo, transfer of title,
loan, sale and buy-back, securities swap, etc.) as lex contractus (see Article
3 (1) of the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to
contractual obligations in the EU).
d) Categories a) to c) above are however restricted to the institutional and
contractual aspects of the issuance and transfer of securities vis-à-vis the
issuer or the counterpart. As such, they do not concern third parties with
respect to either the enforceability of the possible transfer of ownership that
the securities transaction may entail, or the enforceability of the collateral
transaction, especially in case of insolvency or any other form of competition
between creditors. Nor do they address the law governing the rights of the
holder of the securities account in case of insolvency of the intermediary
maintaining the account. In other words, the above categories do not address
the proprietary aspects of securities holdings, which are usually governed
under private international law by the so-called lex rei sitae rule11, which
refers to the law of the place where the relevant assets are located.12
e) The lex rei sitae (or “lex situs”) rule is relatively easy to apply in the case
of direct holdings (and related transactions) of bearer securities in paper
(“physical”) form, as these are indeed governed by the law of the place where
such paper certif icates are physically located or held, as is the case for any
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7 H. Van Houtte (ed.), The Law of Cross-border Securities Transactions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), No
1.07.
8 Van Houtte, op. cit., No 2.03-2.06 (by S. Weber); R. Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International
Finance (London: Butterworths, 1991), p. 168.
9 Van Houtte, op. cit., 4.22 –4.24; see also Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000
on insolvency proceedings, OJ No L160 of 30.06.2000, pp. 1-13, which states that “the effects of insolvency
proceedings on the rights and obligations of the parties to […] a f inancial market, shall be governed solely
by the law of the Member State applicable to that […] market”.
10 See V. Marquette and S. Hirsh, “Clearing: Quelques considérations sur la loi applicable”, Rev. droit bancaire
et f inancier (2001), pp. 237 ff, especially p. 240, No 8.
11 R. Van der Elst, “Conflit de lois”, RPDB, Complément, II (1966), No 70; N. Watté, “Questions de droit
international privé des sûretés”, in J. Barreau (ed.), Le Droit des sûretés (1992), No 66, p. 325.
12 On lex situs in English law, see Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2 (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2000), Chapter 22, pp. 917 ff.
other moveable asset.13 Under the same lex rei sitae rule, registered securities
are governed by the law of the place where the register, which constitutes the
rights of the holder, is located or maintained14, as such securities are
represented by entries on the register maintained by the issuer or its agent
(the so-called registrar).
f) Diff iculties started to emerge when securities became largely held through
intermediaries, which felt the need to dispense with physical paper certificates
or the requirement to generate entries in the issuer’s register every time
registered securities were transferred between their clients. Financial
intermediaries in every country decided to “immobilise” their securities with
a common agent (the CSD or any other central custodian) so that the only way
to exchange securities was by way of book-entry transfers between
themselves. This eliminated the need to physically move pieces of paper or
make entries in the register (through the use, where possible, of a nominee
of the CSD or of its aff iliates to hold on a pooled basis registered securities
on behalf of ultimate benef icial owners). In some systems, a new form of
securities – so-called dematerialised securities – was created. This last type
of securities is only represented by book-entries on accounts held with
authorised account-keepers in the books of a CSD in direct relation to the
issuer. Even just at the domestic level, this trend created a strong need for
legal protection of securities held in book-entry form. Certain key issues
distinct from the rules applied to the underlying securities as such needed to
be addressed, such as: what would happen in case of insolvency of the
CSD/central custodian with respect to the underlying paper certif icates held
in bearer form by the latter? What would happen in case of insolvency of the
custodian/account-keeper? The same also applied to collateral transactions
on such book-entry securities, since pledging of a securities account per se
may represent a more eff icient and adequate solution in view of the book-
entry character of the securities immobilised in this fashion, compared with
a physical delivery of securities to the pledgee or with special segregated
physical storage in the hands of a common agent.
g) The intervention of foreign market players also willing to offer to their own
customers the benefits of immobilising securities issued in different domestic
jurisdictions through book-entry holdings15 logically led intermediaries to
centralise in their own books, again in book-entry form, all the entitlements
of their clients with respect to the underlying securities already held at local
level in book-entry form on behalf of their clients. By doing so, intermediaries
were able to offer their customers a centralised pool of assets governed by
the same rules irrespective of where the underlying certif icates were
ultimately held or deposited. These securities could then be transferred or
pledged centrally without necessarily physically moving either the paper
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13 Van der Elst, op. cit., No 78; Dicey and Morris, op. cit., No 22-040.
14 Van Houtte, op. cit., No 1.10, p. 15; Dicey and Morris, op. cit., No 22-044.
15 On the immobilisation process and the emergence of multi-tiered securities holdings, see Dicey and Morris,
op. cit. No 22-042; R. Guynn and N. Marchand, “Transfer of Pledge of Securities Held through Depositories”
in The Law of Cross-border Securities Transactions, op. cit., p. 47; and J. Benjamin, Interests in Securities
(Oxford: OUP, 2000), No 1.78 et seq. 
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certif icate or the local book-entry corresponding to the holding (except for
deliveries with another local recipient). This is the so-called intermediated
or indirect holding system, which basically implies a chain of intermediaries
(registrar, CSD, CSD participants, custodians at various levels) between the
ultimate benef iciary and the issuer. It is also on this basis that links between
CSDs have been established, even though some features of such links may
differ from standard custody relationships and practices.
h) The protection of investors that own foreign securities held on such an
intermediated basis may vary, depending on the jurisdictions and the legal
regime organised for such indirect holding systems16 (e.g. ownership or co-
ownership in a pool composed of the securities of the same issue credited on
the books of the intermediary, which reflects the holding of underlying
securities held ultimately by the intermediary). Such an ownership right may
either be regarded as directly traceable to the underlying securities – as far
as the law of the intermediary is concerned – or only be enforceable against
the intermediary (as evidenced by the book-entries in its records) with,
however, enforceable recovery rights (including in case of insolvency of the
latter). In this last regime, the intermediary must have in turn the enforceable
right to obtain restitution in kind (for bearer certif icates, through physical
delivery; for registered securities, through the re-registration of the ultimate
owner in the issuer register; or for dematerialised securities, through their
transfer to another account keeper of the investor’s choice) of the underlying
securities for the benef it of the account holders up to the amount recorded
in their respective securities accounts.
i) In view of the intermediated/indirect holding structure as described in points
(f) to (h) above, it is crucial to make sure that when holding securities through
a chain of intermediaries, the law governing the custody relationship at each
level of the chain is also the only law applicable between the relevant
intermediary at that level in the chain and its respective account holder (or
between different account holders of the same intermediary), with respect to
the holding of book-entry securities as such and to their transfer, whether
outright or for collateral purposes, and not the law of the jurisdiction where
the underlying securities are primarily issued and deposited (nor the law of
another intermediary one level above or below the relevant level in the multi-
tiered custodial chain). This risk that a foreign court could decide to apply
not the law of the custodian, but instead the law of the place where the
underlying securities are deposited or registered to determine under which
conditions a transfer of ownership can be enforceable or a pledge be perfected
(i.e. made good against third parties) is known as the “look-through” approach
(so named because the Court would in this instance look through the book-
16 C. Bernasconi, R. Potok and G. Morton, “General Introduction: Legal Nature of Interests in Indirectly Held
Securities and Resulting Conflict of Law Analysis”, in R. Potok, Cross Border Collateral: Legal Risk and
Conflict of Laws” (London: Butterworths, 2002), No 2.38 et seq., p. 20.
17 Bernasconi, Potok and Morton, op. cit., No 2.68 and following with reference to the US Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
judicial case in footnote 80; see also R. Goode, “Security Entitlements as Collateral and the Conflict of Laws”
in The Oxford Colloquium on Collateral and Conflict of Laws (1998), special supplement to JIBFL, 1998, p. 22. 
entry intermediated holding to apply only the law of the place where the
underlying securities are physically located or, alternatively, the law of the
issuance).17 This approach probably constitutes one of the major legal risks
in the cross-border securities business, since it could potentially jeopardise
the legal certainty required for a securities account relationship with an SSS
or a custodian by disregarding the law of the custodian expected to be applied
by the parties, and on the basis of which they designed the account structure,
its rules and protection, in favour of another law that the account holder does
not know. This last solution can in practice only work properly if the end-
investor has its securities account directly opened with the issuer CSD in a
segregated position. It certainly will not work if the underlying securities are
held on a fungible pooled basis in the name of an intermediary by means of
an omnibus account representing the total amount of clients’ positions, or on
a nominee registration basis for registered securities in the books of the issuer
or of its registrar. In such a case, which is standard practice in almost all
indirect holding schemes, the law of the place of the underlying certif icates
will of course continue to govern the property aspects of the custody
relationship between the intermediary (holding for the account of its clients)
and its custodian at local level (the issuer CSD, another custodian, the registrar
or the issuer directly). However, it will not determine the rights of the clients
of such an intermediary that have no direct contractual or property rights on
the underlying securities. The property rights and related collateral rights of
clients holding through their intermediary will be determined by the law of
the place where their assets are “located”, which is the law of the jurisdiction
in which their rights in the securities are recorded on the accounts of their
intermediary, i.e. the law governing the book-entry securities held with such
an intermediary.18
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18 The right relating to book-entry securities held indirectly with an intermediary is generally called in Anglo-
Saxon terminology “interests in securities”. In the US it is also known as a “securities entitlement” (Article
8 of the Uniform Commercial Code), and in some EU legal instruments as “rights in securities” (see Article
9.2 of the SFD and Article 24 of the WUD (“other rights in such instruments”)). On this terminology, see J.
Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford: OUP, 2000), No 1.05 and 2.21 et seq.; J. Benjamin, “Conflicts of
Law and Interests in Securities”, in K. Tyson-Quah, Cross-border Securities: Repo, Lending and
Collateralisation (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), No 2.3 et seq., p. 16; J. Benjamin and M. Yates , The
Law of Global Custody, 2nd edition (London: Butterworths, 2002), No 2.17 and 5.30-5.31; in the context of
Belgian Royal Decree No 62 of 1967 relating to the book-entry circulation of securities and governing the
rights of participants in the Euroclear system, see L. De Ghenghi and B. Servaes, “Collateral Held in the
Euroclear System: A Legal Overview”, Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (March 1999),
pp. 85-87; B. Servaes, “Het immobiliseren van effecten: Het Belgisch juridisch kader”, in Nieuw vennootschap-
en financieel recht 1999 (Jan Ronse Instituut-KU Leuven), p. 513. This distinction between interest in securities
as evidenced by book-entries in the accounts of the intermediary and underlying securities has led to the creation
of ownership rights on assets (a pool of fungible book-entry securities) that are distinct from the underlying
certif icates. What is then transferred or pledged in the books of the relevant intermediary is not the underlying
securities but the co-ownership rights of the collateral provider in the pool of book-entry fungible securities
vis-à-vis the intermediary holding the securities account. Of course, “economically, and also for balance sheet,
taxation and regulatory purposes, [such an] asset is indistinguishable from the underlying certif icates”
(Benjamin and Yates, op. cit., No 5.30), on the basis of which corporate actions will be exercised vis-à-vis
the issuer (collection of interests and cash proceeds, redemption and exchange, put and call options, tax
withholding and reclaiming services, voting at a general assembly, etc.), either by the intermediary on behalf
of the investor, or directly by the latter, through different techniques depending on the features of the local
issuer market (proxy voting, registration in the name of the end-investor for the limited purposes of voting,
etc.). Similarly, when the client exercises its rights to restitution in kind for the securities (in the event of a
change to or insolvency of the intermediary), the underlying securities held locally will of course be returned
by way of physical delivery (shipment) for bearer paper certif icates, re-registration in the issuer records of
the registered securities in the name of the clients or of its new intermediary, or transfer of the dematerialised
securities to a new account keeper designated by the client owing the securities.
j) The application of the law of the book-entry securities held with such
intermediaries, which has been recommended for many years now by several
international f inancial market associations19, has already been recognised at
European level by Article 9.2 of the SFD in 1998, which governs collateral
transactions in the scope of designated systems.20 This is also the approach
chosen in Article 24 of the WUD in 200121, and is furthermore also the rule
defined by the Collateral Directive in 2002 (Article 9.1) regarding book-entry
securities collateral.22
k) The main purpose of the Hague Convention is to conf irm this solution at
international level and to make it more precise, without however preventing
investors and securities intermediaries from holding their securities directly
at local level under the law of the issuer or of the issuer CSD, if they still
prefer to do so. 
This paper provides below a rapid survey of the key features of the Hague
Convention, focusing on its main achievements in terms of scope, connecting
factors, collateral requirements and impact of insolvency (as opposed to detailed
comments on all the various provisions of the Convention, for which the reader
is referred to the comprehensive Explanatory Report of the Convention). As part
of the conclusions of this paper, this Convention is put into perspective with the
aim of demonstrating why the ESCB and the European Central Bank (ECB)
should, in our opinion, support this initiative. 
3 THE HAGUE CONVENTION: KEY FEATURES23
5. Scope- The Hague Convention is applicable to “securities held with an
intermediary” (see Article 1.1), which means:
– Securities in the broad sense (equities, bonds, etc.) including “any interest
therein”. This naturally also covers interests in securities (see footnote 18
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19 See in particular R. D. Guynn, “Modernising Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws” (1996), a
booklet published by the Capital Markets Forum (Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association.
See also the “2003 G-30 Recommendations on Global Clearing and Settlement (A Plan of Action)”, in particular
Recommendation 15 on legal certainty over rights to securities and collateral, p. 112. 
20 “Where securities (including rights in securities) are provided as collateral security to participants and/or central
banks of the Member States or the future European Central Bank as described in paragraph 1, and their right
(or that of any nominee, agent or third party acting on their behalf) with respect to the securities is legally
recorded on a register, account or centralised deposit system located in a Member State, the determination
of the rights of such entities as holders of collateral security in relation to those securities shall be governed
by the law of that Member State”; see also C. Keller, “Die EG-Richtlinie 98/26 vom 19.5.1998 über die
Wirksamkeit von Abrechnungen in Zahlungs- sowie Wertpapierliefer- und -abrechnungssystemen und ihre
Umsetzung in Deutschland” in Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, 26 (2000), pp. 1269 ff, which refers
to the concept of lex conto sitae (however, we do not share the restrictive view suggested by the author for
the application of Article 9.2 of the SFD; see p. 1274).
21 “The enforcement of proprietary rights in instruments, or other rights in such instruments the existence or
transfer of which presupposes their recording in a register, an account or a centralised deposit system held
or located in a Member State, shall be governed by the law of the Member State where the register, account
or centralised deposit system in which those rights are recorded, is held or located”.
22 “Any question with respect to any of the matters specified in paragraph 2 [property and collateral rights] arising
in relation to book-entry securities collateral shall be governed by the law of the country in which the relevant
account is maintained”, which is “in relation to book-entry securities collateral which is subject to a f inancial
collateral arrangement, the register or account – which may be maintained by the collateral taker – in which
the entries are made by which that book-entry securities collateral is provided to the collateral taker” (Article
2.1.g).
above), since the main objective of the Hague Convention is to protect
indirect holdings of securities through intermediaries. Cash holdings are
excluded as such from the scope of the Convention.
– Intermediaries in the broad sense, meaning any person whose business
is to maintain securities accounts for others. This refers to banks,
investment f irms, other securities intermediaries entitled to maintain
securities accounts under the law of the country in which they operate,
central banks, CSDs, etc., but not to pure registrars or transfer agents
(see Article 1.3 (a));
– Securities must be in book-entry form, which means securities credited
to a securities account with an intermediary. This is again a consequence
of the fact that the Hague Convention is designed to address primarily
indirect holdings of securities, although it can also protect direct
holdings systems as such (see Article 1.4 of the Convention: CSDs are
expressly regarded as intermediaries under the Convention, especially
at the request of the Scandinavian countries, which wanted to benef it
from the protection of the Convention with regard to their own domestic
securities held in book-entry form in the domestic CSD, even though
direct holding system/CSD accounts were generally regarded as
obviously governed by the law of the country where the underlying
domestic securities are issued and deposited with the local CSD). As an
exception, a contracting state under whose law registered (or even
dematerialised) securities are constituted may declare that the operator
of an SSS holding such securities directly (in such a way that its
securities accounts are assimilated to the issuer records and as such
directly constitute the primary record of entitlement as against the
issuer) should not be treated as an intermediary for the purposes of this
Convention (Article 1.5). Opt-out mechanisms have been proposed by
the UK and Irish delegations to avoid treating the CREST System, which
is operated by CREST Co in the UK not just for UK securities, but also
for Irish equities (and is designated as a separate “Irish” system for the
purposes of the SFD), as an intermediary under the Convention in
respect of those Irish-registered securities, as this could lead to the
application of  English law instead of Irish law. This would thus be
contrary to what is currently applied for the settlement of Irish securities
in CREST, as CREST does not have a qualifying off ice in Ireland which
could justify under the Convention the application of Irish laws to Irish
holdings entries. This opt-out mechanism could even apply to CREST
in respect of UK securities that it directly holds and for which CREST
books are assimilated to issuer records, even though here the reason for
not applying the Convention’s protective regime might appear less
immediate.
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23 See on the final text, R. Potok and C. Bernasconi,“ PRIMA Convention Brings Certainty to Cross-border Deals”,
IFLR (January 2003), p. 11; M. Germain and C. Kessedjian, “ La loi applicable à certains droits sur des titres
détenus auprès d’un intermédiaire: Le projet de convention de La Haye de décembre 2002”, Rev. crit. DIP
(2004), pp. 49 ff; K. Alexander, “The Development of a Uniform Choice of Law Rule for the Taking of
Collateral Interests in Securities”, JIBFL (2002), p. 436 and JIBFL (2003), p. 56; H de Vauplane and P. Bloch,
“Loi applicable et critères de localisation des titres multi-intermédiés dans la Convention de la Haye”, Mélanges
AEDBF-France, IV, p. 469, to be published.
6. The Convention is aimed at determining the applicable law that should govern
the following aspects relating to book-entry securities24, as def ined under
Article 2.1: 
– the legal nature of the rights of the account holder resulting from the 
book-entry holding (ownership, contractual claims25, etc.) and the effect
of such rights as against the intermediary and third parties;
– In case of a “disposition” of securities, meaning any transfer of book-entry
securities whether outright (a sale) or for securities purposes (transfer of
title, repo) as well as any granting of security interest (a pledge) on such
book-entry securities, including a lien by operation of law in favour of the
relevant intermediary to secure any claim in connection with the
maintenance of the securities account (see Article 1.2): 
– the perfection requirements or steps to make a disposition (as def ined
above) effective against third parties;
– priorities between conflicting interests (e.g. good faith protection in case
of multiple dispositions, but not the ranking between creditors’ claims
in case of insolvency, which is not affected by the rules of the
Convention pursuant to Article 8.2 (a); see below Section 12); 
– the duties of an intermediary to third parties in competition with the
account holder or with other persons in relation to the book-entry
securities (attachment proceedings, etc.);
– the realisation requirements to enforce the rights of the collateral taker
on the book-entry securities (sale of pledged assets, etc.);
– the extent to which a disposition of securities may include an entitlement
to cash proceeds relating to such securities (even though cash accounts
as such are not covered by the Convention).
7. The Convention shall not apply (see Article 2.3) to determine either the law
governing the pure contractual aspects of the custody relationship between
the intermediary and the account holder (duties of the intermediary, definition
of contractual services, liability, statute of limitation, etc.), or between the
parties to a disposition (contractual aspects of a pledge or of a repo
transaction, e.g. netting, currency, interests for late payment, etc.), which
continue to be governed by the lex contractus nor the law governing the rights
and duties of an issuer of securities (or of its registrar or transfer agent) –
see above, Section 4 a.
8. Determination of the applicable law. The main rule of the Hague Convention
is laid down in Article 4.1:
I. The law applicable to “proprietary” aspects (classif ied as “Article 2.1
issues”; see above Section 6 and also footnote 25) of book-entry securities
is the law expressly agreed between the relevant intermediary and the
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24 This applies when an international situation involving a possible choice between the laws of at least two different
States is involved (see Article 3).
25 The fact that the law as determined in accordance with the Convention would qualify the rights of the account
holder on book-entry securities as mere contractual claims, and not rights of ownership, does not prevent the
application of the Convention to what still constitutes “securities held with an intermediary” under the meaning
of the Convention: see Article 2.2 and the Explanatory Report, No 2-30 to 2-35. For the sake of simplif ication,
in the rest of this study the expression “proprietary (or “property”) aspects” is used to illustrate those issues
specif ied in Article 2.1.
account holder to govern the account agreement; in this case, the lex
contractus will govern the entirety of the custody relationship, both pure
contractual aspects and proprietary aspects linked to a securities account;
II. The relevant intermediary and the account holder may however agree
expressly in the account agreement that the proprietary aspects of the
holding and disposition of securities in book-entry form (“Article 2.1
issues”) will be governed by a different law than the law governing the
account agreement; in that case, the contractual aspects of the custody
relationship will be governed by the lex contractus, while the property
aspects will be governed by another law specif ically selected for that
purpose by the intermediary and its client;
III. The Convention does not permit property aspects to be split between
multiple laws in the same securities account: only one law must apply to
the entirety of the issues mentioned under Article 2.1;
IV. The choice of applicable law to property aspects under points I and II is
however only admitted under the Convention provided that the relevant
intermediary has at the time of the account agreement an office in the
state whose law is chosen, and that it is either:
a) engaged in a business of maintaining securities accounts by effecting
or monitoring securities entries, or by administering payments or
corporate actions in relation to book-entry securities, or is otherwise
considered as engaged in such a business (see Article 4.1 (a iii); see
below, point VI), or 
b) alternatively, is identified by a specific means of identification as
maintaining securities account in that state (through a bank code,
account number, etc.) (see Articles 4.1 (a and b)). 
V. The office in question under point IV must be a non-temporary place of
business of the intermediary itself (see Article 1.1 (j)): a branch obviously
qualifies in principle but not a subsidiary, as a subsidiary is a distinct legal
person, nor a representative office, which has no power to enter into account
agreements (see Article 4.2 (d)), but does not necessarily have to be the
entity with which the relevant securities account is in fact maintained. For
the purposes of the securities account business criteria defined under point
IV (a) above, the assessment can also take into account not only the office
in the state whose law is applicable but also other offices (e.g. branches)
of the relevant intermediary as well as the business of “other persons acting
for the relevant intermediary” (for example, service providers to which
securities account activities may have been outsourced) which, as far as the
latter are concerned, may or may not be acting in that state.
VI. Are not considered per se as evidence of a securities accounts business
in the state whose law is declared applicable (meaning that the following
elements are not sufficient to demonstrate per se a business of maintaining
securities account under the catch-all “otherwise” residual provision of
Article 4.1 (a iii); however, they may well further confirm the “securities
account business” test if taken together with other elements under Article
4.1 (a): see Explanatory report, No 4-32 and 4-40): 
– the location in that state of information technology (computer
processing) which supports bookkeeping for securities accounts;
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– the location of call centres for communication with account holders;
or
– the location of mailing, f iling or archiving centres.
9. The current debate on the Hague Convention. The main criterion of Article
4.1 for the determination of the law governing property aspects of book-entry
securities is currently at the centre of intense discussions at EU level, where
some voices have been raised urging Member States not to sign the Hague
Convention, at least not without a comprehensive prior impact analysis. This
is the view expressed by the European Banking Federation (EBF) in two letters
dated 29 June and 18 November 2004 that were circulated to Permanent
Representatives of Member States to the EU and to other banking federations.
The main argument underlying the EBF’s opposition is that the Hague
Convention, by departing from a pure lex rei sitae approach (the “application
of the law of the place where the securities account is maintained”) to favour
the law chosen by the parties to the account agreement, would introduce legal
risks and politically adverse effects. Supporters of this approach argue that the
authors of the Hague Convention did not consider the full implications of
moving from lex rex sitae to lex contractus, and that this would therefore justify
a prior impact analysis at EU level on numerous aspects such as the implications
for all parties in the securities chain, as well as for securities systems and
regulators, on the potential effect on tax regimes, money laundering and fraud
prevention, and on various other economic aspects, such as costs, tariffs and
risks. This is also now the advice expressed by the European Central Bank in
its recent Opinion of 17 March 200526 in relation to the possible signing of the
Hague Convention by the European Union (“the ECB Opinion”).
In the light of the above, it must be emphasised that during the negotiations
of the Hague Convention between 2000 and end-2002, there was actually right
from the outset a clear debate between the European approach, focusing on
the place where the account is maintained (as mentioned in some EU
Directives), and the US position (derived from Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code), which refers to the law governing the account agreement.
In the end, the latter was ultimately adopted in the f inal text of the Hague
Convention. However, this choice was finally supported by all representatives
including the EU Member States27 after thorough discussions that took place
during the whole negotiation process. The debate also benefited greatly from
the intensive involvement of the securities industry (including the EBF) as
well as from the participation of authorities, regulators, central banks,
academics and law practitioners. In the period between June and October
2002, the criterion of the law of the account agreement to govern property
aspects of book-entry securities was presented by the Hague Permanent
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26 ECB Opinion CON/2005/7 of 17 March 2005 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal
for a Council decision concerning the signing of the Hague Convention on the Law applicable to certain rights
in respect of securities held with an intermediary (OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 10).
27 A formal COREPER meeting was even held on 10 December 2002, three days before the f inal text was signed
by delegates, to conf irm the common position of EU Member States and the Commission in order to proceed
on the basis of the draft text on the table at the time, which already contained the debated article (No 4).
Bureau as a possible option (“Option A+”) during regional workshops
conducted with banking representatives around the world, particularly in
Europe (France, Germany and the UK). The topic therefore came as no
surprise at the end of the Convention negotiations, as it had been assessed
ex ante by all interested f inancial sectors, and was f inally adopted by the
Hague Convention as the main rule.
This paper submits28 that the Hague Convention represents a unique
opportunity to achieve in the near future the highest possible degree of legal
certainty on a worldwide basis for all intermediaries active in the securities
industry. This is because the Hague Convention:
a) Ensures the prevailing application of the law governing securities accounts
as agreed between an account holder and its intermediary over other possible
conflicting laws such as the law(s) of the place(s) where the underlying
physical certif icates may be located abroad, or the law(s) of the foreign
CSD(s) that primarily hold(s) the securities, or the law of the local
custodian(s) that hold(s) the securities on behalf of the relevant intermediary,
or the law of the place where IT processing takes place, and so on (see above,
Section 4). As a result, the holding, transferring and pledging of several
securities primarily issued and deposited in various issuers’ jurisdictions may
be centralised in one single account under one governing law with one
intermediary in a legally robust fashion (see also below, point d).
b) Complements the existing EU legal framework, since the EU solution was
either limited to collateral transactions in connection with payment and
settlement systems designated as such by Member States (Article 9.2 of the
1998 SFD), or applicable to f inancial intermediaries, but only for collateral
transactions (Article 9 of the 2002 Collateral Directive), or to a certain extent
applicable to securities holdings as such, although only in case of insolvency
of a credit institution (Article 24 of the 2001 WUD).
c) Provides a harmonised conflict of law regime which, in contrast to the above
EU current regime, is: 
– general (covering all aspects of book-entry securities: holding, outright
transfer, collateral), 
– universal (aiming at covering not only the EU but also the US, Japan,
Canada, Switzerland, China, emerging markets, etc.),
– truly uniform (since the EU solution could not be exported outside the EU’s
boundaries, as demonstrated by the preparatory work of the Hague
Convention), 
– of benefit to all securities intermediaries (and not just system operators
as in the SFD or just f inancial institutions as in the Collateral Directive),
and
– workable for all intermediaries in view of the legal and practical 
diff iculties to determine (even within the EU) what a securities account
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28 See the letter of the author dated 29 November 2004 to the EBF; see also the letter dated 26 November 2004
from the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference to Mr Schaub, Director General of the European
Commission (see Hague Conference website: http://www.hcch.net); see also the ISDA letter to the European
Commission, DG Internal Market, dated 26 July 2004.
really is29, and more fundamentally, where such an account may in fact be
“located”, especially for multi-branches custodians operating on a cross-
border basis through a large network that is decentralised or in which
services relating to securities accounts are outsourced (steps such as
opening a custody relationship, sending statements of account, IT
processing, accounts monitoring, operating call centres, processing
corporate actions instructions, etc., may indeed nowadays be each located
in a different jurisdiction).
d) Offers the ideal solution for intermediated indirect holding systems. This is
indeed the specif ic aim of the Hague Convention: a key objective of an
intermediary and its customers in using such a scheme is to have one law
governing the entirety of the various securities holdings recorded on the
securities account, irrespective of where the underlying papers may be located,
while still preserving latitude, for those intermediaries and clients willing to
do so, to continue to hold their securities directly with the issuer CSD(s) or
via a local branch of the intermediary under local “issuer law”(s) through
separate deposits.
In this respect, the criticism expressed in the EBF’s letters, or now in the new
ECB Opinion to the EU Council of 17 March 2005, does not seem convincing,
and should in no way justify the withdrawal of the support granted so far by the
EU to the Convention. To illustrate this30, this paper discusses below the
implications of the three main objections raised in the letters and in the ECB
Opinion:
– “The Hague convention would lead to “delocate” EU assets in favour of USA
by having the major US banks imposing New-York laws to EU custodians”
(EBF letter of 18 November 2004). This argument is hard to understand. To
take a practical case, assume a French bank has been requested by a US bank
to open an account recording French domestic securities under New York (NY)
law. There are only two possibilities: either the French bank does not have a
qualifying off ice (as def ined by the Hague Convention) in New York – in
which case NY laws cannot be selected under Hague rules, or there is such
an off ice, in which case – assuming the French bank f inally agrees to open
an account under NY law (or, to follow the logic of the critics, is forced to
for reasons of competition) – the French dematerialised securities will be then
held under the US regime, specif ically Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code31 (meaning under a securities entitlement representing co-ownership
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29 It is submitted that the debate on the “subjective criterion: law of the agreement” vs. “objective criterion:
location of the account” is in reality theoretical, since an “account” (including a securities account) is essentially
an agreement between the account holder and the intermediary to record in book-entry form assets (generally
in fungible form) held by the latter in the name of or on behalf of the former, and for this purpose to submit
the entitlement to such assets to a specif ic law that will govern the correlative rights of the account holder.
In fact, in our opinion, a securities account is nothing more than an account agreement which will in fact
create, subject to the conditions organised by the law governing the account agreement (which also may impose
specif ic duties on the intermediary in terms of accounting treatment, etc.), the rights and obligations of the
parties relating to the securities deposited with the intermediary.
30 This paper is not the place to comment on and answer every question or criticism raised in the above-mentioned
letters or Opinion; however, a specif ic discussion of such other arguments could take place in the near future
as part of the recent EU Council decision (June 2005) to launch a limited impact study on the Hague Securities
Convention.
31 By contrast, the actual underlying French dematerialised securities would of course continue to be held by
the French bank with Euroclear France as the CSD (or through another direct aff iliate of Euroclear France)
under the French law regime. 
rights in the pool of similar securities held by the US branch of the French
bank). The latter situation is what US banks can already require and obtain
from the NY branch of a French bank if they are more interested in indirect
holdings under US law than in direct holdings under French law. In any case,
this does not lead to any “relocation” of assets.
– “The Hague Convention may have tangential impacts on EU securities
settlement systems which will apply different laws to the securities held in
their systems”. Again, it is diff icult to understand how an EU SSS could ever
agree to maintain securities accounts governed by different laws (whether EU
ones or not) without totally jeopardising the fungibility of the securities held,
transferred and pledged in the system (as is also recognised in the above-
mentioned ECB Opinion: see paragraph 12). This would moreover directly
impact the reliability of the protection granted jointly to its participants in
case of insolvency of the operator, as well as the application of the SFD as
such (which requires one EU law to apply to the settlement and custody rules
of such a system). There are moreover additional constraints def ined in the
various regulatory standards that apply to such a system in terms of legal
soundness (i.e. the 2001 CPSS-IOSCO recommendations on securities
systems; the 2004 ESCB-CESR Standards; and the 1998 EMI/ESCB standards
for the use of securities systems for ESCB collateral transactions). The ECB
Opinion states however that “there could be no guarantee that” in fact an SSS
would only select one law (see paragraphs 11 and 12). In our view, the
guarantee is precisely the adverse consequences described above that would
derive from the application of multiple laws to securities holdings. In addition,
EU regulators may impose on SSSs specif ic limitations under the above-
mentioned regulatory standards to avoid such “abuse” (if at all conceivable)
as implicitly suggested in the ECB Opinion (see paragraph 10).
– “The Hague Convention is not transparent since third parties cannot know by
which law the account agreement – and as a result the securities recorded on
such an account – is governed” (see paragraph 14 of the ECB Opinion). The
transparency of securities holdings and pledging mechanisms is currently an
issue with regard to cross-border electronic securities; however, this difficulty
already exists for securities accounts held with any multi-branch intermediary
that operates on a cross-border basis, since third parties are not better equipped
to know where the account of their debtor is actually located or maintained or
by which law the recorded securities may be governed, especially as long as
there are still some uncertainties about applicable law (for example, third parties
today do not necessarily know whether their debtors are even in a custody
relationship with a particular intermediary, which often obliges them to initiate
attachment proceedings against multiple intermediaries simultaneously). From
the above perspective, the transparency of collateral arrangements has not
increased at the EU level with the elimination of any publicity requirements
for the constitution and perfection of collateral in the Collateral Directive.
However, public authorities and banks supported this simplif ication.
All in all, the new criterion introduced by Article 4.1 of the Hague Convention
to determine the law applicable to book-entry securities seems reasonable, and
avoids any future discussions or “second-guessing” by competent Courts on the
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reality of the “location of a securities account”, since the Courts will simply have
to apply the law of the account agreement (or any other law chosen to govern
proprietary aspects if this differs), provided that the relevant intermediary has
an off ice in the jurisdiction whose law has been selected. 
10. Fall-back rules, assuming there is no law chosen to govern the account
agreement or specif ically the property aspects of it, are organised in a
“cascade” system by Article 5 of the Hague Convention in favour of the
application of the law of the particular off ice through which the account
agreement was entered into (Article 5.1), or – failing this – by reference
to the law of the jurisdiction under whose law the relevant intermediary is
incorporated or otherwise organised (Article 5.2), or, in turn, by reference
to the law of the country where the intermediary has its principal place of
business at the time the account agreement is entered into (Article 5.3).
11. Another helpful achievement of the Hague Convention is the stipulation
in Article 6 of factors that are considered explicitly as irrelevant for the
purposes of determining the law applicable to book-entry securities (the
so-called black list of excluded connecting factors). These are:
– The place where the issuer is incorporated or organised, etc.;
– The location of underlying certif icates (no “look-through approach”;
see above Section 4 (i));
– The location of the issuer’s register;
– The location of any intermediary other than the ‘relevant’ one. 
12. In contrast to the EU legislative framework (the SFD, WUD and Collateral
Directive)32, the Hague Convention does not protect parties to the account
agreement, nor any interested third parties, against any negative
implications of applicable insolvency law on their respective rights as
determined by the Convention law. Foreign insolvency law which is
applicable to the insolvency of, say, the account holder or of its counterpart,
as collateral provider, may still prevent the non-insolvent counterpart from
directly enforcing its rights or from being preferred over other classes of
creditors (ranking of claims). Such insolvency law could also eventually
lead to the avoidance of previous securities transactions made to defraud
general creditors or during a certain “suspect” period before insolvency
(“voidable preferences”) (see Article 8.2). As a norm of private
international law, the Hague Convention is conf ined to the level of
determining the applicable substantive law in an international context
without regulating either this substantive law33 or the impact of applicable
insolvency law. However, Article 8.1 of the Convention explicitly confirms
the sole applicability of the “Convention law” (the law determined under
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32 On this EU regime, see D. Devos, “Collateral Transactions in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems: The
EU Framework”, op. cit.
33 The harmonisation of substantive securities laws will be the subject matter of the UNIDROIT draft Convention,
which was circulated in December 2004 to UNIDROIT Member States for negotiations in May 2005 and, at
EU level, of the work of the newly established working party of the Commission in charge of the Legal Certainty
Project (see the Communication of the European Commission on Clearing and Settlement of April 2004).
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the rules of the Convention) to govern the proprietary aspects of book-entry
securities for any event that occurred before the opening of that insolvency
to the exclusion of any diverging solution, in terms of any conflict of law
rule, which would derive from the applicable insolvency law.
13. The Convention also contains some provisions that aim at organising a
transitory regime for pre-Convention account agreements or interests, or
in case the law governing the account agreement changes. These rules may
be summarised as follows:
– For account agreements entered into before the entry into force of the
Hague Convention (see Article 16), the Courts may treat either the pre-
Convention account agreements that would have the effect through any
express terms (agreed law to govern the account agreement) that a
specif ic law governs some of the property aspects (“issues specif ied in
Article 2.1”), or those pre-Convention agreements that refer instead to
a jurisdiction in which “the account is maintained”, as validly governing
all proprietary aspects of the recorded book-entry securities under the
Convention regime (Article 4.1). In both of the above scenarios, this is
provided that the relevant intermediary had at the time of the pre-
Convention account agreement in question an office that qualified under
Article 4.1, second sentence (see above). 
– In case of conflicts between pre and post-Convention interests in book-
entry securities, it is the Convention law that will determine how the
conflict must be settled (see Article 15; for more details, see the
Explanatory Report, No 15-1).
– In case the law governing the account agreement changes (or the
proprietary aspects of it), according to the traditional solution, the new
law will as a rule immediately govern the proprietary aspects of the
account agreement, except for some events that remain governed by the
old law (see Article 7) and on which parties were legitimately entitled
to rely on (e.g. existence of an interest, priority between interests arisen,
the perfection of a disposition, made before the new law; the protection
of “pre-change” rights in case of attachment of securities; or of an
insolvency event occurring after the change in law). 
4 CONCLUSIONS
14. Until now, the variety of possible governing laws has led to considerable
legal uncertainty at international level regarding the determination of the
precise national law governing securities credited to an account with an
intermediary in a cross-border context. This legal uncertainty generates
in turn legal risks for both the securities industry and investors to the extent
that the law governing book-entry securities determines the protection
offered to the holder in case of insolvency of the intermediary, as well as
the formalities to be complied with to create, perfect and enforce collateral
arrangements on such securities.
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At the EU level, some Directives have been enacted since 1998 (e.g. the
SFD, WUD and Collateral Directive) which contain provisions in the f ield
of private international law. However, these new rules, even though they
have substantially increased the level of legal certainty at the EU level,
remain limited to the EU and do not address the rest of the world, or all
aspects of the securities holdings or even all market players. These
shortcomings are precisely what the Hague Convention seeks to address.
It is therefore not correct, in our view, to state that “the existing
Community regime is suff iciently satisfactory and does not require an
urgent or compelling signature of the Convention” (see paragraphs 15 and
20 of the ECB Opinion).
In view of the above, and in spite of the criticism that the Hague
Convention may attract (as is generally the case with any new legislation,
whether at national or at EU level), this paper strongly maintains that this
Convention should be supported by the ESCB and adopted by the EU
Member States as quickly as possible. Any major delay in the adoption
process at the EU level would simply put into question the existence of the
Convention itself by sending a message to the rest of the world that the
EU is now doubting its previous engagement. This is also an issue of
credibility, and would in turn discourage other countries from pursuing the
adoption process any further, leaving EU intermediaries without any
uniform global solution for the law applicable to EU securities holdings,
and maintaining the existing legal uncertainties on this crucial issue
concerning transactions with the rest of the world. In this respect, the
author certainly cannot support the view (see the ECB Opinion, paragraph
15) that a conflict of law rule, such as the Hague Convention,  cannot be
adopted before substantive laws have been harmonised, as promoted on a
worldwide basis by the UNIDROIT draft Convention, or at least at
Community level through the proposals that will emerge from the work of
the newly established Legal Certainty Group. Such harmonisation is indeed
still uncertain and, in any event, a matter of considerable work for many
years to come. In the meantime, there is an urgent need to achieve
harmonisation on this very basic f irst step in order to achieve legal
certainty and predictability for the securities business, which is the
determination of the applicable law to book-entry securities. If this key
issue is left uncertain, and if the parties to an account relationship can not
even rely on the law they agreed upon (whatever its weaknesses or
strengths), but are still exposed to the risk that another unexpected law
might be applicable, then the harmonisation of substantive laws (which is
not a synonym for full equivalence) is simply pointless.
As a collateral taker, the ESCB has a major interest in legal certainty with
regard to securities holdings and related collateral transactions, even
though the current features of its monetary policy transactions may be less
demanding in that most that are conducted by individual central banks are
still domestic asset-based. With respect to the ESCB cross-border use of
collateral, another central bank is used by the home national central bank
(NCB) as an intermediary directly holding local securities under local law
on behalf of the home central bank (the CCBM). The use by NCBs of
eligible links between eligible SSSs for monetary policy purposes is limited
(so far) to EU assets held with EU SSSs under the protection of the SFD
and Collateral Directive. 
However, for those central banks that use collateral schemes whereby they
reflect (in their own books, under their own collateral technique, and
governed by their own law) the corresponding interest in securities held
on their behalf in the “issuer SSS” either by the local NCB acting as the
CCB, or by their home “investor SSS” via links, the Hague Convention
might further enhance legal protection by conf irming the application of
the law governing the account in the home NCB’s books. 
Some SSSs in the EU may also have a less clear regime for the holding
(through links) of foreign securities in their own books under their own
law than for their domestic securities, in which case they are indeed
indirectly holding book-entry securities in a similar way to a custodian.
Here again, they may benef it from the legal certainty provided by the
Hague Convention, whether or not they hold EU or non-EU foreign
securities.
Finally, the ESCB, given that it is composed of central banks which oversee
EU systems and are concerned by systemic risk implications in a global
worldwide market economy, should also support any major initiative which
may reduce legal risks for its own f inancial intermediaries at the EU as
well as the international level when dealing with other non-EU
intermediaries. 
This is what the Hague Convention offers: a unique opportunity to adopt
at international level a uniform global rule for the determination of the law
governing book-entry securities accounts. This is in reality the f irst key
step in achieving legal certainty for securities holdings, before any further
harmonisation of substantive legislation.
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OPTIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña
ABSTRACT
Il contributo passa in rassegna gli strumenti di legislazione comunitaria che non
sono destinati ad armonizzare le legislazioni nazionali, ma a fornire un regime
giuridico opzionale in grado di essere utilizzato in tutta l’Unione Europea. Esso
descrive: (a) alcune fattispecie esistenti, quali la Società europea e la Società
cooperativa europea; (b) alcuni progetti in corso, quali la Società mutua europea
e i progetti per la normativa contrattuale europea; (c) alcune iniziative del
mercato attualmente esaminate a livello Comunitario, quali l’ipoteca europea
(Euromortgage), il Pan-European Trust Instrument, per la costituzione di fondi
fiduciari, e il Pan-European Direct Debit Scheme; (d) alcuni strumenti opzionali
creati dagli operatori del mercato finanziario e sostenuti dal SEBC, come STEP
(Short-Term Euro Paper) e EMA (European Master Agreement). Lo studio
comprende anche talune valutazioni critiche sulla tecnica in parola: viene
ricordato come una metodologia simile esistesse anche all’inizio del Mercato
comune nel contesto della libera circolazione delle merci, allorché i produttori,
desiderosi di evitare le barriere tecniche nazionali alla vendita pan-europea,
potevano scegliere di adottare le numerosissime specifiche comunitarie. Questa
prassi onerosa terminò con la sentenza “Cassis de Dijon”, che consentiva le
vendite pan-europee. Nel contributo si sostiene che, piuttosto che seguire la
strada del 26° regime, dovrebbe essere realizzata una giurisprudenza simile (che
al momento non esiste) per permettere la vendita pan-europea di prodotti
finanziari a seguito dell’autorizzazione dello Stato membro di origine. Viene
anche suggerito che le Società europee dovrebbero poter utilizzare i prodotti
finanziari pan-europei, invece di essere costrette a frammentare sul piano
nazionale le proprie attività finanziarie. Si rammenta, infine, che nulla
ostacolerebbe gruppi di Stati membri, ad esempio i paesi dell’area dell’euro,
che volessero agevolare l’integrazione dei rispettivi mercati, attraverso una
legislazione concertata che istituisca strumenti opzionali uniformi.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Beyond its primary objective of achieving and maintaining price stability, the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is legally bound by its secondary
objectives, as def ined in Article 105 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (“the Treaty”), to “support the general economic policies in the
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of
the Community”. One of these Community objectives1 is the establishment of
a common market, which, following the abolition and prohibition of internal
exchange controls in the early 1990s, encompasses the internal market for
f inancial services and markets.2 Monetary unif ication in 1999 removed the last
barriers for f inancial integration, namely exchange risk and trading under
different units of account. The construction of a common and integrated financial
market has been def ined by the European Council and by the Council of
Ministers on repeated occasions as a priority for Community action.3 As the
ESCB is an organisation created by the Law, it must act as determined in its
constitutive charter: all its actions that are compatible with its primary monetary
policy objective are legally bound to aim at fulf illing the secondary objectives
as well, of which f inancial integration is paramount. 
Disregarding legal reasoning, the achievement of an integrated f inancial market
is also in the interest of the Eurosystem: it is bound to carry out ‘single’ policies
in 12 (and soon more) f inancial market environments, in which the potential for
asymmetries and distortions is relatively high. The more integrated the f inancial
markets become, the more homogeneous the performance and the effects of the
Eurosystem’s single policies will be. 
At the end of 2004, the members of the Governing Council of the ECB elaborated
and adopted a “Eurosystem Mission Statement” that is consistent with the above.4
After recalling its primary objective, the Statement reads: “Acting also as a
leading financial authority, we aim to safeguard financial stability and promote
financial integration”.5
The Legal Committee of the ESCB has on numerous occasions dealt with matters
related to the integration of f inancial markets in Europe. From a legal
perspective, and given that f inancial services and markets are a highly regulated
area, the objective of achieving a single internal market for f inancial services
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1 See Article 2 of the Treaty. 
2 Capital movement restrictions within the European Community were abolished in Stage I of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) by way of secondary legislation, and at primary law level by the Maastricht Treaty.
See Articles 51 (2) and 56 (1) of the Treaty. 
3 For example, the European Council, Cologne, June 1999 stated that it “considers rapid progress in this [single
market for financial services] area to be essential”. Other examples include: the European Council, Lisbon,
March 2000: “It is essential to exploit the potential of the euro to push forward the integration of EU financial
markets”; the European Council, Stockholm, March 2001: “Rapid implementation of the Financial Services
Action Plan is of the utmost importance” (this summit approved the Wise Men’s Report (the “Lamfalussy
methodology”)). The European Council, Barcelona, March 2002, similarly stated that it “reaffirms its strong
commitment to achieving fully integrated securities and risk capital markets by 2003 and financial services
markets by 2005”. 
4 Available at www.ecb.int
5 Author’s emphasis.
is a challenging one. It encompasses technical complexity as well as policy and
political issues. At the political level, the overall aim of integrating f inancial
markets, which has been repeatedly and clearly stated by the supreme
Community bodies, seems to be contradicted at lower levels by the staunch
protection extended by the authorities of the Member States to their national
f inancial centres. 
The approach followed to create a single internal market for f inancial services
has relied on the traditional Community method: minimal harmonisation by way
of Directives. And indeed, this is what existed at the start of Monetary Union:
minimal harmonisation, and a whole array of differing rules in the Member
States, whereby host countries have sometimes generously used the “general
good” concept to protect their own local markets.6
The establishment of eight regulatory or advisory committees7 (also known as
the “comitology” procedure) covering all sectors of f inancial services, following
the methodology recommended by the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation
of European Securities Markets8, is a heavy-handed and burdensome mechanism
when it comes to catering for the needs of today’s f inancial services. The
legislative process is still slow and the success of such a methodology remains
to be seen. The Community institutions are considering their strategy for the next
decade, and should ensure an intelligent implementation of the Lamfalussy
comitology procedure. While a sectoral comitology structure may satisfy the
technical expertise needed to regulate f inancial services, three aspects need to
be considered: (i) the inbuilt conflict of interest owing to the national
composition of these committees, leading to the need for compromise solutions;
(ii) the enhancement of diversity as a result of the maintenance of the instrument
of Directives rather than Regulations9; and (iii) the tendency to keep ‘Level 1’
legislation extremely detailed, rather than limit it to framework principles. The
maintenance of generic “general good” exceptions to the free provision of
f inancial services, plus an even greater application of the subsidiarity principle,
does not seem to be the most eff icient model for achieving market integration. 
This article does not dwell on legal harmonisation, which is the task of the
comitology procedure described above. Nor does it advocate maximum, rather
than minimum, harmonisation. Instead, it points to a different methodology
aimed at facilitating f inancial integration via the creation of pan-European
regimes which are non-mandatory for market participants. It proposes that the
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6 “General good” rules, as an exception to the general principle of free provision of services, should be used
restrictively by Member States; any use with the disguised aim of protecting local markets would qualify as
being incompatible with the Treaty. 
7 The Financial Services Committee (FSC), European Banking Committee (EBC), Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC), European Securities
Committee (ESC), Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), and European Financial
Conglomerates Committee (EFCC). 
8 Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Brussels, 
15 February 2001. The procedure was initially limited to just the securities markets.
9 Directives entail national implementation, which produces diversity in the detail; Regulations do not require
national implementation, and thus preserves equal rules throughout the EU. 
Community institutions should provide market participants with the option of
using f inancial instruments that benef it from a “European passport”, i.e. ones
that can be used equally throughout all 25 Member States, if necessary by way
of a Community legal act or with the support of Community bodies. Such
instruments would not need the prior harmonisation of national laws, but would
instead represent an additional option on top of the financial instruments already
covered by national legislation. Participants in f inancial markets, i.e. investors,
lenders, borrowers, issuers, etc., could choose to use such instruments throughout
the 25 Member States, in parallel to their right to keep using the nationally
regulated f inancial instruments. This methodology has sometimes been named
a “26th regime”10.  
2 OPTIONAL INSTRUMENTS CREATED BY COMMUNITY LAW
2.1 THE EUROPEAN COMPANY
Thirty-one years after it was f irst conceived11, the European Company Statute12
(SE) was f inally adopted on 8 October 2001, and entered into force in October
2004. In its Preamble, the SE states that it aims at facilitating the incorporation
and management of companies with a European dimension without the
impediments of having to deal with differences in national company law. 
The incorporation of a European company is optional. National companies with
pan-European activities may continue to be incorporated under national law, but
Regulation 2157/2001 provides for the right, when its conditions are fulf illed,
for the company’s shareholders to convert the company into a European company.
In the case of a new company, the Regulation permits its founder members the
option – but without any obligation – to adopt the SE or to incorporate under
national law. 
Moreover, the solution provided by Regulation 2157/2001 to the old debate as
to whether a European company should have a two-tier or a one-tier board
system, which paralysed the adoption of the Regulation for many years, is to
offer greater freedom to its shareholders. It is the shareholders, and not the
Member States, that can decide in favour of either of the two models. The
preservation of employees’ rights is ensured by the accompanying Council
Directive13, which regulates employee involvement in company affairs. 
Because of the rights of establishment and the freedom to provide services, any
company incorporated in a Member State may in principle trade throughout all
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10 Meaning a regime that is different to the regimes of the 25 Member States, optional to them and applying
throughout the EU. 
11 The f irst proposal of the Commission for a Regulation on the Statute of a European Company dates back to
1970. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE) 
(OJ L 294,10.11.2001, p. 1). 
13 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with
regard to the involvement of employees (OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 22).
25 Member States. Therefore, the benef it of having a European company is
relatively limited. Its greatest advantage is the legal capacity to transfer the seat
of the company anywhere in the European Union (EU) without changing its
statute or affecting its legal personality, capacity and ongoing activities. This
benef it will however be extended to nationally chartered companies once the
draft 14th Company Law Directive on the Transfer of Seat is adopted and
implemented. 
The initial design of the European company as an optional instrument for
business participants with pan-European activities was indeed valuable.
However, the above objective has been only partially achieved, since Regulation
2157/2001 is not a comprehensive set of company law rules, and foresees14 that
whenever matters are not regulated in the Regulation itself, the loophole will
be f illed by the national company law of the registered seat of the European
company. Moreover, the Regulation contains a non-discrimination provision15,
whereby a European company is to be treated in exactly the same way as a public
limited liability company in each of the Member States. This means that, for
better or worse, a European company is also affected by national company law,
since it cannot be put into a position of advantage or disadvantage with regard
to national public companies. Thus, both the law of the seat and the law of each
of the Member States in which a European company performs its activities have
an influence on its corporate status. 
Regulation 2157/2001 is indeed an imperfect legal construction, the result of
compromise. It will take time to see how attractive the European company is, and
may perhaps lead to future reforms designed to improve the attractiveness and use
of this optional instrument. However, in the financial sector, a major multinational
banking group has recently announced its consolidation into an SE.16
2.2 THE EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE COMPANY
The initiative to set up an European Cooperative Society, which was f irst
suggested by the European Parliament back in 198317, f inally succeeded in 2003,
when the Council adopted the Statute for a European Cooperative Society
(SCE).18 Its objective is identical to the aims of Regulation 2157/2001, and the
Preamble of Regulation 1435/2003 mirrors several paragraphs of Regulation
2157/2001. Its constituent membership needs to be “physical persons resident
in different Member States or legal entities established under the laws of different
Member States”; it also allows for the creation of a European cooperative society
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14 Article 9. 
15 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble and Article 10. 
16 Nordea, a f inancial conglomerate with banks in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland; insurance
companies in Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland; and asset management activities based in Sweden,
announced this at the High-level Conference held in Brussels on European Financial Integration: Progress &
Prospects, on 22-23 June 2004. Nordea is the result of a cross-border merger that took place in 2001 between
Merita Bank (Finland), Nordbanken (Sweden), Unibank (Denmark) and Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse
(Norway). 
17 OJ C 128, 16.5.1983, p. 51.
18 Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE)
(OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 1).
in order to merge branches or subsidiaries of a cooperative when these are
located in a Member State other than the state of their head off ice. The SCE has
as its principal objective “the satisfaction of its members’ needs and/or the
development of their economic and/or social activities”. 
Similar to the SE, an SCE is governed by the Council Regulation, by its by-laws,
by the laws of the Member States on cooperatives, and by the consequences of
an “equal treatment” rule19 that preserves a level playing-f ield between the SCE
and the national cooperatives. 
Cooperative banks represent a fairly sizeable percentage of the EU banking
sector. Thus, this optional instrument could potentially cater for the needs of
those cooperative banks whose business extends beyond national boundaries. 
3 OPTIONAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING CREATED BY
COMMUNITY LAW
3.1 THE EUROPEAN MUTUAL SOCIETY 
The European mutual society is a relatively old project20 which is conceptually
similar to the European Company Statute. It aims at providing an optional
instrument for the establishment of a mutual society with a multinational
membership that carries out cross-border business. Employees’ rights are
safeguarded and harmonised by way of a supplemental draft Directive on the
involvement of employees. 
A European mutual society requires a minimum membership of two persons,
either physical or legal, resident or with a seat in two or more Member States.
It may also be established by domestic pre-existing societies when there is a
relevant cross-border dimension in the business carried out by its members at
the time of its incorporation. The European mutual society has legal personality,
and the draft regulation provides for basic corporate rules. The draft regulation
does not affect compulsory social security schemes managed in some Member
States by provident mutual societies.  
The proposal had its f irst reading in the European Parliament in 199321, and was
overall supported. The insurance and pensions industry is currently urging the
Council and Parliament to go ahead with the proposal. However, building
societies, despite being mutual institutions that are active not only on the retail
(mostly mortgage-related) side but also on the money market, derivatives and
other wholesale markets, are unlikely to see any advantage in the European
mutual society until pan-European (mortgage) products may be marketed.
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19 Articles 8 (2) and 9 of the Regulation. 
20 The Commission proposal dates from 18 December 1991 (COM (91) 273/5 and 273/6 f inal (OJ C 99,
21.04.1992, pp. 40 and 57)).  
21 OJ C 42, 15.02.1993, pp. 114 and 120.
Nevertheless, the existence of this optional instrument may serve as a way round
the current barrier of different mutual company laws in the Member States,
which hampers the entrance of foreign companies to national markets. 
3.2 EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
The harmonisation of contract law in Europe has been the subject of extensive
analysis and valuable investigation by several groups of academics.22 In 1989
and in 1994 the European Parliament adopted two resolutions23 calling for the
Commission to start work on a European code of private law. Following this,
in 2001 the Commission submitted for public consultation a Communication on
European Contract Law24, in which several options were offered to deal with
diversity in national contract law. In 2003 the Commission issued an “Action
Plan” on “More Coherent European Contract Law”25, which was discussed in a
joint Conference of the Commission and the European Parliament, together with
representatives of so-called stakeholders of EU contract law.26 Finally, in 2004
the Commission outlined in a Communication27 the details of its plan to offer
an optional contract law instrument to market participants.
The proposed Action Plan abandons the idea of full harmonisation of contract
law and, among other actions, recommends the preparation and adoption of an
“optional instrument, which would provide parties to a contract with a modern
body of rules particularly adapted to cross-border contracts in the internal
market”. It aims to “facilitate considerably the cross-border exchange of goods
and services”, enabling parties to refer to this instrument instead of “insisting
on the necessity to apply one party’s national law”. Such an optional instrument
would be embedded either “in a regulation or a recommendation, which would
exist with, rather than instead of, national contract laws”. It would widen the
parties’ contractual freedom, so that “they would only choose the new instrument
if it suited their economic or legal needs better than the national law which would
have been determined by private international law rules as the law applicable
to the contract.”28
With regard to the diff icult issue of coexistence of the optional instrument with
mandatory rules, for instance those on consumer protection, the Commission’s
proposal seems to point to including the necessary mandatory provisions within
the optional instrument, thereby avoiding the current diversity of national laws
in this regard. However, the Communication cautiously states that this is a matter
for further reflection. 
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22 See the material and bibliography included in A. Hartkamp et al., “Towards a European Civil Code” (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998); J. Basedow, “A Common Contract Law for a Common Market”, CML
Rev. (1996), p. 1196; J. Basedow, Quel droit privé pour l’Europe (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003); L’harmonisation
du droit des contrats en Europe, Colloque, sous la direction de C. Jamin and D. Mazeaud, Economica (2001);
or W. van Gerven, “Harmonisation of Private Law: Do We Need It?”, CML Rev. (2004), p. 505, etc. 
23 OJ C 158, 26.6.1989, p. 400; OJ C205, 25.7.1994, p. 518.
24 OJ C 255, 13.9.2001, p. 1.
25 OJ C 63, 15.3.2003, p. 1. 
26 EU institutions, Member States, the ESCB, f inancial services, consumer organisations, industry, and the legal
professions.
27 “Droit européen des contrats et révision de l’acquis: la voie à suivre”, COM (2004) 651 f inal, 11.10.2004. 
28 Paragraphs 90, 91 and 92 of the Commission’s Communication.
The elaboration of the optional instrument will f irst require a prior step, namely
the def inition of a ‘common frame of reference’, with the initial aim of helping
the EU institutions to achieve consistency when legislating on contractual issues,
as well as of becoming “a point of reference by national legislatures inside the
EU”, in order to “diminish divergences between contract laws in the EU”.29
The Commission has recognised the complexity and importance of this project
by pointing to a horizon of 2009 as the target date for the adoption of this
optional instrument.30
4 SOME MARKET PROPOSALS FOR COMMUNITY ACTION TO CREATE OPTIONAL
INSTRUMENTS
4.1 THE “EUROMORTGAGE” AND THE PAN-EUROPEAN TRUST INSTRUMENT
In March 2003 the Commission set up the Forum Group on Mortgage Credit
(FGMC), an industry advisory group with a mandate to identify and assess
barriers to the integration of this part of the f inancial industry and to make
recommendations to abolish such barriers. On 13 December 2004, the FGMC
published its f irst report31, which constitutes a very valuable analytical piece in
the framing of further policy towards f inancial integration. It contains 48
recommendations that the Commission has committed itself to assessing and
translating into specif ic policy measures by the middle of 2005. 
For example, recommendation 38 announces that “The Commission should
explore the concept of the Euromortgage, for example by way of study, to assess
its potential to promote EU mortgage credit markets integration.” And
recommendation 39 states: “The Commission should encourage Member States
to increase the transferability of mortgages by introducing pan-European
Security Trust instruments.”
The “Euromortgage” is also an old concept.32 However, unlike past designs, the
FGMC report does not aim at harmonising national mortgage laws, but rather at
creating an optional instrument that will run in parallel with national mortgages.
Its introduction would require changes in national legislation, in order to create
the option for borrowers either to mortgage their real estate under national
mortgage law, or alternatively to use a pan-European mortgage that may serve as
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29 Ibid., paragraph 60. 
30 The time horizon for the adoption of the “common frame of reference” was announced as 2007. 
31 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/f inservices-retail/home-loans/index_en.htm 
32 The Commission had already prepared a report (the “Segré Report”) back in 1966 which advocated the
harmonisation of national laws on mortgage and mortgage-backed securities. In 1984 the Commission submitted
a proposal for a Directive on the freedom of establishment and the free supply of services in the f ield of
mortgage credit; however, this did not f inally see the light of day (COM (84) 730 f inal; OJ C 42, 14.2.1985,
p. 4). In 1987 the Union du Notariat Latin elaborated and submitted to the Commission a draft uniform law
regulating the “eurohypothèque”. These initiatives are analysed in O. Stöcker, “L’Eurohypothèque”, Revue
Banque et Droit 49 (1996), or in H. G. Wehrens, “Reflections on a Euro-mortgage”, in A. Hartkamp et al.,
“Towards a European Civil Code” (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). More recently, in 1995 the
General Assembly of the European Mortgage Federation advocated the idea of developing an optional regime
in the f ield of consumer mortgage credit which would benef it from a ‘European passport’ (see J. L. Duplat,
Rev. Droit Bancaire 1 (1996), p. 99). 
collateral for credit obtained either at home or from foreign lenders, or to cover
the issuance of asset-backed securities that may be marketed on a cross-border
basis. To achieve this objective, the FGMC report suggests the use of either
Directives or Regulations, with the aim of allowing a similar optional f inancial
instrument in all Member States, the so-called Euromortgage, the character of
which is outlined in paragraph 117 and Annex VI of the FGMC report. 
The pan-European Trust Instrument is defined as a legal construction that allows
“a single bank to hold mortgage collateral on trust for all the banks participating
in the credit agreement”. The idea behind this is that the Common Law concept
of “trust” should be made optionally available in all 25 Member States for the
specif ic purposes of the mortgage credit market, so that a single mortgage (or
a plurality of mortgages in favour of one bank) may be f inanced by a syndicate
of lenders on a cross-border basis, and mortgage-backed loans can be traded on
a cross-border basis. Although the FGMC report does not specify how this could
be achieved, the establishment of such optional instruments would clearly require
Community legislation.
4.2 INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PRODUCTS
The Commission set up four expert groups33 in October 2003 to assess the state
of f inancial integration following the almost completed adoption of the
legislative measures foreseen in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP).34
In June 2004, the Commission organised a high-level conference35 on “European
Financial Integration: Progress and Prospects” to discuss inter alia the
assessment report of each of the four expert groups. The four reports36 are
extremely interesting and provide an array of ideas on how to advance f inancial
integration; this paper refers below to only one of these, the report of the Expert
Group on Insurance and Pensions. 
Following an explanation of the very “disparate nature of the barriers” to the
cross-border sale of insurance and pension products, and the extremely marginal
amount that such sales represent, the Report of the Expert Group on Insurance
and Pensions inter alia recommended:
– studying the development of a 26th regime;
– encouraging business to develop pan-European products; and
– adopting the statutes for a European mutual society.
The reference to a 26th regime is explained in the Report as an “optional EU
regime governing essential parameters” of insurance and pension products, in
order to “facilitate the marketing of pan-European products on an EU scale.”
The development of pan-European products is also explained in the Report:
“Given the wide diversity of new national rules in the pensions area, some feel
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33 On Banking, Asset Management, Securities Trading & Investment, and Insurance. 
34 COM (99) 232 of 11.05.1999.
35 Palais d’Egmont, Brussels, 23-24 June 2004. 
36 The four reports are available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/f inances/actionplan/
stocktaking.htm 
that the evolution of a pan-European pension product based on a 26th regime
was the only viable way forward in the short term.”
Finally, the last indent refers to the European mutual society statute, as
mentioned earlier in this paper. The Report limits itself to stating that “the
statutes for a European mutual society should be f inally adopted.”
4.3 THE PAN-EUROPEAN DIRECT DEBIT SCHEME
The European Payments Council (EPC) is an industry body that was established
by the three main European banking associations37 at the start of the twenty-first
century to represent the payment systems industry and to interface with the
central bank community and with EU legislators. In September 2002 the EPC
decided to launch a project with the aim of devising a harmonised scheme for
direct debit, namely an instrument that allows instructions by clients to debit
their bank accounts to be implemented on a cross-border basis. On June 2004,
the EPC adopted a Resolution with the parameters of the Pan-European Direct
Debit (PEDD) scheme, and which reads: “it appears unrealistic to harmonise
the numerous and very different existing national schemes in order to enable
customers and banks to effect in the same way euro direct debit transactions
throughout the Single Payments Area; […] a new instrument can coexist in
parallel with unchanged national schemes during a transitional period and is the
fastest way to launch the implementation of the PEDD; […] the new instrument
is to process both cross-border and national direct debit transactions”. The
resolution also contains the parameters of the PEDD, including the criterion that
“the migration of payment flows [from national schemes to the PEDD] will be
market-driven.”  
The PEDD project is an example of a 26th regime, a market-driven, harmonised
scenario. The EPC resolution indeed acknowledges that “the full implementation
of the PEDD scheme” will require “the removal of all national and EU legal and
regulatory barriers.”
5 OPTIONAL INSTRUMENTS CREATED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS AND
SUPPORTED BY THE ESCB
5.1 THE SHORT-TERM EURO MONEY MARKET PAPER (STEP) INITIATIVE
The initiative to create an optional instrument for short-term euro money market
paper (STEP) came from the financial market itself38, in view of the heterogeneous
standards and practices currently prevailing in the fragmented and asymmetric
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37 European Banking Federation, European Savings Banks Group and European Association of Cooperative Banks.
See EPC documents on its website: www.europeanpaymentscouncil.org 
38 The Association Cambiste Internationale (ACI) – The Financial Markets Association (FMA). The European
Financial Markets Lawyers Group (EFMLG), a group of lawyers from the EU banking sector working on the
harmonisation of market practices in Europe, assisted the ACI-FMA in the implementation of this project. A public
consultation by these market groups was responded to by many market participants. The Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) and the EU Commission also attended some of the organising meetings as observers. 
short-term money market paper, and with the aim of fostering its development in
those Member States where such a market is either marginal or non-existent. The
legal vehicle to establish this optional instrument is through a market convention
that market participants have to adhere to in order to benefit from the STEP label.
This convention standardises the eligibility conditions for short-term securities
to obtain the STEP label, the eligibility of issuers to issue under that label, the
minimum amounts of the papers, and the disclosure of information and the format
of the documentation. It also sets the rules for the electronic settlement of
instruments issued in book-entry form under the programme, establishes the
provision of data to the ESCB for the production and publication of statistics, and
regulates a STEP Market Committee with the capacity to grant the STEP label
to those issuance programmes that comply with the market convention. The STEP
label does not refer to the f inancial soundness or creditworthiness of the issuer,
or to the liquidity of the assets, or the accuracy, completeness or truthfulness of
information provided in the STEP information memorandum.
The ESCB’s support of this market initiative became apparent in the Governing
Council decision of 22 July 2004, according to which the ESCB would assume
a clearly defined limited role consisting of the collection and publication of yield
indices and of statistical data on market activity, as well as the provision of some
technical assistance to the STEP Market Committee. This support was requested
by numerous banks, issuers and trade associations in view of the neutrality, pan-
European capacity and independence of the ESCB. 
All of the features foreseen in the market convention aim at avoiding a situation
whereby the STEP instruments are covered by the requirements of the Prospectus
Directive. This part of mandatory law is thus not applicable. However, the limits
of market action are shown by the fact that other existing national rules,
including regulatory and/or supervisory regimes, with regard to short-term
securities will continue to apply. The optional instrument is therefore subject
to marginal national legal differences. 
5.2 THE EUROPEAN MASTER AGREEMENT 
At the start of Economic and Monetary Union in January 1999, one of the
barriers to the successful integration of the secured euro money market and of
the (re-denominated into euro) bond markets was the absence of one single
common market documentation. No less than 15 market standard agreements39
were in use in those markets, implying considerable diversity in the legal
background of trades conducted with the same single currency, with risks linked
to discrepancies between different agreements applying to connected
transactions. 
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39 PSA/ISMA GMRA 1995, Italian Annex to GMRA 1995, Netherlands Annex to GMRA 1995, TBMA/ISMA
GMRA 2000, Italian Annex to GMRA 2000, Netherlands Annex to GMRA 2000, PSA/ISMA 1995 Supplemental
Terms and Conditions for Belgium, Rahmenvertrag für echte Pensionsgeschäfte 1997, Rahmenvertrag für
Wertpapierpensionsgeschäfte 2002, Convention-cadre relative aux operations de pension livrée,
Convention-cadre relative aux operations de marché à terme, Acuerdo-marco para operaciones financieras,
AEB, ISDA Master Agreement 1987, ISDA Master Agreement 1992, ISDA Master Agreement 2002. In addition,
for central banking market operations, each national central bank had its own terms and conditions (within
the “minimum common features” established by the Governing Council of the ESCB in 1998).
For this reason, the three main European banking industry associations40 prepared
an optional instrument for use by wholesale market players in both domestic and
cross-border trades, named the European Master Agreement for Financial
Transactions (EMA), which was launched on 17 July 2001.41 The 2001 version
was enhanced on 29 January 2004 with the addition of a “Product Annex for
Derivative Transactions”. 
The EMA entails a single legal regime for a wide variety of wholesale
transactions.42 It is therefore an alternative to not only the different national
standards, but also the several ‘international’ master agreements that are product-
specific.43 It is a multi-product agreement which allows for cross-product netting. 
This single legal regime is also multi-jurisdictional. Before launching the EMA,
the sponsor organisations obtained legal opinions to ensure the validity and
enforceability of the EMA in most EU Member States and in Switzerland. Thus,
and in contrast with the “international” master agreements which are actually
subject to either English or New York law and jurisdiction, the EMA may be
subject to the law and the jurisdiction44 of many European States, including all
euro area Member States. For this reason, the EMA is available in many
European languages. The implementation of Directive 2002/47/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on f inancial collateral
arrangements45 should ensure the validity and enforceability of the EMA in all
25 Member States. 
The use of the EMA by market participants operating in several EU jurisdictions
provides another advantage: a single EMA executed by the head off ice would
cover the transactions undertaken by its branches. Until now, branches located
in different Member States have had to use the local standard documentation,
with the result that a single legal person would need several market standards
to document as many agreements as the jurisdictions where it operates by way
of branches. The EMA, on the other hand, is a multi-branch agreement and
economises in this respect, providing a consistency that beforehand did not exist.
However, the EMA does not go so far as to cover in a single agreement the trades
of subsidiaries, as it does not permit cross-aff iliate netting. 
The ESCB began to support this market initiative in 2001 when the Governing
Council decided that the ECB would use this optional instrument for all its repo
operations with its EU and Swiss foreign reserves and own funds counterparties.
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40 European Banking Federation, European Savings Bank Group and European Association of Co-operative Banks. 
41 Available on the website of the sponsoring organisation, at www.fbe.be 
42 Repurchase (“repo”) transactions, securities loans, currency swaps, foreign exchange spot transactions, forward
transactions, put and call options on f inancial assets and on commodities, interest rate swaps, cap, floor and
“collar” transactions, and combinations and variants of these. 
43 TBMA/ISMA Global Master Repurchase Agreement, ISDA Multi-currency Cross-border Master Agreement,
the Overseas Securities Lending Agreement, Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, TBMA Cross-
product Master Agreement and ISDA Cross-bridge Agreement.  
44 Contrary to other pre-existing master agreements, the EMA contemplates the possibility for arbitration, and
while allowing full freedom to the parties to organise such arbitration, it foresees two arbitration institutions,
the European Centre for Financial Dispute Resolution and the International Chamber of Commerce. Speeded-
up procedures, technical expertise and confidentiality are strong arguments in favour of the arbitration option. 
45 OJ L 168,  27.6.2002, p. 43. 
The Governing Council decided in March 2005 to also use the EMA for the
ECB’s derivative operations in 14 EU jurisdictions and in Switzerland. The
changeover from existing master agreements to the EMA was swiftly carried out.
The ECB continues to use pre-existing standard documentation with
counterparties located outside the EU and Switzerland. 
With regard to other ESCB members, as of June 2005, the central banks of
Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and Malta have also decided to use  the EMA,
while the other EU central banks are considering the use of this optional
instrument. According to sponsoring organisation sources, the two f inancial
markets in which the EMA is most extensively used are those of Germany and
France. 
6 CRITICAL REMARKS
6.1 GENERAL COMMENT
This article has focused on an approach to f inancial integration that avoids or
bypasses the need for legal harmonisation. By introducing optional pan-
European vehicles and products, f inancial trades may indeed overcome some
national barriers through the use of legal vehicles that have a pan-European
‘passport’; by these means, market players may foresee economies of scale
commensurate with the new dimension of EU f inancial markets. The approach
is indeed neither ‘hard’ law harmonisation (in the sense that national legal
diversity persists) nor ‘soft’ law (in the sense that once market participants
decide to use it, it becomes legally effective and binding). In this it resembles
the American example of the Uniform Commercial Code, a set of uniform rules
that both contractual parties in their contracts, and State legislators in their law-
making, may choose to adopt or follow, but are otherwise not legally binding. 
This paper examines a model for market integration in the f inancial sector that
has until now received insufficient attention by European policymakers. Optional
instruments are however not new in the Community’s history. In the
establishment of a common market for goods, several legal acts in the 1960s and
1970s provided producers with the option either to follow national technical
requirements, or to adopt standards harmonised by Community legal acts.46 The
Court of Justice’s “Cassis de Dijon” judgement47 made redundant the extensive
practice of optional harmonisation: the mutual recognition of national standards
suff iced thenceforth for the free circulation of goods. As stated in the
Commission’s Communication following that landmark judgement: “Any product
lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State must, in principle, be
admitted to the market of any other Member State”.48
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46 See the section on “Optional harmonization” in P. J. Slot, “Harmonization”, EL Rev. (1996), p. 383, which
provides examples and a bibliography. 
47 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979], ECR, p. 649.  
48 Commission Communication concerning the consequences of the judgement of 20 February 1979 (‘Cassis de
Dijon’), OJ C 256, 3.10.1980, p. 2.
The achievement of a single market for financial services would similarly require
its own Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence to ensure that f inancial services lawfully
provided and marketed in one Member State are admitted to the market of any
other Member State. This would make the use of optional instruments redundant,
as it did for the free circulation of goods, and would require a profound revision
of the “general good” exception in the f inancial acquis, limiting its scope and
with a European control mechanism. It would also represent an enhancement,
beyond purely prudential supervision aspects, of the competences of the home
Member State vis-à-vis the host Member State, so that f inancial services and
products marketed in the company’s home state may also be marketed throughout
the EU. 
Although some jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has pointed in the direction
of the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence in the domain of f inancial services49,
f inancial products cannot so far be marketed throughout the Community, unlike
commodities. The recent Caixabank case50 does not go as far as the Cassis de
Dijon jurisprudence, although it questions whether the “general good” exception
used by France to justify its prohibition to foreign banks to market in France a
f inancial product marketed – in this case – by Caixabank in Spain is suff icient
to limit the freedom of establishment foreseen in the Treaty. It reaches the
conclusion that in this particular instance, this is not the case. In this sense, the
Caixabank judgement also represents a positive step forward and gives some
hope that the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence will spill over into the f inancial
services. 
Unless a similarly radical approach is followed to the one outlined above, it will
take many years before the EU can reach the promised land of an integrated
f inancial market by following either the path of legislative harmonisation
through the Lamfalussy methodology, or that of optional pan-European
instruments. Experience shows that Member States tend to see optional
instruments rather like Trojan horses, seeking to introduce harmonisation by
default.51 The resistance to the European Company and similar pan-European
vehicles, and the requirement that no discrimination provisions be included in
such vehicles, show that Member States are not ready to admit competition
between their national laws and pan-European standards. Member States seem
to prefer the diff icult path of approximation of laws, namely through the
comitology procedure, whereby they can influence the outcome, to competition
with a pan-European optional instrument. Market participants, on the other hand,
would wish to operate under maximum freedom, including the optional use of
instruments that have a pan-European reach. This article aims at least to submit
for renewed debate the potential use of pan-European optional instruments as
a tool for fostering f inancial integration.
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49 See comment on the ECJ Judgement of 25.7.1991 on Case C-76/90 Säger in L. Roeges, “L’exercice de l’activité
bancaire dans le domaine de la prestation des services” Rev. (belge) de Banque (1996), p. 303; and 
A. Gkoutzinis, “Free Movement of Services in the EC Treaty and the Law of Contractual Obligations Relating
to Bank and Financial Services”, CML Rev. (2004), p. 119. 
50 Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France v. Finance Ministry, judgement of 5 October 2004.
51 The expression is taken from W. Blair and R. Brent, “A Single European Law of Contract?”, European Business
Law Review 15 (2004), p. 20 (“Those who are opposed to a European code will carefully review these proposals
[the optional instrument], lest a Trojan horse is admitted by default”).
6.2 OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR PAN-EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
As already described in this article, Community law has provided or is about to
provide the option for pan-European vehicles (i.e. the European company, a
European cooperative society and a European mutual society). However, it remains
to be seen whether they will be successful in reality. So long as these European
vehicles need to operate under national rules, there seems little incentive for entities
to use them. A pan-European credit institution wishing to benefit from one of these
optional vehicles will f ind that it cannot offer the same financial products
throughout the Community, and nor will it be able to raise funds homogeneously
in its area of operation. Moreover, its deposit guarantee scheme will differ from
Member State to Member State.52 Pan-European vehicles currently need to adapt
their operations to the national rules of each jurisdiction in which they operate. 
This article submits that the option of using such entities would be promoted
if the Community enabled the use of pan-European instruments – for instance,
the possibility to use a Community-regulated single deposit guarantee scheme,
or to issue securities53, offer deposits, consumer loans, life insurance policies
or occupational pension products under a single framework. This would require
the Community to design and adopt additional optional instruments, which may
exist in parallel to national rules. 
6.3 THE INTEGRATION OF THE EURO AREA
Optional instruments do not necessarily need to be adopted by the Community.
A group of Member States seeking to facilitate the further integration of their
f inancial markets could coordinate the adoption of multi-jurisdictional optional
instruments by way of national rule-making, enabling these instruments to be
mutually recognised and operative within their markets. The start of the third
stage of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999 and the disappearance
of currency barriers for the integration of the f inancial markets of the
participating Member States has arguably entailed the emergence of a business
case with regard to optional rule-books that would facilitate the integration of
f inancial services within the single monetary area. The cross-border
consolidation of markets or of market infrastructures may be facilitated if
adequate legal vehicles are made available to concerned parties.54 Participating
Member States should have a policy to provide participants with the legal
instruments needed to achieve the economies of scale that Monetary Union
makes possible. This paper contends that the technique of optional instruments
– in addition to the more complex process of legal harmonisation in a community
of 25 Member States – may usefully contribute to this end.
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52 For instance, in the example of Nordea bank mentioned in footnote 16, one of the attractions of becoming a
European company does not and will not materialise unless amendments are introduced to the current
Community Directive governing the Deposit Guarantee Scheme for credit institutions that would allow for a
single regime irrespective of whether the  European company is operating in several jurisdictions.  
53 It may be recalled that pan-European official banks such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or the ECB need to operate under national legal systems when
they issue securities, and do not have a framework that enables them to operate under a single set of rules.
54 The business case for a single optional legal structure is supported by the existence of entities that functionally
operate on a cross-border basis but are subject to several national rules, such as the Euronext stock exchange
and the Euroclear and Clearstream securities settlement systems, etc.. 

EPILOGUE
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
This book has been written by a group of friends of Paolo Zamboni Garavelli
in memory of his human qualities and to honour his wide-ranging career as 
a central bank lawyer. I knew Paolo Zamboni Garavelli for many years, and
witnessed his personal and professional excellence. Therefore I am pleased to
be able to add my modest contribution to this book. 
The authors are all, or have all been, central bank lawyers, engaged collectively
in the preparation of the institutional and operational framework of the ESCB,
as well as in the many supplementary and subsequent tasks entrusted to the
Working Group of Legal Experts of the EMI (WGLE) and to the Legal
Committee of the ESCB (LEGCO). 
This book also commemorates 10 years of work of the WGLE and LEGCO and
their contribution to the legal framework for the introduction of the euro, as well
as to the general legal framework of the ESCB and the Eurosystem.
Central bank lawyers operate in an environment of economists. Their ‘client
units’ and decision-making bodies are the policy makers, normally professional
economists. Lawyers are therefore required to have a sound understanding of
economic processes and paradigms, in order to take into account the economic
effects of legal decisions. 
The relationship and interaction between law and economics is as old as the study
of economics as a distinct science. Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx,
to name but a few, addressed this relationship. Also on the lawyers’ side there
has been and still exists a systematic approach to the economic foundation or
effects of legal institutions, such as in the theory of Rudolph von Ihring on the
impact of private interests in the law, or the work of Max Weber on the effects
of law on sociology and collective behaviour, or in contemporary works of legal
philosophy by Professor Guido Calabresi of Yale University, or the US Supreme
Court Judge Antonin Scalia, both of Italian origin. Since the sixties this
relationship has been the subject of a whole area of academic research, with
Nobel Prize recognition in the cases of Friedrich Hayek, James Buchanan,
Ronald Coase, Gary Becker and Douglas North. It has many aspects. The school
of ‘economic analysis of the law’ initiated at the University of Chicago by
Professor Richard Posner, which, starting from the observation that the behaviour
of persons is determined by the legal system, suggests that the common law
approach reflects an ‘eff iciency logic’ whilst civil law systems serve other
objectives (such as fairness, reduction of uncertainties, etc.); the school of
‘public choice’, which analyses how private interests operate in the public law
domain and have an impact on law-making, as well as the role of the public
sector in correcting the effect of market forces; the ‘game theory’, studying the
effect of rules on interaction between people, based on the fact that one person’s
choices depend on what other persons choose and vice versa; the ‘institutionalist’
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school, focusing on the impact of institutions in the economy; etc. These many
facets of the relationship between law and economics show that ‘reductionism’
of the issue into a ‘form versus substance’ relationship, the former being 
the law and the latter the economy, is inaccurate. Both interact and are
interdependent, and lawyers as well as economists, despite their different
backgrounds, need to understand this interdependence.
The work of central bank lawyers is of enormous relevance in this context.
Central banks are core institutions of the f inancial system and therefore of the
economy. Satisfying the ‘institutionalist’ theory, the setting-up of the ESCB itself
has had an important impact on the European economic scene and on the
behaviour of economic operators. The rules governing its operational framework
reflect ‘public choices’ that have an effect on markets. The advisory contribution
of central banks to rule-making in the Community and in the Member States has
indeed shaped future economic decisions. I encourage central bank lawyers to
deepen their sensitivity towards the economics of legal acts and decisions, as
bef its the role and responsibilities of central banking in modern societies.
Paolo Zamboni Garavelli was for a period of his professional life the Head of
a newly-created Off ice for the Law of the Economy in the Banca d’Italia. A
department composed of lawyers and economists, mandated precisely to analyse
the economics of draft national legislation in order to enhance the advisory
contribution of the Banca d’Italia to the law-making processes affecting the
Italian economy. Some important pieces of advice and proposals for legislation
came out of this department. It is both his due, and also f itting, that a group of
central bank lawyers, also immersed in this complex area of the relationship
between law and economics, have decided to honour his memory in the manner
that he would most appreciate: by a series of legal articles on the ESCB. 
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